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Explicitly and implicitly, planners make choices about values and use values to make choices. Values 
are presented as reasons to do and not to do in setti g goals and during participatory planning 
processes, cited in scholarly articles used as planning knowledge, and purposefully collected by 
surveys. Attention to values is generally focused on substantive and procedural dimensions, such as 
determining what peoples’ values are or deciding which values are relevant, in what circumstances, 
and at what point in planning processes. As well, planners may have a particular interest in 
understanding why people take particular positions on values, especially when values appear to 
conflict with values embedded in particular planning purposes and proposals.  
Most of such usage of “values” takes the meaning of values for granted. It begins with an 
assumption of shared understanding about what “values” are. This thesis takes a step backwards to 
explore whether or not this assumption is warranted by identifying what appear to be different and 
disconnected usages of the word “values”.  
The first part of the thesis considers the history of usage of the word “values” and objections to 
using values language before proposing a theory about diverse usage of values. This theory was 
developed using grounded theory methodology, an iterat v  method of constant comparison and 
contrast applied to thousands of examples of values usage. Examples were gathered from 
contemporary everyday usage and from a broad range of scholarly material dating back to the late 
1800s. These examples included but were not limited to examples from planning. Conclusions 
reached in the study of values are then used as a bis for developing three propositions that are 
applied to planning: (1) Calling something “a value”, instead of a belief, principle, attitude and so 
on, can make a difference; (2) Particular usages of “values”, no matter how diverse, are 
expressions of a concept of values in general; nd (3) A questioning attitude should be attached 
to all values usage by default. For values to be a useful planning tool, the propositions should have 
explanatory value and create new opportunities for analysis and understanding of values usage in 
planning.  
That there are multiple ways of using “values” suggests that planners have a choice in deciding 
how to use values. The third proposition is used as a starting point for proposing a usage of values 
that may be particularly suited to sustainability planning. The proposed usage takes into consideration 
the implications of a theory about diverse usage and a flexible and vague concept of values in general, 
the diverse history of usage of the word “values”, objections to the use of values language, diverse 
usage of “values” in planning in general and the neds of planning. 
 Sustainability planning appears to have a particularly desperate need for integrating values across 
sectors into which society and ideas about society are organized. The usage of values proposed for 
sustainability planning is applied to a case study of a municipal sustainability initiative to consider its 
explanatory value and how a different understanding of values might have affected the planning 
process and subsequent implementation of the sustainability policy. If this theory about values holds 
in application to planning, then values may be a powerful tool with which to challenge convention 
and the status quo. 
Conclusions are drawn about the desirability and feasibility of explicit and deliberate use of the 
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This is a study about ideas with which the word “values” is and has been associated and the 
implications of these for planning.  
There is no single, generally agreed upon definitio of “values”. The flexibility of the word has made 
possible its application in the service of a wide range of disciplines, contexts, and purposes. That 
there is no single definition or understanding of “values” and that the word is so pervasive suggest a 
potential for confusion. The differences in usage may be minor or they may be highly significant and 
even contradictory. The word may, for example, describe values sourced externally to humans and 
associated with ideals, faith, and intrinsic qualities. It may describe opinions and attitudes that 
characterize a particular culture or group at some time in history but not in other times. Values may 
be considered either as essentially and necessarily subjective or essentially and necessarily 
impersonal, as changeable or timeless, as absolute r r lative, and a multitude of other apparent 
contradictions and paradoxes. 
A low level of awareness about multiple ways of understanding values makes presumption of shared 
understanding more likely. Might it matter if some planners talk about values in one way and others 
in different ways; if some members of the public call some thing “a value” and others do not; if the 
literature and research to which planners turn reflects a wide range of usage? Little attention has 
been paid to the implications for public processes uch as planning of various usages of “values”. 
Readers who bring to this thesis their own particular way of understanding values may experience 
first hand the difficulties that can accompany any communication about values.   
 
1.2 Vision 2020: Sustainability Planning in Hamilto n, Ontario 
In 1990, a few years prior to the creation of the Local Agenda 21 program at the Rio Conference, the 
Region of Hamilton-Wentworth in Ontario, Canada took its first formal steps towards what was 
described as a “sustainable community initiative.” The process was to take two and a half years, 
involving organizations, schools, businesses, and over 1000 residents in focus groups, town hall 
meetings, forums, citizen working groups, presentations and team work. In June 1992 Council 
adopted “Vision 2020” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992a) and for the next months the focus shifted to 
developing an implementation strategy. In February 1993 Council officially adopted “Implementing 
Vision 2020: Directions for Creating a Sustainable Region” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1993). In 2000, 
the local governments of the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth were merged into an enlarged City of 
Hamilton. Sustainability is one of the ten “core values” of the new City (Hamilton, 2003a). 
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In the years that followed adoption of Vision 2020, the Region’s achievement was recognized 
nationally and internationally. In 1994, soon after Council had adopted the final Vision 2020 reports, 
the Region was selected by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and 
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) as one of 14 communities around the world 
recognized as models for sustainability under the Local Agenda 21 program1. By 1997, the Region 
had received over 300 requests for information from over 40 countries, international visitors, and 
invitations to visit to international conferences. All of this contributed to what was described as 
“Hamilton-Wentworth’s Growing World-Profile” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 52). 
The planning process appeared to have been thorough, s ccessful, and deserving of accolades. By 
seeking community input not only at the stage of goal-setting but also at the stage of formulating 
implementation strategy, the Region’s community initiative was more welcoming of public input than 
many. Despite extensive efforts to involve the public in developing Vision 2020, however, three years 
after the final Vision 2020 package had been adopted by Council the level of awareness had increased 
only to between ten and fifteen percent of the roughly one-half million citizens (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1997, 49). A 1997 overview report by the project manager cited low awareness and 
understanding among the list of “Lessons Learned” from the planning process. 
                                                  
1 The Division for Sustainable Development is part of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (2004) and defines sustainable development as “Development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The Agenda 21 program 
refrains from prescribing substantive dimensions of ustainable development. Although “consultation”, 
“consensus-building” and that the local authority should “learn from citizens…” are prescribed as procedural 
matters, these have substantive implications.  
Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 sets out the “Basis for action”: “Because so many of the problems and solutions being 
addressed by Agenda 21 have their roots in local activities, the participation and cooperation of local authorities 
will be a determining factor in fulfilling its objectives. Local authorities construct, operate and maintain 
economic, social and environmental infrastructure, ov rsee planning processes, establish local environmental 
policies and regulations, and assist in implementing national and sub-national environmental policies. As the 
level of governance closest to the people, they pla a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to the 
public to promote sustainable development”.  
Process is prescribed in Section 28.3, under “Activities”: “Each local authority should enter into a di logue with 
its citizens, local organizations and private enterprises and adopt ‘a local Agenda 21’. Through consultation and 
consensus-building, local authorities would learn from citizens and from local, civic, community, business and 
industrial organizations and acquire the information needed for formulating the best strategies. The process of 
consultation would increase household awareness of ustainable development issues. Local authority 
programmes, policies, laws and regulations to achieve Agenda 21 objectives would be assessed and modified, 
based on local programmes adopted. Strategies couldalso be used in supporting proposals for local, natio l, 
regional and international funding.”   
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 “Probably the most significant barrier and one which maybe we 
should have spent more time on before starting the Task Force has 
been community awareness and understanding. The final products of 
the Task Force may have been stronger and had better community 
support if a larger proportion of the population understand the 
purpose of the initiative and its importance.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 
1997, 49)   
The overview report suggests that greater involvement by greater numbers would have sufficed to 
increase support for Vision 2020 because greater numbers of people would then have understood the 
purpose and importance of Vision 2020—the value of Vision 2020. A different though ultimately 
complementary aspect of the problem is to consider what else might have influenced how Vision 
2020 was valued.  
One such factor might be how the word and idea of “values” were used in the Vision 2020 planning 
process. The Task Force explicitly solicited “the public’s values” to be the goals of Vision 2020, 
using the words “values” and “goals” interchangeably as a firm foundation for planning. It was not 
until the overview a few years later, after the planning process was complete, that “the people’s value 
set” was identified as a “significant barrier” that remained to be addressed (Hamilton-Wentworth, 
1997, 49). In contrast to the first usage of values-as-goals during the planning process, this second 
usage treated values as changeable attitudes and emerged as another “Lesson Learned”.  
Treating values as goals appears not to have prepared lanners for anticipating or addressing the 
problems with values-as-attitudes. Starting with values-as-attitudes, on the other hand, may not have 
appeared sufficient on its own to provide a firm foundation for planning. To implement the values-as-
goals of Vision 2020, the municipal government would need to change people’s values-as-attitudes 
fundamentally even as it continued to be obliged to respond to the wishes of its citizens. This 
obligation would remain constant whether citizens’ “wishes” were described in the form of values-as-
goals (firm and constant) or in the form of values-as-attitudes (pliable and changeable) about details 
such as bicycle lanes.  
 “Establishment of an ethic of sustainability in our citizens puts us in 
[a] position where our simple social marketing activities must 
compete with the massive marketing budgets of large corporations. 
Although the municipality can change its way of operation and try to 
establish itself in a leadership role, it still must respond to the wishes 
of its citizens. If they are unwilling to accept bicycle lanes, 
naturalized parks, a more compact urban form and so on, these 
changes will not occur. On its own, a municipality does not have the 
resources to create the more fundamental change required in people’s 
attitudes and values.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 49)  
Had goals and attitudes not been treated explicitly as “values”, describing the problem might have 
seemed fairly straightforward –attitudes would need to be changed to fit with the goals of Vision 
2020 if the goals were to be met. Once both goals and attitudes are treated explicitly as values, the 
problem may become more complex. Used as a foundation for public policy, values-as-goals and 
values-as-attitudes may represent potentially incompatible ideas: 
 
4 
1. Values are necessarily good and true and provide a firm and certain foundation conceptually 
and politically as goals and ideals. (What is not good, true, and unchangeable should not be 
called “a value”.)  
2. Values reflected in existing ideas, opinions, attitudes, and behaviours may be right or wrong, 
good or bad, true or false, and changeable. (Calling something “a value” does not require that 
it be any or all of right, good, true, or unchangeabl .) 
A variety of features may play a role in determining how one usage of “values” can be 
distinguished from another. If each values usage has t e potential to determine what counts as a value 
according to that usage, this suggests that ideas about what counts as a value may differ widely. 
In the case of Vision 2020, two ways of understanding values appear to have been treated as 
distinctly and discretely different. That these two usages were treated as disconnected from one 
another may explain in part why each usage was addressed separately in planning for Vision 2020. It 
may explain why planners were surprised to find at the end of the process that the “p ople’s value 
set” remained to be addressed even though Vision 2020 had been based on “the public’s values”. If 
this does turn out to be the case, it suggests that had moderately or even considerably greater numbers 
been involved in the Vision 2020 planning process, “the people’s value set” would still have been a 
surprise at the end. It suggests if values usages can only be treated as straightforwardly and distinctly 
different from one another, then explicit and delibrate use of “values” may have nothing special to 
offer to planning. 
Are values usages necessarily discretely and distinctly different—merely homonyms clarified by 
context? To treat such different usages of values as sufficiently related to allow comparison and 
contrast would require some conceptual device that establishes sufficient common ground at the same 
time that it respects the differences among usages. If particular values usages can be considered 
instead as diverse examples of some broader concept of values, then integrating diverse usages may 
help to avoid the type of surprise encountered in the Vision 2020 planning process. If so, explicit and 
deliberate attention to values may be more useful to p anning. 
 
1.3 Research Rationale  
There are many ways to study values. Studying how existing values are or might be projected into the 
future, the differences between what people say they value and what their behaviour reveals, 
attempting to understand how people can claim to value things or ideas that appear to be 
contradictory, whether and how values might change as available information changes, all of these 
begin with a focus on the substantive dimension of values, on the content of values. With the same 
focus on the substantive dimension of values, surveys might be used to gather information to describe 
people’s values about issues such as those of interest to Vision 2020 planners—bike lanes, naturalized 
parks, and a compact urban form. They might measure values about globalization, government 
intervention, ethical behaviour in the corporate world, and so on, over time and among countries. 
This study began as an exploration of whether explicit and deliberate attention to values might be 
beneficial to planning. It soon became obvious, however, that there is no single, generally agreed 
upon definition or way of understanding values, making it difficult to answer the general question in a 
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more traditional way. Moreover, there is no single set of immediately obvious criteria by which to 
choose one definition over others or even to distinguish among what appear to be different usages of 
values. This problem might have been addressed by conducting normative research into why certain 
criteria might be better than others and for what re sons, leading eventually to selecting a definitio 
of values that may be beneficial to planning. Instead, this thesis explores the way that the word 
“values” is and has been used, with a view to gaining a better understanding of whether such usages 
must be treated as necessarily disconnected and discrete or there might be some way to consider 
usages of values as a group. 
Just as definitions serve to establish the set of what belongs to a particular word, ideas associated 
with the word “values” may establish a set of what belongs to particular ways of understanding and 
using the word “values”. How the word “values” is understood may play a hidden role in shaping the 
substantive dimension of values; how something is valued may shape what is valued. Because there 
appear to be many ways of using the word “values”, there are potentially many ways in which values 
usage might shape the substantive dimension of values. If so, values usage may be an important 
variable that should be considered in any study that takes substantive values as its starting point. 
This thesis, therefore, has a dual focus. In the first half, I explore usages of the word and idea of 
“values” in general and consider what might be required in order to consider what appear to be 
merely different and disconnected usages instead as diverse examples of values usage in general. In 
the second half, a theory about diverse values usage i  applied to planning in general, more 
specifically to sustainability planning, and lastly to Vision 2020 as a case study of local sustainability 
planning in Hamilton, Ontario.  
 
1.3.1 The language context of values 
Given the increasing prevalence of the word “values”, that there is not much attention paid to 
differences in usage is somewhat surprising. Assumptions about a shared understanding of “values” 
may indicate a general unawareness of the variety of usage. Such lack of awareness may result in 
values being treated as having more authority than ey deserve. In an editorial in Planning Theory & 
Practice, Heather Campbell notes that mistakes about shared understanding of words in planning can 
result in such words exerting “a huge, often unmerited, influence”.  
“I have been struck over the last few months…how much words are 
used in planning-related conversations yet how little meaningful 
communication takes place…certain words are used repeat dly, 
seeming to have a life of their own…Understanding of these words is 
assumed to be shared and agreed, when often it is no ; and through 
this ability they exert a huge, often unmerited, influence. It is 
presumed we all understand what is being talked about, when, very 
often, despite the use of the same words, we are actually speaking at 
a tangent to one another, if not at cross-purposes….failure to 
acknowledge that while the same words are being spoken they may 
form part of different languages, or ways of seeing the world, hinders 
the ability of the planning community to develop insight and 
progress understanding knowledge.” (Campbell, 2003, 389) 
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The word “values” may be one such word, an example of how easy it is to overlook words and 
ideas that are taken for granted because they are so familiar. Campbell gives as examples of “planning 
speak”, words such as “participation”, “community”, “partnership”, “integration” and “sustainability” 
and combinations such as “sustainable communities”, “community participation” (2003, 389). The 
word “values” is conspicuously absent from her set of examples. Ten years earlier, Walter Nash, 
British Emeritus Professor of Modern English Languae, had already included “values” in his 
glossary of jargon words—“prod it and it will crumble”, he wrote (Nash, 1993, 203). Is “values” no 
more than a jargon word with a shared meaning so superficial that it cannot withstand scrutiny?  
As used in this thesis, the word “values” is necessarily loose and flexible. From the outset, the 
challenge was to avoid prematurely skewing research in some particular direction of usage at the 
expense of others. No usage has been peremptorily disqualified. As used here, the word “values” can 
refer to anything, whether these things or ideas might also be called attitudes or preferences, opinions 
justified or not, beliefs or false beliefs (illusions), standards, norms, principles, goals, and so on. This 
necessarily loose usage accommodates “values” whether these are understood or presented as 
absolutely true, commonly true, relative, abstract, context-bound, discrete, synonymous with ethics, 
and so on. For the present purposes at least, the legitimacy of particular ways of using “values” is 
neither determined nor confirmed by whether there is agreement that something is or is not a value 
and whether the number of people who might share the same value is great or small.  
The primary focus of this research is on explicit rather than implicit use of the word and idea 
“values”. This is not to suggest that the study of implicit or hidden values is unimportant. A study of 
these however, would require criteria by which to identify what counts as an implicit value; it would 
require adopting a particular usage of “values”, even if temporarily. Different usages of implicit 
values could only be studied from the perspective of a particular usage or several usages serially. 
 
1.3.2 The planning context of values 
The word “values” may be introduced into planning processes by members of the public, experts, 
planners themselves, politicians—anyone who participates or contributes in some way to the planning 
process. It may emerge from scholarly literature or veryday life, from economic studies, from moral 
beliefs, from cultural norms, from scientific research, from public opinion, and so on. With so many 
possible sources for values in planning, there is potential for a wide range of usage. Nor can it be 
assumed that each of these sources themselves wouldnecessarily represent single, homogenous 
understandings of values.   
What impact might the discovery of a wide range of usage of “values” have on planning? Some 
ways of understanding values may be compatible and complementary; others incompatible and 
contradictory. There may be no significant shared maning or understanding. There may be diversity 
of usage outside planning but internally planners might share a single understanding of values. 
Awareness of different usage might prompt a reassessm nt of some particular understanding—
perhaps affirming, perhaps rejecting that usage as a re ult. If there is different usage outside planning 




Values terminology may be completely absent or it may be central to planning approaches, as 
Campbell suggests by associating values with the making of judgements.  
“Judgement is, therefore, at the heart of what planners do, and in 
making distinctions about good and bad, better and worse, in relation 
to particular places we are constantly engaged in questions of 
values.” (Campbell, 2002, 272) 
If values are indeed at the heart of planning, thenit may be all the more important to have a good 
grasp of what we mean and what we expect others to understand when the word and idea of “values” 
are invoked. Understanding values as products of value judgements may be something quite different 
from understanding values as firm principles that guide choices and different again from values as 
changeable attitudes.  
 
1.3.3 Different usages, diverse usages, and a conce pt of values  
When values usages are treated as discretely and distinctly different from one another, they are best 
described as homonyms for which meaning is clarified by context rather than by how a word sounds 
or is spelled2. Such usages of values have no shared history; they are linguistic accidents that can only 
be considered serially and not as members of a coherent set of values usages. Particular usages of 
“values” may establish criteria according to which something either counts as a value or does not. 
Their differences are treated as so significant that comparison and contrast are impossible. 
                                                  
2 The word “homonym” is used here loosely rather than precisely because there appears to be disagreement 
about what criteria must be met in order for something to be called a homonym. According to one definitio , 
words must be unrelated in meaning but spelled in the same way and pronounced in the same way in order to 
qualify. According to another definition, words must be unrelated in meaning but ei her spelled in the same way 
or pronounced in the same way in order to qualify.  
Refined further, “homonyms” (having the same name) ar  classified as “homophones” (having the same sound 
but different meanings, as in “horse” and “hoarse”) and “homographs” (having different meanings but using the 
same letters, as in “mean (unkind)” and “mean (intend)”. Illustrating that attempts at refinement and precision 
do not necessarily enhance clarity, homographs are also described as “may sound the same and be spelled in the 
same way but have different origins” (The Random House Dictionary, 1987). The word “pole” is an example; in 
the sense of “shaft”, the word originates in Old English but in the sense of an “extremity of an axis”, the word 
has an origin in Greek and in Middle English (The Random House Dictionary, 1987).  
As used in this thesis, the word “homonym” serves primarily to describe usage of the word “values” (meaning 
that the spelling is the same, as with homographs) that are discrete, disconnected (unrelated), and distinctly 
different in order to distinguish these from usages of the word “values” that can be compared and contrasted, be 
discussed as a group, and have a shared history. 
 
8 
Were values treated as diverse instead of merely different, they might have potential to be more 
useful as a planning tool.  Values usages would be sufficiently related (connected) to allow them to be 
treated as members of some larger set of values usages. Their differences could not be so great as to 
completely negate similarities. They would have a common history that can be explored and some 
common point of origin. It should be possible to connect criteria established by various usages for 
determining what counts as a “value”, to compare and contrast usages, and to integrate various usages 
within a single study or exercise.  
To treat values usages as diverse instead of different, however, requires surmounting significant 
hurdles. The sheer range of application of the word “values” suggests that the word is so fluid that 
boundaries beyond which the word is meaningless may be difficult to establish. Identifying a 
common point of origin may not be feasible. 
Most significantly, it cannot be taken for granted hat some concept of values in general is even 
possible. In 1968, anthropologist Ethel Albert wrote the entry on “Values” in the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. She and fellow researcher Evon Vogt had worked extensively 
with values, having recently completed their terminal report on the first large-scale study of values 
(Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 3). The study was empirical, exploratory, cross-culturally comparative, 
interdisciplinary, and inclusive of diverse theoretical and methodological approaches (Vogt and 
Albert, 1967b, 3). The researchers had encountered un xpected problems, preventing the 
development of a unified conclusion or integrated summary. The study had not mandated the use of 
any single understanding or definition of values, laving “representatives of a dozen different 
specializations…dealing with five cultures” (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 3) to work independently. 
As researchers discovered, the history of values cannot be separated from the history of ideas and 
beliefs in general. The explanation for what was perceived as a methodological failure centred on the 
problematic subject of research, on “values” themselves (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 7). Absent a single, 
generally agreed upon definition, the difficulty in distinguishing “values” from other descriptors (such 
as preferences, attitudes, beliefs, interests, princi les, and so on) proved to be a significant problem. 
With such extensive experience, Albert’s pessimistic caution about the possibility of a general 
concept of values carries considerable weight and nee s to be taken seriously. Albert notes that 
interest in a general theory of value faded as the fluidity of the concept became more apparent—“The 
diverse lines of approach are not likely to converge with ease in a unified theory and methodology” 
(1968, 288). The breadth of ideas and purposes with which the word “values” is associated has 
continued to expand. 
It is one thing to suggest that values usage might be considered as diverse instead of merely 
different if some concept of values could serve as the connecting link among usages; whether such a 
concept is possible is another. Any proposed concept of values in general must overcome barriers 
encountered by Albert without itself becoming merely another particular usage of the word “values”, 
struggling to compete with other particular usages to be recognized as representative of the whole of 
values usage.  
Like the Values Study researchers, planning too is in a position to benefit from being able to treat 
results from interdisciplinary approaches to values as coherent and comparable, even in the absence 
of some single definition of values or a “unified theory and methodology” for the study of values. 
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What appear to be two distinctly different usages in the Vision 2020 planning process may be but two 
examples of a wider range of difference in usage. 
 
1.3.4 The questions this thesis attempts to address  
This thesis attempts to make a contribution towards considering the following general question: “Is 
explicit and deliberate use of values neutral, beneficial, or detrimental to planning?”  
The following questions guided the study: 
o Given the frequency with which the word “values” is u ed as interchangeable with other 
descriptors, such as preferences, attitudes, beliefs, interests, principles, and so on, can calling 
something “a value” make a difference?  
o Are various usages of “values” merely discretely and distinctly different homonyms or can 
they be treated as diverse instances of some concept of values in general?  
o What are the implications and opportunities for planning? 
 
1.3.5 How this thesis addresses these questions 
This thesis is divided into a first part and a second part. The first stage of research was guided only 
from the perspective of values usage. No overarching theory about values guided the analysis of 
examples of values usage. Using grounded theory methodology, the sole purpose was to consider 
whether it might be possible to devise a framework within which what might appear to be essentially 
different examples of usage could be set side by side for comparison. In the second half of the thesis, 
the results from the first stage are applied to planning in general, sustainability planning in particular 
and finally to a case study of local sustainability planning. Methodology is discussed in Chapter Two. 
In Chapter Three, I explore the history of usage of the word “values”. As pervasive and fashionable 
as the word now may be, it is a relatively recent addition to the English language that emerged in the 
late 1800s. In order to discuss values as a group, I postulate a flexible and vague concept of values. 
The history of usage may shed light on how features of particular usages may be similar enough to 
treat as connected even though particular usages themselves may differ to the point of appearing 
contradictory.  
In Chapter Four I consider four objections to the us of the word “values.” The first objection 
claims values are necessarily relative and cannot be treated as firm or certain ideals. Because firm and 
certain ideals are necessary to humans, values cannot satisfy human needs or be used to consider what 
is truly worthy and common good. The second objection builds on the first by arguing further that 
values language is necessarily a destructive force in d mocratic society because it glorifies narrow 
individual preferences reinforced by market forces. Not only can values not be used to consider the 
common good, they should not. The third objection agrees that presently values language serves no 
useful or distinct purpose but differs from the first two in claiming that this is not a necessary 
consequence of values. Were there a better grasp of values in general, values might have the potential 
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to be a useful tool. The fourth objection dismisses th  word “values” as having no special meaning. 
Calling something a value serves no purpose except to obfuscate communication. Widespread use of 
the word is an indicator of nothing more than its status as a jargon word. If these objections cannot be 
addressed, then there is no point to considering whether values can or should be addressed explicitly 
and deliberately in planning processes. 
A grounded theory about diverse usage of values is pre ented in Chapter Five. A flexible and vague 
concept of values in general may be a means to conne t apparently discrete examples of values usage. 
It may also explain assumptions about a shared understanding of values. This concludes the first stage 
of the study from the perspective of values in general. 
Chapter Six introduces the second stage of the study in which three propositions are tested in 
relation to planning. The first two propositions are responses from the grounded theory about diverse 
usage of “values” to the first two questions that guided this research. The third proposition emerges 
from the theory. To be useful, the theory about diverse usage should have explanatory power and 
create new opportunities for analysis and understanding values in planning. If there are many ways to 
understand “values”, planners may have a choice in how to understand and apply “values”.  
Sustainability literature is replete with calls fora change in social values. In Chapter Seven, I apply 
the theory about diverse usage of values to sustainability planning and propose a particular usage of 
“values” based on the third proposition.  
Vision 2020 in Hamilton, Ontario is discussed in Chapter Eight as a case study of a particular 
application of sustainability planning in which explicit and deliberate attention was paid to values.  
In Chapter Nine, the usage of “values” proposed in Chapter Seven is applied to Vision 2020. If this 
particular usage of values is helpful, it should assist in understanding whether “the public’s values” 
and “the people’s value set” are more usefully understood as examples of diverse usage of “values” 
than as discretely different and unrelated homonyms and why this might be important.  
The conclusions are summarized in Chapter Ten, implications proposed, limitations noted, and 
















2.1 Purpose of the Study 
This research began with a general question: Is explicit and deliberate use of “values” neutral, 
beneficial, or detrimental to planning? Initially I had expected this study of values to be conducted 
primarily from the perspective of planning. That exp ctation changed when I was faced with the 
challenge of choosing a definition of values in order to proceed. A preliminary literature review of 
values in general suggested a variety of approaches and ways of understanding values, none of which 
seemed immediately or singularly to be applicable to planning. I chose to make no assumptions about 
values and to leave open the possibility that an understanding of values for planning might need to be 
developed, proposed, and tested instead of being selected from amongst existing alternatives.  
 
2.2 Selecting an Approach 
2.2.1 An absence of a single, generally agreed upon  definition 
The word “values” is not unique in being without a single, generally agreed upon definition. 
Alexander begins his exploration of approaches to planning by noting that “planning…unlike the 
sciences, is ultimately a prescriptive, not a descriptive activity.” Because planning is not descriptive, 
it should be no surprise that “There is no single areed upon definition of planning theory, nor is there 
any consensus on what it includes” (Alexander, 1986, 4). Yiftachel and Huxley also observe an 
absence of a shared definition with respect to both“theory” and “planning”: 
“We will also observe a persisting confusion in planning theory, 
linked to the inability of theorists to agree on two fundamental 
definitions: what is ‘theory’ and what is ‘planning’.” (2000, 907) 
The challenge in this research was to determine how to study the relation between planning and 
values when neither can provide a single, generally agreed upon definition to use as a touchstone. 
One approach might have been to match various prescriptive meanings of values with respective 
prescriptive meanings of planning. Although this approach might have assisted planners in selecting 
which way of understanding values might fit with their own understanding of values, it would not 
have addressed the problem of what to do when potentially different ways of understanding “values” 
are introduced into planning processes from sources external to planning, whether from experts and 
literature emanating from other disciplines or from members of the public. Neither would it have 
assisted in situations where planners themselves may not have self-consciously and overtly adopted 
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some particular prescriptive approach to planning. It would not have shed light on what general 
purpose or purposes might be served by calling some things or ideas “values” and not others. It would 
not have assisted planners in connecting what might appear to be distinct groups of values. 
Unlike philosophical consideration about the role of values in determining truth and goodness, 
social science research into values generally seeks vidence to describe what values are held by 
individuals or societies, the depth of commitment, the patterns of change, and so on. Both of these 
approaches, however, are commonly focused on the substantive dimension of values, on the content 
of values and positions people take about what is valuable. This study of usage of the word “values” 
would require a methodology that would be empirical and philosophical as well as exploratory. The 
methodology should not require taking an initial stnce on the substantive dimension of values or 
making assumptions about what values in general should be in advance of the study. Either of these 
starting points would have resulted in a normative study of values, the former more overtly than the 
latter.  
 
2.2.2 The concept of “values” as a social actor? 
LeCompte and Preissle describe qualitative research in general as having come to “denote any 
investigation into subjective issues, those involving attitudes, values, beliefs, and meaning” (1994, 
160). Where a concept or idea of “values” is itself the subject of qualitative research, as in the present 
study, the investigation is of “attitudes, values, beliefs, and meaning” of values. In such research, 
values may appear to play a role as social actors. 
Bryant distinguishes between qualitative studies that do and do not involve people according to 
whether the subject of research is able to have perce tions:  
“If the topic involves people, however, a further aspect of perception 
is involved, since the actors themselves will have perceptions that 
have to be taken into account so attention must be given to the 
accounts of those involved.” (Bryant, 2002, 36) 
In no situation are we privy to what is in the mind of another person in the same way that we can be 
aware of our own thoughts. Similarly, no researcher can know immediately and precisely what is in 
the mind of any social actor; the evidence is in what participants choose to share, in how they behave 
and in what they say. In this respect, the challenge i  studying “values" is no different from the 
challenges of qualitative research more generally. The challenge may appear to be greater in part 
because of a lack of consensus about what values are and in part because of unrealistic expectations 
about our ability to know the minds of others. Hecht r, for example, describes as a serious challenge 
that all values, irrespective of how they are defined, are “unobservable” (1993, 3). 
Whether or not a concept of values is itself capable of being “subjective”, of having perceptions, 
each example of how the word and idea of “values” is used exhibits the “attitudes, values, beliefs, and 
meaning”, as cited above, of a social actor who used th  word “values” as a means of expression. 
Each example of usage presents a wealth of evidence that is in many respects richer than attempting 
to observe directly what is in the mind of another, even were this possible. A multitude of examples 
of values usage set side by side may create a picture of how the word “values” is and has been used 
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and understood by social actors over time and in a wide range of contexts. As a focus of research, 
“values” is thus in some intermediate state between social actors with perceptions and inanimate 
objects with no ability to perceive. Tracked through its usage, the word “values” may provide an 
account of users’ perceptions of values in general that may be more revealing than users’ own 
descriptions. 
 
2.2.3 Considering possible methodologies 
Content analysis methodology could have admitted evi ence of values usage in a variety of forms—
audio, text, visual, and behavioural. A broadly qualitative approach to content analysis that studied 
more than a frequency of incidents of values usage was therefore a possibility.  Had there been but a 
single definition of values, content analysis might have been appropriate. Content analysis, however, 
provides no guidance for what to do when developing categories for analysis is problematic—when 
what is at issue is how to classify values when they ar  not attached to other purposes or ideas.   
An example of qualitative content analysis that would not be a good fit with this present research is 
Philipp Mayring’s very systematic procedure. The process is so tightly controlled that Mayring 
himself concludes there are two conditions in which “[t] e procedures of qualitative content analysis 
seem less appropriate”. Both of these conditions apply to the present research. 
• “if the research question is highly open-ended, explorative, 
variable and working with categories would be a restriction, 
or  
• if a more holistic, not step-by-step ongoing of analysis is 
planned.” (Mayring, 2000, parag. 27) 
Presuming categories in advance of examining evidence of usage could have a significant effect on 
the outcome because categories create a context for other categories, thereby providing criteria for 
classification that are so deeply hidden they are likely to be overlooked.  Boeck, Wilson, and Acton 
end their discussion of types of category by issuing just such a caveat: 
“The true nature of a category does not depend on the alternative 
categories it is compared with, but the alternative categories are an 
important methodological feature that restricts what one can or 
cannot find.” (2005, 153) 
Maintaining an absence of categories in advance of amassing evidence also made surveying and 
structured interviewing problematic methodologies. These methodologies do not facilitate 
simultaneous collection and analysis of spontaneous vidence of unclassified values usage. What 
counts as a distinct meaning of values, and why, would have needed to be addressed first.  
Creating conditions in which participants might be lik ly to contribute spontaneous usage of the 
word “values” during unstructured interviews also presented a challenge. A sample base of some 
particular group or area of interest could not be expected to provide the depth and range that would 
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permit a large variety of perspectives about values over time. Randomly selecting participants, subject 
to logistical constraints, would not necessarily result in body of evidence that was representative and 
diverse enough to provide a challenging test of whether what emerged as an understanding of values 
had broad explanatory power. There was also the possibility that a very large number of words would 
need to be collected and examined in order to extract what might be a very small number of examples 
of actual use of the word “values”. Taken together, the above concerns suggested that interviewing 
and surveying would be an inefficient research methodology that could produce potentially 
misleading raw material. 
Interviews and surveys would also have been problematic because people might interpret the 
questions as a test of their ability to know their own thoughts, specifically their own thoughts about 
usage of the word “values”. Self-consciousness could change the nature of the raw material from one 
that reflected actual usage to one that reflected what people believed the usage should be and might 
well have eliminated the opportunity to study taken-for-granted habits (Clark, 2000) in talking about 
values. Not making respondents aware of the real purpose of a study was not considered as an option, 
particularly because non-invasive and ethically unproblematic means of collecting raw material were 
freely available and these could serve the same purpose as well or better.  
 
2.3 Classifying and Categorizing Values
Any attempt at categorizing values is done to serve a specific purpose (Bowker and Star, 1999, 32)1. 
Had I adopted some existing classification or schema of values I would also have adopted the 
underlying purpose of such a classification, thereby adopting a normative approach. This topic 
required an exploratory approach because without first conducting the research, there were no criteria 
by which to distinguish or select amongst definitios. Neither might all definitions have been 
sufficiently distinct to be designated as separate meanings, in the same way that some forms of 
language are called dialects instead of full-fledged languages. As well, some definitions might 
initially have appeared insignificant or irrelevant i  their potential to assist in planning, increasing the 
likelihood that they might have been prematurely dismissed. Given such concerns, no example of 
usage could justifiably be excluded from the study, no matter how infrequently it arose in the 
literature or how marginal it appeared to be.  
Had this study not been approached as explorative and c tegories been developed and formalized 
early in the research, these would likely have been more or less a reflection of how I understood 
values at the time. If when data collection began I u derstood values primarily as moral values, for 
example, it is likely that moral values would have been a core category that shaped the collection of 
subsequent evidence of values usage. It could potentially have determined what literature was 
reviewed by limiting research to instances of explicit use of the phrase “moral values”. Even had I 
grasped the significance of other categories applicable to a variety of values usage at some later time 
                                                  
1 Bowker and Star use grounded theory methodology in teaching a course on “Ethnography of Information 
Systems”, for which “The basic analytic tools…rely on the grounded theory method of Glaser and Strauss…” 
The course outline is included in Myers (2005), a colle tion of resource material on qualitative research. 
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during the research process, by then the evidence would already have been skewed in favour of 
collecting examples of moral values.    
 
2.4 Constant Comparison as Grounded Theory Methodol ogy 
The formal methodology that most closely corresponds2 with that selected for this study is “grounded 
theory methodology”, developed jointly by sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967. 
The name refers both to “a method of inquiry” and a “product of inquiry” (Charmaz, 2005, 507).  
What “really” counts as grounded theory methodology, however, is hotly contested and any claim to 
having used grounded theory methodology requires explanation. Ian Dey observes that there are 
“probably as many versions of grounded theory as there [are] ‘grounded theorists’” (1999, 2). 
Disagreements in these different versions are “not o ly over what the methodology of grounded 
theory is in principle, but also over how to put into practice” (1992, 2). 
Charmaz refers to a “lingering hegemony of positivism” (2005, 511) that needs to be satisfied.  
Claims to have used grounded theory methodology might be used simply to imply justification 
(Locke, 1996, 244) or as “a template for doing qualitative research stamped with positivist approval” 
(Charmaz, 2005, 509). Such observations speak to the broad nature of the debate about grounded 
theory methodology; these are genuine disputes about what in general counts as good methodology 
and what in general counts as good research.  
 
2.4.1 Origins of the grounded theory methodology of  Glaser and Strauss 
When sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss “di covered”3 grounded theory methodology in 
1967, they recognized they were doing so in the context of a prior sociological tradition of research. 
Traditional tools of sociological research were used in new context. More than 35 years later, the 
context has changed again. Aspects of the dispute about grounded theory are discussed below. 
                                                  
2 A methodology called “analytic induction” (Znaniecki, 1934) also fits aspects of the present research. It 
involves “scanning data for categories, establishing relationships, and developing hypotheses on the basis of the 
initial data collected” (LeCompte and Preissle, 1994, 155). In their original publication, Glaser and Strauss see 
an ally in Znaniecki’s and Thomas’ important and influential work The Polish Peasant in Poland and America” 
(1918) and devote several pages to discussing reasons why this work was criticised by then mainstream 
sociologists. They note that “the authors had been much concerned with methodological issues and had taken a 
stand against several types of knowledge then much advocated” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 12). 
3 Glaser and Strauss use the word “discovered” to describe both the origin of grounded theory methodology 
itself and the products of using grounded theory methodology. Whether such theories result from discovery or 
are constructivist interpretations is one of the flash points at issue in the debate between supporters f the 




Context: The sociological tradition to which grounde  theory methodology responded 
Glaser and Strauss described their work as representing the coming together of two traditions of 
sociology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, vii). Strauss brought an academic background in symbolic 
interaction at the University of Chicago, influenced by the social psychology of John Dewey and 
George Herbert Mead (Robrecht, 1995) and a pragmatist ph losophical tradition (Charmaz, 2005, 
509) handed down from Charles Pierce. Glaser brought experience in quantitative methodology and 
qualitative mathematics, with an academic background in theory construction, theoretical coding, and 
explication of text (Fernández, 2004, 45). Coming from Columbia University, Glaser represented a 
tradition of sociology that was centred on Merton’s “middle-range theory”, coding and Lazarsfeld’s 
quantitative methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, vii). Glaser had studied under Merton, who in 
turn had learned theoretical coding from Talcott Parsons (Fernández, 2004, 45).  
Glaser and Strauss describe the “Chicago tradition” from the 1920s to 1950s as being “associated 
with down-to-earth qualitative research, a less than rigorous methodology, and an unintegrated 
presentation of theory” (1967, vii). For grounded theory methodology to promote the generation of 
theory was to challenge the prevailing belief that t e purpose of research was to subject existing 
theories to verification. Qualitative sociological research was treated as secondary in importance to 
quantitative because of difficulties with “testing theory rigorously” (1967, 15). 
“What is required, we believe, is a different perspctive on the 
canons derived from vigorous quantitative verification on such issues 
as sampling, coding, reliability, validity, indicators, frequency 
distributions, conceptual formulation, construction of hypotheses, 
and presentation of evidence. We need to develop canons more 
suited to the discovery of theory. These guides, along with associated 
rules of procedure, can help release energies for the rizing that are 
now frozen by the undue emphasis on verification.” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, viii) 
In its quest to shift the focus from verification to generation of theory, grounded theory 
methodology responded to the predicament of social s ences in general. Pierce had strongly 
criticized positivism as part of his larger mission t  establish unity between science and philosophy.  
“Positivism is only a particular species of metaphysics open to all the 
uncertainty of metaphysics, and its conclusions are for that reason of 
not enough weight to disturb any practical belief.” (Pierce, 1958, 
140)  
Michael Lynch draws attention to the similarity of ideas about verification in Pierce’s anti-
positivist writings and the idea of “verificationism” as promoted by the group of scientists and 
philosophers who were part of the logical positivism movement in the 1920s. Like pragmatist 
philosopher Pierce, they too “aimed at unifying the sciences, dispensing with metaphysics, and 
solving all philosophical problems.” Underlying the idea of verification was that “anything true can 
be scientifically verified (Lynch, 2005, 78). Pierc held that “to understand truth…look to the 
practical effects of truth on our experience.” Practical effects could be investigated by using science. 
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“…we can put Pierce’s basic idea like this: true beliefs are simply 
those we would, in fact, come to believe at the end of science, were 
the exhaustive process of collecting evidence and testing hypotheses 
ever completed. Put more simply: truth is ideal verifiability.” (Lynch, 
2005, 78) 
 
Addressing the weaknesses of deductively derived thories  
Glaser and Strauss targeted what appeared to them to be the common practice of developing theory in 
isolation from a real world context, a problem that neither of their traditions had successfully 
addressed (1967, vii). Their purpose was to provide a framework in which tools previously used in 
quantitative research (with its “emphasis on verification”) could be applied to “improving social 
scientists’ capacities for generating theory that will be relevant to their research” (1967, vii-viii). 
They proposed grounded theory in reaction to “logically deduced theories based on ungrounded 
assumptions” (1967, 4), for sociologists “writing their theories within a rhetoric of generation, to 
balance out that of verification” (1967, 18).  
“Grounded theory method stresses that theory must come from data, 
not prior knowledge, and that the operations leading to theoretical 
conceptualizations must be revealed.” (Robrecht, 1995, 171) 
Though they describe their theory as being “not logical” but “phenomenological” (1967, 6), they do 
refer to comparison as a type of logic:  
“Comparative analysis is a general method, just as are the 
experimental and statistical methods. (All use the logic of 
comparison).” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 21) 
They do not specify the ways in which the “logic of c mparison” is different from inductive logic 
but there is no question that what they are reacting against is deductive logic as it was commonly used 
to derive theories from logical assumptions (1967, 30). Glaser and Strauss do assign deductive logic a 
role in grounded theory but it is combined with both inductive logic and comparative logic, not used 
alone.  
“Deducing practical applications from formal theory rests on the 
assumption that the theory supplies concepts and hypot eses that fit. 
When the theory does not fit well, the consequences ar  a typical 
forcing and distorting of data to fit the categories of the deduced 
applications, and the neglecting of relevant data that seemingly do 
not fit or cannot be forced into the pre-existing sociological 
categories….Clearly a grounded theory that is faithful to the 
everyday realities of a substantive area is one that has been carefully 
induced from diverse data, as we have described the process.” 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 238-9) 
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The goal is to promote the generation of new theory discovered in evidence rather than deduced 
from other theories. They speak approvingly of Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy as having 
endured because it was based on data (1967, 4)4. They object to the tendency in sociology simply to 
use the “grand theories (1967, vii)” already created by sociology’s “great men” (citing among others 
Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Marx, and Veblen), noting that subsequently Parsons and only a few 
others generated their own “grand theories” but that even these “lacked methods for generating theory 
from data, or at any rate have not written about their methods “(1967, 10). Grounded theory 
methodology emphasizes “theory as a process…as an ever-developing entity, not as a perfected 
product” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 32). 
 
Adapting tools from quantitative research 
Glaser and Strauss combine tools that had already been developed for quantitative research with 
prevailing ideas about what counts as valid knowledge. This makes grounded theory susceptible to 
accusations that it attempts to emulate “hard” science.  
Prior to Glaser’s and Strauss’ use of constant comparison in grounded theory, Parsons (1954) had 
already used what he called “pattern variables” in his sociological analyses of society. Like Glaser 
and Strauss, Parsons too had praised Weber’s developm nt of theories that were empirically 
grounded. In describing Weber’s work in schematizing values according to “the belief systems of the 
religious traditions in which they were developed” Parsons identifies empirical grounding as a “major 
development in sociology” because of its reliance on a “comparative method”. 
“…by the use of the comparative method on the broadest scale, 
Weber, was carrying on empirical research which came closer to 
logic of the crucial experiment, than was the case for the work of 
almost any of the “empirical” sociologists whose coverage of the 
supposedly important facts of an empirical field was often much 
more ‘adequate’ than his. The essential point is that t e very breadth 
of the range Weber covered gave him, since he had a fruitful 
conceptual scheme, the opportunity to elect out what for him were 
the theoretically crucial considerations of fact. Many details might 
remain unclear, but on the level of the research teniques he used, 
the broad contrasts, e.g. as between Chinese traditionalist 
particularism and Western universalistic “rationalism,” were 
unmistakable; and these contrasts have proved to be theoretically 
crucial.” (Parsons, 1954, 15-16) 
Grounded theory methodology also appropriates Robert M ton’s use of the term “middle-range 
theory” to capture both substantive and formal theory. Glaser and Strauss refer to middle-range 
theories such as Merton’s as those that “fall betwen the ‘minor working hypotheses’ of everyday life 
                                                  
4 By translating Max Weber’s work into English from the original German, Parsons had popularized Weber 




and the ‘all-inclusive’ grand theories” (1967, 33). Although they adopt this aspect of Merton’s theory, 
Glaser and Strauss summarize Merton’s position on qualitative research as an example of the type of 
thinking that grounded theory was intended to supplant (1967, 259-262). 
 
2.4.2 Disputes about grounded theory methodology 
In 1990, Strauss coauthored Basis of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and 
Techniques with Juliet Corbin. Glaser (1992) broke publicly with Strauss by denouncing this work, 
precipitating persistent dispute about what counts as grounded theory. Glaser continues to defend the 
original version, what he calls now “classic” grounded theory, from constructivist and interpretive 
revisionists.  
“There can be few more scathing critiques than the one Glaser 
(1992) published of an updated version of grounded th ory by 
Strauss and Corbin (1990). If the authors who inspired grounded 
theory have fallen out, it is not surprising to find some sharp 
differences of opinion among their disciples.” (Dey, 1999, 2) 
The central issues in dispute revolve around the following: 
(1) the role of the researcher and the purpose served by the possibility or impossibility of 
neutrality and objectivity on the part of the researcher  (Locke, 1996); 
(2) the relationship between the data and the real world and whether the raw data exists 
independently of perceivers and the relationship betwe n the researcher and the raw material 
(Charmaz, 2005; and 
(3) how validity is arrived at—whether by allowing data to speak for itself or by creating an 
evidentiary path that can be accepted as plausible or not by others. (Robrecht, 1995) (Bryant, 
2002) 
These three issues are at the heart of broader arguments about whether theory results from the 
researcher’s symbolic interaction with the raw data, Strauss’ position, or from the methodology, as 
held by Glaser. Glaser claimed in 1992, and continues to claim (2004a, 2002), that it is both possible 
and necessary for validity that theory emerges from evidence. Robrecht notes that over time “an 
increasingly complex set of operations and procedurs” was developed to assist grounded theory 
researchers by clarifying what Glaser and Strauss had originally outlined. Specification of which 
steps to take, and when, was one of the major changes i itiated by Strauss and Corbin. Robrecht 
supports Glaser’s position that such steps detract from rather than adding to the original, classic 
version of grounded theory methodology. 
“Instead, the newly enlarged methodological procedur s have tended 
to encourage the production of grounded theory withpoorly 
integrated theoretical explanations resulting from violations of the 
original premises of the grounded theory method, in which theory 
comes directly from data…The additional prescribed steps encourage 
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students and researchers to lo k for data rather than look at data 
leading to emerging theory.” (Robrecht, 1995, 171) 
Constructivist grounded theorists who trace their vrsion of grounded theory method to Strauss 
claim that expecting theory to emerge from evidence is unrealistic and impossible.  Kathy Charmaz 
characterizes central features of the original grounded theory as objectivist and positivist. 
“Glaser’s…strong foundation in mid-20th-century positivism gave 
grounded theory its original objectivist cast with its emphases in 
logic, analytic procedures, comparative methods, and conceptual 
development and assumptions of an external but discernible world, 
unbiased observer, and discovered theory. Strauss’s version of 
grounded theory emphasized meaning, action, and process, 
consistent with his intellectual roots in pragmatism and symbolic 
interactionism…Like Glaser, Strauss and Corbin alsodvanced 
positivistic procedures, although different ones. They introduced new 
technical procedures and made verification an explicit goal, thus 
bringing grounded theory closer to positivist ideals. In divergent 
ways, Strauss and Corbin’s works as well as Glaser’s treatises draw 
upon objectivist assumptions founded in positivism.” (Charmaz, 
2005, 509) 
Glaser defends the original theory against proponents of a constructivist grounded theory, such as 
Charmaz (2005, 2000) and modifications that turn grounded theory into a version of qualitative data 
analysis attached to “naturalist inquiry”, as by Lincoln and Guba (1985). Both these revisions, on 
Glaser’s view, weaken grounded theory methodology t the point where neither qualifies as grounded 
theory (Glaser, 2002) (Glaser, 2004b).  
Both Charmaz (2005 and 2000) and Glaser (2004b) appear to agree that when grounded theory was 
formalized in 1967 it served an important purpose in legitimizing qualitative data analysis. The extent 
of their agreement is qualified by Glaser’s insistence that grounded theory and qualitative data 
analysis are distinct (Glaser, 2004a). At times, Glaser and Charmaz also appear to agree that which 
version is preferable is not a question of “better than” but “different than”. Glaser also maintains, 
however, that only the classic version counts as grounded theory—the constructivist version does not. 
In the following citation, “GT” refers to grounded theory and “QDA” to qualitative data analysis.  
“These criticisms do not apply as they all remodel GT into a QDA 
method devoted to careful full, voice and meaning description of the 
participant’s story, in short a QDA DESCRIPTION. This is exactly 
what GT is not—a QDA meaning, story description. GT is a theory 
about a conceptualized latent pattern—e.g. cultivating, 
credentializing, covering, client control, ritual loss ceremonies… etc, 
etc. Criticizing it for not doing what it does not purport to do, is an 
authors’ [sic] error on CHARMAZ’s part. It is in essence a default 
remodelling of GT to a poor QDA method, and thus a block on good 
GT research to achieve a conceptual theory…” (Glaser, 2002) 
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In his response to Glaser’s defence of classic grounded theory (2002), Antony Bryant identifies the 
“essential issues” as positivism and expectations of neutrality linked to objectivism. 
 “…the positivist stance of a neutral observer, gathering data about 
the world, from which theories somehow emerge is now s  severely 
discredited that one of the few places in which one can find such 
unreconstructed positivism is in the work of some of th se claiming 
adherence to GTM – including, but not restricted to, Barney 
GLASER. (Bryant, 2003, parag. 7) 
Both the original and constructivist versions of grounded theory are applied to exploratory studies 
of people in organizations. Applied to the health industry, the classic version searches for a theory 
“that accounts for behaviour which is relevant and problematic for those involved” (Glaser, 1978).  
“Thus the analyst’s own symbolic interaction with the data will 
influence what dimensions are understood to be mostsalient and 
represent the main concerns of the participants in the investigation.” 
(Robrecht, 1995, 175) 
Other areas in which grounded theory methodology has been applied include social justice 
(Charmaz, 2005), business (Douglas, 2003), information systems (Fernández, 2004), and psychology 
(Dick, 2000). There appears to be no clear delineation of which version best fits which kind of data, 
despite classic grounded theory seeming to be a better fit with coding in science-oriented psychology 
(Dick, 2005) and information technologies (Allan, 2003, 8). Some prefer the original version because 
it is simpler and because they are less interested in debates about theory than in application 
(Fernández, 2004).  
The apparent simplicity of the classic version is deceptive. Despite being less prescriptive about 
method, classic grounded theory assumes a higher degree of skill on the part of the researcher. 
Strauss’ and Corbin’s “revisionist approach” is often recommended for novices because it is “well 
delineated and overtly applicable to entrepreneurial researching” (Douglas 2004, 66). Bryant supports 
Glaser’s criticism of Strauss and Corbin’s highly systematized grounded theory methodology process. 
The highly systematized version, says Bryant, “could be classified as one of the methods that were 
the main target of Glaser & Strauss in 1967” (2002, 36). 
Because “GT is simply too valuable a method to leave to the objectivists” (2003, parag 14), Bryant 
attempts to reconcile differences by looking beyond the words that Glaser and Strauss used to 
describe their theory. In the citation below, Bryant ppears to credit Baszanger and Dodier with 
having coined the term “constant comparison”. However, Chapter V in the Glaser and Strauss 
original is titled “The constant comparative method of qualitative analysis” (1967, 101-115). Bryant’s 
main point below is that rewording the way in which original grounded theory is described may be 
another ground on which to debate what grounded theory “actually” is.   
“If we look at what GLASER and STRAUSS actually did, rather 
than what they claimed—and continue to claim—they wre doing, 
there is the basis for a powerful research approach. BASZANGER 
and DODIER (1997) termed the method of GLASER and 
STRAUSS’ as one of ‘constant comparison’. They characterize it as 
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a method of ‘consisting of accumulating a series of individual cases, 
of analyzing them as a combination between different logics of 
action that coexist not only in the field under consideration, but even 
within these individuals or during their encounters’. The aim of such 
methods is generalization rather than totalization, with the objective 
of producing ‘a combinative inventory of possible situations’”. 
(Bryant, 2003, parag. 14) 
Even this attempt by Bryant to find a calmer ground behind the words is problematic. Douglas, for 
example, specifically rules out “generalisation” as an outcome of grounded theory. 
“The distinctive advantage of grounded theory is that it commences 
from specific naturalistic situations, with the inte  of understanding 
the nature and rationale of observed interactions and processes. 
Inductive theory generation is embedded in explanatio  of 
phenomenon rather than generalisability. The explanatory power of 
the grounded theorist is to develop predictive ability…” (Douglas, 
2003, 53-4) 
Bryant insists that if Glaser does not tackle the ideas underlying constructivism, there can be no 
resolution to the debate. Glaser refuses to acknowledge that constructivist grounded theory 
methodology serves the same purposes as classic grounded theory methodology and refuses to 
acknowledge the debate as legitimate. For Glaser, constructivist, interpretive grounded theory 
methodology is not a competing form of grounded theory methodology but something completely 
different. 
  
2.4.3 Role of the researcher, approach to data, and  threats to validity 
Fernández, Lehmann, and Underwood all used a version of classic grounded theory methodology in 
their own doctoral research. They assembled the following list to describe demands on the researcher. 
1. “tolerate confusion – there is no need to know a priori and no need to force the data 
2. tolerate regression – the researcher might get briefly “lost” before finding his or her 
way; 
3. trust emerging data without worrying about justificat on—the data will provide the 
justification if the researcher adheres to the rigour of the method; 
4. have someone to talk to—Grounded Theory demands moments of isolation to get deep 
in data analysis and moments of consultation and discussion; 
5. be open to emerging evidence that may change the way the researcher thought about 
the subject matter, and to act on the new evidence; 
6. be able [to] conceptualize to derive theory from the data; and 
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7. be creative—devise new ways of obtaining and handling data, combining the approach 
of others or using a tested approach in a different way.” (Fernández, Lehmann and 
Underwood, 2002, 116-117) 
Fernández described his own work as “extremely intensiv , time-consuming and all absorbing” 
noting that “the researcher must be persistent and resilient” (Fernández, 2004, 58). This supports the 
position that classic grounded theory methodology is not designed for novices. The list also appears 
to confirm a caution voiced by Glaser and Strauss in the original work—that this research 
methodology relies on the expertise of the researchr though they noted as well that such expertise 
can be acquired by training (1967, 249).  
Just what it means for a researcher to allow theory to emerge from data is disputed. Douglas, who 
supports grounded theory, questions how a qualified researcher could function without “baggage”.   
“The traditionalist [i.e. classic] approach is iterative and requires 
creativity that may possibly be more likely to be found within the 
established and developed abilities of the well-practised qualitative 
researcher. Though such a person may him/her-self have developed 
biases that could stymie the necessary open ‘no-baggage’ approach 
that is a useful starting point in traditionalist grounded theory?” 
(Douglas, 2004, 66)  
Bryant analyzes a particular application of grounded theory methodology in the field of 
informatics. He concludes that what the researchers claimed to have done can only be described as a 
“feat of cognitive evasion” that surely is evidence of an objectivist theory. 
“Given that they are obviously well aware of such theories, the 
authors reassure their readers that they took a conscious decision not 
to allow this knowledge to affect their work, ‘in order to avoid a 
standard way of thinking about the phenomena observed’. How they 
managed this feat of cognitive evasion is not clear.”  
“Here is a view of cognition that is determinedly objectivist. Other 
theories known to the observer can simply be discarded, assumptions 
can be reduced or dispensed with altogether. The phenomena can be 
observed from a totally neutral position by a dispassionate, passive 
observer. Cognitive reservoirs of previous experience and knowledge 
can be dammed, blocked or diverted—the imagery is theirs.” 
(Bryant, 2003, parag 9) 
Were this the only way to explain the interaction between researcher and research objects, indeed 
what Glaser and Strauss proposed might sound impossible. Glaser and Strauss themselves do not 
seem to have intended such interpretations. In a chapter titled “Insight and Theory Development”, it is 
quite clear that insights are recognized as connected to researchers’ prior experiences.  
“…the researcher can get—and cultivate—crucial insights not only 
during his research (and from his research) but from his own 
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personal experiences prior to or outside it.” (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967, 252) 
That a “theory must fit the substantive area to which it will be applied” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
238) is a means to control whether the researcher has forced theories on the data or allowed the theory 
to emerge from the data. Existing theories are not ignored but are treated as just another source of 
data, used to scrutinize data but also themselves subjected to the same kind of scrutiny. 
“…there are many pitfalls in the current ways of developing 
sociological theory that may preclude a good fit. A sociologist often 
develops a theory that embodies, without his realizing it, his own 
ideals and the values of his occupation and social class, as well as 
popular views and myths, along with his deliberate efforts at making 
logical deductions from some formal theory to which he became 
committed as a graduate student (for example, a formal theory of 
organizations, stratification, communication, authority, learning, or 
deviant behaviour). These witting and unwitting strategies typically 
result in theories so divorced from everyday realities of substantive 
areas that one does not quite know how to apply them…where they 
fit the data of the substantive area.” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 238) 
In describing her work on linguistics, Robin Lakoff voices a similar concern. As evidence of what 
can happen when there is no methodological structure to act as a safeguard, she cites early 
anthropological studies that did not give sufficient significance to the beliefs of the people being 
studied.  
“To this end it was necessary to develop objective and scientific 
methods of investigation, so as to avoid the subjectiv  perspectives 
that caused earlier scholars to understand other societies and their 
ways from the vantage point of their own (and thus necessarily as 
unintelligible or inadequate).The new science of linguistics also had 
to devise empirical methods of discovery and analysis, in order not to 
force the data uncovered in the field into the Cinderella’s slipper of 
preexisting theories, themselves often based (knowingly or not) on 
the Indo-European habits of thought innate to the scholars, all 
speakers of European languages and members of Western cultures.” 
(Lakoff, 2000, 3) 
Glaser and Strauss advise against preliminary literature reviews because finding theories in 
advance might lead researchers in particular directions before a theory is allowed to emerge from the 
evidence. This increases the possibility that evidence will be made to fit the theory, rather than the 
reverse. The advice is merely cautionary, however, recognizing that some researchers may have more 
difficulty than others in not allowing themselves to be captured by existing theories (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, 253). Some interpret this advice strictly and narrowly. Fernández, for example, 
interprets this as meaning that there should be no preliminary literature review at all until the research 
is nearly done, at which point literature is woven into the analysis as new data that is a test of the 
newly discovered theory (2004, 87). In describing his own application of grounded theory 
methodology, Allan refers to such interpretations of preliminary literature reviews as  
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“…a misconception of the original premise put forwad by Glaser & 
Strauss (1967, 169) who encouraged researchers to ‘u e any material 
bearing in the area’. This is taken to include the writings of other 
authors…A review of the relevant literature established current 
thinking in the areas of configuration management and the use of 
commercially available components. However, this literature review 
did not lead to any hypotheses of sufficient interest.” (Allan, 2003, 7) 
An ambiguous and perhaps not fully articulated consideration of relations between researcher and 
research in the original 1967 publication may be onf the more pivotal reasons for the break 
between Glaser and Strauss. Though supportive of this view, Locke indicates that such a difference is 
equally about the role of process. These two issues are related and should not be separated. 
“Specifically, Strauss locates agency for theory development in 
human researchers, whereas Glaser confers agency on neutral 
methods and data. These differences are reflected in the disparate 
stands each takes on the sources on which researchers may draw to 
develop theoretical insights and on the practices that ensure 
complexity in theoretical frameworks.” (Locke, 1996, p. 240) 
 
2.5 Grounded Theory Applied to the Present Research  
2.5.1 The role of the researcher 
I approached this research by assuming a stance of uncertainty about prior beliefs and understanding. 
This is different from claiming to begin with no “prior baggage” and allows for the caveat that not 
everyone taking such a stance would be starting from the same position, perspective, or degree of 
uncertainty. That we are none of us always even aware enough of all our presumptions to deliberately 
set them aside does not negate the value of attempting to do so. Difficulty assuming such a stance 
might be remedied by asking oneself to consider “what if” one is wrong about prior judgements and 
beliefs. Consciously adopting a stance of ignorance creates a state of mind in which one intentionally 
avoids trying to fit new evidence to existing knowledge and is therefore predisposed to learning 
something new. Such a strategy does not require denying that to some extent at least we humans are 
prone to relating new knowledge and understanding to something we already know. 
Robrecht’s description of a scientist’s starting positi n as “knowledgeable but underinformed” 
serves the same purpose; it creates a condition of u certainty. Uncertainty makes a feeling of 
discovery possible and alerts the scientist to allow the data to take the lead. 
“The process of dimensional analysis focuses the analyst’s attention 
on the data and recognizes that, as a scientist, the analyst is 
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knowledgeable but underinformed about the area of inquiry.” 
(Robrecht, 1995, 175)5  
Glaser and Strauss recognized the significance of their previous experiences and their place in the 
tradition of sociology. The process of comparing and contrasting evidence requires that theorizing (by 
researchers) be woven in. Kaplan describes attempts by positivists to claim that “the contents of 
observation itself are free from conceptual contamination” as “the dogma of immaculate perception” 
(1964, 131). 
“…the difference between facts and theories lies in the ways in 
which they function in inquiry rather than in the processes by which 
we arrive at them, in their use rather than their origin. All 
observation involves theorizing, and—for science, at any rate—
perception is impossible without conceptual processes.” (Kaplan, 
1964, 131) 
I positioned myself as an ignorant outsider who wanted to learn from actual usage how I should 
understand and use the word “values”. Anthropologists become participants in other societies to learn 
what people value; in this study I wanted to learn how people use the word “values”.  I tracked the 
behaviour of the word and idea of “values” by looking at how the word was actually used instead of 
how I might be told it should be used. The same raw evidence I compiled might well be analyzed 
differently by someone else using the same process and examining exactly the same examples—or 
not. The objective is not to make the research free of interpretation; even according to classic 
grounded theory methodology an absence of involvement by the researcher does not improve validity.  
“Even when you disagree, you should see that my version might 
work for someone who brings to the interpretation a context different 
from yours.” (Lakoff, 2000, 8)6  
Whether such involvement is called interpretation or something else may lie beside the point. 
 
2.5.2 Appropriateness for exploratory research 
Douglas suggests that although grounded theory methodology may not be appropriate in all 
applications, it may be particularly useful in exploratory research to address phenomena such as 
social interactivity, echoing the first of Mayring’s points cited above.  
“Where existing theory is well developed, then argubly, deductive 
methods could be more useful in developing entrepreneurship 
understanding, especially at a macro economic level….grounded 
theory particularly orientates towards eliciting theoretical-
conceptualisations of processes of social interactivity. Such 
                                                  
5 Robrecht studied grounded theory with Strauss, Corbin and others (Robrecht, 1995, 177). 
6 Lakoff directs the reader to Tannen (1984) for a discussion of this issue. 
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phenomena are not so well disposed to improved understanding 
through the logic of mathematics.” (Douglas, 2004, 66) 
Examining particular examples of values usage has been treated in this present study as exploratory 
research. Research that focused on developing a conceptual model using deductive logic, only later 
applying this model or theory to particular examples, would have been very different. 
Using grounded theory methodology to do exploratory research requires accepting the possibility 
that the research will not turn up anything significant or original.  
“There is also the risk of finding something that is not new. What if 
this has been done before? This appears to be more a natural fear 
than a probable risk…A good grounded theory study should be able 
to point out similarities and differences, and to pr duce patterns that 
are particular to the substantive field of research. Yet, as with any 
methodology, and indeed any human activity, there are no 
certainties.” (Fernández, 2004, 58) 
2.5.3 Recognizing the importance of language 
Written and spoken language as equivalent sources of data 
Constructivist grounded theory methodology encourages particular attention to the language of both 
participants and researchers. In Charmaz’ words “we must attend to our own language and make it 
problematic” (2005, 525). The classic version of grounded theory also recognizes the importance of 
language. Words spoken in interviews are considered quivalent to words documented in unsolicited 
or spontaneous material—“…any materials that force a range of comparisons will be useful: letters, 
diaries, newspaper accounts or other miscellaneous n nfiction” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 170). 
“There are some striking similarities—sometimes obvi us although 
often overlooked—between field work and library research. When 
someone stands in the library stacks, he is metaphorically, 
surrounded by voices begging to be heard. Every book, every 
magazine article, represents at least one person wh is equivalent to 
the anthropologist’s informant or the sociologist’s interviewee. In 
those publications, people converse, announce position , argue with 
a range of eloquence, and describe events or scenes in ways entirely 
comparable to what is seen and heard during field work. The 
researcher needs only to discover the voices in the library to release 
them for his analytic use. We say ‘discover’ because, like field work, 
social research in the library must be directed with in elligence and 
ingenuity.” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 163) 
Documented evidence is an important source of raw mterial for grounded theory research, 
provided that the search for raw evidence is open to a variety of sources, and does not restrict 
comparative analysis to one or a few perspectives (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 170).  Using as an 
example the “principle topic” of the “urban image” and “closely related synonyms” such as “mobility, 
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social classes, ‘success’”, Glaser and Strauss describ  how a wide range of perspectives might be 
collected. This approach benefits from associative thinking and postulating novel relations. 
“Again, a self-conscious style of thinking comparatively is a great 
asset. Thus one goes to the library catalogs, or to the Readers’ Guide 
to Periodical Literature, and thinks of numbers of terms that might 
relate to the principal topic. Labor unions—mobility through 
collective bargaining? Tramps and hobos—downward mobility? 
…Police manuals—strategies for dealing with the poorer classes? 
Collections of sermons—images on the consequences of too much 
success, ideological counsel for the rich and consolation for those 
who fail to become rich?” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 170) 
“While chance is a powerful goddess, it is wise not to rely solely 
upon her powers. So the library researcher ought to permit himself 
time to browse in unfamiliar journals, looking in the neighbourhood 
of the journal he happens to be scrutinizing; he must visit unfamiliar 
parts of the library (What would cookbooks show, or b oks on 
athletics?); and he may wish to utilize the contemporary newspaper 
collection, as well as reading his daily newspaper with more than a 
casual eye for accidental data.” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 175) 
 
Spontaneous evidence from the perspective of linguistics 
Divisions within the discipline of linguistics reflct the same questions that continue to haunt other
social sciences and that characterize the debates about grounded theory. Robin Lakoff classifies these 
divisions according to the backgrounds people brought with them to the new field of linguistics.  
• People trained as social scientists and anthropologists sought to use linguistics as a means of 
understanding other cultures; 
• People trained as humanists sought to determine from “their superficial form, what sentences 
‘really’ meant at a deeper level”; 
• People trained in formal logic or mathematics had a rule-based approach to language, “less 
interested in the relationships between language and culture, and language and thought than 
in the relations that held between the parts of sentences.” (Lakoff, 2000, 5) 
Lakoff’s approach to linguistics appears to fit well with the version of grounded theory adopted for 
the present study. 
“Analyzing the superficial linguistic form of a communication alone 
cannot explain why these particular words, in those specific 
combinations, operate o this exact effect on the minds of hearers, 
much less can it teach us how to be discriminating hearers and 
responsible creators of language. Looking (like political scientists 
and communication theorists) only at the effects of linguistic choices 
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as demonstrated in polls and focus groups leaves opn the question 
of what exactly happened to create this effect.” (Lakoff, 2000, 7) 
The way to do this is by “bringing these different forms of analysis together” (2000, 7). Analyses 
cannot be based on artificially produced language in artificial conditions, as done in studies of 
abstract grammar. Lakoff urges instead that analyses be based on “real people’s actual utterances” 
(2000, 6) and “real spontaneously created language” (2000, 7). Spontaneous language is not solicited 
specifically for study. It may or not be verbal—it may even be “planned”. 
“Another controversy arises out of the data I have chosen as the basis 
of my analyses: largely written, generally mass-media, most often 
planned discourse…In a literate society like ours, meaning is 
negotiated through a wide array of communicative channels: written 
language and oral; public and private; formal and informal; 
spontaneous and constructed; direct and mediated…If we are 
interested in the way language creates and construct  us all, we must 
consider all the forms our language takes. Any claim that some forms 
of language are ‘realer’ or more legitimate objects of analysis than 
others is misguided.” (Lakoff, 2000, 14) 
In this research I examined both everyday language and scholarly literature for instances of the 
word “values”, phrases and contexts in which it appeared. No source was granted a priori higher 
status or credibility. There was no shortage of examples and all examples of values usage were treated 
as evidence of how values are understood.7  
 
2.5.4 Using examples of values usage as raw evidenc e 
Values usage and a preliminary literature review: 
I surveyed literature from a variety of disciplines, on the assumption that even if there were unanimity 
about values within planning it would be important to know if other disciplines treated values 
differently and why. This preliminary review became th  first source of textual evidence about values 
usage once I realized that the word “values” was being used in multiple and varied ways and that this 
variety of usage would also find its way into the hands of planners. Had I not encountered a variety of 
usage early on, even though I did not yet know how to respond to it, falling prey to some theory about 
values and allowing that theory to direct the study would have been very easy in the early stages. The 
concern about a preliminary literature review by Glaser and Strauss is justified. 
 
                                                  
7 In his study of “visioning”, Shipley (2000) conducted a linguistic and historical context for the word. In an 
earlier article on the same subject (Shipley and Newkirk, 1999), the authors note that they turned to in erviews 
to study visioning because of “the absence of a true body of consistent writing about vision and visioning” 
looking for “an understanding [of visioning] that had not yet found its way into the literature.” 
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Collecting evidence of values usage  
Where classic grounded theory methodology is more typically applied to studying the behaviour of 
people in organizations, the method generally permits a smaller sample size. In the present research, 
however, the breadth of application of the word “values” required collecting a sufficiently diverse 
body of evidence about values usage that was representative of multiple disciplines and perspectives. 
Though collection of examples of values usage never nded formally, as is consistent with grounded 
theory methodology, data collection was intensive or a period two year period (1999-2000). Well 
over three thousand examples of values usage, primarily from North America, were collected from 
various media sources, including newspapers articles, ommercials, radio shows, print 
advertisements, greeting cards, popular non-fiction publications, magazines, statements of values 
displayed on the walls of businesses and professional offices, and even the comics section of the 
newspaper. Examples of values usage from scholarly sources were not limited to North America. 
Explicit use of the word “values” determined what qualified as values usage. 
Examples of current usage provided a contemporary perspective of values usage. Historical 
examples of values usage were sought in scholarly literature over the past 150 years. Contemporary 
everyday sources of spontaneous language were treatd as equivalent to examples of spontaneous 
values usage in planning literature and scholarly literature in general. The aim was to provide as 
varied a set of perspectives as logistically possible, extensive enough to cover as many situations as 
possible, seeking values usage wherever might be found.  
LeCompte and Preissle note the importance of research rs self-monitoring (1993, 341-348). I 
recorded how I understood values prior to beginning data collection so that I would have something 
more solid than recollection to check the degree to which I might be superimposing my 
preconceptions on the raw material as I proceeded. This turned out not to have been necessary 
because my own ideas changed radically the more I explored values usage. Nevertheless, it was a 
useful control. 
 
Theoretical saturation and theoretical sampling 
Significantly, grounded theory method does not design a point at which data collection begins and 
analysis starts:  “Theoretical sampling continues to guide decisions about data collection until the 
very end” (Simmons, 2004, 98). Theoretical sampling is a means to achieve theoretical saturation. 
“Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating 
theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his 
data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in 
order to develop his theory as it emerges.” (Glaser nd Strauss, 1967, 
45) 
This entails deliberately seeking out more evidence from areas that may not have been well 
represented in the initial stages of constant comparison and analysis. By this stage, theories about the 
evidence have already begun to emerge and are continually tested in an iterative process of constant 
comparison and contrast. Although the sample size was large and the range of evidence gathered was 
extensive, I continued to process new examples until the end, on the chance that there was something 
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about values that I had missed earlier. I did specifically search for more examples of “ambiguous 
values” to improve my understanding of how values presented themselves as already pre-classified.  
Because data collection is an ongoing process, the emerging theory is constantly tested against new 
evidence. Allowing the combined process of collection and analysis to be open-ended is a key 
component of grounded theory methodology. 
“The analysis may lose complexity and explicitness if the sampling 
process falters. That is, the fewer the dimensions addressed, the less 
sophisticated the explanation.” (Robrecht, 1995, 17) 
Theoretical saturation occurs when there is nothing new to add to the categories. 
“The criteria for determining saturation, then, are combination of 
the empirical limits of the data, the integration and density of the 




The importance placed on memoing by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 is another indicator that even in 
the classic version researchers are expected to be activ ly involved in developing emergent theory.  
“This rule is designed to tap the initial freshness of the analyst’s 
theoretical notions and to relieve the conflict in h s thoughts. In 
doing so, the analyst should take as much time as necessary to reflect 
and carry his thinking to its most logical (grounded in the data, not 
speculative) conclusions.” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 107) 
I used both written memos and a digital voice recorder. Originally I had anticipated that all audio 
memos would be converted into text but found that tis was only possible with those memos in which 
I was deliberately talking in dictation mode. For the most part, audio memos took the form described 
below as “stream of consciousness”, meaning that there was urgency in capturing ideas. Urgency 
minimized the importance of enunciation and resulted in digital files being unconvertible to text. This 
turned out not to be a significant problem, however, b cause for the most part merely having spoken 
the words out loud was enough to lodge the idea more firmly in my mind.  
“When writing memos, you should think and write theoretically, in a 
‘stream of consciousness’ fashion, with little consideration for 
grammar, spelling, sentence structure, and organizations. You should 
write down ideas, even if they are hunches or don’t make immediate 
sense…Memoing takes precedence because it provides the bridge 
between data and the emergent theory. Data are always available for 
analysis at any time. Ideas are fragile, so they should be written 




Categories and Classification and Constant Comparison 
Glaser and Strauss distinguish between categories and properties. A category “stands by itself as a 
conceptual element of the theory”; a property “is a conceptual aspect or element of a category”. Both 
“are concepts indicated by the data (and not the data itself) [and] both vary in degree of conceptual 
abstraction” (1967, 36). Classifying values only or even primarily according to what they are about, 
what Glaser and Strauss call “current labels” and “descriptive categories”, would have steered the 
research in a completely different direction. Simply adopting commonly occurring ways of 
classifying values would have made this research empirically descriptive rather than exploratory. 
There are two different types of categories for a researcher, 
“…those that he has constructed himself (such as ‘social loss’ or 
‘calculation’ of social loss); and those that have be n abstracted from 
the language of the research situation…As his theory develops, the 
analyst will notice that the concepts abstracted from the substantive 
situation will tend to be current labels in use for the actual processes 
and behaviours that are to be explained, while the concepts 
constructed by the analyst will tend to be the explanations.” (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967, 107) 
Sameness and difference are treated here as relational rather than discrete, together creating a larger 
context for making judgements about whether a particular thing or idea is more like x or y in 
important or unimportant ways. Comparison cannot pay attention only to similarities and expect that 
comparable things must be similar in all respects. An interactive treatment of sameness and difference 
has been applied previously by psychological researchers (Luthans, 1982). As well, Ferdinand De 
Saussure, known as the “father” of linguistics, is credited with insights on utilizing difference in his 
linguistic theory (1966 [1915]) to balance the previous emphasis on similarities.  
The framework for analysis, concepts, and categories ar  all developed during the process of 
comparison and contrast. This is consistent with Glaser’s and Strauss’s recognition that although 
deductive theories have weaknesses, induction alone is ot sufficient for building theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, 30) “because facts do not exist outside of the framework for analyzing them” (Emigh, 
1997, 660). 
Trial, provisional classifications were thus an important part of the iterative process of comparison. 
Raw data were continually reclassified, re-described and organized differently8. This procedure was 
useful in coming to understand what Glaser and Strauss had called “pre-coding” as a device to track 
ideas backwards, searching for a better understanding of how pre-coded categories had come to be 
pre-coded. By repeatedly demanding reclassification of raw data in order to explore different 
similarities and differences, the constant comparison method itself acts on the importance of 
classification. 
 
                                                  
8 A discussion of what is involved in the process of reclassification and redescription is provided in Chapter 6. 
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2.6 Rationale for a Single, Retroactive Case Study 
Vision 2020 in Hamilton, Ontario was undertaken in 1990 by the then Region of Hamilton-
Wentworth as a community-based process for developing a municipal policy on sustainability. 
 
2.6.1 Why Vision 2020 was chosen  
This case was chosen as an example of sustainability planning because the word “values” was used 
explicitly and deliberately during the planning process, because literature and information was readily 
available to track use of the word “values”, and because it was an example with which I was familiar.  
This single case offered a rich opportunity to consider how at least two separate meanings of 
“values” were used by actors participating in the same process. Had there not been such a case at 
hand, likely more than one case study would have been r quired, each to explore a potentially 
different application of values usage. Although the word “values” is used with increasing frequency 
in everyday language, there can be no assurance at th beginning of a process that actors will actually 
use the word in the case being studied, making an ongoing case study a much greater risk than a 
retroactive case study. As well, using a longitudinal case means that potential consequences have had 
a chance to show themselves over time. The need for longitudinal study is one of the rationales 
accepted by Yin for single-case design of a case study (2003, 42). 
In some respects, Vision 2020 is a typical case of sustainability planning at the local municipal 
level. In light of the recognition it received and its Local Agenda 21 model status, an argument could 
also be made that Vision 2020 provides an “ideal-typical” model. Representativeness is another 
rationale accepted by Yin for single-case design of a case study (2003, 41). There are limitations to 
the degree of representativeness that can be claimed and these are noted below. 
As a member of the public, I was one of roughly 1200 participants involved in developing Vision 
2020. I later served on the committee that organized Annual Sustainable Community Days, wrote 
columns on Vision 2020 for the local paper, and assisted as a resource person in a role-playing 
exercise for students. As well, I had maintained a file of newspaper clippings and magazine articles 
about Vision 2020 since 1992. My treatment of Vision 2020 also incorporates the lengthy and at 
times explosive controversy that surrounded the decision by the municipal Council to build an 
expressway through the Red Hill Valley. Prior to undertaking the present research I was also a 
participant in this issue as an opponent of the expressway.  
Vision 2020 was also of academic interest because at the time that it was being criticized as 
“utopian”, I was completing a MA thesis (Philosophy) on utopian thinking (Varangu, 1992). 





2.6.2 Case study methodology 
The case study is designed to benefit “from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2003, 12-13) that were arrived at using grounded theory 
methodology. Case studies do not require that the res archer approach the study without having a 
prior theoretical framework (Yin, 2003, 14). 
Pursuant to Yin’s technical definition of case studies, the purpose of this study was to investigate “ 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, specially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, 13). Because “values” attach so easily 
to other ideas, applying grounded theory to the cas study of sustainability planning engages other 
key issues, such as relations among societies, governments, and individuals. This makes the study 
“technically distinctive” (Yin, 2003, 12-13) because more than one variable is of interest. 
Yin cites five different purposes for using case studies as part of evaluation: explain, describe, 
illustrate, explore, and meta-evaluation. Of these, only meta-evaluation does not apply to this present 
study. The case study tests the explanatory power of a grounded theory on a subject matter that is “too
complex for the survey or experimental strategies”. Description is qualified here to include and not 
preclude having description serve particular purposes. The case study thus illustrates “certain topics” 
in a descriptive mode but is exploratory because there is “no clear, single set of outcomes” (Yin, 
2003, 15). 
 
2.7 Plausibility and Triangulation 
LeCompte and Preissle describe the purpose of triangul tion: 
“In land surveying, physical objects are located exactly by sighting, 
or triangulating, along several points, rather than just one location. 
Triangulation in social science research is similar, n that conclusions 
are assumed to be accurate only if they can be confirmed or 
corroborated by more than one data source…Triangulation, then, is a 
means of proof achieved by logical argument and the mustering of 
alternative sources of empirical evidence.” (1994, 9) 
Both grounded theory methodology and the case study methodology triangulated data internally, 
using multiple sources of data from different perspctives according to the methods discussed above. 
Grounded theory methodology ensured constant and ongoing movement between the level of details 
and level of generalisations, the essence of classification and another means by which to establish 
perspective. Triangulation for the study as a whole is supported by the application of the grounded 
theory about diverse usage to a particular case study of sustainability planning as a test of its 




2.7.1 Triangulation in grounded theory 
Sources of evidence and logical argument tell only part of the story. Ultimately it is the researcher’s 
treatment of perspectives afforded by the evidence that bears on plausibility and thus on triangulation. 
The empirical world is not knowable by humans except through human experience with it. Einstein 
encapsulated this in saying “Pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical 
world; all knowledge of reality starts from experienc  and ends in it” (1954 [1934], 271). Grounded 
theory methodology is a research process that is itself an experience. It ensures that the researcher is 
not isolated from the empirical world and raw evidenc  is not treated superficially. 
Grounded theory methodology encourages the researcher to recognize when triangulation has been 
achieved. It is the researcher’s responsibility to recognize when theoretical sampling is required and 
when theoretical saturation has been achieved. A deliberate effort was made in this study to ensure 
that the raw evidence of values usage represents as wide as possible range of diverse contexts, 
applications, and purposes. This might have been accomplished in a shorter time using fewer 
examples—I did continue to process new examples even aft r these appeared not to contribute 
something new to the existing body of evidence. I understand now that the purpose of this extended 
exercise was to use repetition to train my mind out of i s previous habits. Only gradually did I became 
accustomed to distinguishing between what Glaser and Strauss identified as the descriptive pre-
classification of values based on substantive characteristics on the one hand and the explanatory 
categories that are indicators of original thought. T is way of interacting with raw evidence requires 
the researcher consciously and deliberately to put on hold previous perceptions and understanding 
that may be based on descriptive categories. It is therefore the most challenging aspect of grounded 
theory methodology even as it is the most important f ctor in developing original theory.  
 
2.7.2 Triangulation in the case study 
Of Yin’s six sources of evidence, three apply to the present study: 
Data triangulation:  Four sources of evidence were collected from 1992 to 2005: The use of minutes 
of meetings, newspaper articles, administrative reports, and formal studies provided different 
perspectives of the same event. Applied to the present study, Yin’s list of strengths of documentation 
as a source of evidence are stability (“can be reviewed repeatedly”),  unobtrusiveness (“not created as 
a result of the case study”), exactness, and ability to cover a long span of time (2000, 86).  
Direct observation: I was actively involved during the event as a member of the public, not a 
researcher. Though I could not have predicted that I would revisit this event looking specifically for 
examples of values usage, I was a keen observer of the process even without the title of “researcher”. 
The advantage now is that I am familiar enough with the event to recognize factual errors in the 
documentation. I found one such error. On Yin’s list of the strengths of observation, I covered the 
events in real time and covered the context of the event (2000, 86). Potential weaknesses listed by Yin 
are selectivity (I supported the project and assisted in the process), time-consumption, reflexivity, and 
cost/hours required by observers (2000, 86). The latt r three are not applicable because at the time I 
had no particular interest in or sensitivity to usage of “values”, there was no study underway, and I 
was not acting as a researcher.  
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Participant observation: Through prior interactions, I was familiar enough with the context of the 
case study to be “insightful into interpersonal behaviour and motives” (Yin, 2000, 86). The potential 
weakness of participant observation as noted by Yin is “bias due to investigator’s manipulation of 
events” (2000, 86). Because this case study is historical, past events are documented. 
Interviews were not used as a source of evidence, even though these are described by Yin as “one 
of the most important sources of case study information” (2000, 88). The advantage would have been 
to solicit other perspectives about values usage, pot ntially augmenting triangulation. Using readily 
available written words provided a much more efficient means of uncovering spontaneous usage of 
“values”.  
 
2.7.3 Limitations, transferability and generalizabi lity  
Limitations 
In the analysis of values usage on which the grounded theory is based, examples in planning theory 
and applications were included along side examples from many other fields but accorded no special 
status. That the theory about diverse usage of values was not developed specifically from the 
perspective of planning or for the purpose of planning might be viewed by some as a restriction on 
the potential of such a theory to be useful to planners. 
This is a study of examples of the way that the word “values” is used. Such usage necessarily takes 
place in a broader social and historical context, not all of which can be brought to bear on a single 
example or in a single study.  
Using a method that depends on comparative logic may play a role in shaping the results of 
research. There is no denying that in this thesis both the research method and the conclusions about 
values are comparative in nature. Grounded theory methodology also encourages subjecting raw 
material and ideas about analysis to rigorous testing. In this thesis, Chapter 4 on Objections to Values 
Usage is used as a control for comparative logic. If both supporters and critics portray values as 
essentially relative, rather than absolute, this suggests that the claim that values are essentially relative 
carries more weight than if supporters or critics alone had portrayed values as essentially relative. 
   
Transferability and generalizability 
The explanatory potential and range of application of the theory about diverse usage is supported 
by being grounded in actual examples of values usage. Explanatory power with respect to planning is 
further tested by applying the theory about diverse u age to planning in general, to sustainability 
planning, and lastly to a particular case of sustainability planning. Together these address the general 
research question, whether explicit and deliberate use of “values” is neutral, beneficial, or detrimental 
to planning. 
Though the exact process and context may not be replicated elsewhere, Vision 2020 is an example 
of how a real-life planning process incorporated different usages of “values”. Although Vision 2020 
was designated as a model, in one respect at least it may be considered atypical. That this case 
involved a highly controversial local issue may limit transferability of results. It is also possible, 
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however, that if a better understanding of values might have been beneficial in this controversial case, 
planning processes not involving highly controversial issues may benefit likewise. The presence of a 
highly controversial issue is not unambiguously either a benefit or a detriment. 
 
2.8 Methodology and Values 
For the purposes of this study, I distinguish among the roles of values in 
1) research in general,  
2) research when descriptive, substantive values are the subject of investigation, and 
3) research when the study of values is exploratory about values in general.  
Of these three, the last may be judged by a more rigorous methodological standard because it also 
subsumes the first two. The present research is of this last type. 
Much attention has been paid to the influence of researchers’ values as biases, attitudes or 
preferences on research in general. As it pertains o the present study, this aspect of values is 
subsumed above in discussing the role of the research r. Methodology should assist the researcher in 
being wary of superimposing her own preconceptions. 
The second group pertains to studies that aim to describe values substantively. The role of 
methodology in such cases is to provide means to develop accurate descriptions of the substantive 
content of values, whether raw material is gathered by means of focus groups, surveys, or polling, and 
so on.  
Distinguishing between the first and second groups is not always straightforward. These two types 
of relation between values and methodology were conflated in the “Comparative Study of Values in 
Five Cultures”, more commonly known as the “Values Study” (Vogt and Albert, 1967). This 
landmark, large-scale study of values was the first of its kind, undertaken shortly after the end of 
WWII. At the time there was much excitement about the potential of “values” in the social sciences, 
particularly because of expectations about the potential of values for explaining and determining 
behaviour. Those who designed the study recognized the potential problem. 
“The role of values in the observer’s perceptions, which presumably 
affect all inquiry, is often confused with methodology for studying 
values as a distinct class of phenomena. These issus become 
entangled in disputes over basic and applied science.” (Vogt and 
Albert, 1967b, 5) 
Methodological problems in the study reflected “the problematic history of the values concept” 
(Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 3), in particular as the social sciences themselves had contributed to that 
history. Issues related to aspects of values, such as concern about researcher bias, continued “implicit 
or explicit dialogues with earlier theories” that were not always relevant to the study at hand (Vogt 
and Albert, 1967b, 5). 
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Although not necessarily presented in terms of “values”, this same phenomenon of attaching other 
issues to the central issue is evident in the conflicts among proponents of competing versions of 
grounded theory methodology. Issues specific to grounded theory methodology were argued on a 
broader level, bringing to the debate questions that applied to research in general. The result is that, o 
some extent at least, proponents of both versions of grounded theory methodology have perpetuated 
existing divisions about how research should be conducted, in dichotomies such as objectivity and 
subjectivity, positivism and constructivism, and so on.  
Research of the third group seeks to understand what is being claimed or intended when some thing 
or some idea is described as “a value”. In this type of research, methodology must satisfy not only the 
demands of the first two groups but additionally propose a plausible role for values in research 
design. The risks of conflation increase when the res arch is about non-substantive and non-
procedural aspects of values. This type of research is even more likely to be snared by existing 
theoretical disputes about values, disputes that pre-classify values and claim them for one or another 
theory or discipline or faith. Had this present research into values begun in a more traditional way by 
using existing theories about values as a springboard, then it too would have been more likely to take 
its direction from existing disputes that may themslves now function as descriptive/substantive 
categories to pre-classify further discussion or debat . 
The inclination to derive hypotheses from existing theories was one of the problems that spurred 
development of grounded theory methodology. Existing controversies about values are reflected in 
this thesis but the need to respond to existing disputes did not determine the research process. I was
therefore able to proceed without first defining values. Defining values before undertaking research 
would likely have been shaped by my own understanding of values at the time, by some attempt to 
anticipate a definition of values that might best serve planning, or, sadly, by frustration at being 
presented with so many ways of understanding “values” that feeling compelled to pick one may have 





DIVERSE USAGE OF VALUES: A BRIEF HISTORY  
3.1 Introduction 
The word “values” is so much a part of everyday life in the English-speaking Western world that it is 
hard even to imagine that it was not always so; that still today not all cultures have a word for 
“values”, and that whatever substance there might be to a general concept of values is fluid and in the 
process of developing. Since the late 1800s, the idea of “values” has undergone many changes as the 
word was applied in different ways to serve a variety of purposes. A sketch of the historical context in 
which values evolved may help in understanding why a variety of usages coexist today. 
To consider diverse usage historically, I postulate a fl xible and vague concept of values in general 
and treat what appear to be discretely and distinctly different usages of “values” as competing 
interpretations of values in general. An exhaustive list or schema of types of diverse usage of “values” 
may well be impossible to compile for the past and present and is surely impossible for the future. 
Examining examples of how diverse usage is and has been applied may be a useful way to improve 
understanding of values usage. 
   
3.1.1 Postulating a general concept of values 
Postulating a general concept of values—even without defining it—is a means to consider values in 
general as a group. Values usage is so varied, however, that even to posit something like a general 
concept may already be challenged as taking a step towards advocating some particular meaning of 
values in general over others. To say that a concept of values originated at some point or another in 
history is similarly contestable. 
Abraham Edel distinguishes between a general concept of value and “the idea of the worth or value 
of something” which “had always been around in the common language, but it had rarely been made 
the subject of philosophical analysis and controversy” (Edel, 1988, 14). Edel searched for roots of the 
concept of values prior to the 20th century but found none1 because he rejected approaches that used 
the word “value” or “values” in more limited application and did not appear to refer to a broader 
concept of value (Edel, 1988, 14).  
The assumption that there is a shared understanding “values” is common in literature about values. 
As a starting point, assumption of shared meaning may discourage awareness of the variety of usage 
and the need to consider how usages differ. For example, Edel’s orientation is from the social 
                                                  
1 Edel does mention a German connection in passing but focuses almost exclusively on origins of “values” in 
English-speaking Western culture. 
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sciences and his usage of “values” is applicable to more than moral values. Tony Moyers (1996), by 
contrast, focuses strictly on moral values not as aparticular usage but as if moral values were the 
totality of values. He compiles a descriptive history f moral values that extends back in time to 
ancient Egypt, predating any of the modern usages of “values”2. In order to accomplish this, Moyers 
uses the modern day understanding of “values” and superimposes it on his presentation of history3.  
Taken together, various explanations and histories f particular ways of understanding values in 
general may create a picture of a broader concept of values; a general, flexible, and vague concept of 
which there may be as many interpretations as therear  ideas to which “values” can be attached. 
Postulating the mere possibility of a concept does not require that the concept have a hardened or 
static definition; the mere possibility acts as a placeholder while its potential explanatory power is 
explored. Awareness of diverse usage of values in general may prompt reconsideration of particular 
usages that may previously have been considered the only possible usage, the only way of 
understanding values in general.  
 
3.1.2 Language as an indicator of a concept of valu es 
Merely by naming certain objects or ideas “values” we bring to bear the distinctive structure of the 
English language. The English meanings of “value”, “values”, and “value judgement” are matched 
most closely by the German nouns “Wert”, “Werte”, and “Werturteil” (Terrell et al., 1997). That 
values language originated uniquely in English and German speaking cultures was no accident; both 
of these languages have a propensity to see the world in terms of objects, of nouns. Other languages 
may place a more equal emphasis on nouns and verbs or shift the balance to make verbs dominant4 
(Abley, 2003; Grenoble and Whaley, 1998).  
                                                  
2 As discussed in Chapters One, Two, and Five, in order to avoid confusion between values and other 
descriptors with which the word “values” is often used as interchangeable, in this thesis only values usages that 
explicitly use the word “values” are considered as examples of values usage. Identifying implicit values requires 
already having particular usage that provides criteria for what counts as implicit usage of the word “values”. 
3 See Objection Two in Chapter 4 for an argument that superimposing the idea of values on material that was 
not originally presented in terms of values changes th  original material in ways that are not always ppreciated. 
4 In Spoken Here, Mark Abley contrasts emphasis on action in Amerindia  languages with noun-dependent Indo 
European languages. The Yuchi language spoken in the Oklahoma area is described by Mary Linn as being 
“stative/active, meaning that “instead of encoding the notion of ‘subject and object’ on nouns, like w do, Yuchi 
cares about the ability of that subject or object to initiate action; i.e. the animacy of the noun” (Abley, 2003, 73). 
Speaking of the Cree and Ojibwa people in Ontario, Rupert Ross is quoted as follows: “My Aboriginal friends 
talk a great deal about what it’s like to have to use English all day, and they generally describe it as a strain. If 
we truly recognized that we occupy a universe of constantly transforming things, people and relationships, then 




That there is often a lack of action associated with values has not gone unnoticed. In the early 
1900s, pragmatist philosopher John Dewey attempted to draw attention to the relation between 
flexible and vague valuing and “values”5. More recently, Dean Charles Lauter advocated an active 
way of understanding values to a class of graduating students at Lawrence University. Values that are 
both verbs and nouns are the “more powerful” values: 
“We have a serious problem, in that many of the values of a general 
nature that we consider most important exist only i the noun form; 
values such as peace, happiness, wisdom, honesty, ju tice, 
community, goodness, truth, courage. Each of them neds a helping 
verb to put it into action…those values that are verbs [are] some of 
the most potent and critical values we can utilize. These are such 
words as value itself, which has both the verb form, to value, and the 
noun form, a value.” (Lauter, 2000) 
The emergence of the noun “values” and its subsequent migration into popular language would not 
have happened had the word and idea not filled an empty space in language and thought, a space that 
language users chose to fill. In her “celebration of lost words”, Sperling introduces the reader to the 
notion that we place value judgements on words as a type of “natural selection” of the most fit:  
“Since the dawn of language, words have been going through a 
process of natural selection in which only the most fit urvive. Every 
one of us, as a reader, writer, and speaker, shapes the course of 
language by choosing the words we want to convey our message and 
rejecting those we deem inappropriate in one context or another. In 
short, we place value judgements on words…One must not infer that 
because a word died, it deserved never to have lived.” (1977, 1) 
From this perspective, all words are expressions and judgements about the value of each word in 
terms of whether it enhances the ability to communicate in particular contexts. The same applies to 
the word “values” itself—the word “values” too is an expression and judgement about the value of 
the word “values”, about the message that the word can convey. As an expression of value about 
values, the word “values” has a special stature. It can have rhetorical power and authority far beyond 
ordinary names and often appears to be in a position of privilege with respect to that authority not 
being open to challenge. 
To speak in English of “worths” today conveys none f the privileged stature attached to “values”. 
Ongoing debate about which word to use to talk about “values” was already evident in the late 1800s. 
One of the reasons the word “values” was preferred was because it was both a noun and a verb—and 
because the adjective “worthy” seemed to have a different meaning.  
                                                  
5 In “The Problem of Values”, Dewey asks whether “values antecede, or do they depend upon valuation – 
understanding by valuation a process of reflective estimation or judgment?…If they antecede, does valuation 




“Some English philosophers object to the use of the term Value as 
the equivalent of the Herbartian ‘Werth,’ and suggest that some such 
word as Worth would be more appropriate. I suppose it i  partly the 
want of a convenient corresponding verb, and in a less degree of a 
corresponding adjective (for ‘worthy’ seems to have  connotation 
which does not quite correspond) that has prevented the latter term 
from coming into general use. If this difficulty could be got over 
(say, by using ‘esteem’ and ‘estimable’ as verb and djective, it 
might be convenient to use ‘Worth’ as equivalent to Eigenwerth and 
to confine ‘Value’ to Wirkungswerth. It is a pity that we have not 
also a convenient word to describe subjective value, as distinguished 
from objective.” (Mackenzie, 1895, 448-9) 
More recently, George Grant (1969) and Edward Andrew (1995) argue in favour of using the word 
“worthy” in place of “values”, precisely because of its different meaning6. 
In 1968, Ethel Albert wrote “Few languages have a general term equivalent to ‘value’” (1968, 290). 
Some other languages shared variations or narrow meanings of “values” but until recently most other 
languages have not had a separate word that can represent a concept of values in general. Since the 
time of Albert’s observation, translations of “values” have spread prolifically into other languages. As 
English continues to influence global communication, some version (or versions) of the English 
“values” migrates to other languages and cultures. In other languages, these words too will be 
judgements about some aspect of “values”.  
From a linguistic perspective, values understood as judgements are necessarily contestable. In this 
respect they are unlike values used to represent something so unquestionably true that it is not in need 
of judgement, as when values are referred to as “abolute” or “intrinsic”. 
 
3.1.3 Nietzsche’s usage of “values” triggers a need  for a concept of values in general  
In the latter part of the 19th century in Germany, Nietzsche called for a “critique of all moral values” 
(1956, 155) and a determination of the “true hierarchy of values” (1956, 188). This critique was 
directed not only at the dominant religion and truth of his own society but also the value of religion 
and truth in general (Nietzsche, 1973, 15). Nietzsche’s call for “the transvaluation of all values—die 
Umwertung aller Werte,” amounted to a call for overturning of Western culture because “he 
undermined the epistemology, metaphysics, morality, science, and the very logic of Western thought” 
(Pletsch, 1991, 14). The tool Nietzsche used was a new application, a new usage, of “values”. For the 
purposes of the present thesis, two main features chara terize the “transvaluation7” of values: 
                                                  
6 These arguments are discussed in Chapter 4. Grant’s position is the starting point for Objection One; 
Andrew’s position is the starting point for Objection Two.  
7 The phrase “die Umwertung aller Werte” is variously translated as “transvaluation of all values”, “revaluation 
of all values”, and “re-evaluation of all values”. “Transvaluation” is the English word used commonly i  
scholarly journals prior to the Second World War. In the 1960s, Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale 
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(1) No idea should be considered so sacred, absolute r privileged that its value cannot or 
should not be questioned. 
(2) How values come to be values matters.  
Outside of economics, calling something “a value” previous to this was not an invitation to debate 
about the extent and conditions under which something might or not be valuable. To ask “how 
valuable?” would have introduced something foreign to the philosophical use of “value”. So long as it 
was only a word with an unambiguous meaning, “values” had no need of a larger concept8. Nietzsche 
used the word “values” to introduce the possibility that what were called ideals or values or absolute 
truth might be no more than illusions and could be challenged. This new usage expanded the range of 
how it was possible to understand “values” and preci itated the emergence of a broader concept of 
values9. The notion that values are unambiguously and certainly valuable continues today as one of 
many usages of “values”. 
                                                                                                                                               
popularized Nietzsche’s writings in their translations. Both used “revaluation”, notably in their joint translation 
of The Will to Power (1967). Brian Leiter also uses “revaluation” in his Nietzsche on Morality (2002). Earlier, 
Francis Golffing had used “transvaluation” in transl ting Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals (1956).  
The Random House Dictionary (1987) defines revaluation as “to make a new or revised valuation” but 
transvaluation as “to reestimate the value of, esp on a basis differing from accepted standards”, dating usage 
back to 1905-10. One of the translations for the German prefix “um” in “Umwertung” is the English word 
“about”, applicable here in the sense of “turn-about” rather than “pertaining to”. Applied here it suggests an 
“about-turning of values” rather than simply a revaluation. Nietzsche’s call was for a new process of valuation 
in the strong sense of valuating again entirely differently. His “good and bad” valuation used a completely 
different set of criteria, amounting to an overturning of conventional values rather than the weaker sense of 
revaluation. 
8 Discussions about which values were best or consistent or most desirable could take place irrespectiv of 
whether the idea of values was attached to absolute or understood as relative. Nietzsche’s usage of values was 
new because it acted on the level of values in general rather than on the level of particular values or particular 
positions about values. See Objection One in Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion of the novelty and 
implications of Nietzsche’s usage. 
9 Edward Andrew credits Hermann Lotze with having introduced American philosophy to “values discourse” in 
the 1880s when Lotze’s works were translated into English (1995, 5). In 1890, George Santayana uses the word 
“value” in relation to both Lotze and Hegel: “The difference is not great between a person who, like Hegel, 
finds the value of the world in the idea it expresses, and one who, like Lotze, finds it in the divine happiness it 
produces” (1890, 201). In 1895 J. S. Mackenzie cites Kant as previously having proposed the terms “Fancy 
Value, Market Value, and Dignity or Worth, where Fancy Value corresponds to subjective value and Dignity or 
Worth to Eigenwerth [intrinsic values]” (1895, 449). What is lacking, says Mackenzie, is a way to talkabout 




 Almost immediately, Nietzsche’s writing was a subject of discussion in English language scholarly 
journals10. By 1897 an eleven volume translations of his collected works was underway11. In its new 
application to social life, epistemology, and morality, the idea that “values” could be either right or 
wrong or good or bad was different from the narrow economic sense in which values had previously 
been understood as synonymous with “price” or as the products of desire and demand12. It was 
different too from utilitarian calculative approaches to values, approaches that measured fit but did 
not necessarily question the value of whatever value was used as a criterion (Means, 1880). The new 
application also differed from previous use of “values” as synonymous with moral and ethical 
ideals13. For better or worse, Nietzsche’s new usage of “values” made social, religious, moral, and 
epistemological values potentially contestable and negotiable.  
The idea that values could be examined or quantified had roots in a broader social and 
philosophical context. For example, in A History of the Modern Fact, Mary Poovey tracks the 
conjoined history of facts and values in 18th century Britain, asking “How and why did happiness and 
value come to be understood as concepts that could be quantified (and by extension commodified)?” 
(1998, 280). The theological utilitarian movement tended “to discuss virtue in mathematical terms” 
(Poovey, 1998, 282) but that movement failed to garner support for the idea that facts could be truer 
than values. People believed that real truth was known by faith, by values, and were suspicious of the 
                                                  
10 Examples of early authors are W.F. Trotter in 1897, Charles M. Bakewell in 1899, and Charles Gray Shaw in 
1901. In 1907 Erville Bartlett Woods of the University of Chicago discusses values in relation to the concept of 
progress. He discusses the work of three writers who take a “natural-process theory of moral values”—one f 
whom is Nietzsche. Woods also cites another American author’s treatment of Nietzsche, Grace Neal Dolson 
(1907, 796). Georg Simmel’s “A Chapter in the Philosophy of Value” was published in The American Journal 
of Sociology in 1900.  
11 In 1897, W. F. Trotter reviews Alexander Tille’s collection of Nietzsche’s works in English. He starts by 
noting that the collected works is evidence of “The increasing attention which is being paid to Nietzsche” in 
Britain (1897, 258). Tille’s translation is also discussed by Bakewell in 1899. 
12 In criticizing the narrow approach to values as deires by economists, J. S. Mackenzie writes “It seems an 
abuse of language to say that in the strict sense, we value anything without reflecting upon it and comparing it 
with a standard…whether or not we are to maintain that the consciousness of value involves a judgment in the 
ordinary logical sense…it can hardly be denied at le st that the consciousness of value involves judgment in the 
sense of judgement upon. It is one of the normative facts in our psychical life. It involves comparison with a 
standard, and this surely implies judgment…Desire involves feeling, but it also involves the apprehension of an 
object: value involves feeling, but it also involves reflection upon a standard of comparison or upon the idea of 
an end.” (1895, 435) 
13 Andrew credits Lotze with being the first “to unite the morally good with beauty, happiness and holiness ‘into 
one complex of all that has Value’” (1995, 5). In 190 , Charles Gray Shaw of New York University was aware 
of both Lotze and Nietzsche. 
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use of numbers to represent truth. At that time, th idea of measurement “had less to do with 
quantification than with determining the ‘fit’ between the action and God’s laws” (Poovey, 1998, 
282). The now generally assumed close association between the idea of measurement and the idea of 
quantification came much later. 
Where determination of “fit” was the primary purpose of examining values, the standards by which 
value was judged were set by religious faith. Because the standards themselves were never in 
question, the word “values” could refer to both the products of determinations of fit and the standards 
used to determine fit; no purpose would be served by istinguishing between these two usages. 
Whether some value was actually valuable or not was not a meaningful question, provided that two 
other ideas remained unchallenged:  
(1) religious faith itself and  
(2) the idea that faith, whatever its substantive character, embodied real truth—something 
that facts and numbers could not.  
Nietzsche’s usage of “values” in the late 1800s challenged not only values as the products of 
determinations of fit but also the very standards used to determine fit, the truths of religious and 
metaphysical faith. This new usage of “values” raised the possibility of fallibility with respect to 
claims about truth and goodness. Was “value” something t at could be proven or justified? If so, 
how?—by empirical means, by religious insight, by mathematics, by metaphysics, by analytical logic, 
by reason, by instinct, by ethics…how? Once the idea of “values" becomes fallible, it develops into a 
general concept, the appropriate application of which appears to follow no rules and has no bounds 
except as these are stipulated in and for specific applications.  
 
3.2 Early Years of Values 
3.2.1 Values and democracy 
Nietzsche attacked ideas and institutions that crushed individual human will and derided the masses 
that unquestioningly followed their leaders. Although Nietzsche was known for favouring aristocracy 
over democracy14, Nietzsche’s new usage of values as essentially contestable was almost immediately 
recognized as a tool that had significant potential for democratic societies.  
                                                  
14 Nietzsche’s position on democracy is much too complex to be encapsulated briefly and definitively here. In 
part this is because of a writing style that expects the reader to “ruminate”: “One skill is needed—lost today, 
unfortunately—for the practice of reading as an art: the skill to ruminate, which cows possess but modern man 
lacks. This is why my writings will, for some time y t, remain difficult to digest” (Nietzsche, 1956 [1887], 157). 
Ease of encapsulation is hampered because not all of his positions on democracy are stated explicitly and need 
to be extrapolated in light of possible implications. Interpretations range widely and the passage of time has 
made the question more, not less, complex. The moretraditional interpretation is of Nietzsche proposing a 
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Professor John Stuart Mackenzie was a prolific author of journal articles from the late 1800s to the 
1930s, broadly cited by others. He is generally described as belonging to the British Idealist School, 
best known for its metaphysical belief in absolutes, r jecting atomistic individualism, and reacting 
against empiricism. That his starting point was so different from Nietzsche’s would seem to 
predispose him to attack and dismiss the new usage of values, as many did15. As an idealist and as 
someone whose focus was on both the scholarly and practical political import of moral values16, 
Mackenzie’s positive reaction to Nietzsche’s usage of “values” may provide some useful insight into 
                                                                                                                                               
society in which values favour the elite, where “The higher must not be made an instrument of the lower” 
(Nietzsche, 1956 [1887], 261). Georg Simmel describes the values Nietzsche supports as a “depreciation of all 
democratic ideals” (1991 [1907], 141). Further, “…Nietzsche’s liberalism is not of the familiar kind. It 
espouses, certainly, a social idea, but one in which t e technique of orientation toward social goals is based on 
individual freedom and on the accentuation of individual being…[and] “specific individuals are unequal a 
priori ” (1991 [1907], 146-7). Edward Andrew describes Nietzsche as sharing Aristotle’s “aristocratic 
anticommercialism” (1995, 14) and prompting the “Nietzscheanization of the American academy…manifest not 
only in the ubiquity of values-discourse but also in the universal espousal of pluralist values…their common 
aspiration to be more pluralist than anyone else” (1995, 157). The 10th International Conference of ISSEI 
(International Society for the Study of European Ideas) in July 2006 includes a workshop on “Nietzsche, 
Europe, Democracy”.  The pre-conference description of this workshop states “As a fundamental principle of 
his political philosophy Nietzsche emphasizes that ‘t e democratization of Europe is irresistible’ (ISSEI, 2006). 
In reviewing Brian Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche (2002) Bernard Reginster objects that Leiter 
“’democratizes’ Nietzsche’s ideas too much” (2003). Hollingdale describes Nietzsche as prompting 
consideration of what democracy really means—“Do you want total democracy (to paraphrase Dr Goebbels) or 
do you think we have sufficient or do you want less? Or don’t you want anything very much? None of these 
questions can be answered by Nietzsche, but he can suggest that there are ways of considering them which have 
not yet occurred to you” (Hollingdale’s preface in Nietzsche, 1968, 10). Simmel notes “It has frequently been 
stressed that Nietzsche’s doctrine is in opposition to his personality: a rude, warlike, and yet bacchntic cry 
erupts from an extremely sensitive, quiet, introspectiv , and lovable man…But nobility is the point at which the 
ideal Nietzsche teaches and the reality of his nature meet: it is the high-water mark of his personal being from 
which he floats into the empire of human desire” (Simmel, 1991 [1907], 179-180). 
15 Two of Nietzsche’s most strident critics were Trotter (1897) and Bakewell (1899). Bakewell questions why a 
writer “at first sight, so bizarre, so absurd, so blasphemous” would be so in vogue. He complains that Nietzsche 
is being treated as a prophet “by the unthinking and u critical crowd” and “by the half-cultured youth”, asking 
why he has been “taken up in academic circles, particularly in Germany and special courses…devoted, in all 
seriousness, to the consideration of his views”. Because of this positive reception, Bakewell considers 
understanding Nietzsche’s work all the more important, whether one agrees with it or not.   
16 Mackenzie was President of the “Moral Instruction League” in London (Mackenzie, 1908, 273, ftnt. 1). 
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the roots of subsequent diverse usage. As well, Mackenzie’s fluency in German allowed him to play 
an important role in disseminating German ideas about the new values usage in Britain and 
internationally through journal articles.  
In 1900 Mackenzie explores “the source of moral obligation” in a presentation to the Bristol Ethical 
Society (1900, 464). He begins by observing that “scepticism and agnosticism” appear to becoming 
more widespread in his own society17. 
“What I mean is…that in our time scepticism has distinctly begun to 
creep—as it did in the time of the Greek Sophists—into the practical 
aspects of life, as well as into the more purely theoretical. I do not 
think that this would have been as true of the last generation as it is 
of this…Speculative doubt did not in many such insta ces materially 
affect practical moral conviction. Whatever may be true of other 
countries, our country has in the main been faithful, in profession, if 
not in practice…to the great moral traditions which are broadly 
associated with the ideas of Christianity…But I think there is some 
change…I do not mention this as a sign of deterioration’; for I am 
not at all sure that it is.” (Mackenzie, 1900, 465-466)  
Mackenzie observes that Nietzsche would have “seemed more surprising in the last generation” 
(1900, 466) when people were less in the habit of being sceptical. The “skeptical habit of mind” that 
had previously been characteristic of “more purely speculative problems” is now characteristic of 
how people address questions of “practical morality”. He predicts “…that this questioning attitude of 
Nietzsche will become more common as time goes on” (1900, 467). As this questioning attitude 
                                                  
17 Nietzsche makes a similar observation in 1887: “…The smell of a failure, or a soul that has gone stale...We 
no longer see anything these days that aspires to grow greater; instead, we have a suspicion that things will 
continue to go downhill, becoming ever thinner, more placed, smarter, cosier, more ordinary, more indifferent, 
more Chinese, more Christian—without doubt man is getting ‘better’ all the time…This is Europe’s true 
predicament: together with the fear of man we have also lost the love of man, reverence for man, confide ce in 
man, indeed the will to man. Now the sight of man makes us despond. What is nih lism today if not that?” 
(1956, 178).  
In 1899 Bakewell describes Nietzsche as a product of his time whose writings reflected “certain very wide-
spread tendencies and favorite theories of this dying century” (1899, 315): “The reception which Nietzsche’s 
works are being accorded shows that he is far from standing alone; that the feeling of discontent with all present 
moral standards, which he has made articulate, is shared by many of his contemporaries” (1899, 314). That a 
writer reflects historical context may be a benign observation in most cases, but observing this of someone who 
argued for perspectivism, for recognizing horizons tied to perspectives, this observation is potentially more 
incisive. It raises the question of whether Nietzsche’s work may be so bound to its own time and place that it 
may not apply in other contexts, or, if it applies, then perhaps for different reasons and with different 
implications.    
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becomes more common, it will be “more and more necessary for those who believe in moral 
principles to be able to give some reason for the faith that is in them” (1900, 467).  
Nietzsche’s usage of values did not single-handedly destroy the firm foundations of traditional 
societies but was a product of its time, reflecting a d articulating an already existing social trend. 
Mackenzie notes that not everyone agrees with him tat development of such a questioning attitude 
might be a positive development; others view sceptiism as an expression of fearfulness and 
pessimism, a necessary consequence of losing firm and certain foundations.   
“They fear that we are losing our old anchorage before we have 
found any new moorings, and that a general decay of moral purpose 
is to be anticipated, giving rise to a recrudescence of barbarism.” 
(Mackenzie, 1900, 467)  
Such scepticism has arisen, he says, because the populati n is undergoing a second change in moral 
and social consciousness. The first change in the British people’s moral and social consciousness was 
in response to the “economic or social problem” in the 1800s. Before that time, people were 
individualists; since that time they have become “social-problemists” (1900, 468). 
“…recognition of this problem has, to a great extent, altered men’s 
moral conceptions. The good man of two generations ago was an 
individualist—not in the sense in which an individualist is opposed 
to a socialist, but in the sense in which one who thinks mainly of 
personal obligations is opposed to one who thinks mainly of social 
obligations…The good man of our time is one who thinks, not of 
personal virtues and duties, but of trades-unions and municipalities 
and model dwellings. This transformation has meant an enlargement 
of our interests, a shifting of our centre of gravity, a readjustment of 
our moral estimates. But we have accommodated ourselves to all 
that, and it no longer suggests any very searching inquiry into the 
basis of moral obligation.” (Mackenzie, 1900, 468-9) 
The British person with a recently expanded sense of moral and social conscience is now again 
confronted by a new need to expand the scope of moral and social conscience. British imperialism has 
consequences that demand a conception of individuals as part of an even larger society.  
“…this enlarged consciousness of our relations to the world has 
come to us in a somewhat disagreeable way, and has been 
accompanied by much that is in the highest degree objectionable – 
by much, even, that might not unreasonably lead us to fear that we 
are losing some of the best results of our past civilization, rather than 
advancing to anything better. But it should be rememb red that the 
same might have been said of the early beginnings of our social 
consciousness.” (Mackenzie, 1900, 469) 
Mackenzie describes this period as just as great an w kening for his contemporaries as it was for 
their grandfathers to learn that more than being indiv duals they were also members of a British 
society. Both events become stages in the development of “social consciousness”, neither presenting 
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itself clearly at first “as an enlargement of the moral consciousness” (1900, 469). In both situations 
people must learn what are their duties and obligations in the new context (1900, 470).  
Mackenzie makes it clear that he is “not an admirer of Nietzsche” and does not agree with 
Nietzsche’s claims that “Christian morality is a morality of slaves”. Nevertheless, suggests 
Mackenzie, what Nietzsche has written about slave mentality may be applicable to British society, 
particularly before individuals gained a sense of themselves as members of society. 
“But I think this statement may be applied with some truth to express 
the general nature of the advance that is at the present moment 
demanded. The moral consciousness of this country a couple of 
generations ago was not that of slaves; but I think it was too much 
that of men who did not sufficiently realize how far it was possible 
for them to control the conditions of their lives. The economic 
changes of the past century have to a large extent impressed on 
men’s minds the great possibilities that lie before them…It would be 
low indeed…if we were to renounce these great obligations, and hark 
back to those merely individual ideals which were indeed by 
comparison little better than a morality of slaves.” (Mackenzie, 1900, 
470-471) 
A “progressive morality” does not support unquestioningly following the authority of either a 
leader or an idea, for “there is something slavish in t e thought of an authority which we are simply to 
obey” (Mackenzie, 1900, 475). 
“…modern thought, as contrasted with the thought of the ancient 
Greeks, has tended too much to express moral ideas as if they 
depended on some law above us, instead of some end that we seek to 
realize. I believe that the morality of Christianity was in essence a 
morality for freemen...But its significance had partly been forgotten; 
and, I think, it is true that we have to learn to emancipate ourselves 
again.” (Mackenzie, 1900, 475) 
What a “progressive morality” requires is that peopl  know and care about who it is that has 
authority in their society rather than holding tighly to “established traditions”. Mackenzie says that 
this is what he means by claiming there is a need to understand “the source of our obligations” (1900, 
471). One by one, Mackenzie considers and rejects as potential sources of authority the state, “the 
will of a divine power”, conscience, and reason.  
“And thus we are led away from the idea of a law that stands as an 
authority above us to the idea of some good at which it is reasonable 
for us to aim.” (Mackenzie, 1900, 475) 
That Mackenzie applies Nietzsche’s usage of values b t comes up with a different answer, 
demonstrates how “a questioning attitude” to values n ed not result in the same conclusions. This 
leads Mackenzie to an idea of “some good” that requi s that individuals reject unquestioning 
allegiance to higher authority in order to aim for c mmon good.  A questioning attitude towards the 
idea of “good” can rescue Christianity as a “morality for freemen”. It is substantively different from 
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Nietzsche’s claims that Christianity is a dangerous ill ion that represses the human will. Nietzsche’s 
usage of values, in Mackenzie’s hands, is theoretically and practically supportive of progressive 
morality and social democracy.   
Eight years later, Mackenzie continues to promote Nietzsche’s ideas as being helpful to social 
democrats. In a presentation to the Moral Instruction League, Mackenzie considers two different 
types of a moral ideal, the more common civic ideal and the other more challenging ideal, best 
represented by Nietzsche’s prototypical “Superman”. 
“One is what we may call the civic ideal, the ideal of social service, 
of self-sacrificing devotion to the welfare of the community in which 
we live…Against this…we have the ideal of which in recent times 
Nietzsche is the most eloquent apostle— the ideal of the ‘Superman,’ 
the realization of a strong individuality, the ideal that urges one by 
all means to love his neighbor as himself, but firsto make sure that 
he really does love himself…The establishment of such an ideal 
would, as Nietzsche puts it, involve a ‘transvaluation of all values,’ a 
reconsideration of what is really to be admired andpraised in human 
life.” (Mackenzie, 1908, 276-7)  
That both these two types (and others) already exist in people’s minds creates difficulties for moral 
education. One remedy is to cultivate both the “individual side” and the “social side” of people. The 
Moral Instruction League, he says, “has been wise in adding the word ‘citizenship’ to ‘moral 
instruction’ in its syllabuses” (1908, 279) to promte the civic ideal. As well, those who teach morals 
should look for what moral ideals have in common, substantive ideas to which all moral ideals “attach 
value”. These are “qualities” to which people in general “attach value”. 
“There is a great difference between the Utilitarian and the 
Intuitionist, between Nietzsche and Tolstoi, between the Christian 
saint and the citizen-soldier; but I think you would find that they all 
attach value, though in somewhat varying degrees, to uch qualities 
as courage…, self-denial…, regard for others…, kindness to animals, 
honesty, fairness of mind, self-control, perseverance, thoughtfulness, 
interest in human progress…And it is, in fact, these general and 
common elements, which may very easily be made the basis for 
more special developments in different directions.” (Mackenzie, 
1908, 280) 
Mackenzie’s application of Nietzsche’s usage of values to social democracy predates both world 
wars and is in sharp contrast to the blame cast mere d cades later on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra for 
inspiring the Superman of the Nazis18,19. The new usage of “values” requires the reconsideration of all 
                                                  
18 George Grant argues that Hitler would have been the prototype of the weak revenge seeker that Nietzsche o 
clearly despised. Nevertheless, Nietzsche must bear some responsibility.  
“The very clarity and force of his criticism of the European past liberated many Germans from the traditional 
religious and moral restraints of their tradition, so that they were opened to a barren nihilism which was a fertile 
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values, irrespective of beliefs about their immunity to challenge. Slavish obedience to ideas is as 
inconsistent with democracy as is slavish obedience to l aders. Even those values that may appear to 
be common to all humans cannot claim privileged stature, because not all people “attach value” to 
them in the same way. 
The contestability of values applies also to the idea of democracy itself—to the value placed on or 
“attached to” democracy. As evidence of his willingness to apply the contestability of values even to 
what he himself favours most, in an article titled “The Dangers of Democracy” (1906) Mackenzie 
considers the value of democracy. He recognizes that not everyone will support his willingness to 
examine an idea that at the time is being proclaimed with “religious fervour”, as having “infinite” and 
“transcendent” value, and as “an end in itself” (1906, 130-131).   
As earlier Mackenzie had explored the “source of moral bligation” (1900, 464) by examining and 
assessing the most likely competing explanations, here too he attempts to build the strongest possible 
argument against democracy by considering the objections of its severest critics. He considers and 
responds to the preferences of Plato for an aristocacy of merit and to the concerns of Aristotle that 
democracy serves the interests of the state, not people of the state. He refutes objections that 
democracies do not represent the general will, do not or cannot accomplish what they purport to 
accomplish, and promote what is of least, not most value. Mackenzie concludes that a democratic 
society is not one that corresponds to some static def nition or ideal but is the responsibility of those 
who shape it. Democracy can be both “the rule of the people” and “the rule of the best” (1906, 140). 
Such an approach to democracy allows Mackenzie to conclude that ideals and a questioning attitude 
are not incompatible so long as the value of ideals is examined closely rather than simply assumed. 
“…everything that is worth anything in human life is or contains an 
ideal. The important thing is that the ideal we have before us should 
be something that has real value…if we mean by Democracy a real 
self-government of the people, each one being allowed to do, and 
trusted to do, that for which he is best fitted, then I believe we mean 
something which has a considerable value for us, even if we do not 
wholly succeed in achieving it. Even only to aim at it, is to realize its 
spirit and to realize its spirit is to go a long way towards its complete 
achievement.” (Mackenzie, 1906, 141) 
                                                                                                                                               
field for the extremities and absurdities of National Socialism. Nor do I imply that his lucid but immoderate 
rhetoric is the best way to put forth one’s thoughts. Indeed it might have been better for humanity if Nietzsche’s 
works of high genius had never been written, or if wr tten, published. But to raise this possibility implies that it 
is better, at least for most men, not to be told where they are...From whom should some knowledge be hidden? 
How much is it good for any one person to know?” (1969, 24-25). 
19 The Nazi application of Nietzsche’s usage of values provides another example of how the area of application 
can modify values usage. Where Mackenzie the Idealist academic and practical moralist applied it in one way, 
the Nazi usage appropriated what was useful and eliminated the idea that a questioning attitude should be 
attached to values.  
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Whether an ideal has “real value” can not be intuited but can be assessed rationally. The way to 
accomplish this type of democracy and to guard against the dangers raised by the objections is to 
cultivate the spirit of citizenship (1906, 142). The only real serious danger faced by democracy “is 
that it may fail to be true to itself, that it may forget its own ideals” (1906, 144). A questioning 
attitude even about the value of democracy as an ideal value is not a threat to democracy but a means 
to secure and sustain it. 
 
3.2.2 Setting the stage for diverse usage by detach ing values from absolutes 
As the word and idea “values” began more generally to acquire an identity separate from broader 
consideration of “what is valuable”, articles about values appear with increasing frequency in 
scholarly journals20. As several scholars cited below attest, this activity was generated by Nietzsche’s 
use of the term in the late 1800s to identify what he perceived as false beliefs or illusions. This usage 
of “values” made it possible to challenge all such phenomena together as a group, making possible an 
across-the-board challenge of values—what Nietzsche call d the “transvaluation” of values. On this 
usage, calling something “a value” automatically meant that its claim to truth was being challenged. 
As well, because what Nietzsche identified as false beliefs were the dominant beliefs in the society of 
his day, to call something “a value” was to challeng  ot only the truth of beliefs about value but also 
the broad social agreement that supported the dominant beliefs.  
In an overview of the first quarter of the 20th century, Wilbur Urban describes the phrase 
“transvaluation of values” as the most significant of he Darwinian epoch for having detached the idea
of values from absolutes and linked values to perspective. 
“The category of value is, to be sure, in a sense as old as philosophy. 
But in another sense the realm of values is new to exploration and it 
is only in our day that this exploration has been undertaken with all 
the resources of modern psychological and logical an ysis. It is 
scarcely necessary to indicate the various causes which have led to 
this exploration. They may perhaps be summed up in the phrase 
‘transvaluation of all values,’ which bids fair, when our epoch is seen 
in its true perspective, to be recognized as the most significant phrase 
of the Darwinian epoch.” (Urban, 1926, 101) 
Urban writes prolifically about values in the early 1900s. In 1908 he observes “There has scarcely 
been a time in the history of thought when the problem of “value” has so occupied the centre of 
                                                  
20 Articles in scholarly journals are used here as the primary source for considering the discourse about val es in 
the early years of the concept. Despite diverse appro ches and applications, common themes echo througout 
the early literature about values. A search for the term “values” turns up articles about values beginning in the 
late 1800s in all of the following journals: The American Journal of Sociology, The Philosophical Review, The 
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, American Sociological Review, International 
Journal of Ethics, Mind, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, and The American Journal of Theology. 
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attention as at the present” (1908, 42). Others agree. Jared S. Moore declares 1909 the official year of 
birth of values as philosophy, a new stage in the sudy of values.  
“The year 1909 was marked by the birth of a new philosophical 
discipline—the philosophy of values. In saying this, I do not, of 
course, mean to imply that the problem of values is in any sense a 
new one, but that during the past year for the first time the systematic 
description, classification, and explanation of values was entered 
upon quite independently by several of our foremost thinkers.” 
(Moore, 1910, 282) 
In the war-time of 1917, Herbert Schneider’s observations leave no doubt that there has been much 
discussion about values, not only as a topic of scholarly interest but also as one propelled by events:  
“The problem of values has been in the front ranks of the battle-line 
so persistently during recent years that it may seem d sirable to let it 
rest in peace for a while. It has been attacked from all sides, and 
some claim to have vanquished it. It still seems to have some life, 
however; in fact its very hardiness invites attentio . It is evidently a 
vital problem in current thought, and the events in Europe seem to 
have revived rather than extinguished its vitality.” (1917, 141) 
In a few short decades of use, there has been so much attention to values from so many different 
directions that there is already confusion about values usage. Already there is enough use of “ethical 
theory” and “values” as interchangeable that Schneider needs to remind his readers that the former 
arose “independently”.  
“The problem of goods, good and the Good, is an ancient one for 
philosophy, but it was not until comparatively recently that 
psychology became interested in it. Apparently it did not like the 
terms ‘good’ and ‘goods,’ perhaps because of their m taphysical and 
theological connotations, perhaps because of their ‘objectivity,’ so it 
adopted and adapted terms which were better suited to its purposes, 
namely, ‘value’ and ‘worth.’” (Schneider, 1917, 141).  
To clarify what values are and what they are not, Schneider proposes closer attention to language, 
particularly to the distinction between “the adjective ‘valuable’” and “the noun ‘value’” (Schneider, 
1917, 145).  
“Current usage has …identified the term ‘values’ with ‘valuables,’ so 
that one can often hardly tell which of the two meanings is 
employed, and considerable confusion has resulted…On the whole, I 
think, the term ‘value,’ when used concretely (a value, values, etc.), 
is used in the sense of “something valuable,’ ‘a valuable object.’ I 
shall attempt to keep this distinction, and where I do not substitute 
the terms ‘valuables’ or ‘valuableness’ the context will, I hope, make 




Although Schneider’s attempt at a solution may have added to confusion, this tendency to turn to 
semantics to find a solution to the problems created by diverse usage has persisted21.  Schneider’s 
frustration is directed at reclaiming the meaning of a word, a meaning that in a relatively short time 
already appears to be going astray. “Values” began as a rejection of “absolutist ethical theory”. They 
served that purpose by drawing attention to the need for “revaluation and reorganization of social 
activities.” But now, says Schneider, values have be n 
“…pressed into service to bolster up the very thing to which it 
constituted a reaction. Certain values have been apotheosized and 
given absolute significance; they are viewed as things to be 
conserved. The plea here is that the psychology of values should not 
turn traitor to its own cause by becoming a conservative and 
conservator.” (1917, 154) 
Schneider’s assessment of the problem foreshadows the confusion, contradiction, and cross-
purposes that would continue be attached to the word and concept of values. In such a short period in 
the life of an idea, its meaning is already being subverted. What began as a challenge to absolutes is 
itself now being used to justify absolutes. 
One clue as to what might have inspired such an contest between ways of understanding “values” 
comes in 1880, from D. M’ G. Means’ review of Spencr’s criticisms of utilitarian methods and 
positions. At issue are questions such as whether deductive reasoning might be used to derive moral 
values in mathematical fashion (Means, 1880, 400), whether values are essentially relative (Means, 
1880, 397), and Spencer’s claim that “no part of conduct can be understood unless we understand the 
whole, not only of human but also of animal conduct, and not only all present but all past conduct” 
(Means, 1880, 400). Means argues that this attempt to remove all uncertainty is bound to lead to 
errors in estimating what is valuable.  
“[Spencer’s] system has the strength and the weakness of other 
systems that assume a knowledge of final causes…But no such 
system is favourable to freedom, for it involves the belief in a part of 
mankind that the freedom of the rest can lead only to their misery. 
The only ground of freedom is in the uncertainty of the future. 
Remove that, and the lives of all men ought to be marked out for 
them, and any divergence from what is known to be for the general 
good must be punished. This is the doctrine of the Roman Church. It 
is also a doctrine to be learned from [Spencer’s] Data of Ethics.”  
(Means, 1880, 402) 
The tension between a desire for certainty and recogniti n of the significant, if often 
unacknowledged, importance of uncertainty continued to play a role in values usage. Satisfying the 
                                                  
21 In 1988, for example, Edel suggests Dewey’s approach to values might have been understood better if 
“linguistic chance had fastened on the term ‘worth’ ather than ‘value’….There would have been less 
temptation to make a substantive out of value and a readier attentiveness to context and process” (1988, 1 ). 
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desire for certainty, prematurely or not, sees values treated as firm ground. A questioning attitude 
towards values allows uncertainty and the possibility of fallibility to be part of study and learning.  
Diverse usage emerged early in the life of the new concept of values, setting set the stage for 
subsequent diversity of usage. Nietzsche’s usage of “values” may have reflected prevailing concerns 
and perhaps precipitated renewed efforts to defend the connection between the idea of values and the 
idea of certainty. By treating the aspiration to firm ground as merely an illusion of certainty, 
Nietzsche’s usage of “values” may have exacerbated social instability and feelings of uncertainty. A 
new version of values-as-certain usage emerged in response. It differed from the prior treatment of 
absolutes as ideals in being a more mature and overt rej ction of a challenge that simply could not be 
ignored. Firmness and certainty attached to claims that something is valuable could no longer be 
assumed to be the default usage of “values”. Mackenzie, the idealist, accepted that values would have 
to be justified and maintained that this was compatible with the use of ideals. Those who disagreed 
would continue to use the word with an unambiguously positive and firm meaning.  
Treated as contested meanings of a newly emerging ge eral concept of values, both values-as-not-
certain and values-as-certain may be diverse attemps to grapple with the same challenges rather than 
discretely isolated from one another. This also suggests that how a general concept of values is 
understood may change depending on what particular usages are dominant at any given time. The 
concept may not exist independently of its constitutive parts, of diverse particular usage of “values”. 
 
3.3 Values Usage Continues to Diversify 
The relation between individuals and states, whether the value of ideals such as democracy could or 
should be contested, the need for individuals to make reasoned judgements about value, how to know 
what was valuable and what was not, whether values could or not provide firm ground—all of these 
opened up new arenas in which “values” could be used. As social, economic, and political contexts 
changed and events generated new ways of addressing such issues, the everyday world too became a 
source for new and diverse usage of values.  
 
3.3.1 The role of context in shaping diverse usage 
To explain the major influences and growing popularity of the concept of values, Edel identifies three 
broad trends that influenced values in the early 20th century.  
(1)  Industrialism created a need for consumers to choose amongst commodities. Free choice also 
became possible in other areas—“in occupation, in marriage, in residence, in mode of life, even in 
ideas” (1988, 19). Free choice and the decision model emphasized comparison and measurement. 
“Choice requires comparison of alternatives and some measurement 
of properties and some measurement of properties. The 
pervasiveness of measurement in modern life is obvious. Hence the 
process of valuation becomes entrenched and generalized. The 
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ordinary idea of the worth of something, always around in the 
common language, has to be self-consciously developed. (1988, 19) 
(2) The publication of Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1998 [1874]) prompted two different 
directions for values. A naturalistic conception of humans cannot explain freedom of choice, action, 
or responsibility. Therefore some principle must be found in morality in order to fully explain human 
life. Philosophical idealists were driven to “rescue” the human spirit by the need to avoid “the 
consequences of a purely naturalistic view of man”. Others attempted “not to reduce spirit to nature 
but to find a comfortable home for the phenomena of spirit in nature”. Where values were treated by 
the former group as “transcending both nature and se se-perception”, they were secularized by the 
latter (1988, 20). 
(3) Although “value” had previously been used in economics, it was not a broad enough concept of 
value to apply to other disciplines. As economics developed, its concept of value broadened to 
include desire but desire came to be treated uncritically.   
“The labor theory of value in the earlier classical economists fixed 
on congealed labor in commodities as the crucial factor, whereas the 
later classical economists turned to the psychology of demand and 
desire…At first, relying on Benthamism, they assumed cardinal 
measurement for pleasures and pains and therefore the possibility of 
calculating the total utility of a commodity across individual 
valuations…Eventually…all attempts at interpersonal comparison 
dropped away, and total valuations had as their bedrock basis the 
individual’s uncriticized expression of preferences and aimed at an 
overall maximization.” (1988, 19-20) 
Substantive changes in response to changing social conditions were often more obvious than 
changes in how values in general were understood. Ktchemidova’s study of the rise of cheerfulness, 
for example, links it with the “rise of individualism” by which “human agency gained value” (2005, 
7). Although by the twentieth century cheerfulness had become the “main emotional norm” in 
America, in the 18th century sadness and melancholy had been all-pervasive: “People sought to 
partake in sadness and valued its expression” (2005, 7).    
“Moderns developed an impatience with helplessness, which was 
accompanied by a distaste for grief and later translated into male 
aversion to tears. Since cultural meanings form by opposition, the 
opposite emotion to sadness—cheerfulness—began to serve as a 
symbol for virtue when virtue was found to reside with self-help. A 
cheerful countenance came to be seen as a sign for a  active 
personality, capable of solving its own problems. The newly valued 
qualities—a self-attained material and moral well-bing and an 
ability to control one’s life—were represented by keeping in good 
spirits at all times.” (Kotchemidova, 2005, 9)  
As cheerfulness became the social norm, the symbol of a well-functioning individual, it helped to 
identify which individuals were capable of making their own decisions and established a new 
standard by which to identify problem behaviour andpersonality. Unlike speculative moral ideals 
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arrived at deductively, it was a value that could not be understood without also understanding its 
history and the broader context of values to which it was attached.  
The value of happiness also changed. Deal Hudson analyzes how ideas associated with positivism 
changed how happiness was understood. Hudson describ s the current conception of happiness as a 
“momentary” state of well-feeling attached to pleasure, resting on “unexamined notions of 
happiness…embedded in the patterns of life” (1996, xix). The older conception is a deeper meaning 
of well-being, a life well lived that could be held up to public scrutiny and judgement to see if the 
person’s claim to happiness could be justified (1996, xx). He argues that in general we place a higher 
value on the current conception: There has been a shift from the older meaning, rooted in the Greek 
idea of eudaemonism, to a life where material consumption becomes the highest good (1996, xix). 
Hudson locates the beginnings of this shift in the 19th century. It was during this same period that 
positivism became associated with value. Hudson describes positivism as  
“a rejection of the abstract ideals of speculative philosophy and a 
move toward a concrete and social form of thinking…[It] took on the 
meaning of value...which has resulted in the idolatry of techniques 
capable of bringing about desirable effects and shortcutting the 
creation of stable foundations, whether in personal r national 
character.” (1996, 13) 
The factors to which Hudson attributes a substantive change in the value of happiness are similar to 
those associated with the emergence of a new usage of values. Hudson identifies the problems as: 
1) If there is more than one conception of happiness, the result is confusion about happiness 
(1996, xviii); 
2) That happiness is so pervasive a part of our everyday experience that it tends not to be 
examined, leaving only unhelpful vagueness (1996, xv); and 
3) Happiness can no longer appeal to an agreed upon “objective” standard (1996, xix). 
Applying these points to values, there was no confusion about values until people acknowledged 
that there was more than one conception. The second p i t suggests that awareness of competing 
conceptions of values need not be automatic. Third, the disappearance of an “objective” standard of 
values prompted a new usage of values and the emergnce of the new concept of values. 
Among other influences on values, the two world wars precipitated feelings of uncertainty and 
instability. For Dewey, the impact on society of the First World War was magnified because “the 
earlier period of optimism” was replaced by insecurity and uncertainty. The situation was “almost 
incredibly” even worse after the end of the Second World War. 
“Insecurity and strife are so general that the prevailing attitude is one 
of anxious and pessimistic uncertainty. Uncertainty as to what the 
future has in store casts its heavy and black shadow over all aspects 
of the present.” (Dewey, 1957 [1920], vi) 
The insecurity and “pessimistic uncertainty” might have had a moderating effect on the 
“questioning attitude” that Mackenzie had observed only decades earlier. Speculative moral 
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philosophy had failed to prevent the world wars. Particularly after the Second World War, 
preoccupation with what was good and ideal was supplanted by questions about what was normal and 
what was deviant in societies (Thomson, 1998). It was not the idea of certainty and firm ground that 
was rejected but philosophy for having failed to achieve certainty. The new social sciences were 
charged with this responsibility to “reveal" values that could be treated as certain. 
“The great hope was that an ethical value system could be found in 
the science of psychology; that psychology could reveal the values 
which humans carried, psycho-biologically, within themselves from 
the earliest age, and that society would be organised to encourage the 
healthy development of these natural values.” (Thomson, 1998, 46) 
Identifying values had been part of the mandate of social sciences from their earliest days. Treating 
values as something to be revealed meant that the questioning attitude was not needed and that 
principles such as freedom of choice became less important. The effect was to reinvigorate the 
opportunity for what Mackenzie had called “slavish” devotion to the authority of people and ideas. 
The authority of an “objective standard of social control” was considered a sufficiently impersonal 
idea that it could be applied in the service of the common good. It would require 
“…changing our measure of values from the subjectivistic individual 
criterion where it now rests to the social criterion of the good and 
development of society as a whole…based upon the completest 
possible scientific and objective analysis of the conditions of social 
activity in the individual and the group.” (Bernard, 1910, 341) 
The world wars created an opportunity for states to experiment with large-scale social projects, in 
the process generating changes to substantive values nd creating new usages of “values”. Education 
applied the new knowledge gleaned from “large-scale organizational and management techniques” 
(Smith, 1998, 66) that had begun in the 1930s and flourished during the Second World War. Smith 
identifies the Normandy landings of 1944 as not only being on an “unprecedented scale” but also 
“much of the planning and procedures were new” (1998, 66). The result was that “People no longer 
did things as individuals, or as communities, but as small cogs in a large system” (1998, 67). The 
official theory of learning, on Smith’s account22, was now based on the ideal of the Prussian soldier, 
“totally standardized, reliable, and predictable” (1998, 47), an ideal made possible by developments 
in behavioural psychology.  
Following Smith, from the mid 1800s forward—the same period during which a concept of values 
emerged—teaching gradually became “a science controlled by experts” (1998, 48). Changes to the 
                                                  
22 John Taylor Gatto has a similar account of the history of education in A Different Kind of Teacher (2001). He 
also describes changes to children’s books that took place during the early decades of the new concept of 
values: “Without explanation or warning, timeless cultural myths disappeared from children’s books betwe n 
1890 and 1920, replaced by new synthetic myths children were encouraged to accept… In the thirty-year p riod 
in question, our textbook industry suddenly became  creator of values, not a reflector of them; only the 
monopolistic nature of school publishing allowed this transformation” (2001, 127). 
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relationship between teacher and student deteriorated until “we have finished up with almost no 
individual relationships among them at all” (1998, 46). Behavioural science techniques replaced the 
importance previously placed on personal relations and learning from peers (1998, 44) and having an 
effective means of control eliminated the need for trust (1998, 55).  
Those values that once had been learned from human relations could no longer be taught or learned 
in schools that were modelled on behavioural psychology; ethics and good character had to be learned 
in different ways. When values became part of the curriculum, this changed what “values” were—
both substantively and in how values in general were understood. Smith’s description of values as 
“the right answers to questions” is another example of how a questioning attitude and a desire for 
certainty might be combined in values usage. 
“To the extent that any of these values are officially regarded as 
having educational relevance they are taught as academic subject, as 
the right answers to questions not as ways of life. The effort to teach 
them fails…In such a context there is no point in even considering 
how students might acquire patience, persistence, courage, 
steadfastness, or hope. Or how they could fail to learn that happiness 
is material self-satisfaction, together with contempt for authority and 
helplessness in the face of it.” (Smith, 1998, 59) 
In the fall of 2006, public schools in Hamilton, Ontario plan to adopt an academic approach to 
values that is similar to the approach denounced by Smith. The purposes are described as “building 
character”, “bringing civility back to schools”, and “to make a student an individual in society who 
contributes on many levels”. At the time of the annou cement in April, 2006, there was no decision 
on what specific values the schools will “inculcate”. In a newspaper article, the reporter contrasts the 
public school system “with its tapestry of faiths and cultures” with the Catholic school system which 
has much less difficulty deciding which values fit w h the teachings of Jesus Christ and the Catholic 
Church (Faulkner, 2006). The teaching of moral values is revisited by the same newspaper a few 
weeks later. In a full page article about Muslims in Hamilton preferring to send their children to 
Catholic, not public schools, a past president of the Hamilton Muslim Association explains: “People 
believe there’s better discipline in Catholic schools and that any religious values are better than no 
religious values” (Boase, 2006). 
One value that may be taught is Empathy, with the purpose of “building character to reduce 
violence” and so that “students will intervene to st p bullying” (Faulkner, 2006). Under the heading 
“Our Values”, the School Board’s website lists Respect, Innovation, and Accountability (Hamilton-
Wentworth District School Board, 2006). Four values suggested by students are Fairness, Respect, 
Courage, and Integrity (Faulkner, 2006). Of these, only Respect overlaps with the Board’s own 
values. This use of values applied to moulding character and citizens differs from Mackenzie’s not so 
much perhaps in the list of what values should be promoted but in how ideas about values in general 
can shape what values are believed to be able to do.  Both are examples of applications of values to 
moral education but Mackenzie’s approach, adapted from Nietzsche, was to emphasize critical 
valuing as an activity. Similar to the approach to values advocated by Lauter (2000) and Dewey 
(1913), Mackenzie too approached values as verbs. 
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The emerging behavioural science disciplines thus helped to change ideas about education in 
general and specifically about how values can be learned. Behavioural science now promised to make 
it possible for governments to mould citizens who would be appreciative of democracy. Curiously, 
this took place during the same era that the role of the individual gained more stature in society. The 
more important the role of the individual, the more systematized education became appealing to the 
state. The industrial state needed a labour force t match modes of production and youth who wanted 
to do the work. The value of education to the state increased as schools were believed to be able to 
mould ideal citizens and workers. There were other reasons as well for the state to be interested in 
moulding citizens. John Gatto, for example, notes that he moulding of citizens in the US was spurred 
by increasing numbers of immigrants. Between 1880 and 1920 in particular, there was fear that the 
influx of immigrants on a mass scale would threaten “ancient ways of distributing wealth and 
authority” (Gatto, 2001, 124). 
No single usage of values could become dominant in societies in which there were multiple 
purposes and ideals. Edel observes that the increasing complexity of society inevitably brings changes 
to ideas.  
“The scope of human purposive activity in such complex 
organization, especially at the pace at which it was growing in the 
second half of the century, brought theory and practice together, 
strained to the breaking point older intellectual dichotomies of theory 
and practice, knowledge and valuation, and in general imparted an 
active attitude to the consideration of questions of value.” (Edel, 
1988, 23) 
The emergence of individuals with a questioning attitude towards values coexisted with the idea 
that individuals were “cogs” in whom values could be instilled. The diverse usage of values comes 
not from a general concept of values alone but from the association of values with other ideas. Where 
these other ideas appear to contradict one another, it should not be surprising that the usage of 
“values” reflects such contradictions.  
 
3.3.2 Values and mental health 
By the time the Second World War had ended, mental he lth had become a global pursuit. The World 
Federation of Mental Health was an agency that acted as an advisor “on social, political and cultural 
policies to bodies such as UNESCO” (Thomson, 1998, 51). It was hoped that attention to mental 
health could lessen the chances of future wars by overc ming “national and ideological divisions” 
(Thomson, 1998, 50). It would do this by providing “a new value system which would overcome 
national and ideological divisions” (Thomson, 1998, 50). The Mental Health movement as a large-
scale social program and the Values Clarification movement on an individual level both illustrate how 
the idea of value-neutrality could co-exist with the idea that some values could remain immune from 
contestability. Values Clarification demanded value-neutrality from the teacher but not the student; 
the Mental Hygiene movement used science to disguise its foundational values, considered firm and 
beyond questioning.  
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The issue of value-neutrality reflected a more general debate about whether social-science should 
or could have anything to do with values. Dewey andother progressives supported a legitimate role 
for the state in shaping the values of its people but recognized the dilemma. 
“When ‘sociological’ theory withdraws from consideration of the 
basic interests, concerns, the actively moving aims, of a human 
culture on the ground that ‘values; are involved anthat inquiry as 
‘scientific’ has nothing to do with values, the inevitable consequence 
is that inquiry in the human area is confined to what is superficial 
and comparatively trivial, no matter what its parade of technical 
skills. But, on the other hand, if and when inquiry attempts to enter in 
critical fashion into that which is human in its full sense, it comes up 
against the body of prejudices, traditions and institutional customs 
that consolidated and hardened in a pre-scientific age.” (Dewey, 
1957 [1920], xxvi) 
The insecurity, uncertainty, and strife following the world wars (Dewey, 1957, [1920], vi) were 
diagnosed as counterproductive to achieving good mental health, whether or not such feelings were 
justified. In 1915, Perry had argued that some values have a positive effect on the human mind 
because they contribute to mental hygiene and that they can have this positive effect whether or not 
the belief about the value is true.  
 “By the instrumental value of subjective belief is meant the liability 
of belief to bring about the existence of other value objects, real or 
ideal, whether it be true or not. Value of this sort may be described as 
mental hygiene. There are certain beliefs, such as t e belief in the 
triumph of good, or the belief in the supremacy of spirit, that have a 
generally wholesome effect upon the human mind. They aid 
achievement through removing anxiety or through furnishing 
incentive, or, where the belief is a belief in the achievement itself, 
through affording confidence. These values depend on the content of 
the belief and are independent of its truth.” (Perry, 1915, 10) 
Behavioural science could attempt to change feelings of insecurity and uncertainty without being 
required to make judgements about whether these feelings were true or justifiable. If some values 
were good for mental hygiene and others not, which values were good and bad could be resolved in a 
value-neutral way. The use of mental hygiene as both the purpose and the criterion for classifying 
values as good or bad for mental health evokes the earlier determination of value as a question of fit 
using unquestioned truths as criteria. 
Whether the incontestability of values comes about ecause of religious faith, impersonal truth, or 
objective truth, the effects are the same. Applied in the service of democracy, the goal of mental 
health was an arena in which behavioural science could converge with a moral philosophy that was 
oriented towards impersonal and objective truth. 
“… mental health was conceptualised as both the product of and the 
foundation stone for a democratic (and often also a cialist or at 
least ‘planned’) society…‘Mental health’ thus provided an 
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apparently value neutral way to evaluate the good life and the good 
society: an answer to the ‘crisis of valuation’ which faced those 
disillusioned with political ideology and religion yet still searching 
for values to tackle what was perceived as a long-term politico-moral 
crisis…” (Thomson, 1998, 45) 
 
3.3.3 Values, deviants, and the Mental Hygiene move ment 
When the National Committee for Mental Hygiene in America was founded in 1909 by progressive 
reformers, mental illness was considered “the most serious social evil of the time” (Cohen, 1983, 
126). The response to mental hygiene thus became “a prime example of social interventionism on a 
massive scale” (Cohen, 1983, 140). Mental hygiene “points of view” quickly spread into education, 
as a means to address behaviour problems in the school . Misbehaviour was to be treated as illness or 
cases of “maladjustment”, not as misguided morality (Cohen, 1983, 130). This required more than a 
set of instructions on how teachers should respond; it required a change in the methods, goals, and 
values of teachers (Cohen, 1983, 132). In order to be “true and lasting”, change could not be achieved 
by legislated reform (Cohen, 1983, 132). Cohen describes the zeal with which mental hygiene 
proponents approached their task as utopian, a faith tha  was “quasi-religious” about the scientific 
method. 
“Many hygienists envisioned a society free of all problems; a society 
in which war and even unhappiness was eliminated thanks to the new 
knowledge of human nature vouchsafed by psychiatry and mental 
hygiene. Indeed the mental hygiene movement took on aspects of a 
quasi-religious phenomenon; the truths of psychiatry  surer 
foundation of the New Society than the truths found in the Bible.” 
(Cohen, 1983, 141)  
This same scenario played out in youth education throughout the United States. From the late 
1880s to the 1920s, the YMCA developed programs to spread Christian values throughout schools to 
promote clean leaving and Christian citizenship, with the aim of creating a Christian social 
democracy (Setran, 2005). The aim at first was to minimize “opportunities for immorality” (Setran, 
2005, 2). By the 1930s, the influence of the Mental Hygiene movement led to replacement of  
“…themes of Christian democracy with emphasis on youth 
‘personality development’. Rooted in the literature on mental 
hygiene, this perspective grew out of a desire to meet the needs of 
young people who were ‘depressed’ by the economic dislocations of 
the 1930s.” (Setran, 2005, parag. 67) 
MacLennan documents the transition of the Canadian Me tal Hygiene movement from volunteers 
to professionals. Here too, ideas about behavioural science were rooted in values as ideals, such as te 
“social value of motherhood” and “the ideal family” (1987, 2). By 1926, the connection between 
social ideals and science was firmly entrenched in practice. Professionals scrutinized child-rearing to 




3.3.4 Values Clarification  
“Values clarification” was introduced in 1966 by Louis Raths and his co-authors. They noted the 
absence of a general definition of “value” in the social sciences but did identify something that all 
values have in common: All values are valuable.   
“About the only agreement that emerges is that a value represents 
something important in human existence. Perhaps becaus  it is such 
a pivotal term, each school of thought invests it with its own 
definition. For the same reason, a particular definitio  is not often 
acceptable elsewhere. The definition of this book…is closest to ones 
used by those who talk of the process of valuing, rather than of a 
value in any identifiable institutional sense.” (Raths, 1966, 10)  
By describing values in this way, the authors are confirming that their own particular usage will 
necessarily treat values as “something important”. As well, values must satisfy specific criteria in 
order to quality to be called “values”. These criteria are summarized as “…those beliefs, purposes, 
attitudes, and so on that are chosen feely and thoughtfully, prized, and acted upon” (Raths, 1966, 38).  
Values Clarification is described as being less concer ed with particular substantive values than 
with the process by which a person finds these values. The method is distinct from “most research 
dealing with values [that] has tried to measure what values people have and not the process they used 
to get them” (Raths, 1966, 10). By focusing on the process of valuing, Values Clarification takes an 
active approach to values. Without examining values th re is no way of knowing whether the criteria 
are met. Because this knowledge depends on the individual making decisions about criteria, values 
must be truly personal to an individual. The aim is to provide teachers with a method to assist 
students in their growth, though the authors acknowledge that their book would not be news to “many 
sensitive teachers” who had been doing much the sam as Values Clarification for many years, “even 
if they have been calling it something else” (Raths, 1966, 8). Values Clarification is a more 
systematized approach to what had previously been done in the tradition of the Socratic Method 
(Simon, 1995 [1972], 9).  
An important assumption is that “by an intelligent process of choosing, prizing, and behaving” 
(Raths, 1966, 10) it is possible for humans to arrive at values and that values arrived at in this manner 
are defensible. The authors find a similarity between their value theory and “certain approaches to 
critical thinking” (Raths, 1966, 8-9). John Dewey’s Theory of Valuation (1939) is cited as work with 
a similar orientation and background material (Raths, 1966, 9, 206), linking Values Clarification to 
the progressive education tradition. Even as Values Clarification is presented as value-neutral, it is
imbued with and affirms a sense of democratic purpose. To qualify as “a value”, the value must be 
freely chosen and personal. For this to happen, people can not simply be told by others what they 
should value.  
“As a matter of fact, in a society like ours, govern d by our 
Constitution, teachers might well see themselves as obliged to 
support the idea that every individual is entitled to the views that he 
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has and to the values that he holds, especially where t se have been 
examined and affirmed. Is this not the cornerstone of what we mean 
by a free society?…By definition and by social right, t en, values are 
personal things.” (Raths, 1966, 36) 
Citing previous research, the authors affirm that “a number of children’s problems currently 
attributed to emotions…are more usefully seen as resulting from value disturbances” (Raths, 1966, 4). 
Values Clarification is thus a remedy for behavioural problems. Moreover, value disturbances may be 
caused by a lack of values as well as by wrong values. 
“…several kinds of problems children often exhibit n school and at 
home are profitably seen as being caused by values, or, more 
precisely, by a lack of values…we have found that when children 
with certain behaviour problems are given value experiences of a 
particular kind, those problems often ease in intensi y and/or 
frequency. In short, there is strong support for the notion that values 
must be added to the possible explanations of children’s behaviour.” 
(Raths, 1966, 4) 
Not only can Values Clarification remedy behavioural problems, it can also develop in individuals 
qualities that make them good citizens and allow individuals to become more successful in their 
personal lives.  
“…those who have used this approach in their lives have become 
less apathetic, less flighty, less conforming as well as less 
overdissenting. They are more zestful and energetic, more critical in 
their thinking, and are more likely to follow through on decisions. In 
the case of underachievers, values clarification has led to better 
success in school and on the job.” (Simon, 1995, 12) 
Values Clarification has a complicated relationship w th value-neutrality. Teachers are to take a 
value-neutral stance but the values of their students must be personal in order to be genuine. Althoug 
Values Clarification purports to be neutral about substantive values, the notion that values can be 
“lacking” implies that some values are good values that all people should have. Simon, one of the co-
authors of the 1976 book, unambiguously states twenty years later that respecting the “needs and 
rights of others” is a purpose of values clarification. 
“…attention to the needs and rights of others should always be a part 
of the values-clarification process…This is why good inculcation and 
modeling are so important. Concepts of justice, ethics, and morality 
do not necessarily occur spontaneously; they must be instilled as well 
as discovered. So consideration of moral and ethical issues should be 
a part of the values-clarification process.” (Simon, 1995, 11-12) 
Whatever else it may have been designed to do, Values Clarification is also a strategy for 
inculcating values and developing good citizens. This usage of “values” does not correspond exactly 
to other usages, such as by the Mental Hygiene moveent or Mackenzie. Although the usages may be 
diverse, however, they are not unrelated. Values Clarification “questions” values only in the sense of 
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determining fit, it emphasizes an active approach to values, and it considers values as both good and 
useful to individuals and the societies in which these individuals function. It purports to be neutral 
about values even though quite clearly it supports tho e ideal values which are consistent with being 
an ideal democratic citizen. For legitimacy, it relies on systematization and consistent application of 
the same process by each individual even though values must be “personal” to the individual.  
That all values must be “something important” and must satisfy specific criteria in order to qualify 
as “values” creates something of a predicament. So long as there is lingering uncertainty about its 
importance or its ability to satisfy the criteria, an idea can not qualify as “a value”. Values are the 
products, the end results of a student’s individual process of clarification. While the student is 
engaged in the process of clarifying, the ideas involved can not be called “values”; at most they might 
be called “potential values” because until the end of the process is reached, it is impossible for all 
criteria to have been satisfied. Applied on a broader social scale, it becomes even more difficult to use
the word “values” with any precision. Criteria according to one usage, whether met or not, need not 
match criteria for another usage. It is more than possible that at any given time people talking about 
values will be talking past one another. 
The big picture of such a usage of values would be an aggregate description of what values are 
prized by at least one individual. No further conclusions could be drawn, however, about the level of 
social agreement about values or what counts as “a value”. The connection between individuals and 
the common good cannot be bridged by such a usage of “values”. 
By establishing stringent criteria that cannot be met until the end of a process that determines 
whether or not something qualifies as a value, Values Clarification anticipates the end of a search for 
values. Once something qualifies as a value, there is no further need to question it. While a potential 
value is still in the process of being examined, there can be no talk about “values” without stretching 
the meaning of values to the breaking point. In its consequences, this is similar to the ground on 
which D. M’ G. Means had earlier criticized Spencer for anticipating the need to know everything 
before anything can be known. Values Clarification sets boundaries for what qualifies as a value so 
explicitly that there is no room for a questioning attitude about values. This usage of “values” is a 
clear example of how a particular usage establishes not merely a definition of values but determines 
what can count as a value.  
The description of Values Clarification as a systematic investigation of values by individuals does 
not at first appear to suggest that its usage of “values” involves protecting values from a questioning 
attitude. Both Values Clarification and the Mental Hygiene movement, however, protect from 
questioning the firm and certain values on which their methods are based. Both grant privileged status 
to the ideal values that the processes are designed to serve. The ideal values are granted immunity 
from a questioning attitude.  
This way of understanding values as absolute ideals is a second generation of absolute values, 
different from the usage of “values” as ideals that predated Nietzsche. This post-Nietzsche usage of 
values-as-absolutes gets its privileged status not as an automatic right, because the definition 
precludes any other understanding of values, but from aith in a method that uses fixed criteria that 
are required to be the same for every person using the Values Clarification process. The usage of 
“values” has no flexibility in such an application. This suggests that in order for all values to be 
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connected through a concept of values in general, such a concept must be sufficiently flexible and 
vague that it need not require all particular usage be flexible as well.  
 
3.4 Summary of History of Diverse Usage 
Starting in the late 1800s, values emerged as a distinct area of study that was comprised of a wide 
range of diverse components—not despite but because of th  flexibility in ideas about what values 
could be. This flexibility was made possible when the idea of values was detached from the idea of 
absolutes and attached to the idea of perspective. That agreement about values in general turned out 
not to be necessary in order for use of the word and idea to propagate becomes an essential feature of 
an emerging concept of values in general that appears to tolerate a wide range of usage. The 
flexibility of values makes diverse usage possible and prevents the general concept of values from 
hardening into an absolute or a static artefact. 
The general concept of values took shape as the idea of values was successively applied to other 
ideas and ongoing debates, whether triggered by events or conceptual pursuits. If values were 
subjective, emotional, desires of individuals, they would be one thing but if values were objectively 
and impersonally true, whether by science or as ideals, values would be something entirely different. 
If values were specific to cultures they could be studied one way; if they were true of all humans in 
every society, they could be studied in other ways. If values were matters of faith, understanding 
values as expressions of truth would be more appropriate than understanding values as judgements. 
Nietzsche’s usage of “values” precipitated the emergence of a general concept of values by 
introducing the possibility that all values are notvaluable by definition, that the value of something 
might be an illusion, and that a “slavish” obedienc to the authority of values is counterproductive to 
understanding what is most valuable. In detaching the idea of value from the idea of absolutes, 
Nietzsche’s use of “values” as a tool for identifying false beliefs engages a questioning attitude and 
willingness to acknowledge uncertainty, both epistemologically and socially.  
Accepting the idea of a concept of values that is not prescriptively definitive requires at least some 
awareness of the diversity of usage. The examples of u age discussed above need not be 
representative to make this point. Most certainly they are not exhaustive; each new application of 
values to other ideas has the potential to become a new instance of diverse usage. Without a general 
concept of values, diverse usage might reasonably be understood as a series of discrete examples of 
the word “values”, the same word with different and unrelated meanings in different applications. 
That particular applications of “values” present themselves as being definitive of all values illustrates 
how easily values might be assumed to be homonyms. Given a willingness to accept that different 
usages may be related as diverse examples of a common concept, awareness of even one other way of 
understanding values could be sufficient to prompt consideration of whether a single usage can be 
prescriptively definitive of values in general.  
Diverse usage was reinforced by how the ideas to which “values” were applied in turn contributed 
to and shaped a concept of values in general. Subseq ent values usage diverged from Nietzsche’s 
understanding of values, responding not only to it but to other ideas and events, each new application 
making a contribution to a general concept of values. The “questioning attitude” diminished in 
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importance where the idea of values was attached to disciplines, approaches, and methods that were 
valued because they promised certainty where previous approaches had failed. In such applications, a 
second generation of values usage emerged that again tre ted values as incontestable and objective 
absolutes. This usage would coexist with the new meaning of values as contestable but now needed to 
be clearly labelled as “absolute values” to distinguish it from other usages. Prior to Nietzsche’s usage 
there was no need to draw attention to the close asociation between values and absolutes because all 
values were understood to be absolute and could only be positive. 
That the usages were diverse rather than merely different homonyms is reinforced by the frequency 
with which features of usages of “values” overlap, even when the usages themselves appear to be 
disparate. Anticipating that there is an end to the search for values at which point all will be known 
was characteristic of Spencer’s utilitarian usage but also echoed much later by the usage in Values 
Clarification. Even if a questioning attitude is required during the process of establishing what a value 
is, there will be an end point at which knowledge about values will no longer require questioning and 
values can revert back to being treated as absolute. That values on which methods are based are 
themselves not to be questioned is common to usage in both Values Clarification and the Mental 
Hygiene movement.  
A variation of this feature is essential to the usage of values as a “determination of fit”, where a 
single overriding value or set of dominant values acts s the criterion by which all other values are 
derived. The overriding value derives its authority from faith or belief and is immune from challenge.  
Faith and belief are also the only available means to support absolute values when these re-emerged 
as a second-generation usage. Unquestioned faith and belief for “a value” can coexist in the same 
usage with the idea of value-neutrality, as demonstrated by values usages in behavioural science 
applications and in Values Clarification. That ideals once treated as absolutes can not only survive but 
thrive if they are critically examined is demonstrated by British Idealist Mackenzie’s application of 
Nietzsche’s new usage. Mackenzie also adopts Nietzsche’  socio-political dimension of values; 
slavish obedience to ideas is as inconsistent with democracy as is slavish obedience to leaders. Years 
later the Mental Health movement abandoned concerns about slavish obedience to support the 
inculcation of values as a means to mould democratic citizens. Results of such tightly-managed 
approaches to values were expected to be predictable and controllable. That Mackenzie’s treatment of 
values differed in substance from Nietzsche’s demonstrated that applying a questioning attitude to 
values could lead to unanticipated conclusions. 
Hudson worried that having more than one conception of happiness results in confusion, 
demonstrating how the loss of an objective standard not only changed ideas about values in general 
but also in more specific ways. The emergence of cheerfulness as a value demonstrated that values 
were not only products of deductive reasoning but emerged in response to events and a broader social 
context. Edel reasoned that no single usage of values could become dominant in increasingly complex 
societies with multiple purposes and ideals, yet large-scale state projects after the world wars made an 
effort to reinstate values as objective standards based on science. In these applications a questioning 
attitude toward values would be counterproductive and ntisocial, in the same way that Nietzsche’s 
usage of values emerged as a revolutionary tool for social change. A questioning attitude could be a 
serious threat, even to democratic societies, and prticularly so if the value of democracy itself was 
questioned. When Mackenzie subjected the idea of democracy to rigorous examination, he was fully 
aware of the religious fervour that protected democracy. 
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This approach to a history of diverse usage suggests calling something “a value” can and does 
make a difference. How particular usages define values can have a significant impact on the content 
or substance of values. Whether values are treated p ssively as received knowledge or actively as the 
results of judgments by humans may affect what, how, and why something is valued.  
 
3.5 Implications of the History of Diverse Usage of  Values 
Whether or not all diverse usage of values is related through a concept of values, there is no question 
that the word “values” is used in a variety of ways. This suggests there may be reason for concern 
about the possibility of miscommunication and confusion. 
Should explicit use of the word “values” be avoided? Objections to values usage are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
3.5.1 Implications for planning methods and approac hes 
That there is more than one way of understanding and using “values” suggests that planners have a 
choice in deciding whether to use the word “values”, how to understand it, and whether planning 
should have one usage or several. 
That there appear to be no boundaries to limit the number or nature of particular usages of values 
leaves wide open the question of what criteria planners should use in determining what usage or 
usages might be a best fit with planning. 
Values understood as incontestable and unconditional may be easier to systematize and 
operationalize than values to which a questioning attitude is attached. This may act as a constraint on 
the willingness of planners to subject values to critical scrutiny. 
 
3.5.2 Implications for the politics of planning 
That values usage arose in a time of scepticism and pessimism about the future may be significant. 
The context of uncertainty may have contributed to a willingness to look for non-traditional answers. 
This suggests that how values are understood may differ in times when events generate a greater 
psychological desire for certainty. 
The large-scale use of values as a means for states and international organizations to mould citizens 
suited for democracy did not question that democracy justified manipulating people’s values.  What 
weight should be given to existing values when these appear to present a barrier to planning goals? 
Do planners need to take a stand on whether or not it is within a planner’s mandate to “mould 
citizens” by inculcating values?  
The appeal of certainty may influence which values are desired. In the history of diverse usage, the 
word “values” was used both as firm and certain and s requiring a questioning attitude. If planners 
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are presented with both usages during a participatory planning exercise, the first impulse may be to 
give more weight to the value that is presented as firm and certain.  
 
3.5.3 Implications for sustainability planning 
The history of diverse usage suggests that the import of values for sustainability will vary according 
to how values are understood. 
If values are understood as timelessly true and goo, then the challenge is to determine how to 
organize society to fit with timeless values. This would be a case of the “determination of fit” model 
of values usage discussed above. Determination of fit does not require questioning the overall purpose 
that establishes criteria; only whether something fits with the purpose and its criteria. 
If values are judgements that result from a questioning attitude, then it is not possible to predict 
whether the products of valuing will be compatible or not with sustainability. The Mental Hygiene 
movement example suggests that manipulating values to serve an overall purpose may be justified by 
a quasi-religious faith in that purpose. 
If conventional values are perceived as a hurdle for sustainability to overcome, something to be 
replaced by more appropriate values, this suggests tha  values are de facto understood as being 
potentially good and bad and/or right and wrong. If values are not only always good and right, this 
suggests more opportunity for fallibility. Knowing which values need to be changed is more 
challenging when there is no firm and certain set of values to act as a guide and when there is sharp 






OBJECTIONS TO VALUES USAGE  
4.1 Introduction 
The idea of values, once an agent of change, itselfcomes under attack on ethical, philosophical, and 
political grounds in the 20th century. Just as Nietzsche had challenged Christianity and other values 
dominant in his day, challengers in the 20th century argue that “values” itself has become a new 
dominant value that needs to be overturned. In the same way that Christianity and other dominant 
values worked in the background to shape society, the goodness of values language too is an illusion, 
a false belief so pervasive and so deeply entrenched that it shapes how we think and what we value 
without drawing attention to itself as convention. In our day, to challenge convention requires 
challenging values language, not merely the values that are produced using values language. To 
object to values language on these grounds is to assume that it is a powerful factor in determining 
what people value—that using values language as the medium by which people value affects the 
content of what is valued. The contrary view is that t e word “values” is treated as if it has power and 
authority because it is so all-pervasive but that such power and authority are undeserved. 
Objections discussed below are presented under the following headings: 
Objection One: Values are relative and cannot be virtues 
Objection Two: Values are narrow individual preferenc s  
Objection Three: Values are relational but treated as if they were not  
Objection Four: Whether or not something is called “a value” makes 
no difference 
Although the first objection is inspired in large part by George Grant’s argument in Time as History 
(1969) and the second in large part by Edward Andrew’s argument in The Genealogy of Values 
(1995), the objections outlined here are a much abbreviated and partial rendering of the broader 
arguments each puts forward. A greater emphasis has been placed here on those points in their 
arguments which speak to the same questions as those raised in the present research. Objections One 
and Two, therefore, are not intended to be a full statement of either Grant’s position or Andrew’s 
position. Further, their arguments are elaborated and supplemented by other sources as appropriate in 
order to make the strongest case for each objection. In some respects Objection Three is a rebuttal to 
the first two objections and is derived from questions that arising during the study of examples of 
explicit use of the word “value”. Objection Four uses historian Jacques Barzun’s dismissal of the 
word “values” as a starting point. 
Were any one of these objections to be allowed to stand, use of the word “values” should be 




4.2 Objection One: Values are Relative and Cannot B e Virtues 
In connecting reason, virtue, and happiness in the idea of the Good, Plato took as true that “Human 
existing was at its heart to be trusted as good” (Grant, 1969, 28). In mainstream western thought there 
had previously been no questioning of whether what were called ideals were necessarily and 
unambiguously good, true, and valuable. From Nietzsche forward, the concept of values placed 
humans “beyond good and evil1”, irrevocably changing how ideas about good and evil are 
understood. Henceforth, ideals of goodness, truth, and value could all be treated as potentially false, 
as being illusions. It is the shattering of this belief that differentiates the modern concept of values 
from earlier usage of “values” as co-extensive with ideals and absolute truths.  
In Time as history (1969), George Grant presents the case against the use of values language to 
consider matters most important, matters beyond the reach of “values”. The primary ground for 
rejecting Nietzsche’s use of values is that as humans “we are not fitted for living the conception of 
time as history” (1969, 45). Humans are not equipped to have the whole burden of creating meaning 
placed on our shoulders, on our own “will to do” (1969, 17).  
Usurpation of responsibility for creating meaning and purpose inevitably requires humans to master 
actively, to create actively. This is a task properly reserved for God (1969, 11). Grant argues that our 
concept of history is unique to western English civilization (1969, 1). We understand history as 
“man’s collective development through the ages”, differentiating humans from non-human species 
and from nature, which then become the objects of our will to master (1969, 4-5). This concept of 
“history” “determines our apprehension of what is” (1969, 2) and is central to how we see ourselves 
as “historical beings” (1969, 3)2. History is something humans create; time goes forward despite what 
humans do. 
Because the word “values” has the same type of power, th  call for humans to take active 
responsibility for our values is the very essence of folly because that is precisely the source of our 
trouble. Grant rejects Nietzsche’s concept of humans as limited to perspectives determined by our 
horizons because seeing our future as a succession of horizons reinforces in us the notion that we are 
and must be historical beings, who “think our orientation to the future together with the will to 
mastery” (1969, 10-11). The very idea of progress lads us increasingly to associate historicity with 
the future, as the site of potential. The future is where we create, and therefore where humans who see 
themselves as historical beings properly reside (1969, 13). Living in the future, humans lose any 
sense of purpose that is larger than humans:  
                                                  
1 Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: A Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, (1973) was published in 1886. 
2 The extent to which language itself reinforces our understanding of the human focus of history is more 
noticeable when the English word “history” is compared to the word for history in other languages. In Estonian, 
for example, the word for history is “ajalugu”. Translated literally as “time’s story”, it is absent a focus on 
humans or human development. 
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“We will, not so much for some end beyond will, but for the sake of 
the willing itself. In this sense, the challenge of the will is endless to 
the resolute, because there is always more ‘creation’ to be carried 
out. Our freedom can even start to make over our own species.” 
(Grant, 1969, 19) 
If there are no limits, there are no reasons not to remake humans into beings that fit human 
purposes instead of purposes grander than humans. Increasing life expectancy by solving medical 
problems serves a human purpose. This is part of the rationale underlying Ray Kurzweil’s conception 
of the merger of humans and machines, one that challenges the current role of values, beliefs, and 
knowledge.  
“Historically, the only means for humans to outlive a limited 
biological life span has been to pass on values, beliefs, and 
knowledge to future generations. We are now approaching a 
paradigm shift in the means we will have available to preserve the 
patterns underlying our existence. Human life expectancy is itself 
growing steadily and will accelerate rapidly, now that we are in the 
early stages of reverse engineering the information pr cesses 
underlying life and disease.” (Kurzweil, 2005, 323)  
Only 35 years after Grant’s observations, the ways in which we understand “progress” are 
increasingly turned inward on humans, on the possibilities and promises of improving or replacing the 
human species through cloning and genetic manipulaton. For people who see themselves as historical 
beings, there is always more “creation” to be done. Human purposes tied to mastery and advancing 
control become the purposes of planning. 
 
4.2.1 Loss of the old purposes in creating a new pu rpose 
Grant laments that values language in modern society is imbued with a historical relativism so deeply 
ingrained that we rarely notice or acknowledge its presence. Historical relativism and values language 
are complementary concepts. Together they determine how we live. 
 “We are taught early to use the language of values, to ay that our 
values are dependent on our historical situation and that this 
generalization proceeds from any objective study of the past. 
Civilizations and individuals have lived by different values. As there 
is no way of judging between the value of these values, we are taught 
early a very simple historical relativism...[later] we are taught to 
express that historicism with greater sophistication. However, the 
almost universal acceptance of this relativism by even the semi-
literate in our society is very recent. The belief that men are enfolded 
in their historicity and the consequent historical relativism with its 
use of the word ‘values’, only began to be the popular vocabulary in 
this century.” (Grant, 1969, 26) 
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Following Nietzsche, humans had to find a way to live with the knowledge that we ourselves are 
responsible for creating our own purposes and that these purposes cannot be sought or found 
anywhere in the nature of things. This way of thinking and way of life became a way of actively 
creating ourselves (1969, 30). Humans became both the product and the purpose of willing and 
creating, of time as history rising from scattered uins of universal truths whence purposes had once 
come:   
“Till recently it was assumed that our mastery of the earth would be 
used to promote the values of freedom, rationality, and equality—
that is, the values of social democracy...the highest political 
wisdom.”  (Grant, 1969, 31)  
Grant asks what is intended to be disturbing question of modern liberal movements who have 
turned their backs on God and purposes larger than human. Without a concept of God, “What kind of 
reason or evidence then sustains the belief that men are equal?” (1969, 32). Taking Grant’s question 
further, why is equality better than inequality? Rationality better than irrationality? Freedom better 
than confinement? Just why is truth better than a falsehood or an illusion? 
Grant reminds us that before the introduction of values language by Nietzsche, not just our values 
but our very outlook on life was different because we believed that there was wisdom, justice, and 
even happiness that resided in the nature of things; the e enveloped individual humans in their 
expansiveness and (in Grant’s terms) could be loved. The problem is so serious than it cannot be 
addressed by using values language. Goodness cannot be reached by following the path on which we 
who talk about moral values now find ourselves.   
“…men did not think about their actions in [values] language. They 
did not think they made the world valuable, but that ey participated 
in its goodness.” (Grant, 1969, 44-45)  
Talking in terms of values is a dead end. In “The American Culture War”, James Davison Hunter 
draws a clear line between values and what is trulyvaluable: “What we have in the contemporary 
American culture war are competing understandings of the sacred, competing faiths—in reality 
competing parochialisms. And this fierce competition is all about which moral vision will prevail” 
(1998, 7-8). To talk about what is moral and sacred in terms of values demeans the value of the moral 
and the sacred. 
“In tracing this debate over moral authority…it is clear that what is at 
the center of today’s normative conflict is more than ‘values’ and 
‘opinions’. Such language misconstrues the nature of the cultural 
forces at play and the moral commitments of those indiv duals and 
groups involved. The language of ‘values’ reduces moral 
commitment to preferences and ‘lifestyle’ choices. Today’s conflict 
burrows deeper into the culture and deeper into people’s 
pretheoretical consciousness. What we are dealing with here are two 
fundamentally different conceptions of the ‘sacred’ and the moral 




4.2.2 Imagining the perfect is necessary because hu mans are not beyond good and 
evil 
The idea of perfection is necessary for humans precisely because it is unchanging and complete. It is 
atemporal and acontextual. It gives meaning to what “good” is and should be. Considering “good” 
without a concept of a perfect good leaves us searching for meaning or creating our own meaning of 
good. The former is not necessary; the latter is harmful.  
“I simply state the argument for perfection (sometis called the 
ontological argument): namely that human beings are not beyond 
good and evil, and that the desire for good is a broken hope without 
perfection, because only the desire to become perfect does in fact 
make us less imperfect. This means that the absurdities of time—its 
joys as well as its diremptions—are to be taken not simply as history, 
but as enfolded in an unchanging meaning, which is untouched by 
potentiality or change.” (Grant, 1969, 47) 
Humans have been conditioned to think of morality as something about which humans can make 
judgements. Morality, however, is a human invention in the same way that values are a human 
invention; both anticipate and call for action and ju gement by humans. The idea of perfection is 
impersonal but values are highly personal, irrespectiv  of what they are about private matters or 
public matters.    
“How can we think of ‘morality’ as a desiring attenion to perfection, 
when for the last centuries the greatest moral philosophers have 
written of it as self-legislation, the willing of our own values?” 
(Grant, 1969, 48) 
Perfection cannot be measured; it simply is. It is so complete on its own that making it relative to 
other ideas alters its true nature. To connect perfection to truth is to demean it; the moment we call 
perfection “true”, it should be perfectly clear that truth is a human judgement, a way to measure 
perfection by some human criterion. Once made relativ , perfection is no longer infinitely absolute 
and thus no longer perfection.  
“The use of the language of ‘truth’ is an assertion of value about 
what we consider ‘good’ and ‘evil’, which we will to impose upon 
ourselves and others.” (Grant, 1969, 27) 
Considering perfection in terms of truth is similar to considering perfection in terms of values. 
Although calling perfection “a truth” is one such error, relating perfection to a concept of values is 
another. Both are equally harmful to humans. Calling perfection “a value” is an outrageous and 




4.2.3 Historical beings live in the future 
When humans think of time as history, we acquire a s nse that humans have some measure of control 
over future events because we view time past as a series of events created by humans. Despite time 
and events being unknowable and unpredictable, however, on Grant’s view this can be mitigated by 
the collective (social) planning of human future. 
“…the inscrutability and unpredictability of events must not be over-
emphasized, in either the individual or the collective case. We can 
plan our lives so that within limits the future depends on what we 
have done and are doing. This is truer collectively than individually 
because of the greater ability of the collective to control the results of 
chance...” (Grant, 1969, 12) 
Grant appreciates the need for humans to plan but makes the point that the purposes of the 
collective are not always sound and not necessarily conceived as an attempt to reach perfection. The 
collective is so much better at planning than are indiv duals who plan according to individual 
purposes that humans tend to become complacent and begin to believe there can be no greater 
purposes (grander and external to human purposes) than those adopted by the collective. Simply 
because a collective has devised a purpose does not make the purpose good; collective purposes 
sometimes turn out to be harmful. Planning, therefore, requires a way to “envisage the future” at the 
same time as it requires a keen awareness of why we want to plan and what we want to accomplish—
the purpose of planning. 
“(Indeed the greater ability of collective than of individual purposes 
to be sustained against accidents is one of the reasons why, in an age 
given over to making the future, we all more and more truly exist in 
the collective, and less and less pursue purposes which transcend it.) 
Indeed our surrender to the oil cartels has taught s ecologically that 
the best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men gang aft a-gley. It would be 
however facile pessimism to carry the tag too far. Human purposive 
doing is both possible and potent. And the more complex that which 
we wish to accomplish, the more we have to envisage the future in 
which it will be accomplished. The presence of the future in our 
imagining is one reason why men are so effective in their doing.” 
(Grant, 1969, 12) 
Humans can and should plan for the future but should do so with a deep appreciation of what is 
truly good. Casting the truly good, the perfect, in terms of other words and ideas—whether as truth or 
values—necessarily diminishes goodness and perfection and is counterproductive to planning. Not 
only is values language essentially and necessarily relative, it reinforces the frivolousness of 
individual preferences and removes a necessary means and motivation for scrutinizing the quality of 
collective human purposes. Grant’s pre-modern view is that such “perfection” is knowable (to a 




4.3 Objection Two: Values are Narrow Individual Pre ferences  
Objection Two takes Objection One as its starting point. In The genealogy of values (1995), Edward 
Andrew argues that values should be confined to the economic sphere because values overtake and 
destroy social and moral principles when such principles are recast as (mere) values. Values language 
is inevitably a servant to economics and possessive individualism3. Relativity cannot lead to 
goodness. Therefore, we must reject values language in order to constrain the negative impact of 
values.  
Calling truth or justice a value demeans truth and justice and minimizes our ability to see either 
clearly. Values language necessarily precludes placing a high value on what is good for all. Because it 
is relative, it requires valuation by the individual and serves whatever preferences are personal to 
individuals. It encourages individuals to present values as unchallengeable, as dogmatic. Values are 
“temporary and negotiable” (1995, 164). That they must be estimated means that they cannot be 
esteemed, be loved (1995, 167).  
“When we replace expressions such as “the sanctity of life” or “the 
right to life” with “the value of life,” we have, perhaps 
unconsciously, removed life from the sphere of the invaluable into a 
sphere whereby we estimate its value in relation to other things—the 
costs of hospitalization, the use of fetal material in medical research, 
the amount of suffering, the desire to control life processes, and the 
like.” (1995, 168) 
Values usage, as handed down from Nietzsche, presumes that all perspectives can and should be 
considered. Andrew challenges the idea that values should be attached to perspective, citing a passage 
from Nietzsche to illustrate the impact of perspectivism on considering the value of justice. What 
Objection Two supports is the old way that Nietzsche’s values usage rejects.  
“Task: to see things as they are! Means: to be able to see them from 
a hundred eyes, from any persons. To stress the impersonal and to 
characterize as moral seeing from the eyes of the neighbor was a 
false way to see. To see many neighbors and from any eyes and 
from loud personal eyes—is justice (das Rechte).” (Andrew, 1995, 
161)  
                                                  
3 Andrew’s argument against values is much broader, dealing also with the aesthetics of values of both 
Nietzsche and Proust. As well, he states categorically th t his argument is not that “value-philosophy is 
contaminated by its market origins” (1995, xxi), and that “it is not the economic origins, but rather the
postmodern ignorance of economics, that cheapens th use of the word values. A critique of values is a critique 
of liberal pluralism, a critique of the marketplace of moral options” (1995, xxii). Values language “spilled over 
from the realm of economics into the realm of culture” once political philosophers after Mill and Marx lost 
interest in “economic discourse” (Ideas, 1998-1999, 110). 
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Perspectivism treats the theoretical possibility that humans can “entertain the totality of ‘subject 
positions’ or outlooks” (1995, 162) as something that is likely to happen. Andrew argues that it is not 
only not likely to happen but it is an impossibility. Impersonal justice is a common good and provides 
a remedy for this impossibility. It is also “is parti l to the weak, or those in need of justice” (1995, 
162). By contrast, “a vocabulary of choice, will, and value” appeals to “those free from the urgency of 
need” (1995, 170). Treating justice or any other common good as a value makes it impossible to 
consider the common good because the common good is impersonal but values are not.  
“Justice, as a value depends on whether one is [for example] a Jew or 
a Gentile; it is not impersonal but depends upon balancing the ‘loud 
personal eyes…by taking up the point of view of one’s opponent.” 
(Andrew, 1995, 163) 
 The necessarily relative nature of values means that values are essentially temporary and 
negotiable (1995, 164). What is relative lacks sufficiently solid ground to justify commitment. 
Economic values are expected to be relative, moral values are not—“Principles are nonnegotiable, 
values are negotiable” (1995, 164). Whenever we use values language, irrespective of what is being 
discussed, the subject is made relative, subjective, and individual.  Thus, “Values are the good 
privatized and personalized” (1995, 160).  
Andrew argues that values language originated in and spilled out from the exchange values of the 
market sector and that Nietzsche used market values for a model4 (1995, 169). Values language is 
therefore a tool for liberating economics from its s atus as one of many sectors of social life and 
elevating it to a position of dominance over other social sectors. Values language does this by 
destroying our belief that there are ideas that are worthy; that there is such a thing as “truth” that is 
above and beyond human truth.  
Values language uniquely distinguishes a way of thinking, one that should be not superimposed 
where it does not belong. Values and social democracy are not compatible: “Not only the specific 
content of Nietzsche’s values but also the general fo m of values-discourse is biased against social 
democracy” (1995, 10). Andrew decries those who “read the language of values back into writers 
who never used it, or confined its use to the sphere of economics” (1995 xi).  
Recasting the arguments and positions of others into the terminology of values is common. Berke 
and Conroy (2000), for example, restate the positions taken in the WCED’s Our Common future as 
ones having to do with “societal values”, even though the only “values” cited in the report are 
“economic values” (WCED, 1987 155).  
“…the Commission attempted to weave together multiple societal 
values to confront the challenges of reducing overconsumption and 
grinding poverty. These values are sometimes referred to as the 
‘three Es’ of sustainable development: environment, conomy, and 
equity.” (Berke and Conroy, 2000) 
                                                  
4 Andrew also notes that Nietzsche was not familiar with “economics discourse” (1995, 4) and “shared 
Aristotle’s aristocratic anticommercialism” (1995, 14).  
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Objection Two holds that calling “environment, economy, and equity” values cheapens them by 
making them relative. Values language is an assault on truth, not a neutral tool. It opens the door for 
market values to “invert natural goodness” (1995, 19) by undermining moral values that could be 
used to constrain the market sector (1995, 170).  
“…values lack a ground on which to stand or make a stand. One 
trades with values as one stands on principle.” (Andrew, 1995, 159) 
Values language works to undermine the truly good without our even realizing it. Calling what is 
universally and eternally good “a value”, undermines what is truly valuable. Calling greed “a value” 
does not merely reflect inverted values; it assists in he inversion of what is good and what is not. Not
only is using values language inappropriate when applied to impersonal and unchanging good, this 
way of talking is also detrimental to humans.  
 
4.3.1 The impact of values language is undemocratic  
Objection Two holds that values language has changed how we live for the worse. Assigning the 
highest value according to what brings the highest price in the marketplace threatens democracy 
because economics is a small part of life and does n t deserve to be treated as the most important. 
Values language cannot reference something that is impersonally valuable without also imposing a 
subjective and personal judgement of value. Judgements are expressions of active estimation, of 
valuing.  
“[Values language] is a language of relative estimation and founders 
in expressions like absolute values, intrinsic values, objective 
values—in short, values without valuation.” (Andrew, 1995, 167)  
Following Nietzsche, values are understood as flowing from individuals instead of from impersonal 
principles or even from the collective (society). Because values are by definition personal and 
subjective, declaring one’s values is tantamount to closing off discussion before it starts. “These ar 
my values...” is in sharp contrast to “...‘These army opinions about retributive justice’...” (1995, 
164). Without discussion there can be no collective decisions about what is good for the collective. 
 “Dogmatic insistence that everyone has her own values preempts 
and vetoes in advance any discussion of human need or of a common 
good.” (Andrew, 1995, 163-164) 
Speakers of values language “exhibit a subjective certainty, a point of view that likes where it is” 
(1995, 164). Individuals come to use the logic and standard of market values to describe their private 
lives, eliminating the need to think critically or make thoughtful judgements. Even as they are 
relative, values are also arbitrary and therefore tend to be claimed dogmatically. 
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 “A value is a value because I say it is, and not because it is 
inherently good, or inherently reasonable.” (Ideas, (1998-1999) 5  
Values language is compatible with liberal pluralism but not with social democracy. More than 
merely reflecting a consumer society, values language reinforces atomistic and possessive 
individualism. It is this type of society that is prone to divisive “interest-group pluralism” (1995, 
164). 
 “An unqualified espousal of the language of values is liberal but 
undemocratic, just as a market economy liberalizes but does not 
democratize.” (Andrew, 1995, 157)   
“The language of values inclines toward individualist patterns of 
consumption and away from collective consumption, tward a 
negative income tax and away from pubic provision of common 
needs.” (Andrew, 1995, 170) 
 
4.3.2 Narrow individualism and market values both p roliferate in the absence of 
constraints 
Because no values exist until they are created by humans, humans who use values language 
necessarily become active valuers. Following Objection One, value does not begin and end with 
humans and humans are not fit to be creators of value. Imbuing what is truly worthy with humanness 
makes us less human by allowing us to base values on caprice. It opens the door to allowing market 
values to define all that is valuable. By freeing idividuals from all constraints, the concept of values 
as popularized by Nietzsche helped to cultivate posses ive and atomistic individualism that emerged 
first in the 1600s. It has permitted and promoted an unconstrained dominance of the market in social 
life—economics becomes more important than anything else. Market values not only allow 
economics to dominate social life on a larger scale but also liberate the individual consumer from 
traditional constraints, creating the opportunity for possessive individualism to flourish.  
“The value lingo goes with a privatized lingo in whic  there are no 
common goods. All goods are to be understood as the valu s of 
particular consumers. And so I think the language of values 
necessarily privatizes what is common...a consumerist, non-civic, 
way of looking at things.” (Ideas, 1998-1999, 120) 
The loss of a common standard and a purpose larger than the individual heightens the profile and 
importance of individuals. “Values clarification” takes these objections to their logical conclusion by 
making individuals the seat of what is valuable.  
                                                  
5 This is a re-statement of Andrew’s position by David Cayley, host of the CBC radio program “Ideas”. 
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 “[Values clarification] has given up hopes of achieving moral 
development through moralizing, through persuasion and normal 
sanctions, through even the use of notable examples. Instead it 
attempts through situations and discussion to render the individual 
reflective about his/her preferences and choices, in the expectation 
that stable, publicly defended, and considered values will occupy the 
self. (Values clarification has been seriously criticized for its 
heightened individualism and for social naiveté.)” (Edel, 1988, 28) 
Individualism and the market economy spurred each other onwards. Both were seen as ways to 
achieve freedom and power; both viewed constraints to freedom as challenges to be overcome. Of all 
the social sciences, economics contributed the mostto the growth of atomistic individualism that had 
no need for critical thinking.  
“Economics was the one social science that early talked of 
value...Eventually...all attempts at interpersonal comparison dropped 
away, and total valuations had as their bedrock basis the individual’s 
uncriticized expression of preferences and aimed at an overall 
maximization. In these theoretical developments, the concept of 
valuation is separated from any constraint provided by the object that 
is being evaluated or by the process of individual valuing...The 
generality of the value concept thus expresses the unfettered 
individualism within a community where the social aim is the 
maximal achievement of individual achievement.”  (Edel, 1988, 21) 
Absent a larger context, the individual’s own prefences become the framework within which 
decisions are made. The market sector is not fit toassume the role of larger than human purpose and 
therefore should not be allowed to dominate social life. Its influence needs to be curtailed and 
confined to the market sector. Values are perfectly suited to the market place and cannot be 
rehabilitated to consider common good. 
 
4.3.3 Using another language to talk about the good  and worthy 
Values language is powerful enough to shape our ideas about what is valuable but not powerful 
enough to take us toward what is truly worthy. “Value” requires engagement by valuers who 
inevitably must interpret value as a relative estima on. “The medium—values-discourse—not only 
bears the message of subjectivity but also is the message” (Andrew, 1995, xiii).  
Although subjectivity of values is the primary target of Objection Two, values language is also to 
be rejected because it “oscillate[s] between subjectivity and objectivity” (Ideas, 1998-1999, 112).  
“The idea that values are an outsider’s appraisal, and not an insider’s 
expression of belonging suggests that values have an objective, as 
well as a subjective dimension…Values are subjectiv insofar as 
they manifest my identity or my self estimate, but also objective 




The “instability of values language” (Ideas, 1998-1999, 112) is caused by dividing the world into 
subjects and objects. That values are not firm ground on which to stand is not simply because they are 
relative but because we cannot commit to objects that we create in the same way that we can commit 
to a world to which we belong and that we love. “Without love to point us towards what is inherently 
worthwhile, we are left with values” (Ideas, 1998-1999, 112).  
“Grant brings forth the experience that the language of science, the 
language of subjects and objects out of which we get the world of 
scientific facts and, conversely, the subjective language of values 
opposing it, does not describe a world that people live in. The world 
is neither objective nor subjective, and we have to convert a world of 
things that are around us into scientific objects by tripping them of 
all their qualities and then we project back onto th se things those 
qualities that we call values. And so it’s a reduction of familiar 
things to a world of objects and then a re-projection of qualitative 
aspects onto them which are said to come out of the subjectivity of 
the individual, which we call values.” (Ideas, 1998-1999, 112) 
Values “are always seen from the outside”, as a study of “the value of various religions” is 
“comparative” and not an evaluation of “the experienc  of revelation as it appears to an individual” 
(Ideas, 1998-1999, 112). Seen from the outside, values are objects and not experience, in the same 
way that Dean Lauter6 contrasted values as nouns to values as verbs, the lat er the “more powerful” 
(Lauter, 2000). Values language uses both nouns and verbs to navigate between subjective and 
objective perspectives of the world. 
Andrew has two solutions for remedying the negative impact of values language. One is to call for 
a “language of love” (Ideas, 1998-1999, 111) to replace values language, something Grant also 
advocates. Where there is love, there can be no talk f values: “Anything you love isn’t a value” 
(Ideas, 1998-1999, 111). Where values language is harmful because it is necessarily and essentially 
relative, the language of love is beneficial because according to Objections One and Two it is a 
medium through which individuals can consider common g od. Words can change how we think and 
what ideas we have. 
Andrew’s second solution is to use two parallel languages, one to talk about what is valuable and 
one to talk about what is worthy. Values language is “appropriate for the marketplace” because it 
“entails that nothing is intrinsically good and nobody is intrinsically worthy” (1995, 170). Humans 
need another language, “a grammar of the common good,” to talk about “universal principles and 
common goods” (1995, 170). Values are a creative act of will and “not appropriate to a polity where 
we should have unshakeable principles” that are “discovered by our common reason” (Ideas, 1998-
1999, 112). Andrew is satisfied to have these two languages function as “a duality or plurality of 
discourses” (1995, 169). The two languages would operate in parallel but be applied to different 
situations; which would be applied where is “a matter for political deliberation between citizens” 
(1995, 169).  
 
                                                  
6 See Chapter 3. 
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4.4 Objection Three: Values are Relational but Trea ted as If They Were Not  
Objection Three agrees with the first two objections that values are relative, that values require 
individuals to make judgements, and that considering what is valuable in terms of values has the 
potential to change the nature of what is valuable. It differs in two important respects. First, Objection 
Three does not view these features of values as negativ . It agrees with Objection One that anything 
that is treated as a value cannot also be absolute or infinite but maintains that this does not preclude 
using values in the service of the common good. To the contrary, considering multiple interpretations 
and valuations is essential in deciding what the comm n good is. Second, Objection Three does not 
agree that it is the relativity of values that is to blame for the failure to examine and contest 
declarations of value when values are presented with “dogmatic insistency” and “subjective 
certainty”. It agrees with Objection Two that superficial, anything-goes values are indeed 
characteristic of everyday usage but interprets this as a symptom of a poor grasp of values and not a 
necessary result of values language. Unlike the first two objections, Objection Three does not 
maintain that it is the essential character of values that makes them a negative social force. The 
problem is not with what values are but with how they ave come to be used.  
 
4.4.1 A passive approach is not unique to values re flects a larger context 
Even before people talked in terms of values, they managed to devise arguments and situations 
similar to those now accomplished with the help of values. If we could act as if greed were a value 
even before values language was introduced, then values language cannot be said to cause greed to be 
valuable. About a century before Nietzsche introduce  his usage of values, Rousseau wrote: 
“The ancient political Thinkers forever spoke of morals and of 
virtue; ours speak only of commerce and of money...They appraise 
men like herds of cattle. According to them a man is worth to the 
State only what he consumes in it.”  (Rousseau, 1986 [1750], 16) 
By calling dominant social ideas and norms “values”, Nietzsche drew attention to conventional 
ideas that were assumed to be valuable but were so p rvasive and powerful that they escaped 
examination. In articulating a particular usage of values, Objections One and Two do not give enough 
attention to the importance of questioning values bcause, following their interpretation of Nietzsche, 
they treat values as an act of will rather than an act of reason.  
Objection Three holds that using values language domatically is not a necessary consequence of 
values. To the contrary, dogmatic use of “values” has made it easier for beliefs about what is 
important to be protected from challenge, on both epist mological and socio-political dimensions. 
Treated dogmatically, values should not be contested because this infringes on the freedom and rights 
of individuals and values do not need to be contested because there is nothing more to know about 
values. If there is no need to contest values, values can be declared dogmatically and arrived at 
arbitrarily. This is a passive approach to values, r quiring no effort on the part of valuers. An 
understanding of values that allows anything to be declared a value by anyone but not expect this 
declaration to be contested or examined contributes to a tyranny of ignorance that does not support 
either liberal pluralist democracy or social democracy. 
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Neither dogmatic insistence nor subjective certainty is exclusive to values language. Rational 
society requires “the capacity to tolerate doubt” (Kaminer, 1999, 189-190) and encourages dissent. 
The willingness to evaluate and think critically requires an active frame of mind. This way of thinking 
must have sufficient power or authority to command belief while not obliterating doubt and 
scepticism. Kaminer argues that the high value placed on irrationality in today’s culture allows 
political agendas to prevail without being examined or challenged (Kaminer, 1999, 186). Neil 
Postman argues that the belief that stereotyping and superficial information is equivalent to 
knowledge is encouraged by popular media (Postman 1999, 150-154). Whether or not people actually 
place a high value on irrationality and superficialty, the impact of widespread tolerance for these is 
more than substantive; the idea that values can be treated passively becomes yet another diverse usage 
of “values”.  
Kaminer calls “democracy’s vice” the assumption “that everyone who has a right to be heard has 
something to say that’s worth hearing” (1999, 233). That science is disconnected from truth and is 
reduced to “a mere viewpoint” (1999, 74) happens in a larger context where most everything is 
reduced to “a mere viewpoint”. The need to make judgements loses out to a question of rights—
everyone has a right to their own values.  If all vues have equal value, either on grounds of 
everyone’s right to have their own opinion or on grounds that there is no means or set of criteria to for 
judging, then there does not seem much point to airing values. The assertion that something is “a 
value” becomes rhetorical jargon when a dogmatic declaration of value meets with no resistance.  
Diverse usage of “values” flows from applying “values” to other ideas.  Whether or not the idea of 
common good is valued, and to what degree, is a substantive question about what is considered 
valuable but the value of common good is shaped by whatever usage of values is being used. Michael 
Sandel argues that since the Second World War values have been used to support the public 
philosophy of procedural liberalism dominant in theU.S. (2005, 20). Procedural liberalism aspires to 
a neutral government and treats values as being attached to an individual’s freedom to choose. To 
achieve neutrality, procedural liberalism must maintain a strict separation between politics and moral 
values. Doing so, however, leaves politics without a larger purpose and “creates a moral void that 
opens the way for intolerance and other misguided moralisms” (2005, 28). Sandel argues that 
attaching values only to the rights of individuals destroys the idea of civic virtue. Attaching values 
only to the rights of individuals is a particular usage of values, an outcome of how the idea of values 
is associated with ideas about irrationality and neutrality. 
The concept of values and its diverse usage is a tool; as is the case for all tools, values too can be 
used for good or ill. Ken Goldberg argues “each newinvention for communication or measurement 
forces us to recalibrate our definition of knowledg” (Goldberg, 3, 2000). As a relatively new 
invention, values have the potential to make a positive contribution to knowledge. We have failed to 
recalibrate our understanding of knowledge and society to support this potential. Values have been 
recalibrated to fit with existing approaches to knowledge and existing social conditions. The status 
quo acted on values rather than values acting on the status quo. This is not a rigorous test of the 
potential of values. 
To simply ban a word as popular as “values” is not reasonable and the idea that discussion about 
common good can be rescued by replacing the word “values” with the word “worthy” may prove 
more an expression of hope than a useful prescription. So long as using the word “values” requires no 




4.4.2 Values as relational 
Objection Three agrees with the first two objections that allowing values presented with “dogmatic 
insistence” and “subjective certainty” to stand uncontested does not assist in determining what is truly 
valuable. Objection Three considers what is truly valuable to be determined by individuals acting 
within a collective experience in a historical context. Determining what is valuable is the result of 
perceiving and appreciating relations among ideas. It i  not a determination of fit with an ideal that is 
not itself contestable but requires questioning the significance of similarities and differences.  
At a later time, a value may turn out not to have be n as valuable as first believed. Considering 
values as relational creates a conceptual space for the possibility of error and a reason to explore why 
and how a given value came to be believed to be valuable in a particular historical context. This 
approach to values as relational expands the range of what is relevant to cognition so that includes all 
of “the material, social, and ecological aspects of cognition” (Bowker and Star, 1999, 288). It 
combines a focus on values as the responsibility of he individual with a focus on values as the 
responsibility of the collective. By contrast, the first two objections see values language as necessarily 
invoking an individual and anti-social form of cognition. In describing the approach that informed 
their research into classification, Bowker and Star characterize the two different approaches that 
Objection Three treats as being complementary.  
“In brief, the research in this tradition seeks to gr und activities 
previously seen as individual, mental, and non-social as situated, 
collective, and historically specific.” (Bowker and Star, 1999, 288) 
Appealing to a vague ideal may lead to new confusion when people understand or interpret the 
ideal differently. Objection Three does not protest hat there is no such thing as “truly valuable”, but
that merely having some idealized version of what is truly valuable provides no real guidance for how 
different interpretations of the truly good and perfect might be resolved. Such a usage of “ideal” does 
not anticipate differing interpretations or diverse usage that cannot be resolved by referring to the 
ideal.  
Whether or not the word values is used explicitly, attention needs to be paid to the process of 
determining what is truly valuable as jointly a knowledge-seeking exercise and a political process of 
arriving at agreement. Both of these aspects of the process may involve trial and error. Objections 
One and Two do not detect a need to anticipate error because the answer (whatever is truly valuable) 
is already assumed to be known and further applications are derivations of the ideal and therefore also
good and true. They are determinations of fit. Treating the truly valuable as an incontestable ideal 
does not allow for situations in which an ideal itself, rather than the consequences of aspiring to an 
ideal—is less than ideally good and true or for fallibility. 
When the answer is not assumed to be known in advance, in the first instance all interpretations of 
“what is truly valuable” must be considered conditionally legitimate. This is similar to scientific 
methods permitting and encouraging a wide range of hypotheses, ruling out no hypotheses 
prematurely. Using values language allows for error to be recognized as a legitimate and potentially 
valuable component of the process of discovering what is valuable, extending the possibility of error 
 
85 
to include descriptions or interpretations of the id al. Objection Three accepts a concept of values that 
is comprised of diverse usage of “values”. The first two objections understand their particular type of 
usage to be co-extensive with the whole of values, with a concept of values in general.  
That the first two objections find the relativity of values objectionable is directly related to their 
belief that firm and certain knowledge about truth and goodness is possible. Principles are firm 
ground on which to stand (Andrew, 1995, 159) but values are not. Ideas about relativity are relative to 
ideas about firm and certain ground. Firm and certain knowledge is sourced in something impersonal 
and external to humans, such as God, Nature, or metaphysics. Objection Three, by contrast, holds that 
firm and certain knowledge about truth and goodness that is not altered by human apprehension is an 
illusion; that this belief is itself an example of how values, whether or not they are explicitly called 
“values”, can be so broadly pervasive that they escape examination and are not contested.  
Neither is it clear that individuals value consistently in the same way; to classify values according 
to whether they are individual and subjective or impersonal and objective obscures other potentially 
relevant features of valuing. For example, when “gut-based value judgements” are replaced by 
numbers, the value still originates with individuals but now in a completely different way:  
“Polls, focus groups, and other forms of market research had made it 
possible to replace the old gut-based value judgments, for which the 
individual himself was responsible, with judgments beholden only to 
“the numbers”—to assign a kind of Q Rating to cultural experience 
that had never been quantified or measured numerically before.” 
(Seabrook, 2000, 7) 
It is not sufficient to claim that humans need an idea of perfection, of what is truly valuable, 
without also considering how such an idea of perfection might be knowable socially. If knowledge of 
the truly valuable as an ideal is direct, transparent, and immediate for all persons in the same way 
then there is no need to prepare for fallibility or su prise. If knowledge of the truly valuable is simply 
another way of describing a personal experience of faith, then considering common good would still 
require accommodating different personal experiences. Eliminating values language will not 
eliminate subjectivity. Values Clarification had a similar problem in defining values as having to be 
personal, as prized by an individual, without providing a bridge between the individual and the 
common good. As Edel noted above, Values Clarificaton was criticized for its “social naiveté” (Edel, 
1988, 28). 
Both of the first two objections criticize values because they are relative and relativity because it i  
not firm and certain. To leave ideas about what is firm and certain in the domain of uncontested 
beliefs creates an opportunity for individuals to claim privileged knowledge of the truly valuable and 
for states to act in the name of the truly valuable without expecting to be judged on the quality, 
immediacy, or directness of their claim to knowledg. The result is the same, whether dogmatic 
claims are made about values or about what is firm and certain. Objection Two’s argument rests on a 
belief that firmness and certainty are preferable. The quarrel with values is secondary; values and 
relative estimation are not valued because they are “not appropriate to a polity where we should have 
unshakeable principles.” Unshakeable, firm, certain pr ciples are the goal to which values language 
is not a means, suggesting that people would find it easier to talk about firm principles if only the 
language of values could be eliminated as an obstruction 
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“There are some things that are intolerable. If we talk about the value 
of liberty, then it’s always something to be traded off against some 
other thing…if we’re employing the language of values, we’re 
encouraged to think in this way, to start trading off one good for 
another.” (Ideas 1998-1999, 112-113) 
Objection Three characterizes the first two objections as deeply sceptical about the potential of 
humans to make subjective choices about the common go d and claims that their scepticism is 
misplaced. Contrary to how values are described by the first two objections, values as nouns are 
treated passively, not actively created or experienced. Objection Three is itself deeply sceptical of 
whether values can be widely understood in the active, creative, and subjective way that the first two
objections assume they already are.  
 
4.4.3 The negative consequences of values usage 
Objection Three agrees with the first two objections that because values are relative, phrases such as 
“absolute values”, “intrinsic values”, and “universal values” are nonsensical. Users of such phrases, 
however, include religious institutions that describe their religious values, fundamentalists who talkin 
terms of incontestable values, and governments, organizations, and international bodies that talk 
about values firm enough to be deserving of commitment. These are not necessarily cases of outsiders 
describing someone else’s values but of insiders describing their own values; they are subjective 
declarations about values presented as if they wereobjective. Describing them as “absolute” refers to 
their use and presentation as incontestable, irrespective of their substantive application. That such 
phrases are used so commonly means they cannot be dismissed as an error without understanding 
why use is common or explaining the standards by which error is determined. Andrew, following 
Grant, explains such usage as being caused by the “instability” of values language, shifting between 
subjectivity and objectivity (Ideas, 1998-1999, 112). In the first instance values are subjective; in 
application objective.  
What Andrew and Grant characterize as the instabiliy of values language, Edel calls flexibility 
(Edel, 1988, 26). A competing explanation for why prases such as “absolute value” are so prevalent 
is that this is a different usage of values. The first two objections describe all values usage as creative 
because this is the way that they define values in general, following their interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
usage. Objection Three holds that the first two objections articulate a particular usage of values that 
aspires to be the whole of values but is not because ctual usage shows another usage of values.  
Users of phrases such as “absolute values” need not agree that values are relative, subjective, and 
creative. Theirs may be a second-generation usage of values as absolute ideals—not the older usage  
of the word prior to the development of a concept of values but a usage of values as firm and certain 
that developed in reaction to Nietzsche’s usage of values as fallible, a challenge to convention, and 
absent an objective standard. Such usage of values s absolute ideals may be an example of how a 
flexible and vague concept of values allows particular sage to make differ from one another. 
The consequence of this usage of values as absolute ideals is to neutralize the revolutionary aspects 
of Nietzsche’s usage. The consequences would be the sam  whether this was a deliberate strategy to 
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defuse a powerful challenge to convention or an effort to create certainty from the new confusion. 
Less effort is required to treat ideas as firm and certain than to question them. Ease of application 
alone could explain the popularity of values usage s absolute ideals7. 
Objection Three rejects the claim that any of these competing usages of values represent the 
concept of values in general. All invoke particular usages of “values” in order to make their 
arguments, the substance of their arguments depending on the other ideas to which values are 
attached. Mackenzie for example, endorses “values” for precisely the same reason that the first two 
objections reject it. Values are not the end but the process. 
“While, however, the idea of Value has the advantage of directing 
attention to the metaphysical (as distinguished from the purely 
psychological) implications of ethical theory, it seems to me, at the 
same time, to have the advantage also of a certain superiority over 
the old metaphysical idea of ‘the Good’. The latter is too apt to 
suggest some single end, such as pleasure or perfection to be 
attained, once for all, at the end of a process; whereas the idea of 
Value lends itself more readily to the conception of an organic 
system of ends, possessing various degrees of worth. It also serves, 
better perhaps than any other conception, to emphasize the 
essentially normative character of ethical science, as being concerned 
primarily neither with the simple study of existenc, nor with the 
simple inculcation of rules of conduct, but with the investigation of 
the worth of actions and of types of character.” (Mackenzie, 1895, 
447)  
Usage of values as absolute ideals is in competition both with the idea that “worthy” is preferable 
to “values” and values usage as relative.  All three usages are used concurrently, sometimes 
competing and other times isolated in parallels. The description of valuing as a process of 
determining fitness with an incontestable purpose applies to the first two but not the third. The 
popularity of the phrase “absolute values” perpetuat s the idea that moral values are not sourced in 
humans and not a creative act of will, even when th values begin as subjective. If they are not 
acknowledged as being sourced in humans, moral values cannot be applied where values usage is 
                                                  
7 Fundamental conservative values presented as incontestable, as absolute, played a major role in the 2004 U.S. 
election. The contest had been as much about the definition of values in general as it had been about the content 
of values. Linguist Geoffrey Nunberg called values “the ‘v’ word” of the 2004 campaign, noting: “A foreigner 
listening to those claims might think that this was simply a disagreement about who has better values, lik  Wal-
Mart versus Costco. But it goes deeper than that. It’s really about what ‘values’ means, and what rolevalues 
ought to play in political life.” (Nunberg, 2004) In a radio interview in March 2006, Nunberg says “when I look 
in the so-called liberal media…in domestic political ontext at the word ‘values”, I see that conservative values 
are anywhere to three to five times as common as liberal values. And that’s not a matter of some dictat coming 
down from the editor of those papers, nor is it really a matter of a conscious decision. It’s just that ‘v lues’ 
nowadays in American speech evokes conservatism rather than liberalism” (Nunberg, 2006). 
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relative. Usage of values as absolutes minimizes and trivializes the idea that treating values as 
relational has potential. In comparison to something that can be presented with authority and 
certainty, every other type of valuing pales as no more than a diversion, no more than entertainment.   
Minimizing relative values effectively isolates them. Absolute values and relative values cannot be 
compared and contrasted and connecting relations are obscured. Objection Three maintains that 
because values are relational, not recognizing the connectedness of all spheres of life perpetuates the 
idea that some aspects of life can be valued separat ly but not together or as a whole. This impedes 
our ability to value them. The remedy is to recognize that boundaries segmenting aspects of life are 
no more than descriptive, substantive categories superimposed on other categories humans have 
constructed to make sense of the world. Understanding particular usages as related by a concept of 
values in general makes it possible to compare and co trast them and to find underlying categories 
that reflect other criteria and themes. Comparing dverse usages makes valuing an act of meta-
analysis that requires an active usage of values with a questioning attitude.  
Objection Three is in agreement with Objection Two that values of the marketplace should not 
determine all other values but disagrees about the rem dy. Objection Two seeks to isolate and contain 
the marketplace in order to protect what is worthy in society, at least so long as economics is 
misunderstood.8 Objection Three seeks to contain it by illuminating relations between the 
marketplace and other aspects of life. 
Treating different applications of values as diverse u age of a concept of values suggests that there 
may yet be an opportunity to rescue and rehabilitate “values”. By taking responsibility for the 
authorship of values and inviting controversy, values might yet be rescued and put into the service of 
democracy. Objections One and Two claim that, regrettably, values are already treated this way. 
Objection Three disagrees. Objection Three, however, is deeply pessimistic. In contemporary culture 
we would do to the word “worthy” what we have done to the word “values”. 
 
4.5 Objection Four: Whether or Not Something is Cal led “A Value” Makes No 
Difference 
Objection Four is dismissive of “values” because “it is just a word”. Compared with the first three 
objections, the fourth objection to values usage may appear at first glance to be a minor player. It is
simple and straightforward but not minor because it has the power to completely obliterate the first 
three objections. Where the first three objections argue about how the power of values should or not 
be put to use, Objection Four finds no power in the word at all. This means that calling something “a 
                                                  
8 Andrew suggests that the need for such segregation need not be permanent. He finds the origins of values 
language in the time when economics was cast out frm other affairs of social life:  “My guiding hypothesis is 
that values-discourse spilled over from economics into philosophy at the time when political philosophers 
ceased to consider economics to be an integral part of moral philosophy” (Andrew, 1995, xv). If economics 
were understood differently and its limits appreciated, then values language might be different (Andrew, 1995, 
xxii).    
 
89 
value” makes no difference because the word has no special meaning that distinguishes it from other 
descriptors such as preferences, attitudes, beliefs, interests, principles, and so on. It disagrees with the 
first three objections that values are necessarily relative. According to Objection Four there are no 
necessary features associated with “values”. 
There are several variations of this objection. Oneclaims the word “values” is meaningless because 
it is a linguistic embellishment, a “junk” word that is momentarily fashionable. Andrew (1995), for 
example, calls them “ornaments” (Ideas. 1998-1999, 111). William Connolly considers the 
superficiality of values: 
“Those who roundly condemn ‘cultural relativism’—an u likely 
stance usually attributed to those who do not affirm it themselves—
do not appreciate how violent it is to treat cross-cultural differences 
as if they were different ‘values’ painted on the surface of the same 
acts and identities. They thereby fail to appreciat how dicey and 
permeable the boundary is between the positive corporealization of 
cultural norms and the infliction of injury through cultural 
imposition.”  (Connolly, 1995, 195) 
Maio and Olson (1998) conclude that some values are “truisms”, “…values may be widely shared, 
rarely questioned, and, therefore, relatively bereft of cognitive support…” (Maio and Olson, 1998) 
That values are truisms is not considered a necessary u ge of values. Their study showed that some 
values function like truisms while others do not and that the habit of using values as truisms varies 
across age groups and societies. Maio and Olson use “values” both as truisms and as metaphysical 
absolutes. In neither of these applications are values treated as contestable. 
“We do not argue that values must always be truisms. We simply 
suggest that values are currently truisms for many people and will 
probably remain so until individuals begin to think carefully about 
why the values are important to them. Perhaps open-minded 
questioning of values may never occur, because values are 
metaphysical absolutes, that is, doctrines that are taught with the 
sanctity of tradition and that are necessary for the smooth running of 
society.”  (Maio and Olson, 1998) 
The more compelling version of Objection Four begins with historian Jacques Barzun’s dismissal 
of values: “In any context the word values is surely the emptiest in current use” (2000, 769). It is the 
most compelling because Barzun explicitly addresses on  of the central themes of the first three 
objections: relativity. Objections One and Two reject both values and relativity. Objection Three 
rejects passive usage of values but not relativity. Objection Four rejects values “in any context” but
not relativity. Barzun describes Nietzsche as a pragmatist in the search for truth (2000, 670) and 
“naturally immune to the contagion of populism” (2000, 671). He discusses Nietzsche’s “assault on 
the character of both the mass man and the intellectual onformist” (2000, 671). He highlights some 
of the most significant aspects of Nietzsche’s thought. Barzun, however, makes no association 
between Nietzsche and “values”.  




“In the realm of ethics, the most blatant absurdity of the day is 
wrapped up in the bogey word Relativism. Its current misapplication 
is a serious error, because it affects one’s understanding of physical 
and social science and derails any reasoning about the morals of the 
day. Nine times out of ten, the outcry against Relativism is 
mechanical, not to say absentminded. Everybody is supposed to 
know what the term means’ it has become a cliché that stands for the 
cause of every laxity, corrupt or scandalous conduct is supposed the 
product of a relativist outlook. When linked with Liberal politics, it 
implies complacent irresponsibility.”  (Barzun, 2000, 760-761) 
As do the first two objections with respect to values, Barzun too associates relativism with 
pluralism and its opposite with absolutes but sides with Objection Three. “One must therefore ask the 
anti-relativist: ‘Whose Absolute are we to adopt and impose?’ The plural state is full of them, down 
to the several sects of any one religion” (2000, 761- 2).  Objection Four is not neutral with respect 
to common good but does not relate it to values langu ge. Barzun also notes that the firmness and 
certainty idealized by anti-relativists is itself a judgement arrived at by comparing the present to an 
uncritical ideal of the past: “When the anti-relativist deplores the present state of morals he is judging 
it relatively to a previous state, which he believes was fixed and eternal (2000, 762). Looking for 
some “fundamental principles of conduct that the whole world acknowledges as binding and not 
subject to change” he finds none, not even prohibition against killing (2000, 762). Where the first two 
objections proposed parallel languages and the third objection found use of the word “values” 
objectionable, Barzun’s solution is to reject the cliché “relativism” and instead substitute the word 
“Relationism”: 
“One would then notice that science is Relationism first and last. The 
whole effort is to establish relations between phenomena, ultimately 
between pairs of well-defined sense impressions, by the medium of a 
material or numerical yardstick…Form in art—fitness in anything—
consists in a subtle or vivid relation between parts that cannot be 
arrived at by means of an absolute formula. In society tact is the 
great art that makes for civility, for civilization, and tact is nothing 
but the subtlest relationism in action.” (Barzun, 2000, 763) 
Although Barzun does to “relativity” what the other objections do to “values”, he is not impressed 
enough with the word “values” even to give it serious attention. He prefaces his dismissal of “values” 
by saying, 
“What is absurd is the habit of believing the order to be the truth and 
the facts negligible. Almost as bad is to import the cast of thought 
and the jargon where they are not needed; for instance, to say, 
‘everybody tends to maximize their values.’ Instead of: seeks 
pleasure and tries to avoid pain—if that is indeed the thought behind 
the vague abstraction.” (Barzun, 2000, 769) 
The meaning of “values” can never be clear enough for it not to be an obstacle to clear thinking and 




4.6 Summary of Objections 
4.6.1 Calling something “a value” can and does make  a difference 
Taken together, the objections address one of the questions that this present study of the word 
“values” was designed to answer:  
Given the frequency with which the word “values” is used as 
interchangeable with other descriptors, such as preferences, 
attitudes, beliefs, interests, principles, and so on, can calling 
something “a value” make a difference?  
The first three objections derive much of their force from what they judge to be one of the essential 
features of “values” and the power of this feature to shape what is considered valuable. All three 
agree that values are essentially relative, irrespective of whether they purport to be about what is truly 
valuable or what is frivolous and narrowly personal. Because values are essentially relative, they can 
be neither absolutely true nor absolutely good. All agree that calling something that simply is 
absolutely, infinitely, or immeasurably good “a value” automatically changes its meaning so that it no
longer can be something absolutely good and certain.  
Objection Three identifies a second essential featur  of values as a corollary. If values can be 
neither absolutely true nor absolutely good, they must be conditional and contestable and a therefore 
questioning attitude must be attached to the idea of v lues. Because they are relative, values require 
critical examination. This aspect of values appears not to be appreciated, either by the first two 
objections or by how the word “values” is used because when values are presented as unconditional 
absolutes, they are allowed to stand without being contested. This is unfortunate and perhaps 
irreversible because of how the meaning of the word “values” has evolved, but it is not an essential 
feature of “values”. 
The first two objections fail to take this second step. Instead they focus on the dogmatic 
presentation of values, arguing that values are present d as if they were absolute and incontestable 
even though they are not. The “absoluteness” of dogmatically presented values stems not from an 
objective good (sourced externally to humans in general) but from sourcing values in individuals. 
This makes all values subjective, at least in the first instance. The problem with values, therefore, is 
that they are individual judgements about narrow individual preferences and cannot also be individual 
judgements about the common good because the common good cannot be relativized. 
Objection Three’s expanded position on what is essential to values language provides a rebuttal to 
Objection Four’s position that calling something “a value” makes no difference at all. Were values 
recognized as requiring a questioning attitude, maintains Objection Three, use of the word “values” as 
jargon and linguistic embellishment that obfuscates communication (as characterized by Objection 
Four) would not be allowed to go uncontested; use of “values” would need to be justified in an 
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ongoing way. Objection Three’s rebuttal to Objection Four dissolves unless values continue to be 
treated as conditional and contestable. 
That calling something “a value” makes a difference is a fundamental point and may now be 
treated as a conclusive because both critics and supporters of values language take the same position, 
agreeing that the relativity of values shapes, at le st in part, what is valued and how it is valued. This 
conclusion is also supported by the historical overview of diverse usage (Chapter 3) which 
demonstrates that how calling something “a value” makes a difference depends, at least in part, on the 
particular usage of values by which it “counts” as a value. That considering what is valuable in terms 
of values has the potential to change our ideas about what is valuable describes and explains how 
assumptions about what values are can establish the ground on which to make normative9 judgements 
about the content of values. How values are understood underlies positions taken about what is 
valuable. That there are many ways in which “values” are understood and applied, notwithstanding 
what is or is not an essential feature of values, means that values usage cannot be assumed to be a 
constant that requires no critical scrutiny. The differences among the first three objections 
demonstrate that agreement about essential feature(s) of values does not also mean that the next steps
will not diverge.  
That the first three objections themselves all consider the value of values language by subjecting it 
to critical scrutiny suggests that if this kind of scrutiny can be applied to values in general, it should 
also be possible with respect to specific values and specific positions about values. For Objections 
                                                  
9 I recognize that distinguishing between normative judgements and judgements about what values “are” is 
treacherous ground. Certainly it can be argued that there is no judgement that is not also normative, at least in 
some respect, if the context expanded. There is a difference, however, between attempting to understand what 
an idea is, without presuming in advance what it should be, and determining whether the idea and its 
consequences are or might be desirable. However nuanced this difference, treating everything as if it were 
equally normative blurs what may be useful to distinguish. Some judgements are more overtly normative; some 
less. In this case, distinguishing between them helps to identify what is a common starting point: Critics and 
supporters of values language agree that values are rel tive but not about whether it is desirable. It helps to 
grasp the double-headed position taken by Objection Three in distinguishing between what now is and what 
might be possible. That Objection Three does not fid the idea of values being relative undesirable may provide 
the motivation but this does not mean that Objection Three’s position on relativity emerges from a normative 
stance. Considering what values necessarily are requires a different kind of judgement from the judgement 
about whether values language is desirable. Objection Three is saying to the first two objections, “We agree that 
values are necessarily relative. We agree that values are subjective and that they are presented dogmatically. But 
you are making an error in assuming that subjective dogmatic declarations are necessarily the only possible 
result. Even if we disagree about whether values langu ge is desirable, you have made an error in overstating 
the narrow range of possible consequences of values understood as relative”. The ground for Objection Three’s 
position on a questioning attitude is articulated in Chapter 5 as part of the theory about diverse usage of values. 
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One and Two to argue otherwise would be to reveal a deep scepticism about the ability of others to do 
what they themselves have done. 
 
4.6.2 Calling something “a value” has consequences 
Having established what values are, the Objections evolve into what are more clearly normative 
positions about the desirability of features identified in the first stage; the same features now becom  
part of the normative argument.  
Values language is one way (but not the only way) of considering the broader question of what is 
valuable. Once agreement has been reached about the essential feature(s) of values language, its 
ability and effectiveness in addressing the broader qu stion remain to be considered. The 
consequences of using values language are the normative differences that follow from calling 
something “a value”.  
Agreement that values are essentially relative means that there is agreement also that values 
language precludes having knowledge that is certain because it changes whatever is or might be 
timelessly absolute and certain into something relative, uncertain, and impossible to prove or validate 
conclusively. For Objections One and Two, this is not desirable because what is truly worthy is 
timelessly absolute and immeasurable and sourced ext rnally to humans. For Objection Three, this is 
desirable because any attempt by humans to apprehend what is timelessly absolute and immeasurable 
transform these into human knowledge, even when this is not attempted by using values language. All 
human knowledge is necessarily conditional and contestable. 
All three objections agree that it is desirable for individuals and collectives to consider the 
common good. They agree that 
o Dogmatic and uncontested claims about values are not beneficial for democratic 
societies because they put an end to discussion.  
 
They disagree about whether  
o Values language necessarily prevents individuals and collectives from considering 
the common good. (Objections One and Two) 
o Values language encourages narrow individual preferences, as opposed to good 
from the perspective of the collective. (Objections One and Two) 
o Individuals can only value on the basis of narrow individual preferences, as the 
preferences of consumers, not of citizens. (Objection Two) 
o Treating values as contestable is necessarily preclud d by what values in general 
are. (Objections One and Two) 
o Treated as conditional as well as contestable, calling something “a value” is a 




4.6.3 Judgements about the desirability of values l anguage 
For Objections One and Two, values language is undesirable both because it is relative (conditional) 
and because values are presented dogmatically (unconditionally). Values language is necessarily 
harmful because:  
• it disconnects consideration of what is valuable from absolutes, making all values conditional 
(whether they are about absolutes or narrow preferenc s), 
• narrow subjective judgements are presented dogmatically and uncontested, 
• when humans use values language we automatically assume responsibility for creating values 
but we are not god-like and not equipped to create v lues, 
• it is harmful to democracy, and 
• it encourages citizens to see themselves as consumer  
 
Values language is not necessarily harmful (Objection Three) because: 
• treating values as unconditional and incontestable is not a necessary consequence of values 
language 
• values language changes a quest for a single Good to ne of determining multiple related 
goods 
• does not require overstating conclusions by presenting them as a single correct answer 
• the possibility of absolute truth and goodness is one thing; human knowledge of it is another; 
the desire for firm ground and certainty is one thing, the possibility that such exists is another, 
• that values are subjective judgments made by individuals need not preclude discussion of the 
common good nor encourage narrow individual preferences of consumers 
 
4.6.4 Action to take about values language 
For different reasons, all objections agree that values language as it is now used poses a threat to the 
ability to collectively consider the common good. “Values” is potentially a negative and damaging 
force because it diminishes the capacity of individuals and society to grasp what is truly valuable.  
The first two objections argue that this is necessarily so; that “values language” is an attack on all that 
is good and truly valuable and, lamentably, a victory f r the status quo, mob rule, and narrow 
individual preferences.  
For the first two objections, there is and can be no ground on which values or usage of the word can 
be “rehabilitated” by understanding or using the word differently. The remedy is to consider the 
common good and what is worthy by using a language that does not relativized absolutes, the 
language of love.  
According to Objection Two, values language should be confined to the sphere of market values—
where values are intended to be relative and individual preferences can be narrow without doing 
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further harm. Objection Two is concerned about the pervasiveness of a consumer mentality and the 
role that values language plays in perpetuating this mentality and spreading it into other aspects of 
life. It establishes a pattern of valuing from the perspective of a consumer. The remedy is to keep both 
the marketplace and values language separate from what is really valuable.  
The third objection distinguishes between actual usge of “values” and how it might be used if a 
questioning attitude were taken toward values. From the perspective of Objection Three, if values 
language is to continue to be used, the remedy is to recognize that isolating sectors of society is both 
unrealistic and unhelpful. The problem is not that values enable the marketplace mentality to 
dominate social life but that the relational aspect of values is not appreciated, that a questioning 
attitude is not attached to values, and that treating values as if they were unconditional constrains their 
natural suitability for cross-sectoral applications. 
Only the third objection holds out a possibility tha  explicit and deliberate use of values might be 
useful to planning but is sceptical about whether values usage that necessarily engages a questioning 
attitude can become common usage. It questions whether the opportunity to realize that potential has 
evaporated in light of how the concept has evolved. At the same time, it recognizes that abolishing or 
even curtailing values language, as it is now used, i  not feasible. 
 
4.7 Implications of Objections to Values Usage 
4.7.1 Implications for planning methods and approac hes 
If Objections One and Two are correct, then values ar  not only unhelpful but may be harmful to 
planning for the common good. Talking in terms of values necessarily entrenches narrow individual 
preferences and destroys our ability to imagine a prfection that is not tailored to human wants and 
needs. Planning, therefore, should not use values language. 
The alternatives, to speak of “worths” or use a “language of love”, allow humans as a collective to 
consider what is absolutely good. Therefore, they provide an overall purpose or framework within 
which to consider common good, and these discussion may involve debates and consideration of 
means, but what is truly worthy is not to be contested.  
With or without using values language, Objections One and Two preclude debate about what is 
truly worthy. This may work for planning in homogenous societies but would present a problem for 
most planners. 
Currently, values are treated as if they were incontestable and unconditional. If Objection Three is 
correct, then current usage interferes with and mayfrustrate any benefits values might have as a 
planning tool. Objection Three could be satisfied were a questioning attitude to be attached to all 
values and values might be a useful planning tool. 
Treating all values as contestable may add to time and cost of planning processes and encourage 
planners to scope which values may be contested and which not. 
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4.7.2 Implications for the politics of planning 
The first three objections all agree that either necessarily (Objections One and Two) or because of 
how values are misunderstood (Objection Three), comm n good cannot be discussed and collective 
decision-making is not possible if values language is used. Although deeply pessimistic about the 
possibility that values can be broadly understood as requiring a questioning attitude, Objection Three 
maintains that if this were the case, discussion about the common good in terms of values would be 
possible.  
Even were planners themselves not to use “values”, they would still need to understand diverse 
usage of the word by others, at least well enough to grasp contributions offered in values language by 
participants in planning processes.  
That the desirability of values language may invite debate suggests “a politics of values” that may 
find its way into planning processes. This debate would focus on whether humans are fit to create 
values (Objection Three) or what is truly worthy must come from an authoritative source external to 
humans. 
 
4.7.3 Implications for sustainability planning 
A dilemma raised in Chapter 3 is confirmed by the objections. If sustainability planning treats all 
values as relative, the first three objections agree that what is timelessly true and good is beyond the 
reach of sustainability. Not only is it beyond reach by means of values language but competing 
interpretations of what is timelessly true and good c uld not be admitted either because 
interpretations, like values language, also relativize what is absolute.  
If the purpose of sustainability planning is to aspire to what is truly valuable, then this purpose can
never be contested or scrutinized, whether or not values language is used. The result of using values 
language or a language of “worth” is the same. Both lead to something similar to the “determination 
of fit” usage of values, where the overriding dominant value is granted immunity from contestability 
and survives by means of faith and belief. Under this umbrella, what is a value and what is not can be 
questioned and debated. Values as judgements would be restricted to the lesser values. 
Following Objections One and Two, if conventional vues are to be changed fundamentally in 
order to bring about sustainability, sustainability cannot aspire to timelessly true and good unless it i  
prepared to forego examining the overall purpose. 
Confining values language to the marketplace (Objection Two) reinforces isolation among social 
sectors and may constrain how well sustainability panners are able to coordinate choices that involve 
all sectors. This may serve to reinforce the status quo. In these circumstances values could not be a 
tool for social change because the relativity of values in the marketplace would not allow them to be 







THE DIVERSITY OF VALUES USAGE: A THEORY 
5.1 Introduction  
In describing the lack of “consensual definitions” of values, Hechter observes that this “gives each 
writer both the obligation and the license to defin the term de novo” (1993, 3).  This may come as a 
surprise to those who assume that there is a single, shared meaning of values. After all, if there were 
no shared meaning, no single, generally agreed upondefi ition of values, how could values be the 
focus of so much attention, be used with such frequency, and yet not draw attention as a source of 
miscommunication? One answer might be that the mere assumption of shared meaning, justified or 
not, itself discourages awareness and further investigation. Communicators muddle through. 
However, if Hechter is right and values usage is continually created “de novo”, then what pertains 
to each usage is properly understood in light of that particular usage and no other. Values might as 
well be described as discreet homonyms and the language of values becomes a truly treacherous 
ground for novices. 
Cross-usage comparison is riddled with potential complications. There must be some understanding 
and explanation of how usages differ. Each step of the comparison needs to be qualified so that the 
understanding of values accurately reflects both the originating application and the destination 
application. Comparing only two usages in precise detail is potentially a cumbersome and wordy 
exercise; comparing more than two could be tortuous f r both the writer and the reader. Relying on an 
assumption of shared meaning may be the reasonable strat gy as the lesser of evils, even when the 
assumption is incorrect, because qualifying every application of the word “values” may create more 
confusion and even less understanding 
This chapter proposes another possible explanation for assumption of shared meaning, that values 
usage may be related not irrespective of diverse usage but because of it. What all values share, 
however much they may differ, is that they are exprssions of a general concept of values. This theory 
about diverse usage postulates a flexible and vague concept of values in general that does not exist 
independently of the diverse ways of understanding values. The concept of values acts like a genus, in 
that there can be no single actual member of any species that is representative of the whole genus. 
That particular usages of values share some features, some of the time, also implies that they differ 
with respect to some features, some of the time. Particular usages, like species, can be classified as 
belonging to a general concept of values not because they are identical to some composite 
representation of the concept but because they are both the same and different from the concept of 
values in general. What this analogy leaves open is the question of whether and what the genus 
requires that all values have in common. 
Another analogy to a flexible and vague concept of values is the idea of “dogness” in Meillet’s 
example of how a child learns the meaning of “dog”: The concept of dogness begins with knowledge 
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of particular dogs. When first learned, “dog” is applicable to a known dog; what follows is learning to 
apply that word to other dogs.  
“…it is only as he hears the same word applied to other animals that 
he strips it of its concrete character and gives it a general value. One 
sees, from this example, that the general value of words is, in large 
measure, a social fact, and that the generality of he meaning of a 
word will often be proportional to the size of the group: in the dialect 
of a village of shepherds, the dog is truly the shepherd’s dog; but in a 
language such as French, the word dogexcludes any special 
connection to a given breed and refers in an abstract w y to an 
animal species.” (Meillet, 1961, 1018) 
In the previous analogy to genus and species, thereis no implied action or movement. Meillet’s 
example suggests that there is ongoing movement between knowledge of particular dogs and the 
knowledge of an abstract idea of dogness. Extending this to a concept of values suggests continual 
movement between particular instances of values usage and an abstract concept of values. A concept 
of values in general may be created first from a particular usage of values and then elaborated by 
relating subsequent particular usages to a concept of values. As with dogness, if there is no exposure 
to or recognition of subsequent values usage that is different from the first values usage then this 
limits how a concept of values in general is understood. 
The concept of zero changed commerce in the Italy of the 1300s by making double-entry 
bookkeeping possible (Kaplan, 2000, 110). In commerce, negative numbers were now just as “real” 
as positive numbers. In the same way, the concept of values from Nietzsche forward included both 
positive and negative values. A third analogy betwen the concept of values and the concept of zero 
speaks to how the concept of value creates at least a two-directional scale by acting as a placeholder 
for both negative and positive values. In The Nothing That Is, Robert Kaplan  (2000) observes that it 
is not simply the concept of zero acting on negative and positive but in turn the negative and positive 
acting on zero—“the friction of these mutually exclusive bodies…redefined zero” (2000, 110). In the 
same way, the concept of values is redefined not only by new values usage but also by the inclusion 
of negative values and the interaction of negative and positive values. It is this aspect of Nietzsche’s 
usage of values that precipitated the need for a concept of values. More than simply challenging the 
dominant values in his society, it was the naming of these ideas “values”, rather than simply illusion, 
that changed the vocabulary for how to talk about values.  
 Unlike zero on a mathematical scale, the concept of values has to be more than two-directional 
about what value counts as a real value and what value is actually a “disvalue”1 (Allen, 1993, 8). 
Diverse particular usages of “values” not only coexist in parallel but can be found in the same 
                                                  
1 Allen defines the primary meaning of values as “what makes objects good or bad, or right or wrong, in one 
way or another. Values, then are specifications of go dness and badness…That is as much as we can do to 
define value itself. There have been many attempts to define value or goodness, but they all break down” 
(Allen, 1993, 4). He therefore requires a vocabulary to talk about “bad” and “wrong” values and uses the term 
“disvalues” for that purpose. 
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conversation, even uttered by the same person. Instead of a single two-directional line for positive and 
negative values, the concept of values acts as the plac where all of these diverse usages intersect. 
Without it, the diverse ways of defining values cannot all be talked about together as “values” and 
every conversation about them would need to qualify, in lengthy detail, every instance in which the 
word “values” is used. The concept legitimizes calling anything a value without requiring that the 
claim that something is a value be stated unconditionally, incontestably. 
The two preceding chapters have focused on differenc s, with the purpose of establishing that there 
is in fact diverse usage that may be a source of confusion and cause for concern. The purpose of this 
chapter is to consider whether diverse examples have enough in common to allow comparison and 
contrast, and, if so, what might that be. This question is different in kind from those that begin with a 
proposition about how values might be connected and test the proposition. This study was not 
designed to test, for example, Nietzsche’s usage of values, John Dewey’s usage of values, Values 
Clarification, or any other particular usage. Aspects of this theory about diverse usage may echo 
aspects of how others have used the word “values”. Because this theory is grounded in actual 
examples of values usage, such reflection is desirable and to be expected.  
The theory about diverse usage aims at a different understanding of values in general than if there 
were a single meaning according to which all usage could be ruled as correct or misapplication. With 
no single, commonly agreed definition of “values” there is nothing by which to judge which claims 
about particular usages might be justified. That this stage of the research was conducted purely from 
the perspective of values does not mean that its purpose will be perceived as neutral by everyone. 
From the perspective of those who already have a firm understanding of what values in general are, or 
must be, there still may be insufficient reason even to consider whether diverse usage exists. The 
treatment of their understanding of the whole of values as but one of many particular usages might 
reasonably meet with resistance. 
Determining correctness is not the purpose served by such a concept of values. It is the very 
flexibility of the concept and the span of ideas to which it can be related that allow particular usages 
of values to aspire to be the whole of values. 
 
5.2 Obstacles to a Theory about Diverse Usage of Va lues 
In an entry on values in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences in 1968, Ethel Albert 
observed that interest in a general theory of value fad d as the fluidity of the concept became more 
apparent—“The diverse lines of approach are not likely to converge with ease in a unified theory and 
methodology” (1968, 288). As the idea of “values” was more broadly applied, new ways emerged of 
disagreeing about what values “really” are and agreement about values in general became even more 
unlikely. By 1987, John Fekete, writing from a postmodernist perspective on values, is looking for 
something only vaguely similar to a general theory of value. The expectations have changed 
dramatically.  
“I am not talking of a unified axiology, of a single discipline, of an 
abstraction from specialised studies. What is at issue is an emerging 
intertextual discursive field in which the point of view of value 
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orientation may disseminate, in which value commentary may take 
the form of an intervention, and in which a value-th oretical 
approach may hold greater attractions than the repres ntations of the 
onto-epistemological tradition...there can be no question, of course, 
of a discursive field being occupied by a single unified theory.” 
(Fekete, 1987, xiv) 
Not only do particular usages differ from each other, each usage of values also provides its own 
criteria for determining what counts as diverse usage. This means that potentially there are as many 
different criteria for classifying diverse usage of values as there are ways of understanding what 
values are. A theory about diverse usage of values in general, however, can not be developed solely 
from the perspective of a single understanding or application of values, just as the child in Meillet’s 
example may first develop a sense of dogness from knowing a particular dog but dogness will not be 
limited to that particular dog.  
Albert may be correct and a general theory about all aspects of values in general may be neither 
fruitful nor possible. Neither is it useful, however, to leave the diversity of values usage a murky, 
unexplored territory. The theory proposed here is not a “single unified theory”, nor is it about all 
aspects of values in general. It is a middle-range2 th ory that seeks to explain the diversity of values 
usage by exploring the possibility of a general concept of values as a means to connect otherwise 
distinctly and discretely different values. If nothing else, an improved grasp of the reasons for diverse 
usage might prompt awareness of the variety of purposes to which values are applied. The moment 
that a particular way of understanding values emerges as the single most useful or significant way to 
understand values is the moment when the concept of values in general has been put into the service 
of another idea or particular purpose. In this research that moment comes when the theory about 
diverse usage is subsequently applied to planning.  
 
5.2.1 The Values Study example: Problems relating d iverse usage of values 
Ethel Albert’s pessimism about a concept of values in general was based on her own experience with 
“values”. As an anthropologist herself, Albert traced the origins of values to anthropologists and 
others who in the mid 1900s began using values langu ge to study comparative value phenomena in 
different societies and needed to construct a “value vocabulary” of other peoples (1968, 288-289). 
People of Rimrock (Vogt and Albert, 1967) is the terminal report describing the first large-scale study 
of values. It was undertaken shortly after the end of WWII, a period during which there was much 
excitement about values in the social sciences, particularly because of the potential for using values to 
explain and determine behaviour. Officially the study was known as the “Comparative Study of 
Values in Five Cultures”; unofficially it became known as the “Values Study”. The primary 
researchers, Ethel Albert and Evon Vogt, were considered experts on values. Their advisory team 
included Clyde Kluckhohn and Talcott Parsons. 
                                                  
2 Middle-range theories are what grounded theory methodology is designed to produce.  See discussion of 
methodology in Chapter 2. 
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The study was the first of its kind (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 3). It was empirical, exploratory, cross-
culturally comparative, interdisciplinary, and inclusive of diverse theoretical and methodological 
approaches (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 3). The research was ground-breaking not only in its aspirations 
and methodological design but also subsequently in he candid assessments by lead researchers about 
methodological problems with values. Despite being led by a team of experts, the study encountered 
unexpected problems that prevented the development of a unified conclusion or integrated summary.  
Vogt and Albert attributed failure to the very nature of a concept of values. Below I briefly discuss 
three aspects of Vogt’s and Albert’s assessment of their study as these bear on the present research.  
 
5.2.2 Recognition and acceptance of diverse usage i s insufficient 
The methodology did not call for arbitrarily selecting a single uniform definition of values for the 
interdisciplinary team. There was an awareness and appreciation of the ambiguity, generality, and 
vagueness of the term “values”. Preparatory work had included a study of “the variety of phenomena 
to which the ‘values’ label has been attached” (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 7).   
“A sample of the nearly fifty topics listed suggests the range of 
variability in values research and theory and hence i  the underlying 
definitions of values: administration, children’s values, conflict, 
decision-making, game theory, ideology, international relations, 
kinship, language, law, mental health, morals, personality, planning, 
political behaviour, relativism, social control, social stratification, 
socialization, and universals…The relation between science and 
values is a substantial subdivision in the literature that connects, or 
divides, empirical values study and philosophical issues of values. 
Preoccupations in this area include: the possible biological bases of 
values; value problems of applied science, natural and social; the 
relation of facts and values; science as an ethic; and value judgments 
in relation to scientific method, especially the issue whether science 
is value-free.” (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 7)  
More than simply describing areas in which values have been applied, these descriptions were 
appreciated as indicators of variability. Although several values schema were used in the Values 
Study, this early characterization of variability established descriptive categories as a starting point 
for the research. The descriptions situate values and the study of values within existing categories 
(divisions). In grounded theory methodology, Glaser and Strauss call these “descriptive” and 
“substantive” categories (1967, 197)3. In the Values Study these were called “content” ca egories, and 
their limitations were recognized. By whichever name they are called, such categories are the ways in 
which values present themselves as pre-coded, as pre-classified and apparently as not requiring re-
classification. The most appropriate use of such categories is simply as indicators as to whether some 
particular value exists or not within a given culture. The use of these categories to indicate presenc 
or a value led to “assuming comparability solely on the basis of presence of a specific value” (Vogt 
                                                  
3 See Chapter 2 for methodology. 
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and Albert, 1967b, 13).  For example, health was identified as a “value” based on whether people 
believed it to be significant or insignificant within a given culture. Establishing significance is more 
ambitious than establishing mere presence, however, making statements about the value of health 
only ambiguously true.  
“To say that ‘health’ is a value for all the cultures is only 
superficially true. For Navahos and Mormons it is afocal value; for 
Hispanic-Americans, it is a relatively unimportant valued entity…” 
(Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 13) 
As researchers with the Values Study discovered, relying on content categories means that without 
some generally accepted schema of values and all other related ideas, comparison and contrast of 
different values is not only constrained but potentially impossible. Different usages were considered 
incomparable because their differences appeared to outweigh their similarities. In his review of 
Vogt’s and Albert’s terminal report, fellow anthropologist John Bennett suggested that comparing 
discrete cultures might have been possible had there b en a different methodological orientation. 
“But even more fundamental was the anthropological frame of the 
study…This imposed a paradox: while the objectives w re 
comparative, the notion of discrete cultures prohibited 
comparison…The key question is how people us  psychological 
items called “values,” not simply what the values may be 
descriptively.” (Bennett, 1968, 838) 
Vogt’s and Albert’s own assessment of the methodology used in the Values Study demonstrates 
that even where there is a deep interest, an extensive familiarity with values, and appreciation of the 
diversity of ways in which “values” are understood, these are insufficient to ensure that other ideas 
associated with “values” do not manipulate the methodology used to study values. As Bennett noted, 
“values” as an analytical variable applied to descriptive concepts and categories turned out to be 
“subservient to other variables” (Bennett, 1968, 838) (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 21). Classifying 
values on a substantive dimension simply amplified an reinforced existing classifications and was 
not helpful in bridging differences among cultures or groups within cultures. Bennett’s distinction 
between studying the use of values and describing values is one that grounded theory methodology 
enabled in the present research by emphasizing the need to go beyond substantive categories to 
conceptual categories. 
 
5.2.3 Diverse usage cannot be compared without find ing similarities 
Although methodology in the Values Study was explorat ry and results were not expected to be 
definitive, the inability to compare or integrate results from various study teams meant that results 
were much less useful than had been hoped. That no uniform definition of values was mandated at the 
beginning of the study was the result of a deliberate choice to be permissive and inclusive of the 
various approaches of “representatives of a dozen different specializations…dealing with five 
cultures” (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 3).  
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“In both cross-cultural and interdisciplinary inquiry, aims, methods, 
and theories are diverse, sometimes divergent, despite a common 
focus on a single subject. When that subject is values, a concept with 
a notoriously long and involved history, research problems become 
more acute.” (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 3) 
This approach made it difficult to produce a uniform set of results. Although no “unified theory” of 
values emerged, there was “general agreement as to what the values of the five cultures are” (Vogt 
and Albert, 1967b, 5), using content categories to es ablish presence of a value and resulting in the 
ambiguity evident in the example of health discussed above. Reviewing the study’s methodology was 
an attempt to understand why this had happened. The explanation centred on the problematic subject 
of research, on “values”. There were no regrets about n t having insisted study teams adopt a single 
definition or uniform approach to values. 
“…the policy of permissiveness as to definitions and methods turned 
out to be a realistic acceptance of pluralism as appropriate to 
exploratory study of values.” (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 8) 
The lack of a single, generally agreed upon definitio  was more than the result of respecting a 
plurality of approaches to values. It was also the result of recognizing that there were no “generally 
accepted ground rules” (Vogt and Albert, 1967b, 7) and the difficulty in distinguishing “values” from 
other descriptors. 
“A complicating factor is the obvious similarity ofsome conceptions 
of values to phenomena studied under other labels, for example, 
motivation, attitudes, opinions, ideology, choice, policy-making, 
mores, law, and taboos. Since these, too, tend to be ill-defined or 
subject to a multiplicity of competing definitions, any attempt to 
relate them to values is likely to be merely a verbal exercise.” (Vogt 
and Albert, 1967b, 7) 
It was difficulty in distinguishing “values” from other words that resulted in the present research 
being limited to explicit examples of values usage. The word “values” became the primary unit of 
analysis and core category of research. Had this not been done, the conclusions here as well would 
have been clouded in confusion about how to distinguish values as beliefs from values as attitudes, 
values as principles, values as preferences, values s opinions, values as interests, and so on. 
 
5.2.4 Values usage can shape the substance of value s  
That different ways of understanding or defining values can create methodological problems has since 
been recognized as a problem by others. Peng, Nisbett, and Wong, for example, criticize cross-
cultural comparisons of values that simply assume that the meaning of values in general is shared and 
not contested. The authors cite previous research to support their claim that there are “two opposite” 
definitions of values. They classify definitions of values into these two groups by using the relation 
between values and behaviour as a criterion. 
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“Current definitions of value, we believe, may contribute to the 
validity problems of comparing values across cultures because they 
have two opposite implications in terms of value-behavior 
consistency. One type of definition implies that value should not 
necessarily be consistent with the behaviors…However, th  other 
type of value definition suggests a strong causal rel tion between a 
value and behavior…We believe that there are shared beliefs about 
what are preferred modes of conduct and end-states within cultures, 
which could best be characterized by the concept of value. However, 
we do want to make a distinction between value [sic] as collective 
representations and values as subjective judgments made by 
individuals.” (Peng, Nisbett, and Wong, 1997, 329-330) 
Peng, Nisbett, and Wong clearly prefer one type of definition over the other; subjective individual 
judgements are not to be considered values at all and should not be called “values”. Values are 
“collective representations” of shared beliefs about “preferred modes of conduct and end-states”. 
Their stance on values illustrates how particular usage of values is intimately connected to the area to 
which “values” is applied, to the other ideas with w ich “values” are associated. Were values and 
behaviour not connected in some way, values would not be as useful a research tool in the authors’ 
own discipline of psychology.  
The challenge for this present research was to find a methodology and a body of evidence that 
could assist in understanding the variety of ways in which the word “values” is and has been used 
from the perspective of values and not from the pers ctive of other purposes or ideas to which 
“values” are attached. Pre-emptively ruling out anyexamples of values usage because they appeared 
not to refer to some idea of “real” values would have been counterproductive and would have skewed 
the study in favour of some particular way of understanding “real” values. There is also a practical 
problem that accompanies any attempt to declare som values usage illegitimate. What word should 
be used to refer to some particular values usage that has been banned in one study but may be 
resurrected in the next4? The flexibility of a concept of values enables an over-arching, general 
discussion of values over time, across disciplines, and among sectors into which life is 
compartmentalized, irrespective of how particular usages set boundaries for usage. 
 
5.3 An Explanatory Theory about Diverse Usage of “V alues” 
This theory provides the context for a minimalist, default concept of values in general. The default 
position is not definitive but serves to identify some key points on which particular usage may 
diverge.  
As the Values Study researchers discovered, the history of values cannot be separated from the 
history of ideas and beliefs in general. It may be the sheer expanse of what has come to be associated 
with a concept of values, not diversity of usage, which is the most significant constraint on 
developing a fully articulated general theory of value. As a middle-range theory, this theory aims to 
                                                  
4 The strict definition of values in Values Clarification led to a similar problem. See Chapter 3. 
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be explanatory rather than prescriptive or exhaustively descriptive of all the ways in which values 
might be classified. 
The distinction in grounded theory methodology between “concepts abstracted from the substantive 
situation” and “concepts constructed by the analyst” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 107) serves in this 
theory to distinguish between “values” and a concept of values in general. The question of whether 
“values” is, can, or should be a discrete category of analysis did not arise until analysis had begun and 
the possibility arose that “values” are not always co-extensive with the phrase “what is valuable”. It 
was at that point, not earlier, that “values” became the primary unit of analysis and the core category 
in this study. “Values” is therefore a “concept abstracted from the substantive situation”. In contrast, 
the concept of values in general was constructed by the analyst, by me.  
The usefulness of a vague, flexible concept of values was tested by grounded theory methodology 
for its explanatory value, not as a static theory but in grounded theory’s approach to theory as process. 
“Diverse usage”, the aspect of values in general that is the focus of this thesis, turned on the question 
of classification: Is what appears to be diverse usage really diverse and if so how and why? Without a 
concept of values in general, diversity would amount to no more than a serial description of unrelated 
descriptive categories. Various values usages could be treated as homonyms and no more. 
 
5.3.1 Themes of theory about diverse usage 
Three overlapping themes are central to connecting particular usage to a flexible and vague concept 
of values. Taken together, they support the proposition that, a questioning attitude should be attached 
to values usage. This proposition is not intended to be definitive or descriptive of all values usage 
because the default understanding of values may be changed by particular usage.  
1. Diverse usage is ongoing and evolutionary.  
a. Diverse usage is not random but related to a concept of values in general. 
Particular purposes, contexts, and events, shape both particular usage and a 
concept of values in general as part of an ongoing process. If knowledge and 
understanding associated with values is ongoing and evolutionary, then assuming a 
strict separation between what is known and what is not known about values is not 
warranted. 
b. Values have a history that can be examined and a future in which past statements 
about values might later be determined to have beenfallible. The habit of treating 
values that are nouns as most important deflects from appreciating valuing as an 
activity. It reinforces an impression that values are unrelated to other ideas, without 
a history that can be examined. Granted an exemption from challenge, values of 
individuals are treated e facto with the respect extended to expressions of faith 
and belief. The mere possibility of error being discovered in the future requires that 
values not be treated as complete and certain knowledge that is beyond challenge, 




c. Each instance of usage is potentially a new application of values, whether in 
significant or minor ways. Whether or not it is a new application cannot be 
assumed and requires a questioning attitude and investigation. Treating values as 
complete and certain is, at best, premature. At worst, this practice can lead to 
accepting dogmatic claims about values at face value nd misrepresenting values 
that are intended to be treated as potentially change ble. 
2. Values are relational. 
a. Matters of relations are matters of judgement. Such j dgement may be reflective or 
so automatic as to be imperceptible. Values are interim conclusions that once 
reached may themselves be used as starting points fr subsequent investigations of 
values. That values are not static suggests values benefit from an ongoing 
questioning attitude. 
b. Determining or apprehending relations requires some form of comparative logic or 
analogical reasoning. Comparing and contrasting is also essential to classifying 
values. Taken as a picture of values in general, diverse usage demonstrates that 
both the criteria that guide classification of values and the classifications 
themselves may vary in particular usages. The concept of values, therefore, cannot 
preclude fluidity and flexibility in classification. That there is no single usage 
suggests that values should be approached with a questioning attitude. 
c. Values may present themselves as pre-classified, what Glaser and Strauss call 
“descriptive categories” and the Values Study called “content categories”. Pre-
classification of values may mask significant similarities and differences. 
Investigating what is hidden may be prompted by a questioning attitude.   
3. Values are dependent on valuers.  
a. Both particular usages of values and a concept of values in general are human 
creations to meet conceptual and linguistic needs, as prompted by ideas and events. 
As human constructs they can not enjoy immunity from a questioning attitude. 
b. Values known by humans are necessarily subjective. Treating values as if they 
were sourced externally to humans is an example of human creativity applied to 
epistemology. It is a means to avoid responsibility for values and reinforces the 
ideas that values can exist independently of humans and are immune to challenge. 
c. How values are understood has the power to affect what is considered valuable. A 
focus on how values are understood, rather than what they mean or how they are 
defined, emphasizes the involvement of valuers. If valuers determine value, then 
value is fallible and changeable and benefits from a questioning attitude. 
 
5.3.2 Diverse usage is ongoing and evolutionary 
In Empires of the Word (2005) Nicholas Ostler studies the language history of the world, the contexts 
in which languages are born, thrive, and die. He concludes that “immigration is the basic seed of 
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language spread”, describing it as “natural growth” (2005, 535), but that above all language spread 
has been effected “by mass production of language texts, and later the means to disseminate them 
instantly over any distance” (2005, 540). Like other expressions of life, languages, words, and ideas 
react to hospitable and inhospitable environments, adapting to what they can and succumbing when 
they cannot.  
This theory treats each example of values usage as potentially having a history. Sperling5 alluded to 
the possibility of treating words as an evolutionary p ocess that parallels the evolution of other forms 
of life: “Since the dawn of language, words have ben going through a process of natural selection in 
which only the most fit survive” (1977, 1). Sperling described each word as being a judgement about 
value. Value judgements, thus, drive the evolution of language.  
The decision to use “values” in the social sciences wa  just such a value judgement, in this case a 
value judgement about the word “values”. That the word “values” is superbly flexible allowed it to be 
applied to needs and purposes in search of a name.  
“To name the subject-matter of so broad a range of inquiry was no 
easy task. A general notion of traditions, ways of life, personality 
types, even patterns, was not specific enough. World-outlooks was 
too broad, though it gave a sense of the systematic; ideas was too 
vague; national character had too psychological a slant. Cultural 
configurations conveyed simply systematic differences, but in 
what?...But all these notions were submerged in presuppositions of 
the kind of unity that would be found… 
What would patterns of culture then be patterns of?...The generic 
concept of value stepped into the breach. It had the appropriate 
generality, the appropriate openness, it could cover the appetitive and 
conative and desiderative and interest and—in short— preferential or 
selective tendencies of people in any field; it could capture habits of 
action and thought as well as moments of choice and decision. And it 
had just the right ambiguity to connote both a state of liking or 
prizing and criteria or evaluating…Quite quickly, almost suddenly, it 
was respectable for American social science to deal with values as 
subject-matter, not of course as investigators’ biases.” (Edel, 1988, 
26) 
Hartz’s fragment theory (1964) extends the evolution analogy to the realm of ideas. To explain 
origins of diverse new world societies, Louis Hartz (1964) proposes understanding these societies as 
fragments of old Europe. As the fragments become nations, they aspire to become new wholes6. 
                                                  
5 See Chapter 3 for more on Sperling’s approach to words as value judgements. 
6 Hartz explicitly differentiates between his fragment theory and the Turner thesis, saying that “American 
democracy is a product of the European logic which governs the unfolding of a liberal fragment, but Turner, 
like the average American, ‘cannot see’ Europe…Since the American democratic outcome is not to be found in 
the larger setting of Europe, and since the visible land is new, it is easy enough to fall into the notion that the 
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Fragment theory explores the role of European ideology in shaping the development of “escaped” 
fragments, even when the connection to old Europe seemed to have disappeared. Instead of 
disappearing, old Europe became “a universal, sinking beneath the surface of thought to the level of 
an assumption” only to rise again, “out of the necessities of fragmentation itself” (1964, 5). The 
fragment attempts to bury its connection with its pa t as a means to securing its own future but 
inevitably the old European ideas emerge in new forms: “Feudalism comes back at us as the French-
Canadian Spirit, liberalism as the American Way of Life, radicalism as the Australian Legend” (1964, 
5). Though escaped fragments were initially revoluti nary reactions to European ideology, the 
revolutionary spirit was “smothered” by “the false c rtainty that those cultures created for 
themselves” (1964, 65) in the process of reinventing themselves as wholes. 
“The whole mechanism of their past development can be viewed in 
terms of the drive for this certainty…The end of that mechanism is 
creating more and not less insecurity, but it is liberating the 
perspective of the fragment for the first time since its original voyage 
from the Old World.” (Hartz, 1964, 65) 
Without something like Hartz’s fragment theory to explain the connection, the new societies have 
no common link to Europe and cannot be described as diverse but related examples of the European 
experience. Positing Europe as the larger whole of which new societies are diverse examples gives 
fragments a history as they evolve to become new wholes themselves. In a general sense, then, 
Hartz’s fragment theory posits that as ideas become diverse over time, their originating point remains 
influential even though at times it may be obscured. Until there is awareness and acknowledgement of 
at least some of the origins of diversity, differenc s appear to be random and unrelated; no further 
explanations appear to be needed. Recognizing diversity necessarily engages classification, which 
necessarily engages comparison and contrast. As Hartz argues, the first step is to take notice of the 
differences, the variety: “…as soon as the variety of the fragments is confronted, the significance of 
their differing European origins comes to view…” (1964, 10, note). 
The same may be true of values. Fragment theory sugge ts that ideas, such as the “American Way 
of Life”, that are referred to as “values” may not be static artefacts but may also have a social history 
of evolution. Viewed not as discretely distinct and disconnected homonyms but as diverse examples 
of values usage, values might share features amongst themselves as well as with some concept of 
values in general. Diverse examples of values usage too might be fragments that evolved into new 
wholes, complete with denial of their revolutionary roots and a drive to create new certainties of their
own. Applying fragment theory to values usage suggests that all values usages may have as their 
common origin the values usage introduced by Nietzsche in the late 1800s. This is the “originating 
point”, the “universal” that is shared by all values usages, even though no usage of “value” will match 
its origin exactly and values usages may appear to have evolved so differently that they appear to be 
unconnected.  
                                                                                                                                               
outcome is due to the land…as soon as the variety of the fragments is confronted, the significance of their 
differing European origins comes to view, and the frontier begins to be discredited as the explanatory factor 
even in American terms” (1964, 10, note). 
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Using language to distinguish between what is known and what is not known can obscure as well 
as illuminate. Joseph describes value judgements about language as “language acting upon itself”: 
 “Value judgements about linguistic variants furnish a rich and barely 
tapped source of data about human cognitive faculties, and about 
how the gap between language and cognition becomes tran lated into 
norms. In so far as consciousness is a linguistic construct, value 
judgments on language represent language acting upon itself, 
between planes of human consciousness.” (1987, 5) 
That value judgements engage both cognitive and linguistic dimensions, “between planes of human 
consciousness” suggests that valuing may be one of the more significant activities humans undertake. 
This aspect of values and valuing suggests that the concept of values has to do with much more than 
simple lists of values-as-nouns. The evolution of human thought and language may be reflected in 
judgements about value and the concept of values. 
Familiar with Nietzsche’s usage of values, Georg Simmel treated valuing as a basic human activity: 
Understanding and devising relations between our own minds and the real world is an ongoing, basic 
form of valuing. Simmel reasoned that “social evoluti n produces frameworks of thought that tend to 
be regarded by social subjects as self-evident” (Boudon, 1994, footnote 7, 309). By treating values 
not as mere reflections of reality but as creations emerging from particular social contexts, though not 
completely dependent upon them, Simmel created an overall framework within which to connect 
values not only to each other but also to how the human mind works. 
“We are rarely aware of the fact that our whole lif, from the point of 
view of consciousness, consists in experiencing and judging values, 
and that it acquires meaning and significance only from the fact that 
the mechanically unfolding elements of reality posses  an infinite 
variety of values beyond their objective substance. At any moment 
when our mind is not simply a passive mirror or reality—which 
perhaps never happens, since even objective perception can arise 
only from valuation—we live in a world of values whic  arranges 
the contents of reality in an autonomous order.” (Simmel, 1978, 60)  
Simmel’s awareness of the limitations of the human i d led him to posit two separate, 
fundamental, and parallel worlds—the world of reality and the world of values. Human thought, 
though an attempt to know the real world, is really engaged in creating the content of the world of 
values. Simmel distinguishes the subjectivity “that refers to ‘my perception’ of the totality of the 
world” from that which “...contrasts value with the given objects regardless of the way they are 
conceived” (Simmel, 1978, 63). Value therefore “is never a ‘quality’ of the objects, but a judgement 
upon them which remains inherent in the subject”7 (Simmel, 1978, 63).  
                                                  
7 Contrary to popular usage, this means that if “intrinsic values” are human judgements then they cannot als  be 
qualities of objects that are independent of human judgement. 
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Because valuing is the means by which we apprehend the real world, we tend not to recognize that 
what we apprehend is not “independent of the act of onceiving” (Simmel, 1978, 65). Humans cannot 
have knowledge that we can justifiably call “absolute”.  
“…the value of objects, thoughts and events can never be inferred 
from their mere natural existence and content, and their ranking 
according to value diverges widely from their naturl ordering.” 
(Simmel, 1978, 59)  
Simmel posits the possibility of absolute knowledge, even though knowing absolutely is beyond 
the scope of the human mind. He cautions that this implies the need to beware of overstating our 
feeling of certainty: “…consequently, in order to avoid dogmatic thought, we have to treat each 
position at which we arrive as if it were the penultimate one” (1978, 104).   
The theory about diverse usage of “values” discourages rigidity and encourages attaching 
uncertainty to ideas about values but does not retreat into deep pessimism about the ability to make 
judgements. From a socio-political perspective, Mackenzie8 the Idealist agreed with Nietzsche that 
slavish obedience to ideas is as counterproductive to d mocracy as slavish obedience to other masters. 
Epistemologically, this theory about diverse usage provides no justification for treating values as 
absolute, certain, or complete. 
  
5.3.3 Values are relational 
In Proof and Explanation (1991), a printing of lectures he delivered in Virginia in 1957, John 
Wisdom argued that we reason by comparing and contrasting, that it is the most basic form of 
reasoning, that we can do it well or poorly, and that sometimes we do it so automatically as not even 
to notice that we have made a judgement9. He also refers to this as case-by-case procedure and proof 
by parallels (1991, 112). Reasoning is neither purely inductive nor purely deductive but always 
engages comparison of cases. 
“[W]hen someone offers a deductive form of justificat on for a 
statement (‘This has twelve edges because it is a cube’), then the 
                                                  
8 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of Mackenzie’s usage of values. 
9 Wisdom’s is not the only effort to understand the significance of comparative reasoning. Psychologists, for 
example, study “analogical thinking”. Hummel and Holyoak (1997) describe it as “representative of human 
thinking”, “ubiquitous in human reasoning”, that it “may provide the foundation for a broader theory of human 
learning and inference”, and that examining “computational models of analogy” may be informative in 
developing a theory of analogical reasoning (1997, 42 ). Holyoak and Thagard (1997) describe the analogical 
mind as “simply the mind of a normal human being” and note its “diverse range of uses” in areas such as t e 




support, reason, and justification thus given in a deductive form are 
no stronger than that which might be given by that sor of case-by-
case procedure which is so apt to be regarded with contempt.” 
(Wisdom, 1991, 141) 
“[T]he justification which is offered by one who offers a deductive, 
demonstrative proof for his conclusion is no stronger a justification 
than that which may be offered by one who puts cases in the way 
I’ve indicated…[W]hen we have a conclusion, This is K, and it is 
deduced from a premise, This is K’, then this deduction provides no 
better justification for this conclusion than would be provided by 
asking with regard to every conceivable K’ other than this, Isn’t this 
a case of K? One who offers a deductive proof for his conclusion 
offers as much as one who offers a case-by-case proof. But though 
he offers as much, he doesn’t offer more.” (Wisdom, 1991, 143-144) 
This is consistent with the approach taken by Glaser nd Strauss to grounded theory 
methodology10. Wisdom’s approach to comparative reasoning and the comparative logic that Glaser 
and Strauss apply to grounded theory methodology come at the same ground from different directions 
but in some respects for the same reasons11. Both challenge conventional ideas about truth and 
validity. Wisdom comes from a background in logic and analytic philosophy to challenge the 
                                                  
10 See Chapter 2. 
11 Each de-emphasizes the role of verification and use of tandard criteria that might apply to all instances of 
comparative reasoning and logic in order to determine whether comparison has been done properly. Wisdom 
wanted his audience to become engaged and experience case by case reasoning for themselves in order to grasp 
it as fully as possible. Stephen Barker notes in his introduction that “sometimes [Wisdom] does not spell out 
what the point of an example is, but leaves it to the reader to see this” (Wisdom, 1991, viii).Wisdom revisits key 
points over and over using different cases (examples) to make his point, with little summarizing or generalizing.  
Wisdom’s work was not published until decades later when a transcript of his Virginia lectures, including 
questions by the audience and answers by Wisdom, was compiled by Barker.  
By contrast, Glaser and Strauss systematized their insights for application in the social sciences, making it 
easier for others to carry forward their approach to comparative logic.  Both Wisdom on the one hand and 
Glaser and Strauss on the other were challenged becaus  of the lack of standard criteria for making comparative 
judgements. How is good comparative reasoning and logic to be recognized? Wisdom’s response was to give a 
series of examples (Wisdom, 1991, 144). Both maintained verification should not be one of the primary 
standards by which comparative reasoning or logic is judged.  
From the perspective of how ideas evolve in a social context, it is perhaps no accident that their works were 
developed within the same ten-year period. Wisdom’s work is used here primarily because he explicitly 
proposes comparative reasoning as basic to all reasoning, including inductive and deductive reasoning. This is 
implicit in Glaser and Strauss but not as fully developed.  
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authority of deductive logic; Glaser and Strauss come from social sciences to challenge the practice of 
building on previous theory by relying on deduction nstead of developing original theory. 
Echoing constraints identified by Simmel, Wisdom’s in ight is to realize that it is humans who 
apply the models. Wisdom’s comparative reasoning is similar to inductive reasoning and “ordinary 
argument by analogy” (Wisdom, 1991, 111) in that it examines previous cases, case by case but 
different because it is not limited to actual past cases. As do lawyers in their arguments, comparative 
reasoning admits and even encourages using hypothetical and imaginary cases to explore problems. It 
is not tied inexorably to past experience, probability, and prediction. Applied to values, it differs f om 
case by case applied to law in not having a generally accepted, codified body of standard “values” to 
guide judgements about value. It is similar to case by case applied to law in those cases where there is 
a need to determine whether or not a new case belongs t  previous classification of knowledge. 
Deductive reasoning uses generalizations and princiles as first premises. Comparative reasoning 
begins with details from which generalizations12 and principles are developed—a never-ending 
process. This is compatible with Simmel’s treatment of value judgements as “penultimate”. Absolutes 
can never reached by this method.  
“Wisdom, and Barker, following him, held that no such statement as 
U [for universals] is presupposed, assumed, or in any other way 
required in reasoning from cases. Their view was tht knowledge of 
cases is epistemically and logically prior to knowledge of universal 
relationships. We couldn’t know that all x,y,z are W unless we knew, 
for some particular x,y,z that it was W. Cases come first, and we can 
reason from one case to another without committing ourselves to 
universal or even general claims along the way.”  (Govier, 1989) 
Once humans attempt to apprehend absolutes and ideals, by whatever means, they can no longer be 
called absolutes but become relational comparisons and contrasts. As Simmel also argued, to make 
dogmatic statements about values is to ignore that w we call absolutes are the constructions of 
human minds. Comparative reasoning is basic to deductive reasoning because it provides deductive 
reasoning with the principles and generalizations it u es as first premises. For deductive logic to 
work, these first premises must be treated as firm and certain. These first premises, however, are also 
no more than judgements that can happen in the blink of an eye or after serious deliberation and 
reflection.  
 
5.3.4 Values are dependent on valuers even when val ues are described as objective 
Objections One and Two claim that what is worthy is neither subjective nor objective but values are 
both. Values are subjective in the first instance, reflecting narrow individual preferences as values in 
                                                  
12 I use “generalization” loosely in this application a d do not intend for this usage to compete with 
“totalization”, in the way that differences between the two are debated in their application to grounded theory 
methodology. See Chapter 2. 
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the market place. The “subject” is full of hubris over the sense of power and authority that comes 
from humans mistakenly believing we are the creators of value. By contrast, for both of these 
objections, what is worthy simply “is”. 
In The Philosophy of Money (1978 [1907]) Simmel argues that ideas about the role of money in 
society have contributed to the mistaken perception that values are objective rather than subjective. 
Simmel’s “subject” creates value as one crafts relations; assessment of relations varies according to 
perspective. Value is a subjective determination, a judgement that can only be made by a subject, 
irrespective of what values are about. 
“What really matters, in order to conceive the independent 
significance of objects, is the distance between thm and our 
impression of them. It is one of the numerous cases in which one has 
to stand back from the objects, to establish a distance between them 
and oneself, in order to get an objective picture of them. This is 
certainly no less subjective a view than the unclear or distorted 
picture that is obtained when the distance is too great or too small...”  
(Simmel, 1978, 71) 
To make an absolute, incontestable declaration of value is to make a dogmatic claim about 
something that is beyond human knowledge. Value cannot be mechanically or automatically gleaned 
from the object. Even if the object “has value”, it is up to the valuer to recognize it and the valuer’s 
perspective will determine the estimation of value. 
“Nature, on many occasions, destroys objects that, in terms of their 
value, might claim to be preserved, and keeps in existence worthless 
objects which occupy the place of the more valuable ones. This is not 
to say that there is a fundamental opposition betwen the two series, 
or that they are mutually exclusive…The case is, rather, that the 
relation between these series is completely accidental. With the same 
indifference, nature at one time offers us objects that we value 
highly, at another time withholds them.” (Simmel, 1978, 59-60) 
To speak, then, of something in nature as “having values” is to use language to obscure the source 
of value. Making a judgement changes whatever object is being assessed, considered, or measured. 
The value can not be called absolute, or intrinsic, be ause the act of valuing has made it relative to 
other knowledge. For different reasons, Objections O e and Two agree. 
Dean Lauter’s13 (2000) observation that values that are verbs are mor  potent than values that are 
nouns (Lauter 2000) reflects an active approach to values that recognizes and appreciates the human 
role in creating value. Awareness of the role of valuers can change judgements about values. Calling 
something “priceless”, for example, may fit with the description by Objections One and Two of ideas 
of perfection and goodness that are not contaminated by human desires. It also fits, however, with 
awareness that values are dependent on valuers. If values are understood as relational, rather than as 
qualities in objects, to say that something is priceless is to express an inability to assign a price (or 
                                                  
13 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of Lauter’s understanding of values. 
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declare some other type of value) because there is no apparent thing or idea with which it can be 
compared. The former approach to “priceless” puts an end to consideration of value; the latter 
approach to “priceless” may prompt further consideration of whether the similarities and differences 
sought in like cases are in fact most significant. It leaves open the possibility that the process of 
valuing can continue. The latter approach to “priceless” applies both to material goods and abstract 
ideas. 
That value judgements are necessarily subjective need ot also mean that values are necessarily 
narrow individual preferences about frivolous matters, as argued by Objections One and Two or that 
when values are about common good they must aspire to b  objective. 
 
5.4 Summary of the Theory about Diverse Usage of Va lues 
The two research questions to which this theory about diverse usage is a response are:  
o Given the frequency with which the word “values” is used as interchangeable with other 
descriptors, such as preferences, attitudes, beliefs, interests, principles, and so on, can 
calling something “a value” make a difference?  
o Are various usages of “values” merely discretely and distinctly different homonyms or can 
they be treated as diverse instances of some concept of values in general?  
Using grounded theory methodology to compare and cotrast examples of values usage, it became 
apparent early in the study that “values” and “what is valuable” are not co-extensive. The primary 
difference lies in the power of the word and idea of “values” to shape ideas about what is valuable. As 
the brief history of diverse usage and discussion of the objections illustrated in previous chapters, 
particular usages of “values” have the potential to determine criteria for what counts as “a value”. A 
history of “what is valuable” would be broader and might subsume the history of values as one of 
several paths toward determining or apprehending what is valuable in other ways. This study, 
however, focussed on explicit usage of the word “values”, the key unit of analysis and core category 
during the research. 
A flexible and vague concept of values in general is proposed as being able to provide support for 
assumptions about a shared understanding of values. Th  general concept does not have an existence 
independent of the particular usages of which it is comprised. Its flexibility extends to not requiring 
that particular usages themselves be flexible. If this theory about a concept of values being comprised 
of particular usages has explanatory power, then it may provide an explanation for assumption of 
shared understanding of “values”, beyond its use as a j rgon word.  
The example of the Values Study illustrates that despit  familiarity with values and an awareness of 
diverse usage, diverse usage can be treated as if instances of “values” were discrete homonyms 
without enough in common to allow comparison and contrast. Postulating a flexible and vague 
concept of values should be sufficient to allow diverse usages to be compared and contrasted as 
examples of values in general. Three themes characterize this theory of diverse usage: (1) Diverse 
usage is ongoing and evolutionary, (2) Values are relational, and (3) Values are dependent on valuers. 
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Related to a concept of values, diverse usage of values is not random but part of an ongoing and 
evolutionary process of recognizing and determining value. This gives a concept of value explanatory 
power, though not predictive power. Even if there might be values that could be assumed with 
complete certainty to be absolutely true in all contexts over time, as claimed by second-generation 
usage of values as absolutes, these values would still need to be distinguished from those that are not 
and still require critical scrutiny. This means that a questioning attitude is an important feature of a
concept of values that continues to evolve. 
All values are relational, irrespective of whether values are about abstract ideas of perfection, truth
and goodness or narrow individual preferences about particular goods or ideas. Relations are 
judgements arrived at by comparison and contrast. When comparison and contrast is familiar and 
simple, such judgements may happen so quickly that the process by which they are arrived at is 
imperceptible. Comparison and contrast is a form of classification, an ongoing process of attempts to 
apprehend and understand. Values present themselves as moments of this process and not final or 
complete. Values are pre-classified, masking their ongoing nature as results of ongoing comparison 
and contrast. Accepting values at face value can thus mask important underlying similarities and 
differences, relations among values that are themselve  the results of earlier comparison and contrast 
and now hidden by more recent valuations. Values ar judgements about relations that should not be 
treated as firm and certain knowledge. As such, values should not be granted privileged status to 
protect them from a questioning attitude.  
Values are dependent on valuers irrespective of whether values are about narrow individual 
preferences or the common good. The subjectivity of values is not something that can be avoided but 
that values are subjective does not justify the making of dogmatic claims. Dogmatic claims can be 
deflated by attaching a questioning attitude to values.  
That a questioning attitude is suggested by all three themes of this theory suggests that values may 
be an appropriate tool for challenging conventional ideas and the status quo. Although the use of 
values to challenge conventional ideas is historically rooted in the origin of a concept of values, such 
usage today is no longer common. To the contrary, fundamentalist claims are frequently presented in 
terms of values. Linguist Geoffrey Nunberg notes that in the US the word “values” now “evokes 
conservatism rather than liberalism” (Nunberg, 2006a). Using “values” only to affirm and amplify 
existing beliefs, knowledge, and social organization makes the word superfluous, in a sense, but also 
reinforces the status quo. This gives it a political agenda. Nunberg notes that the word “values” 
“didn’t really enter the general American vocabulary until the 1950s, when it was picked up in 
progressive circles along with other social-science terms like alienation and peer group (Nunberg, 
2006b, 106). In its American origins, imported from German sociology, the word had  
“a vague association with progressive education and liberal 
anticommunism” (that was when universities began setting up 
programs in “’American values,’ where the phrase suggested only 
the democratic ideals that made America different from totalitarian 
regimes).” (Nunberg, 2006b, 106) 
Nunberg goes so far as to suggest a precise date on which the meaning of “values” in the US 
changed from liberal to conservative—at the opening of the Republican national convention on 
August 7, 1968. It was at this convention that there was a call for judges who “respect traditional 
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family values and the sanctity of human life” (Nunberg, 2006b, 106). From that point forward, the 
Republicans and other forces of right began “to own” the word “values” (Nunberg, 2006b, 107). 
Language in general is “a means of legitimating narrow self-interest by connecting it to a larger 
symbolic structure that gives it moral and political meaning” (Nunberg, 2006b, 114).  
The competition for ownership of “values”, therefore, is a competition on the level of symbolic 
structure; competing usages of “values” are inevitably both moral and political. Understanding the 
competition as a whole requires standing outside of it, n some platform that connects disparate 
political agendas. This is similar to how the concept of values connects disparate usages of the word 
“values”.   
The history of diverse usage (Chapter 3) is an example of how this theory about diverse usage can 
be applied to compare and contrast usages by allowing various usages to be considered together as 
group even when they differ wildly in the purposes they serve. The historical overview demonstrated 
that each usage has something that makes it different from other usages even as others of its features 
will overlap with other usages, even usages that appe r to be significantly different. Each usage, to 
varying degrees of detail, will have features that explain the criteria according to which a particular 
usage determines what is legitimately called “a value”. A flexible and vague concept of values allows 
all of these values to be called “values”—to be considered as a group—even when the criteria by 
which something qualifies as “a value” according to a particular usage appear to contradict one 
another.   
 
5.5 Relating the Theory about Diverse Usage of Valu es to the Objections 
Four objections to the use of “values” were outlined in Chapter 4. Each raised concerns that need 
serious responses. This theory about diverse usage of values rejects the claim by Objection Four that 
whether or not something is called “a value” makes no difference. Values are potentially a useful and 
important tool. Treating the word either as meaningless or as coextensive with a multitude of other 
descriptors is dismissive of its potential. This theory supports the claim by the first three objections 
that values language can make a difference to what is considered valuable, why, and how. Neither the 
word “values” nor the concept of values in general is coextensive with “what is valuable”. 
The first three objections are correct in characterizing all values as relative, irrespective of whether 
what the values are about is presented as truly valuable or frivolous. If values are relative, then values 
are products of processes creating and determining relations and the first two objections are correct in 
saying that the phrase “absolute value” is an oxymoron. It is the flexibility of the theory that allows 
second-generation usage of values as absolute to be c nsidered a values usage along-side other 
usages. The theory does not dictate a single definition of values but explains how usages are related to 
one another. The second-generation emergence of values s absolutes was explained in Chapter 3 as a 
response to Nietzsche’s new usage, as a merger of expectations that behavioural science could be 
objective and philosophy that was based on absolutes. It was a useful tool for states wanting to protect 
the status quo by attempting to inculcate values on a social scale. 
This theory supports the claim of Objection Three that a questioning attitude is missing both from 
the portrayal of values by the first two objections and also from predominant actual usage. Without a 
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questioning attitude, values may not be a useful means to consider common good and concerns of the 
first two objections may not be addressed. 
Objection One claims that ideals must be sourced externally to humans and that ideals such as 
perfection can provide a larger than human purpose. Without a larger than human purpose, humans 
will place greater significance on narrow human purposes and not aspire to the common good. As 
Mackenzie the Idealist demonstrated in Chapter 3, ideals do not have to be presented as absolutely 
true and protected from a questioning attitude in order to survive as helpful. As an example, 
Mackenzie treated democracy as “a value”, despite knowing that his audience would include those 
who believed in democracy with religious fervour. This theory supports Mackenzie’s usage of values 
in the service of common good. 
Because values are relational, they may be a potentially useful tool for relating different areas of 
life and society, facilitating cross-sectoral and nua ced evaluation. Objection Two holds that values 
are essentially an economic model of valuing, a pattern increasingly overlain on non-economic 
considerations and necessarily changing what is conidered valuable by reflecting narrow individual 
preferences instead of the common good. This theory d es not support the domination of patterns of 
social life by any one sector but does support determining values by apprehending relations among 
the sectors. Isolating the economic sector is therefore not supported by this theory. Applying values to 
economic matters need not differ from applying values to other aspects of individual and social life.  
If values are necessarily relative, then there is no way to rescue any usage of values that might 
satisfy the first two objections because their prima y objection is to relativity, which they treat as 
necessarily leading to subjective, dogmatic declarations of values. If Wisdom is correct, then values 
and principles are both the result of comparative reasoning. Treating principles as firm ground, as 
does Objection Two, results in no firmer ground than that on which values are based. 
  
5.6 Implications of the Theory about Diverse Usage of Values 
5.6.1 Implications for planning methods and approac hes 
The history of diverse usage suggests that planners have a choice in how to understand and apply 
“values” to planning. The theory about diverse usage confirms this by explaining the relation between 
diverse usages and a concept of values.   
Awareness of diverse usages may encourage planners to treat different usages of values as a whole. 
It allows considering values as a group, irrespectiv  of whether they are presented as contestable or 
not, as conditional or not. 
This theory elaborates Objection Three’s position. Objection Three was the only one that held out 
the possibility that values language might be beneficial to planning. That this theory now justifies 
taking a questioning attitude towards values suggests that planners should take such an approach to 
values, if values are to be useful to planning. 
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Treating values as contestable may counteract the presentation of narrow individual preferences as 
values. Extending questioning to purpose and criteria may make it possible to encourage use of values 
in the service of common good.  
 
5.6.2 Implications for the politics of planning 
The flexible and vague concept of values does not requi e that diverse usage be replaced by a single 
usage, that planners must adopt a single usage, or that a single usage be enforced among participants 
in planning processes   
Diverse usages may compete with each other. Values s penultimate products of valuing, values as 
narrow individual preferences, values as dogmatic claims, and so on, may each be presented as the 
“real” usage. Being able to relate diverse usages with each other expands the scope of the politics of 
values from a contest between what is timelessly true and good and what is relative and conditional to 
a range of usage that appears to have no bounds. 
Attaching a questioning attitude to values suggests that values may be a tool to challenge 
conventional values. This may make values a potential threat to social cohesion, challenging 
assumptions that common values are the “glue”14 that holds societies together and makes collective 
action possible.   
 
5.6.3 Implications for sustainability 
A dominant strain of conventional values treats values as being unconditional and incontestable. This 
may be a constraint to how effectively values can be a tool to challenge convention and the status 
quo. 
The theory does not support isolating economics from other sectors of life. It encourages relations 
among economics and other sectors. Treating values s relations may be useful for integrating various 
aspects of issues. A questioning attitude towards values suggests values may be a tool for challenging 
convention. Taken together, values as relations and a questioning attitude may provide a new set of 
criteria by which to evaluate existing values. 
A flexible and vague concept of values takes the place of a single, generally agreed upon definition 
of values. The concept of sustainability too may need to be flexible in order to accommodate diverse 
usage of “sustainability” and likewise may not exist independently of instances of diverse usage. This
parallels treating global-level sustainability as comprised of multiple and diverse local applications. 
 
                                                  
14 See Peter L. Berger, ed. The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation n Pluralist Societies, (1998) 
for an exploration of the relation between values and social cohesion, in particular the preface by Weidenfeld, 
and the chapters by Hunter and Berger. 
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This concludes the first stage of this thesis, an exploration of explicit use of the word “values” from 
the perspective only of values. Applying the findings from this study of values to planning is a 
separate stage in which use of the word “values” is now considered from the perspective of planning. 
Had these stages not been separate, the exploration of values might have attempted to anticipate the 
needs of planning or shape values based on descriptive categories of values in planning, potentially 
making the study of values normative rather than exploratory.  
That this theory about diverse usage was developed using grounded theory methodology applied to 
actual examples of values usage means that its explanatory power has already been tested with respect 
to diverse usage of values. Also following grounded theory methodology, however, this theory about 
diverse usage is not static but an ongoing process, ontinually tested as new applications of “values” 
emerge. According to this theory, new usages are not merely additions to an existing concept of 
values but retain the potential to alter what constitutes the concept of values. Each new usage makes a 
contribution to the concept and has the potential to expand the explanatory value of the concept of 
values in general. It may deepen understanding evenas it introduces changes. 
What remains to be explored is its explanatory power in application to planning in general and 
sustainability planning in particular. The second part of this thesis will investigate the application t  
planning by carrying forward a third proposition that emerges from this theory about diverse usage, 
“A questioning attitude should be attached to values usage by default”.  
The purpose of the second stage is three-fold. First, applying the theory about diverse usage to 
planning is a further test of the theory in a different context. Second, applying the theory about 
diverse usage to planning should shed light on whether explicit and deliberate use of “values” is 
neutral, beneficial, or detrimental to planning. Third, because any application of “values” to other 
ideas and events has the potential to yield a new usage, the planning application may produce a 
distinct usage of “values” appropriate to planning.  
If this theory about the diverse usage of the word “values” holds in application to planning, then 






VALUES USAGE AND PLANNING 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews usage of the word “values” in planning to consider whether the theory about 
diverse usage in general has explanatory value with respect to planning. Although the theory about 
diverse usage was developed outside of the framework of planning, examples of values usage in 
planning were included in the raw data on which the theory is grounded. The theory, therefore, 
anticipates diverse values usage in planning and that relating particular usages of values in planning 
to a flexible and vague concept of values makes it possible to compare and contrast particular usages. 
That there is diverse usage suggests that planning a d planners have a choice in how to understand 
and apply values. A better grasp of diverse usage may assist in deciding whether planning can or 
should promote a single usage of values, use “values” in a variety of ways, or some combination. 
  
6.1.1 Three propositions about values applied to pl anning 
The first two research questions of this thesis were addressed by developing and testing a grounded 
theory about diverse usage of values. Results are now carried forward as two propositions in order to 
consider the third research question: What are the implications and opportunities for planning?  
The third proposition to be tested in application t planning is derived from the theory about 
diverse usage of values in general. 
1. Proposition One: Calling something “a value”, instead of a belief, principle, attitude and 
so on, can make a difference.  
a. The word “values” is used interchangeably with a long list of other words. Some 
values may be beliefs but not all beliefs are values1. The same applies to words such as 
                                                  
1 Raymond Boudon became interested in values because “the answers proposed by human sciences to the 
question as to where values come from are extraordinarily diverse” (2001, 21). In The Origin of Values (2001) 
Boudon treats all values as beliefs while acknowledging that not all beliefs are values. The challenge for 
Boudon is how to determine which beliefs are values and on what grounds. He begins by assuming a particular 
usage of values to establish the basic criteria by which that particular usage can be linked with others. It is 
Boudon’s initial understanding of values as beliefs that leads him to identify acquiring “an overview of all the 
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attitudes, opinions, principles, goals, and so on. Not distinguishing values as distinct 
from other such descriptors leads to confusion and c  make use of the word “values” 
superfluous.  
b. Though some usages treat values as coextensive with “what is valuable”, in the sense 
of what is worthy, not all usages do so. Therefore, asking “what is valuable” may be 
but is not necessarily a component of values study. Conversely, “what is valuable” may 
be treated as a broader question and values language as one of several ways to address 
that question2.  
Minimum threshold to meet: Treating “values” as distinct from other words and ideas 
should create new opportunities for analysis and application. 
 
2. Proposition Two: Particular usages of “values”, no matter how diverse, are expressions of 
a concept of values in general. 
a. A concept of values in general that is flexible and vague allows values to be considered 
as a group even when differences appear too significa t to treat usages as comparable. 
This may be one explanation for assumptions about shared meaning of “values”.  
b. That a flexible concept enables considering a wide variety of values usage as a group 
does not also mean that particular usages themselves must be flexible about which 
criteria are to be satisfied in order to justify calling “a value”. 
Minimum threshold to meet: Even a few examples of diverse usage in planning can 
establish diversity, meaning that no definitive or exhaustive list of examples of usage is 
necessary—were such a list possible. No particular us ge need match the default concept 
(Chapter 5) in every respect but both deviations and similarities must be explainable. If the 
concept of values has explanatory value in planning, then differences in usage cannot be so 
great that particular usages cannot be treated as comparable. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
explicit and implicit, forgotten or popular theories on the subject produced by the classical and modern social 
scientists and philosophers” as the “first task for anyone interested in the theory of values and valuation” (2001, 
4). In contrast, the present study is of actual appications of the word “values”, where values usage in scholarly 
theories is considered no more or less relevant tha us ge in everyday language and contexts. This shift in 
perspective has considerable impact. In the present study it could not be assumed at the outset that all values are 
beliefs, whether true beliefs or false beliefs, with corresponding implications for the nature and strength of 
commitment and establishing which values, if any, are or should be shared by all humans and which are 
context-specific. Implicit values in particular cannot be studied unless the researcher already has some particular 
understanding of values because what counts as an implicit value is determined by particular usages of “values”.   
2 As discussed in Chapter 4, Objections One and Two adv cate “what is worthy” as a preferred means for 
considering “what is valuable”. 
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3. Proposition Three: A questioning attitude should be attached to all values usage by 
default. 
a. Three themes of a flexible and vague concept of values (Chapter 5) all require that a 
questioning attitude should be attached to values, making all values contestable by 
default, irrespective of whether particular usages pr sent values as being immune from 
critical scrutiny. 
i. Diverse usage of values is ongoing and evolutionary. An  new application of 
“values” is potentially a unique usage.  
ii.  Values are relational. Although phrases such as “abolute value” and “intrinsic 
value” are oxymoronic, they have been used historically and remain a usage of 
“values”. 
iii.  Values are dependent on valuers even when values are described as having an 
objective existence. Treating the word “values” as distinct from other 
descriptors and from “what is valuable” means that humans can be held 
responsible for values. 
Minimum threshold to meet: Even when particular usage ppears not to require a 
questioning attitude, treating such usages as contestabl  should create new opportunities 
for analysis and application. That a particular usage may discourage a questioning attitude 
should prompt investigation of what purpose or purposes are served by doing so. 
 
6.1.2 How this chapter will address the proposition s 
Three factors that influence values usage are discussed briefly in their relation to planning. These ar
(1) the lack of a single, generally agreed upon definition of planning, (2) the role of descriptive 
(substantive) categories in affirming the status quo, and (3) the role of language. These are followed 
by a discussion of what is involved in moving beyond descriptive categories of values. 
Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944) and Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom 
(1994 [1944]) are used to frame a social and historical context for planning. As well as taking 
apparently opposite positions on planning, both autors also use the word “values”—Polanyi 
sparingly and Hayek more liberally. Just as social experiences and events shaped values usage, so too 
did these affect the scope, scale, and nature of planning. The Polanyi-Hayek dilemmas provide a 
context in which to track the interaction of values and planning historically. Issues raised by these 
dilemmas persist and are applied to sustainability in he next chapter. 
Some examples of particular usages of “values” in pla ning are reviewed briefly. Just as the 
overview of diverse usage of values historically did not need to be exhaustive in order to establish 
that values usage is diverse and can be discussed a a group by relating usages to a concept of values 
in general, so too the examples in this chapter are not intended to be exhaustively descriptive. 
If the first two propositions continue to hold, then the third proposition may provide an opportunity 
to develop a particular usage that may be suitable for sustainability planning in particular. The 
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question of whether planning should adopt a single usage or continue to tolerate diverse usage is 
considered. Features of a usage of values that might be a good fit with planning are proposed. 
  
6.2 Shared Obstacles for “Values” and “Planning” 
6.2.1 No single definition of planning 
“Values” is not the only idea that is treated as having a shared meaning even when differences in 
usage may be significant. Edgar Rose made the same point about planning:  
“The question—‘What is the purpose and meaning of planning?’— 
receives quite different answers at different times and from different 
sorts of people. Einstein once said the same about science.” (1984, 
42) 
Ernest Alexander explores what planning is not in order to address the problem of definitions of 
planning being so inclusive that they are meaningless (1986, 41). For Alexander, planning is not 
purely individual, present-oriented, something that can be routinized, a process of trial and error, the 
imagining of desirable utopias, or limited to the making of plans (1986, 42). This suggests that an 
understanding of values that is all of these things would not be a good fit with planning. For values to 
be treated as purely individual, as affirmations of what is already believed to be certain, as firm and
definitive lists of virtues that can be applied mechanically, as whimsical preferences, as vague 
abstractions, and as relevant only to thinking but not to acting would add nothing substantial to 
planning. It also suggests that how planning is understood has some bearing on how values are 
understood in relation to planning. 
Because there is no single, generally agreed upon defi ition either of planning or values, consistent 
values usage in applications and approaches to planning should not be anticipated. The absence of a 
single usage or way of understanding does not necessarily make communication about planning or 
values impossibly confusing. What rescues communication bout planning and about values from 
impossible confusion is some sense on a general level that people are referring to the same idea. 
Using Alexander’s list of negatives as a basis, values usage in planning should be able to address 
something similar to Alexander’s list of positive features of planning. In this respect, both values and 
planning should be “societal, future-oriented, nonroutinized, deliberate, strategic, and linked to 
action” (1986, 43). 
Selecting a particular way of understanding values is a judgement about value, in the same way that 
Joseph describes value judgements about language as “language acting upon itself” (1987, 5). This 
fits broadly with Alexander’s starting point—that planning  
“…is ultimately a prescriptive, not a descriptive, activity. The 
planner does not aim to describe or to explain the world as it is, but 
rather to propose ways in which to change things in desired 
directions.” (1987, 4) 
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To say that planning is ultimately prescriptive leav s open the question of whether some pure form 
of description is even possible without some prescriptive influence and, if so, whether there are 
borderline cases where description and prescription are combined. 
 
6.2.2 Role of descriptive categories 
Variously referred to as descriptive, substantive, or content categories, this phenomenon was 
discussed earlier in relation to both grounded theory methodology and values3 as a conservative 
influence on understanding. In the same way, descriptive categories in planning tend to reflect the 
status quo and existing ways of social organization. When used only to affirm and amplify existing 
beliefs, this way of categorizing values accords no pecial usefulness to “value”, meaning that words 
such as “beliefs”, “attitudes”, “goals”, and “opinions” could be used just as appropriately instead.  
In Alexander’s approach to planning, a typology of planning that is based only on substantive 
categories is also limited to describing the status quo. Just as in their application to grounded theory 
methodology, substantive categories in planning are “the simplest and most intuitively obvious” and 
distinguish “according to the object of concern” (1986, 66). 
“[A]s a result, planning is divided up on substantive or sectoral-
functional lines. Since this often reflects prevailing institutional 
divisions—in a sense the way we have organized society—it is 
certainly one useful way of distinguishing between different types of 
planning activity, such as physical, economic, transportation, and 
health planning and the like.” (Alexander, 1986, 66)
Though there may be useful applications for substantive categories, as Alexander notes, these are 
essentially attempts at description, implying limited application as a tool for planning when planning 
is understood as necessarily future-oriented and appreciative of uncertainty. To have a deeper 
understanding of what underlies the intuited and easily observed requires crossing “substantive or 
sectoral-functional lines”. 
“Not surprisingly, these [substantive models] have  great deal in 
common, reflecting, as they do, the lines on which our social 
institutions are organized.” (Alexander, 1986, 66) 
At some stage before substantive categories become progressively closer to simple descriptions, 
they may begin life as prescriptive categories thataim to shape understanding and action. For 
example, the very fact that what it means to know smething, what counts as knowledge, what is the 
best way to accumulate knowledge, to describe it, and so on, have not only remained unresolved but 
persisted as the subjects of ongoing debate and dispute uggests there is much that is not understood. 
                                                  
3 See Chapter 2 for descriptive and substantive categories in methodology and Chapter 5 for a discussion of 
content categories in the Values Study. 
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Under such circumstances, attaching firmness and certainty to the word “knowledge” cannot be 
justified. 
The Gulbenkian Commission’s report on social sciences (1996) hints at a phenomenon similar to 
that of descriptive or substantive categories in cosidering how the word “knowledge” has come to 
mean scientific knowledge. As part of a general discus ion of the relation between arts and sciences 
in social sciences, the authors of the report add a caveat to their description of the process by which 
the word “knowledge” has come to mean some types of kn wledge but not others. Although a 
division of knowledge into scientific knowledge and speculative philosophical knowledge4 became 
entrenched in English and Romance languages, in German the word “Wissenschaft” continues to be 
used to refer to all knowledge. Knowledge of a specific type is identified by a modifier attached to the 
root word for knowledge and not by a separate word (as “science” in English implies knowledge 
without explicitly using the word “knowledge”). “Geisteswissenschaften”, is used to mark knowledge 
of spiritual or mental matters, a term the authors note is comparable to the English word for 
“humanities” (1996, ftnt 4, p. 5), absent any specific use of the word “knowledge”5 in English.  
This has implications for how values are categorized n planning, suggesting that words themselves 
can be descriptive, substantive categories of values that are silent on the question of values usage. Th  
phrase “intrinsic values”, for example, is a descriptive usage because it describes what values are 
about without prescribing what counts as an intrinsic value in every application. What is properly 
identified as an intrinsic value is determined by criteria associated with each particular usage of 
values. Despite agreement by the first three Objections6 that phrases such as “intrinsic values” and 
“absolute values” are oxymoronic because all values ar  necessarily relative, both of these phrases are 
perfectly sensible when they are used in the context of a particular usage of values that does not treat 
values as relative. That intrinsic values are not accompanied by the questioning attitude that is 
characteristic of the default concept of values (Chapter 5) can be explained in relation to the concept 
and other usages (Chapter 3), demonstrating that it is related in significant ways and not a usage that 
can or should be ignored because it is regarded as foreign to other usages. 
 
                                                  
4 The division might also be described in other ways, such as between social knowledge and private knowledge. 
5 German is not unique in not categorizing knowledge according its aspirations or claims to certainty. For
example, speakers of Finno-Ugrian languages also lack this linguistic device to conceptually divide knowledge 
according to what counts as certain knowledge and what does not. When the speakers of these languages refer 
to knowledge they refer to it as a unity, with variants of the root word indicating more specifically the type of 
subject matter. They do not first need to decide whther they are speaking of certain knowledge. In practice, this 
might mean, for example, that departments of study in a university might be known in English as “Planning 
knowledge”, “Environmental knowledge”, “Philosophical knowledge” and “Scientific knowledge”, removing 
the medium (such as the words “science” and “humanities”) by which the value of knowledge in each is 
presented as pre-categorized according to whether it p tains or not to certain knowledge. 
6 See Chapter 4. 
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6.2.3 Language and judgement 
The first stage of research demonstrated that the conceptual categories of values that distinguish 
diverse usages of values are factors in shaping the content of knowledge and understanding. The 
conceptual categories take descriptive categories of values as their starting point. Recognizing that 
descriptive categories are not the end point of classifying values (not the only way to classify values) 
helps to avoid making the assumption that conventional ways of presenting “values”  are the best 
possible to this point in history. That words and ju gements about the value of words evolve over 
time need not also imply a single goal towards which linguistic evolution progresses. The tendency to 
make such assumptions has been shown to be a problem in other applications, for example, in the 
quest to determine the “intrinsic worth” of languages. 
“Particularly widespread and well established is a belief in a 
linguistic survival of the fittest, a social Darwinism of language. This 
belief encourages people of European background to assume a 
correlation between adaptive and expressive capacity in a language 
and that language’s survival and spread. Since their own languages 
are prominent among those which have both survived and spread, 
this is of course a self-serving belief.” (Dorian, 1998, 10) 
Understanding language itself as an expression of judgement about value (Chapter 5) suggests 
caution in declaring the intrinsic value of anything  firm and certain terms, if only because these 
values are expressed in terms of language. Though intrinsic values are often treated simply as 
descriptions of qualities, Simmel (Chapter 5) treated each judgement of value as a penultimate 
judgement. For Simmel, “Value therefore “is never a ‘quality’ of the objects, but a judgement upon 
them which remains inherent in the subject” (1978, 63). Intrinsic values can be treated as being either 
conditional or unconditional, depending on the context created by other ideas with which the usage is 
associated. 
The possibility that most everything spoken in langua e is a statement reflecting a judgement about 
the value of something or other can be intimidating, particularly if we are self-conscious of 
continually making judgements with every chosen word. In an article written two years after The 
Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi observes a tendency to avoid putting into words those ideas that 
“more often divide than unite”.  
 “The English people have an almost innate reluctance to formulating 
social ideas in words. Their own, time-honored semantics have 
taught them that words more often divide than unite…If one only 
tries long enough, questions may spontaneously resolve themselves, 
the English seem to say—and in any case one avoids the mistake of 
making them insoluble by attempting to force a soluti n where none 
is yet possible. (1946, 280) 
Extending Sperling’s (Chapter 3) idea that words themselves are value judgements suggests that the 
reluctance Polanyi describes may be a way of avoiding the making of such judgements. Value 
judgements about words that are also considered to be “values” would be even more likely to be 
avoided, for the reasons Polanyi suggests. 
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Wisdom’s case by case, comparative reasoning (Chapter 5) speaks directly to this problem because 
comparative reasoning is the process by which we det rmine whether something is of one kind or 
another. The belief that something is of kind “x” and not kind “y” underlies judgements about value 
and, potentially at least, can influence the value judgement. Taking descriptive categories at face 
value overlooks the need to treat the “kind” of some thing or idea as penultimate; it treats the kind as 
self-evident and not worthy of questioning. This may prolong disagreements7. 
 
6.3 From Descriptive to Conceptual Categories 
6.3.1 Descriptive categories in planning 
The problem of how to compare and contrast values was not only of theoretical interest for this 
research; it is what planners encounter when they must work through familiar and common 
oppositions of values—such as having to decide whether “environment” or “jobs” should take 
priority. Cast in values language, as often it is, his requires being able to compare environmental 
values with economic values. It is common to re-describe the opposition between environmental 
values and economic values as being something like “intrinsic”, “ideals”, and “virtues” on one side of 
the equation and “variable”, “money” or “greed” on the other. The question addressed in this research 
is what counts (or should count) as an “environmental value” and what counts as an economic value; 
how can these two groups of seemingly different types of “values” be set side by side to make 
decisions that are based on judging which position about values is the stronger, more useful, or more 
significant in other ways. This is what is at stake in determining whether values are necessarily 
homonyms, as they appear in the first instance, or diverse usages related to a concept of values in 
general. If values are homonyms, the opposition stad . If values are diverse usages, there may be 
ways to connect the two values. 
Grounded theory methodology encourages treating raw m terial (instances of the word “values”) as 
being pre-classified8. This means that the researcher should not assume that raw material is ever 
unclassified—even if no deliberate attempt has yet be n made to classify it. Examples of “values” 
present themselves as descriptive categories even before a process of constant comparison begins to 
reveal other ways of classifying values according to conceptual categories. As well, that Glaser and 
                                                  
7 A comic illustrates this point by describing an argument that appears to be irresolvable and rests on 
classification. Two zebras are at an impasse and prepared to battle, one saying “We are black with white 
stripes!” and the other “Over my dead body—we are white with black stripes!” (Price, 2006). Description is 
entangled with a dispute over whether something is of one kind or another—the kind of “black with white” or 
the kind of “white with black”. So long as the dispute rests on these two kinds, no further data or facts can 
resolve it, demonstrating the important role of underlying classifications. 
8 Glaser and Strauss use the term “pre-coded” (Chapter 2). Because the question of classification may pl a 
larger role in a study of values than in other studies using grounded theory methodology,  I use the term “pre-
classified” only to simplify the language, not to suggest a different meaning. 
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Strauss distinguished descriptive from conceptual categories serves as a reminder that descriptive 
categories of values are no more than provisional ad not some end point of values classification. In 
this study, the question of classification (Chapter 5) became central to devising a means to compare 
and contrast instances of the word “values”, not merely as static or discrete examples but as usages 
with a history. The method of constant comparison used during the research period is now 
recommended to planners in its most basic form, comparison and contrast9.   
Values present themselves as pre-classified in familiar ways—ethical values, social values, 
economic values, environmental values, cultural values, and so forth on a mid-range level of 
description; Christian values, community values, globa  values, ranchers’ values, and so forth on a 
more detailed level of descriptive values, and cognitive values, absolute values, ideal values, 
objective values, subjective values, universal values, and so forth on an abstract level of description. 
As discussed above (Section 6.2.2), that these groups f values are classified according to what they 
describe does not make them neutral in how they determine subsequent thinking about values. 
Groupings reflect the way that other issues are organized in both social and conceptual life and how 
values are attached to these other issues. They dirct attention to whatever specific aspect of values is 
highlighted as the basis for description. The labels “intrinsic”, “variable”, “ideals”, “money”, 
“virtues”, “greed”, as above, shape the content of any values that are described in these terms. That 
these terms may appear to operate on different levels of thought makes no difference to how they 
function as descriptive categories. Constant comparison reveals that within each descriptive category 
there may be similarities and differences that correspond to the same features in other groups of 
descriptive values. Even the level of detail is not a firm indicator of how values must be classified; 
features of the subjective values might overlap with environmental values and with more detailed 
ranchers’ values, and so on.  
Grouping values according to whether they are abstrct or situational, means or ends, subjective or 
objective, attitude or principle may help to reveal some of the similarities and differences among 
descriptive values but it cannot anticipate how to relate values that appear to be neither abstract or 
situational, means or ends, and so on. It also forces a separation where the difference between abstract 
and situational values, for example, may be blurred. There is always a possibility that some other 
feature may be highly significant but masked by the description. Taken together, the criteria cannot 
yield a unified conclusion but are limited to applying the criteria serially, one oppositional pair at a 
time.  
Comparison and contrast on the level of descriptive cat gories is not sufficient to explain why 
values that appear to be distinct are not or why the should be treated as comparable. Even more 
                                                  
9 Incorporating the research method used for this the is in the approach to values recommended for planners, 
lands the debate over what grounded theory methodology is or should be at the feet of planners. It will be for 
planners to decide whether the results of comparison and contrast are “discovered” or “constructively 
interpreted”, how best to describe the interaction between analysts and raw material in producing conceptual 
categories, and whether the process should be left to planners as trained experts who do not require a st p by 




significantly, classification using features internal to descriptive categories continue to prioritize h se 
features without being able to justify why these features and not others are significant enough to 
highlight. They are grouped according to their labes, with the labels playing a more prominent role 
than similarities and differences10. The new groups of values based on features of descriptive 
categories of values may emphasize a different set of similarities and differences but they are no more 
than descriptive categories themselves. They continue to mask what might be significant differences. 
Looking for an explanation on the relational dimensio  of values in general instead of an 
explanation for how any given pair of values might be related changes the problem. If environmental 
and economic values, are to be compared, for example, then boundaries for comparison cannot be 
assumed to be established strictly by what pertains o environment and what pertains to economics. 
The problem is much more complex than it first appears because what pertains to environmental and 
economic values, for example, is unlimited if connections are pursued far enough.  
For reasons discussed above, value systems also operate on the level of descriptive categories. 
Treating values as systems is an attempt to accommodate relatedness but establish relations on the 
dimension of content and positions about values. As Albert and Vogt discovered in their comparative 
and interdisciplinary study of values (Chapter 5), various methodologies used to study descriptive 
categories of values each changed the content to the extent that ultimately findings about values could 
not be connected and a coherent conclusion that related results from various methodologies and 
approaches was not possible except in very superficial ways. Whether on the level of single-topic 
values, oppositional pairs of values, value systems, or methodology, the medium through which the 
relatedness of values is established differs depending on whether values are classified as descriptive 
or as conceptual. 
 
6.3.2 Diverse usage and conceptual categories 
This stage of the thesis explores the feasibility for planning of using the theory about diverse usage as 
the medium through which to relate conceptual categori s of values. Diverse usage is the primary 
                                                  
10 The terms “current labels” and “descriptive categories” are used interchangeably by Glaser and Strauss 
(Chapter 2): “…the analyst will notice that the conepts abstracted from the substantive situation will tend to be 
current labels in use for the actual processes and behaviors that are to be explained, while the concepts 
constructed by the analyst will tend to be the explanations” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 107). Analysis of 





conceptual category. Properties of diverse usages are also conceptual but do not stand alone11; they 
are non-descriptional features or aspects of values that pertain to diverse usage. They are not super-
imposed on values-as-descriptions but emerge from the  when such values are compared and 
contrasted. This approach to usages of “values” is distinct from usages identified according to 
descriptive categories. 
Whether the description is something like “ethical v lues” or “values used as ethics”, both classify 
values according to what they are about, in this case “ethics”, and not according to conceptual 
categories12. As above, the problem with descriptive categories tr ated as usages of “values” is that 
they tend to mask similarities and differences within e usage. For example, values are treated as a 
“source” of ethics, “the most basic kinds of belief” (Barrett, 2001, 7). Such values are building blocks 
of ethics, with no suggestion that these need to be critically examined. They are provided for planners 
in a “Code of Ethics” (Barrett, 2001, 7) or in “Statements of Values” (CIP, 1994) as guides for 
behaviour. This same usage on a descriptive level becomes a conceptual usage related to the theory of 
diverse usage when the property of “absoluteness” is identified by comparing such a usage with 
another usage of values-as-ethics, where values as “ethical convictions” are treated as judgements 
about value (Campbell, 2002, 282). This fairly straight-forward comparison is complicated when 
absolute values as principles are treated as the basis for pluralist outcomes, as in identifying “specific 
liberal values” which form the basis for “differing conceptions of the good life” (Harper and Stein, 
1995, 12). Individuals’ values that conform to the lib ral values may have “instrumental value” but 
are lacking “intrinsic moral value” (Harper and Stein, 1995, 13). Absolute values are not necessarily 
sourced in individuals, as becomes evident when comparing usage as absolute values of individuals to 
usage by religious institutions, as in use of the prase “absolute values” to describe values sourced 
externally to humans. Values sourced externally to humans are not subject to the same kind of critical 
scrutiny that sourcing values in humans entails. Timothy Beatley, for example, describes “[h]elping 
students to develop and/or clarify their own particular environmental ethic or set of ethics” as one of 
the purposes of a course on “Environmental Values and Ethics” (1995, 324). The course  
“…is about values and about how environmental ethics and 
philosophy can inform us about how we ought to act in relation to 
the environment and its human and nonhuman inhabitants.” (1995, 
324)  
                                                  
11 As discussed in Chapter 2, grounded theory methodology distinguishes between categories and properties. A 
category “stands by itself as a conceptual element of the theory”; a property “is a conceptual aspect or element 
of a category”. Both “are concepts indicated by the data (and not the data itself) [and] both vary in degree of 
conceptual abstraction” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 36). 
12 As discussed earlier (Chapter 1) implicit use of “values” is beyond the scope of the present research. 
Discussion and conclusions are therefore limited to explicit use of the word. This means that what others might 
identify as explicit use of values as ethics cannot be considered in the present study. The purpose is to avoid 
confusion about the word “values” in relation to other descriptor words with which it is frequently treated as 
interchangeable. Without limiting the scope of this study it would not have been possible to determine wh ther 
calling something “a value” makes a difference. 
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Clarification of values, used in this way, is no different from a “clarification of what appropriate 
ethical standards ought to be”, given that the course aims to sensitize students to ethical questions by 
being exposed to  
“…the variety of ethical positions, theories, principles, and points of 
view that can, or could, serve to guide environmental decisions and 
that they will likely encounter in future practice…” (Beatley, 1995, 
324) 
So long as both “values” and “ethics” are both treated as requiring a firm base, values can be used 
comfortably both as identical with ethics and separately as the building blocks for ethics. Once the 
firmness of the base is questioned, the end goal becom s less uncertain and a claim that something is 
or not ethical becomes more ambiguous. Vanessa Watson explores whether 
 “moral philosophies which recognize the situated nature of 
knowledge and values may be more appropriate than those which are 
based on universalist ideals”  
suggesting that if so, then  
“…it renders highly problematic a faith in the role of consensus-
seeking processes as a central decision-making tool in planning, both 
to achieve a common view and to arrive at justifiable outcomes.” 
(Watson, 2006, 32)13 
This usage too is about an ethical dimension of values but differs in significant ways from the 
“building block of character” usage of values. The descriptive category (ethics) directs subsequent 
thinking by establishing which similarity (ethics) i  most significant feature of the above examples. 
That there are significant differences in the above usages is masked by the descriptive category. 
 
                                                  
13 The question of how to address the problem of conflict about values frames Watson’s discussion. By arguing 
that an “acceptance of deep difference” and an absence of “universally acceptable values or models” precludes 
the ability of any judgement by planners “to produce a justifiable outcome” (42) Watson connects an 
exploration of how else values might be understood with differences in positions about values. From the 
perspective of this thesis, applying values usage to values conflicts is a next step but not within the scope of the 
present thesis. The application would involve reconnecting conceptual categories to descriptive categori s by 
applying the theory of diverse usage of values to descriptive categories of people’s differing positions on 
values. The purpose, as discussed above, would be to id ntify similarities and differences masked by the one 
similarity highlighted by current labels of descriptive categories. The task of this present thesis is to establish 
that the theory of diverse usage is applicable to planning. Application will require already having anwareness 
of diverse usage of “values” in planning and of the hidden similarities and differences internal to descriptive 
categories, the topic of this thesis. 
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6.3.3 The planner’s role 
Applied to planning, the theory about diverse usage to planning means that the responsibility for 
identifying new conceptual categories and properties lies primarily with planners. Because each 
application of comparison and contrast will vary according to the comparer and what is being 
compared, there can be no definitive list of features that must be satisfied. A body of examples of 
diverse usage and features by which they are related to ach other and to a general concept of values 
can function as a guide to planners. Examples of values usage discussed in this thesis are a first step. 
To distinguish various usages on a conceptual level, planners should attempt to identify the criteria 
established by a usage to determine what counts as a v lue relative to that usage and the features of 
that usage that link it to other usages and the default concept of values (Chapter 5). The general 
questions or aspects addressed by features are more i portant than whether positions taken by usages 
about those features are identical.  
An example of this is how second-generation usage of values as absolutes (Chapter 3) respond to 
the same issues raised by Nietzsche’s new usage as do other usages of values, even though values 
usages as absolutes eliminates the need for a questioning attitude. Treating values-as-absolutes as part 
of the same family as other values usages means that its relation can be explained as a response or 
reaction to the same originating point from which ot er usages emerged. Taking this approach makes 
it possible to discuss all values as a group, even though the positions these usages take about the 
content or substance of the originating point may differ wildly. 
Taking such an approach to values does not depend on whether or not planners individually or 
planning in general adopt a single, generally agreed upon definition of values. The default concept of 
values (Chapter 5) explains how diverse usages are relat d and justifies use of three themes about the 
relativity of values as grounds to justify taking a questioning attitude towards values. 
 
6.4 A Shared Historical Context for Planning and Va lues  
6.4.1 Polanyi’s The Great Transformation 
Historian Jacques Barzun describes the late 1800s as a period during which “social conventions were 
questioned one after another” (2000, 591). 
“The turn of the century was a turning indeed; not an ordinary 
turning point, but rather a turntable on which a whole crowd of 
things facing one way revolved till they faced the opposite way. The 
image falsifies only a little: things did not turn in unison.” (Barzun, 
2000, 615) 
In the Germany of 1887, Nietzsche responds to “the sm ll of a failure”, the “nihilism” that is 
characteristic of his society (1956, 178). At the turn of the century in the US, Bakewell observes a 
similar change in social temperament, a “feeling of discontent”, that is widespread (1899, 314-315). 
In England, Mackenzie notes in 1900 that scepticism, what he also calls a “questioning attitude”, is so 
widespread in his British society that it is now characteristic of how people address moral problems. 
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This does not trouble Mackenzie, though he notes others may take it as a sign of the deterioration of 
society (1900, 465-467)14.  
In The Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi too identifies an emotional change taking place 
at that time. “Orthodox liberalism” ends in the 1870s and 1880s when collectivists and liberals alike 
began implementing social solutions to address the weaknesses of market economies (1944, 145). 
Until that time, the “ruling philosophy” of that century is both “pacifist and internationalist” and “all 
educated people were free traders”. 
“The source of this outlook was, of course, economic; uch genuine 
idealism sprang from the sphere of barter and trade—by a supreme 
paradox man’s selfish wants were validating his most generous 
impulses. But since the 1870s an emotional change was noticeable 
though there was no corresponding break in the dominant ideas. The 
world continued to believe in internationalism and i terdependence 
while acting on the impulses of nationalism and self- ufficiency. 
Liberal nationalism was developing into national liberalism, with its 
marked leanings towards protectionism and imperialism abroad, 
monopolistic conservatism at home.” (1944, 198) 
At no previous time in history had the market ever b en “more than incidental to economic life” 
(1944, 43). 
“No society could, naturally, live for any length of time unless it 
possessed an economy of some sort; but previously to our time no 
economy has ever existed that, even in principle, was controlled by 
markets. In spite of the chorus of academic incantations so persistent 
in the nineteenth century, gain and profit made on xchange never 
before played an important part in human economy.” (1944, 43) 
Previously, all economic systems “were organized either on the principles of reciprocity or 
redistribution, or householding, or some combination of the three” (1944, 55). Market economies, 
however, cannot function without market societies (1944, 57). Inevitably, “land, labor, and money” 
become commodities, even though none of these are actually commodities because they are not 
“objects produced for sale” (1944, 72). The description of these as commodities is “entirely fictitious” 
(1944, 72). 
“But labor and land are no other than the human beigs themselves 
of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in 
which it exists. To include them in the market mechanism means to 
subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market.” 
(Polanyi, 1944, 71) 
In the absence of deliberate attempts to protect society, the result of separating economics from the 
larger social and political sphere is the “demolitin of society” (1944, 73). Polanyi’s is not an 
                                                  
14 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion. 
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indiscriminate defence of government regulation; he establishes early on that government regulation 
can be done well or poorly. From 1795 to 1834, the Sp enhamland Law not only wreaks havoc with 
the poor of British society but also shapes social consciousness: “Pauperism, political economy, and 
the discovery of society were closely interwoven” (1944, 85) 
After 1834, the social situation deteriorates even further. 
“If under Speenhamland, the people had been taken care of as none 
too precious beasts deserved to be, now they were expected to take 
care of themselves, with all the odds against them. If Speenhamland 
meant the snug misery of degradation, now the laboring man was 
homeless in society. If Speenhamland had overworked th  values of 
neighbourhood, family, and rural surroundings, now man was 
detached from home and kin, torn from his roots and all meaningful 
environment. (1944, 83) 
By the 1830s, “laissez-faire” becomes a “militant creed” (1944, 137) in reaction t  poor 
government regulation and a new awareness of society tha  extends beyond the economic sphere 
(1944, 84).  
“Hope—the vision of perfectibility—was distilled out of the 
nightmare of population and wage laws, and was embodied in a 
concept of progress so inspiring that it appeared to justify the vast 
and painful dislocations to come. Despair was to prove an even more 
powerful agent of transformation.” (1944, 84) 
The shift to a market economy is “a utopian experimnt” (1944, 81), an end that is so desired that it 
justifies “blind faith” in “boundless and unregulated change in society” (1944, 76). Polanyi refers to 
this phenomenon as a “secular religion” that renounces “human solidarity in the name of the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number” (1944, 102). Once the “great perils” of the endeavour make 
themselves known, it is only blind faith that can sustain the social project (1944, 138). 
During the period 1879 to 1929, this utopian ideal takes hold of the world’s economy—“over the 
greater part of the world civilization was of the same fabric”, despite local colour and variations 
(1944, 209). In varying combinations, all market societies suffer the same symptoms: 
“disequilibrium”, “unemployment”, “tension of classe ”, “pressure on exchanges”, and “imperialist 
rivalries” (1944, 209). The artificiality of the separation of economics from politics shows itself over 
and over again. 
“Eventually, unadjusted price and cost structures prolonged 
depressions, unadjusted equipment retarded the liquidation of 
unprofitable investments, unadjusted price and income levels caused 
social tension. And whatever the market in question—labor, land, or 
money—the strain would transcend the economic zone and the 
balance would have to be restored by political means. Nevertheless, 
the institutional separation of the political from the economic sphere 
was constitutive to market society and had to be maintained whatever 
the tension involved.” (1944, 218) 
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Protection of the market economy takes precedence over the protection of democracy. Polanyi 
defines socialism as “essentially, the tendency inherent in an industrial civilization to transcend the
self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society” (1944, 234). In the 
US, where workers have the right to vote, voters are “powerless against owners”. In England, workers 
are not allowed to vote and treated as criminals merely for demanding the ballot.  
“Inside and outside England…there was not a militant liberal who 
did not express his conviction that popular democracy was a danger 
to capitalism.” (1944, 226)  
Market societies are “ripe for fascism” (1944, 234). That market economies are in dread of the 
possibility that socialist governments might interfere with property rights undermines the confidence 
that market economies require to function. Fascism, therefore, is not caused by local conditions but 
by market economies (1944, 237; 242). 
Nineteenth century thinkers take for granted that humans are naturally motivated by profit but 
basing an economy entirely on “self-interest” is not atural (1944, 249). Moreover, industrial 
civilization does not require a self-regulating market economy (1944, 250). The effect of this utopian 
experiment is that by the end of the 19th C, “the peoples of the world were institutionally standardized 
to a degree unknown before” (1944, 253).  
Polanyi expresses the hope—prematurely, as history ubsequent to 1944 now shows—that the end 
of market economies “can become the beginning of an er  of unprecedented freedom” (1944, 256). 
However, “the very possibility of freedom is in question” if every attempt to regulate the market, as is 
necessary, is viewed as being “contrary to freedom” (1944, 257).  The remedy is to recognize that 
believing that a society can be “shaped by man’s will and wish alone” is a “radical illusion” (1944, 
258). 
“But power and economic value are a paradigm of social reality. 
They do not spring from human volition; nonco-operation is 
impossible in regard to them. The function of power is to ensure that 
measure of conformity which is needed for the survival of the group; 
its ultimate source is opinion..[The source of economic value] is 
human wants and scarcity…Any opinion or desire willmake us 
participants in the creation of power and in the constituting of 
economic value. No freedom to do otherwise is conceivable.” (1944, 
258) 
Ensuring that markets are regulated can be accomplished by planning only with awareness of the 
threat that planning can present to freedom.  
“Every move towards integration in society should thus be 
accompanied by an increase of freedom; moves towards planning 
should comprise the strengthening of the rights of the individual in 
society…For, however generously devolution of power is practiced, 
there will be strengthening of power at centre, and, therefore, danger 
to individual freedom.” (1944, 255) 
 
136 
Supporters of market economies do not accept this pos ibility of planning because it places limits 
on aspects of freedom (1944, 256). This disagreement is not about economics but about moral and 
religious matters (1944, 258). 
“As long as man is true to his task of creating more abundant 
freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will 
turn against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their 
instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex 
society; it gives us all the certainty we need.” (1944, 258B) 
Polanyi uses the word “values” sparingly, making it difficult to establish definitively what specific 
purpose or purposes the word is intended to serve. Economic values, says Polanyi, “do not spring 
from human volition” (1944, 258). That “any opinion r desire will make us participants in 
the…constituting of economic value” is coupled with a description of economic values as necessarily 
existing “prior to the decision to produce them” because the “source is human wants and scarcity” 
(1944, 258). Volition may be implied in the “values of neighbourhood, family, and rural 
surroundings” (1944, 83), possibly making these distinct from economic values. Certainly volition 
plays a role in deciding deliberately to protect values such as freedom and peace. Polanyi says “We 
must try to maintain by all means in our power these high values inherited from the market-economy 
which collapsed” (1944, 255).  
If “Man can be as good or evil, as social or asocial, je lous or generous, in respect to one set of 
values as in respect to another” (1944, 46-47), then neither usage—economic or social-moral—is 
dependent on the existence or articulation of some single set of values.  By implication, therefore, 
values should not be treated as incontestable or absolute. Polanyi confirms this interpretation of his
values usage in 1947, when he introduces his “first s gnificant advance” of the thesis presented in The
Great Transformation, by noting first that “Our thoughts and values” have been moulded by the self-
adjusting market. “Today, we begin to doubt the truth of some of these thoughts and the validity of 
some of these values” (1947, 109). Here again, thoug , Polanyi does not continue to structure his 
argument in terms of values, using words such as “motive” instead. 
For Polanyi a questioning attitude towards values-as-motives is useful, perhaps even necessary, for 
challenging conventional ideas. Awareness of the social contingency of values does not appear to 
make values less valuable or less useful, meaning values do not need to be based on a single, 
overriding value from which the value of all other values is derived.  
 
6.4.2 Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom  
Published in the same year as The Great Transformation, Frederich Hayek’s study of the same terrain 
reached opposite conclusions. Broadly, in The Road to Serfdom (1994 [1944]) Hayek favours the 
individual over the collective, argues that fascism  rooted in socialism—not the market economy, 
and concludes that planning is not a better path for the future because it limits freedom.  
Hayek sees himself as arguing against convention—“people whose views influence 
developments…are now in the democracies in some measur  ll socialists”, “nearly everybody wants 
[socialism]” (1994, 7). The dispute, says Hayek, “is about means, not ends” because people “who 
 
137 
value the ultimate ends of socialism…refuse to support [it] because of the dangers to other values 
they see in the methods proposed…” (1994, 38). Hayek’s task is to identify 
“the circumstances which during the last seventy years have made 
possible the progressive growth and the ultimate victory of a 
particular set of ideas, and why in the end this victory has brought 
the most vicious elements among them to the top.” (1994, 9-10) 
 This requires a perspective that those with socialist ideas cannot see. Most believe that the 
principle of laissez-faire has continued to dominate society but in reality there has been no liberal 
society since the time of the First World War (1994, 15). An indicator of this is the lack of respect for 
individuals and their views; individualism is now disparaged and associated with “egotism and 
selfishness” (1994, 17). Seeing individuals in their roles as members of the collective precludes 
seeing individuals “qua man” (1994, 17). The failure of world economies is not brought on by market 
economies but by attempts to constrain them. If liberalism is like a gardener who creates conditions in 
which plants can flourish, the liberal environment in which market economies could flourish has been 
destroyed (1994, 22). The “impersonal and anonymous mechanism of the market” has been replaced 
by “collective and ‘conscious’ direction of all social forces to deliberately chosen goals” (1994, 24).
Hayek is very precise about the type of planning to which he objects. He distinguishes ideas about 
planning in general from the “modern” (socialist) idea of planning that “has become almost 
synonymous with” how the word planning is now used. Hayek continues to use the word “planning” 
instead of specifying a type of planning because he anticipates how the word will be understood, 
regretting that “this means leaving to our opponents a very good word meriting a better fate” (1994, 
48). 
Planning in general is popular “because all desire we should handle common problems as rationally 
as possible with as much foresight we can command…” (1994, 39-40). That choices need to be made 
“intelligently or employ foresight and systematic thinking” is not at issue (1994, 40). 
“In this sense anyone not a complete fatalist is a planner, every 
political act is (or ought to be) an act of planning, and there can be 
differences only between good and bad, between wise and 
foresighted and foolish and shortsighted planning.” (1994, 40) 
To socialists, liberal planning does not count as pl nning (1994, 40) because there is no “conscious 
direction toward a single aim”. The single aim is definitive of socialism, which is 
“…the deliberate organization of the labours of society for a definite 
social goal. That our present society lacks such ‘cons ious’ direction 
toward a single aim, that its activities are guided by the whims and 
fancies of irresponsible individuals, has always been one of the main 
complaints of its socialist critics.” (1994, 63) 
The socialist idea of central economic planning is appealing largely because it is vague (1994, 39). 
“The ‘social goal,” or “common purpose,” for which society is to be organized is vaguely described 
as the ‘common good,” the ‘general welfare,’ or the ‘general interest’” (1994, 64). Because the single 
aim is vague, the course of action is undetermined. Differences inherent in vagueness inevitably show 
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themselves during planning processes, revealing “the concealed conflict between their aims” (1994, 
61). This is a problem particularly because supporters of socialist planning are likely to be single-
minded idealists and therefore unsuitable planners.   
“The hopes they place in planning…are the result not of a 
comprehensive view of society but rather a very limited view and 
often the result of a great exaggeration of the importance of the ends 
they place foremost…[I]t would make the very men who are most 
anxious to plan society the most dangerous if they w re allowed to 
do so—and the most intolerant of the planning of others.” (1994, 62) 
Planning in the service of a single goal precludes anticipating the unexpected, is inflexible, and 
cannot accommodate complexity (1994, 56). Being sinle-minded about an overriding common end 
necessitates the “setting-aside of all other values in the service of a single purpose” (1994, 165).  It 
establishes a single scale by which to judge all other values according to single end.   
“The welfare of a people, like the happiness of a man, depends on a 
great many things that can be provided in an infinite variety of 
combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but 
only as a hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in 
which every need of every person is given its place. To direct all our 
activities according to a single plan presupposes that every one of 
our needs is given its rank in an order of values which must be 
complete enough to make it possible to decide among all the 
different courses which the planner has to choose. It presupposes, in 
short, the existence of a complete ethical code in which all the 
different human values are allotted their due place.” (1994, 64)15 
War is the only condition that justifies sacrificing all other values. In peace time, “no single 
purpose…must be allowed…to have absolute preference over all others”, without exception (1994, 
225). Sacrificing other values creates opportunities for cruelty with no recourse to “general morals or 
rules” in situations such as the relocation of large numbers of people (1994, 165). It sets the stage for 
totalitarian societies. 
“There is always in the eyes of the collectivist a greater goal which 
these acts serve and which to him justifies them because the pursuit 
of the common end of society can know no limits in any rights or 
values of any individual.” (1994, 165) 
                                                  
15 Note that D. M’. G. Means has a similar criticism of Spencer’s utilitarian position, saying it implied that “no 
part of conduct can be understood unless we understand the whole, not only of human but also of animal 
conduct, and not only all present but all past conduct” (1880, 400). The attempt to remove all uncertainty is 
bound to lead to errors in estimating what is valuable (1880, 402).  See Chapter 3. 
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Hayek observes that for a period of 60 years, from 1875 to 1925, England imported ideas from 
Germany16; as Germany became more socialist, so did England (1994, 25; 199). Where Polanyi draws 
attention to the powerlessness of voters to create a check on self-regulated market economies, Hayek 
claims the reverse. Socialism threatens the separation of economics and politics, a separation that is 
“an essential guaranty of individual freedom” (1994, 160), 
“[T]he ‘substitution of political for economic power’ now so often 
demanded means necessarily the substitution of power from which 
there is no escape for a power which is always limited.” (1994, 160) 
Hayek blames the “recent growth of monopoly” largely on the “collaboration of organized capital 
and organized labour, sharing profits” at the expense of the community and “particularly at the 
expense of the poorest” (1994, 218). The consequence will be the “destruction of democracy” (1994, 
218). Either society is to be “governed by the impersonal discipline of the market” or it is to be 
governed “by the will of a few individuals”—“There is no other possibility” (1994, 219). 
Hayek considers an unwillingness to address economic questions as part of a more general 
unwillingness to accept authority. In one respect, this unwillingness flows from demands that desires 
be satisfied and a refusal to accept that they cannot be satisfied (1994, 222). In a second respect, this 
unwilling attitude is also a “much more general phenomenon” that extends beyond the economic 
sphere.  
“This revolt is…a new unwillingness to submit to any rule or 
necessity the rationale of which man does not understand; it makes 
itself felt in many fields of life, particularly in that of morals; and it 
is often a commendable attitude.” (1994, 223) 
Unwillingness to accept authority can also have negative consequences. When people expect to 
understand the rationale but cannot, this may be because what they are trying to understand is not 
conducive to understanding. There are situations in which authority must be accepted on faith, says 
Hayek.  In such situations, failure “to submit to anything we cannot understand” may have serious 
consequences, potentially leading to “the destruction of our civilization (1994, 223). Market economy 
is just such a case. The market impersonally transforms the ideas and desires of individuals (who have 
money) into the ideas of a society but the workings of the market are not easily explained. As difficult 
as it may be to accept the market on faith, people must do so or the result will be dictatorship. 
“The refusal to yield to forces which we neither understand nor can 
recognize as the conscious decisions of an intelligent being is the 
product of an incomplete and therefore erroneous rationalism. It is 
incomplete because it fails to comprehend that the co-ordination of 
the multifarious individual efforts in a complex society must take 
account of facts no individual can completely survey. And it fails to 
                                                  
16 As an example of ideas flowing out of Germany to then be adopted by other nations, Frederick C. Howe 
advocates that Americans consider the type of city planning that happened “First in Germany and now in France 
and England…” (1912, 593). 
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see that, unless this complex society is to be destroyed, the only 
alternative to submission to the impersonal and seemingly irrational 
forces of the market is submission to an equally uncontrollable and 
therefore arbitrary power of other men.” (1994, 224)17 
With the devaluing of liberalism has come the devaluing of the individual and therefore the 
deterioration of moral values. Moral values matter b cause people act according to what they value. If 
risk-taking is now valued less than previously, this w ll have consequences in the ability of people to 
take a leap of faith and support ideas that are beyond the ability of single individuals to understand.  
“It is true that the virtues which are less esteemed and practised 
now—independence, self-reliance, and the willingness to bear risks, 
the readiness to back one’s conviction against a majority, and the 
willingness to voluntary cooperation with one’s neighbors—are 
essentially those on which the working of an indiviualist society 
rests. Collectivism has nothing to put in their place, and in so far as it 
has destroyed them it has left a void filled by nothing but the demand 
for obedience and the compulsion of the individual to do what is 
collectively decided to be good.” (1994, 233) 
This, then, is Hayek’s explanation for the widespread feeling of discontent, caused not by market 
economies but “the collectivist advance” (1994, 235) that has led to the devaluation of the individual. 
Socialism brings with it a devaluing of virtues of the 19th century: “liberty and independence, truth 
and intellectual honesty, peace and democracy, and the respect for the individual qua man instead of 
merely as the member of an organized group” (1994, 23 ). These are the values from which 
democracy emerged in England and the values that democracy continues to require (1994, 234). The 
shift to socialist thinking has destroyed the moral values (virtues) in which the English had previously 
excelled:  
“…independence and self-reliance, individual initiat ve and local 
responsibility, the successful reliance on voluntary activity, non-
interference with one’s neighbour and tolerance of the different and 
queer, respect for custom and tradition, and a healthy suspicion of 
power and authority.” (1994, 234) 
Hayek relies heavily on values language in order to make his argument. He uses moral values 
interchangeably with “virtues” (1994, 234) and “goals” (1994, 165) and considers his own social 
philosophy as being derived “from certain ultimate values” (1994, xlv). Though there may be 
“ultimate values”, however, there should be no single value that takes priority over others. Granting a 
single value the status of an ultimate value would require first establishing the value of all values in a 
complete moral code. This may not be possible but even if it were it would be both undesirable and 
                                                  
17 For an analysis of Hayek’s ideas from the perspective of social epistemology, see Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky’s 
“The Evolutionary and The Evolutionist” (2000).  Hayek’s “premise of ignorance” is contrasted to the 
constructivist “presumption of Reason”. 
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counter to the trend history from the time of primit ve man to the present.  Over time, taboos that 
govern daily activity have become progressively fewer (1994, 64). 
Moral values are recreated daily by individuals (1994, 231). The individual’s responsibility is “not 
to a superior but to one’s conscience” (1994, 231). Moral decisions have “moral value” only when a 
decision to follow a moral rule is made freely (1994, 230). Such freedom is necessary in order to 
decide which values are to be sacrificed for others (1994, 234). It is freedom that defines Hayek’s 
particular usage of values: Freedom makes other moral values possible because all moral values are 
ultimately sourced in freely made decisions of individuals. From the perspective of values usage, 
freedom is treated as the single value that acts as a standard. It creates the scale by which other values 
either qualify as values or they do not, Hayek’s substantive claims about the undesirability of 
pursuing a single value to the contrary. 
 
6.4.3 Expanding the scope, scale, and nature of pla nning 
Polanyi and Hayek were certainly not alone at that ime in writing about planning, economics, and 
democracy. In the American Journal of Sociology, for example, Bushrod W. Allin writes that “it 
seems reasonably certain that Americans would be much less concerned now about economic 
planning if their pre-depression democracy had worked satisfactorily” (1937, 511). Hans Speier notes 
that the term “economic planning is necessarily imprecise for three reasons: “the objective of any plan 
is political;…its execution involves political problems”; and implementing an economic plan bears on 
“other, non-economic relations and activities in the social structure” (1937, 465). Charles Merriam 
reminds readers that “historically, planning is an American product”, that their forefathers 
“deliberately planned” for an industrial and agricultural economy, public education and growth of 
transportation and that the Chicago Plan movement bgan in 1907 (1944, 398).  
“We plan primarily for freedom; the ways and means d
instruments are secondary to the main purpose. The rig t kind of 
planning—democratic planning—is a guaranty of liberty and the 
only real assurance in our times that men can be free to make a wide 
range of choices.”(Merriam, 1944, 404)  
Svend Riemer responds to the debate about planning a d freedom by suggesting that making 
contestable values part of the planning process will make it  
“…impossible for the planning promoter to ask for the blessings of 
the community with only his ulterior motives and his professional 
integrity in mind. We are challenged to continuous criticism and to 
constructive participation if we know that in social planning the 
specified ends as well as the means should be the object of 
consideration.” (1947, 511) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Mental Hygiene Movement in the 1930s used values to mould 
behaviour in the service of American democracy. Combining behavioural science with a religious 
fervour, the issues of mental health and social deviance gained momentum with the events of the 
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Second World War. In an overview of the history of planning theory, Bruce Stiftel traces the origins 
of theories still influential today to the same era. What planning inherited was a scientific approach. 
“New Deal experiments with planning, guided by emerging 
Keynesian economic principles, included the National Resources 
Planning Board, the Resettlement Administration, and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. These programs championed a kind of planning 
that was rooted in the collection and examination of data, the 
evaluation of alternative courses of action and the creation of 
systems for implementation. They expanded planning’s definition as 
a design activity and incorporated scientific techniques. The New 
Deal’s Demonstration Cities program was perhaps the most 
influential on the urban planning profession, because it illustrated 
this new (social) scientific model at the urban level.” (Stiftel, 2000, 
4) 
Pragmatic, managerial liberalism replaced “ideological mass politics” as a means "to protect 
democratic institutions against excesses of the popular will” (Foner, 2001, par 32). Ideas about 
freedom also changed: 
 “If freedom had an economic definition, it was no longer economic 
autonomy, as in the nineteenth century, “industrial democracy”…or 
economic security for the average citizen guaranteed by government, 
as Roosevelt had defined it, but “free enterprise” and consumer 
autonomy—the ability to choose from the cornucopia of goods 
produced by the modern American economy. A common material 
culture of abundance would provide the foundation for global 
integration…under American leadership.” (Foner, 2001, par 34) 
The experience of mobilizing for the purpose of accomplishing a single goal, particularly in the 
case of the Second World War, led to the development of ew skills and tools for governments, skills 
that could be applied after the war to other purposes that required centralized control and 
systematization (Smith, 1998, 67). Together with new t chnologies and new knowledge from the 
social sciences, the experience of single-goal planning—approved by Hayek only in the case of war—
had changed the ability to plan and the nature of planning in the same way that these led to new 
applications and usages of “values”.  
“Logistics is the science of centralized planning, the systematic 
organization of people and materials. It works toward the 
accomplishment of a single clearly defined and distant goal—one 
step at a time. It is the epitome of attention to detail, setting up and 
following predetermined plans with ruthless quality control. People 
no longer did things as individuals, or as communities, but as small 
cogs in a large system….And it worked.” (Smith, 1998, 67) 
After the war, the new planning was promoted by “architects, engineers,…planners, 
and…developers”  in a “sweeping aside of the old” that replaced traditional neighbourhood planning 
with an “idealized artificial system” (Duany, 2000, 4). This type of planning was an “outgrowth of 
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modern problem solving” and “Its performance…largely predictable” (Duany, 2000, 4). The element 
of religious fervour may not have been completely absent after all; Jeanne Wolfe describes post war 
planning as being reinforced by a “belief in the power of technocracy” (Wolfe, 1989, 70). 
 
6.4.4 The dilemma persists 
In 2001, Ernest Alexander challenges the very name of the journal, Planning and Markets, in which 
his article appears. The editorial policy of separating, opposing, and making planning and markets 
“mutually exclusive”, says Alexander, is based on “a fallacy…on obsolete economics” (2001). 
“Asking the right question and abandoning the sterile dichotomy of 
‘planned interventions versus markets’ will have some positive 
effects. For one, it would provide a conceptual framework for more 
rigorous analysis. Such analysis would distinguish between various 
kinds of markets and hybrid forms of governance, and identify more 
complex patterns of asset ownership that mix public and private 
control. Recognizing that planning is not the same s public 
intervention will enable research on planning for, in, and of the 
market.” (Alexander, 2001) 
Though Alexander is right to draw attention to the type of question implied by opposing planning 
and markets, the dichotomy as framed by the Polanyi-Ha ek debate is not necessarily “sterile”. 
Treating their particular usages of values as constituents of a flexible and vague concept of values 
makes it possible to compare these usages despite the r differences. Each has used “values” as a 
device to challenge convention, though in very different ways. Although he does not exploit the 
potential of values language, a questioning attitude towards values is compatible with Polanyi 
challenging what he understands to be conventional values. Hayek explicitly uses values to challenge 
a completely different set of values he understands s conventional.  
Hayek’s values usage is particularly interesting. On a broader level, this usage is an example of 
why Objection 218 claims values language should be abandoned; values l nguage entrenches the 
isolation of economy from social control at the same time as it turns society into a vehicle for the 
economy. A closer look at the details of his usage, however, reveals that what he argues for and what 
he does are not the same. In Hayek’s case, a questioning attitude is not turned inward on his own 
thesis. Were this done, it could alter the way in which Hayek positions freedom as a single overriding 
value, despite his argument against the social use of ingle values. Doing so might allow Hayek to 
consider ways of organizing society other than the two he could imagine.  
Hayek rejects planning for a single value-as-goal on the grounds of complexity and uncertainty 
because planning for a single goal “cannot anticipate the unexpected, is inflexible, and cannot 
accommodate complexity (1994, 56). That Polanyi does not propose a single value-as-goal, Hayek’s 
objections to the contrary, reflects an appreciation of the same. Complexity and uncertainty are 
reasons for rejecting reliance on a single overriding value. These are the same reasons for which 
                                                  
18 See Chapter 4. 
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Means rejects Spencer’s utilitarianism—because complete, static, and certain knowledge (1880, 400) 
is required in order for utilitarian judgements about value to carry any weight19.  Hayek’s single, 
overriding value of freedom serves the same functio as the utilitarian “final cause”; it becomes the 
value which determines the value of all other values. Valuing becomes a determination of fit20 with an 
unquestioned belief rather than based on comparison and contrast. Determination of fit does not 
require questioning the purpose or criteria that flow from the purpose, only whether criteria are 
satisfied. To this point, Means replies “The only ground of freedom is in the uncertainty of the future. 
Remove that, and the lives of all men ought to be marked out for them” (1880, 402).  
Applied to his own thesis, Hayek’s appreciation of the unexpected, the inflexible, and complexity is 
both epistemological and ontological. Ontology determines reason must be replaced by belief: The 
market is too complex for any single individual to understand. Therefore the market can have the 
freedom to do its good work for society only if members of society take a leap of faith and believe. 
Polanyi refers to belief in market economies as utopian and as a secular religion. Hayek does not 
dispute this because faith and risk-taking are necessary and not all choices must be rationally 
transparent and understandable by individuals. In the absence of objective standards and complete 
knowledge, belief and faith may be necessary in order to justify risk-taking. 
Although Hayek advances this position in light of the complexity of market economies, his analysis 
may have broader application to other situations that highlight complexity and uncertainty, such as 
values usage. Diverse usage demonstrates a multiplicity of standards and scales by which judgements 
about value are made, not all of which can be known by any single individual at any given time.  
Understanding all language as reflecting judgements about value suggests that not only should 
“values” not be treated as firm and certain but also that the “problem” of values extends to all 
knowledge whenever knowledge is described in terms of language. No single value or usage of 
values, therefore, can justifiably be treated as having a privileged position over others without 
invoking belief. As a response to complexity and uncertainty, such belief is justified by deep 
scepticism and detached from reason. If a questioning attitude is attached to values, treating such 
belief as “a value” can reclaim it for reason by making it contestable.  
Failure to question belief can leave the belief free to act as a obstruction. Yiftachel and Huxley 
criticize faith in planning for posing just such an obstruction. 
“The faith in planning characterizes most literature in the field, 
preventing scholars from examining critically not just the conduct of 
planners vis-avis their clients, and not just the optimization of 
outcomes by rational evaluation methods, but the tak n-for-granted 
assumptions about the progressive and rational promise of planning.” 
(2000, 910) 
For Hayek, an important advantage of the market is that it is impersonal and anonymous, both 
epistemologically and practically. Although belief n the market is sourced in individuals, the 
beneficial consequence of an aggregate of individuals all believing is a social good delivered by not 
                                                  
19 See Chapter 3. 
20 See Chapter 3. 
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only an impersonal agent but an agent that is a non-person. Others have continued to search for ways 
to introduce an impersonal element into resolving differences about social good. John Rawls’ “veil of 
ignorance”, for example, also relates impersonality21 to a state of unknowing, though now as “a 
purely hypothetical situation” (1971, 12) and more cl arly a conceptual device than an ontological 
claim. As well, Boudon posits an “impartial spectator” as a device to alter “a biased opinion into one
in keeping with the common interest, just as the ‘invisible hand’ turns egoism into altruism” (2001, 
182). 
 
6.5 Examples of Values Usage and Planning 
Below, examples of values usage in planning theory and application serve to demonstrate that there is 
diverse usage. For example, “values”, can be both a guide for making judgements and the result of 
judgements, sourced in humans and sourced externally to humans, or interchangeable with and 
distinct from “ethics”. Such differences in usage may have implications for questions such as whether 
planners should play a role in changing social values to serve particular planning purposes and 
whether the purpose of planning is to serve the statu  quo or direct change. Jill Grant provides a 
succinct statement of the problem: 
“Many would argue that planning in a democratic society should 
work to realize and affirm the cultural values of ordinary citizens. 
They believe that planners should work with community members, to 
enable the community to develop and prosper through active 
participation. They believe that planning has to be pragmatic, 
understanding what people can accept and accommodate. Critics of 
such an approach suggest that accepting popular values means 
ignoring significant urban problems like affordability and 
environmental degradation, and that responding to people’s concerns 
can result in planning by polling. While some may argue that 
planning which supports contemporary mass values is mere 
‘trending,’ others point to the arrogance of public servants who 
might seek to substitute their own personal predilections for those of 
the people whom they serve (based not on persuasive empirical 
documentation as much as on the aesthetic lure of a new 
development model).” (1999, 17) 
 
6.5.1 Value judgements about data and information 
Schneider and co-authors challenge the idea that carrying capacity is a simple calculation, saying that 
a government response will depend on the values of the government (1978, 2).  
                                                  
21 Boudon describes Rawls as a “theorist of values” although Rawls is not generally understood in this way 
precisely because of this device to introduce impersonality (2001, 4). 
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“Because of its origins in the natural sciences, the term carrying 
capacity suggests an objectivity and precision that is not warranted 
by its use in the planning community…The determination of the 
limit of capacity of a given system is, finally, a judgmental act.”  
(1978, 2) 
Morrison and Priddle make similar observations about the role of value judgments in deciding 
carrying capacity, emphasizing that such judgements do not depend only on more information for 
“Empirical data alone will not be sufficient to solve these problems” (1979, 72).  They draw attention 
to the “difficulty deciding what to measure”, the lack of agreement about terms used as factors in 
calculations (such as “crowding”), and the problem of deciding which values to weight most heavily 
(1979, 71). Whose interests count and how can elitism be avoided, particularly if the attitudes of some 
groups, the “purists”, are “most in concert with the specific institutionalized values of wilderness?” 
(1979, 71).  
The ecological footprint tool also aims at providing formation that is to be used to inform 
judgement.   
“Ecological footprinting acts, in effect, as an ecological camera—
each analysis provides a snapshot of our current demands on nature, 
a portrait of how things stand right now under prevailing technology 
and social values.” (Rees and Wackernagel, 1996, 231) 
“Social values” as used above might mean both values about society and values of a given society. 
Stephen Bocking (2004) considers the political consequences of the ecological footprint 
“standardizing units of nature”, such as forest land. Below, “beauty”, “diversity”, and “intrinsic 
worth” can all be undervalued, suggesting that intrinsic worth here is not being used as a description 
of the qualities of an object but as a value that is sourced in humans in the same way that beauty and 
diversity are sourced in humans. 
“By speaking of ‘forest land’ rather than a forest, such units 
implicitly undervalue the beauty, diversity or intrsic worth that 
make people care about these places. These values are already at a 
disadvantage in environmental debates, because they cannot be 
readily expressed in scientific terms, or as factors in a cost-benefit 
analysis…Thus, far from reconnecting people to the land, the 
concept detaches them from the places they appreciate most.” (2004, 
33) 
 
6.5.2 Intrinsic value and ethics  
“Intrinsic value” is used to describe qualities that exist in objects, independently of human judgement.  
These qualities are not sourced in humans but external to humans. The phrase “intrinsic value” is 
common in describing the natural world. In Genes, Genesis, and  God (1999), Holmes Rolston, III 
uses “values” to describe an organism as “self-actualizing”: “It pursues its integrated, encapsulated 
identity; it conserves its own intrinsic value, defends its life” (1999, 84). Organisms value, “even if 
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the organism is not a sentient valuer, much less a conscious evaluator” (1999, 38). Thus, “The tree is 
valuable in the sense that it is able to value itself” (1999, 41). Rolston describes three kinds of values: 
“intrinsic, instrumental, and systemic”, with systemic being “foundational” to reflect that the 
organism is part of an ecosystem (1999, 44). 
From such usage come statements such as “It is an ancient and widespread human practice to set 
aside areas for the preservation of natural values” (Margules and Pressey, 2000, 243). Similarly, the 
Coalition on the Niagara Escarpment (CONE) used the phrase “The Niagara Escarpment has values” 
(Coalition on the Niagara Escarpment (CONE), 1999). In the first case, values usage creates a 
distinction between “preservation of natural areas” and “preservation of natural values”. In the second 
case, values usage eliminates the need to say, “we valu the Niagara Escarpment because…”.  
In “The Source and Significance of Values in Protected Areas”, David Harmon defines “values” in 
what he describes as a “middle way”, to encompass both values that are sourced in humans and 
values that are objective (Harmon, 2003, 15).  
“A value can be completely abstract and disembodied, such as the 
principle of fairness or the good intended by a bequest. Or, it can be 
a quality or characteristic of physical things…In a more restricted 
sense of the word, value means that which has worth: something of 
merit, something estimable—whether or not such worth is assigned 
or recognized by people.” (2003, 13) 
Values that are objective are “intrinsic to their objects”. Once these values are discovered by 
humans they become “instrumental” (2003, 15), as they are applied for human purposes. Harmon 
therefore describes three ways in which values and p rks can be related: 1)“the features…within a 
park have intrinsic value”; 2) if these features are formally designated as protected, they have 
“additional instrumental value”, and 3) parks “provide a setting for the discovery” of both intrinsic 
and instrumental values (2003, 16). Value usage her spans both the subjective and objective, but 
these categories are formally distinct even though the actual values themselves may be connected. 
Gowdy and Hendler’s (1999) usage of values is situated in the context of a study about ethics. The 
broader purpose of the study is “to begin to fill a void in the literature of planning ethics” (1999, 28). 
The immediate purpose of the study is to  
“…describe, not to judge or explain, the values planners have 
regarding the natural environment. Thus, while we are interested in 
apparent inconsistencies and conflicts, we are not concerned with 
comparing the values themselves against some predete mined norm 
or set of norms.” (Gowdy and Hendler, 1999, 29) 
Participants in the study were to “assign priorities to ethical positions” and this was used to 
describe planners’ values by developing “a snapshot” (1999, 29). The study concluded that “It would 
seem that many planners believe that ecosystemic values nd respect for nature are important… 
(1999, 30). The phrase “ecosystemic values” is treated s equivalent to “inherent value of the 
ecosystem” (1999, 30). These are distinguished from“human-centred values” (1999, 30).  
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In this study, it appears that “ethics” is understood as subsuming “values”, with “ethics” providing 
a single framework within which subjective and objective values can be related to each other and to 
ethics. Values provide information on which to base future actions. 
In his analysis of planning and power, John Foreste (1989) treats all values as ethical values22. 
Although values play a significant role in his analysis, Forester does not use explicit values 
terminology or propose values as a planning tool to solve problems. 
The relationship between ethics and values has been a source of confusion for over 100 years23. 
Usage of “values” as synonymous with “ethical values” is common in mission statements and 
statements of values, for example, in the Statement of Values of the Canadian Institute of Planners 
(1994).  
In a presentation on values to public servants, Kenneth Kernaghan attempted to clarify the 
relationship by describing values as “enduring beliefs that influence the choices we make from among 
available means and ends24” and ethics as “standards and principles of right conduct” (1994, 27). 
Ethical values, “enduring beliefs as to right and wrong behaviour”, are a “subset” of values and 
values need not be ethical in order to qualify as vlues (2003, 711). 
  
6.5.3 Values, utopias, and the good 
Lewis Mumford’s values usage and utopias 
Mumford’s The Story of Utopias was written in 1922, the same period during which there was much 
interest in the transvaluation of values25. Mumford’s “utopia of reconstruction” too is based on “a 
fresh scale of values” (1922, 21), a complex vision that “pictures a whole world” and “faces every 
part of it at the same time” (1922, 23). Values are firm and certain enough to be goals because they 
are “rooted in the nature of man” (1922, 77). These values should replace “such values as have been 
                                                  
22 The entry for “values” in Forester’s index refers readers to the entry for “ethics.” 
23 See Chapter 3. 
24 Kernaghan bases his understanding of values on Milton Rokeach’s widely-cited definition (Kernaghan, 2003, 
711). For Rokeach, “A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is 
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A value 
system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence 
along a continuum of relative importance” (Rokeach, 1973, 5). Rokeach describes his study of values as a 
continuation of his interest in “What men believe, why they believe, and what difference it makes…” (1973, ix). 
For Rokeach, the “value concept” is clearly distinct from attitudes, norms, needs, traits, and interess (1973, 17-
22).  Kernaghan also distinguishes values from the “concept of principles” even though these are “often used 
interchangeably” (2003, 712).  
25 See Chapter 3. 
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authenticated by commerce and industry, values suchas efficiency, fair wages, and what not” (1922, 
252). The “old order of things” is a  
“…state in which our values were not fertilized by any intercourse 
with the concrete and actual world about us, and so remained remote 
and sterile. In short, unless our reformers concern themselves with 
the ultimate values of men, with what constitutes a good life, they are 
bound to pander to such immediate faiths and superstition  as the 
National State, Efficiency, or the White Man’s Burden.” (1922, 255)  
Existing values, thus, should be replaced but there appears to be no need to examine “ultimate 
values” themselves, which are treated as firm and certain. From the perspective of values usage, 
Mumford’s reconstructed utopia therefore combines transvaluation with a determination of fit. It is a 
complicate determination of fit, however, because the same set of ultimate values that all humans 
share will likely not result in the same utopia for all. Citing Patrick Geddes, Mumford affirms that “in
the Kingdom of Eutopia—the world Eutopia—there will be many mansions” (1922, 305). 
Mumford’s values usage in part addresses the caution from Objection One26 that humans need an 
idea of perfection to sustain us. Utopia is perfection and “When that which is perfect has come, that 
which is imperfect will pass away” (1922, 308). It cannot completely satisfy Objection One because 
values usage here treats values as firm and certain, something Objection One argues is not possible by 
definition because all values are relative and conditional. 
 
Kevin Lynch’s usage of values in planning the good city 
Kevin Lynch’s value-based approach to planning good cities explicitly proposes values as a planning 
tool. Lynch’s values usage is complex, as is his understanding of how values work: “…single actions 
spring from multiple values and have plural consequences, which in themselves are linked back to 
other values…” (1994, 106). For Lynch, using “value dimensions in place of universal standards 
inevitably dims the force of the normative statement” (1994, 320). Values are not as firm and certain 
as universal standards and must be sought. Values are created as relations of  
“…people to things, as well as…people to each other. More exactly, 
values spring from our relations to people-in-place, and my recital is 
only one step toward that holistic view.” (1994, 293) 
In aiming for the good city, planners must recognize that what is and what should be are 
inextricably linked. Lynch acknowledges that it may be easier to grasp that how a good city should be 
depends on understanding what the city now is. 
“Perhaps it is surprising to encounter the reverse: that an 
understanding of how a city is depends on a valuing of what it should 
be…In the absence of valid theory in either branch, concepts 
elaborated in the one must employ provisional assumptions from the 
                                                  
26 See Chapter 4. 
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other, while making that dependence explicit and maintaining as 
much independence as possible.” (1994, 39) 
Being rational is the only option for making public decisions; because planning decisions affect 
many people they must be communicable and “they must at least appear to be rational” (1994, 107). 
Lynch’s understanding of “rational” is broad, a “middle ground” (1994, 105) that does not exclude 
values but embraces them as unavoidable.  
“At first, it seems logical to think that each action we take, at least 
each rational action, occurs at the end of a long chain of considered 
values and goals…However logical, it is clear that is is a very 
unreal picture of human action…The lower ends of such chains are 
submerged in habit, while the upper ends are lost in the clouds, to be 
revealed only on oratorical occasions. We stop to think only about 
the middle links of the chain.” (1994, 105-106) 
Values can be examined critically (1994, 319) and should be, because “[w]hen values lie 
unexamined they are dangerous” (1994, 1). This is all the more difficult because of the inherent 
complexity of values. 
“Not only is the chain of aim and action long, and i  places 
insecurely linked, but different chains merge and diverge in 
confusing ways…The result is a thicket rather than a chain…a 
thicket whose roots and branches interlace and are gr fted onto each 
other. When we add to these difficulties the fact that different people 
hold different values and have different images of consequences, and 
further add that the changing context of any problem cause values 
and consequences to shift with time, it is at firsthard to believe that 
we can ever act with any rational purpose, particularly on public 
questions.” (1994, 106) 
Humans respond to the complexities and obscurities of both values and rationality “by restricting 
our rationality to narrow bounds” (1994, 106). This does not mean that the scope of rationality is 
narrow, only that we tend to treat it as narrow. For city planning purposes, this means that 
“connections to the broad aims lie unexamined”; that “proposals may be reasonable, but they are 
specific and fixed” (1994, 107). Lynch’s solution to this problem is to focus on performance 
standards as a middle ground that addresses 
 “…the aims in between, those goals which are as general as 
possible, and thus do not dictate particular physical solutions, and yet 
whose achievement can be detected and explicitly linked to physical 
solutions.” (1994, 107) 
That “some long-lived living thing should be visible from every dwelling” (1994, 108) is an 
example of such a middle range performance standard. In this way, values associated with good cities 




Lynch connects values and public interest. He bases hi  belief in public interest on the idea that 
there are “important common values”, noting that he us s this phrase despite understanding that  
 “...there is no such thing as ‘the public interest,’ even within a single 
culture…There are a plurality of interests, all in conflict. The only 
proper role for a planner is to help clarify the course of that conflict 
by presenting information on the present form and function of the 
city, predicting future changes and explaining the impact of various 
possible actions.” (1994, 103) 
As well as understanding values as being created by relations and common (shared) values as the 
basis for public interest, Lynch also identifies a ingle most important value—“biological value 
underpins all other values” (1994, 123). 
“The ground for this outmoded belief is the thought that the human 
species has certain basic requirements for survival and well-being, 
and that in any given culture there are important common values. 
This peculiar view can be supplemented by certain abstr ct notions 
about justice, the care for future generations, and an interest in the 
development of human potential. Admittedly, these abstract ideas 
can be connected to concrete issues in many diverse ways…” (1994, 
103) 
The planner’s purpose is to build good cities and this cannot be done in isolation from the social 
context. Planners are “[a]dvocates, informers, project designers, and public planners” (1994, 46) 
whether or not they always are aware of or acknowledge their multiple roles. In public debates about 
planning, the planning perspective is unique—it “has its own special interest”. The obligation to 
ensure that debates include the planning point of view shapes what planners need to do and includes 
an obligation to incorporate values explicitly in the process.  
“I would characterize that special interest as one which is prejudiced 
in favor of five things…: the long-term effects, the interests of an 
absent client, the construction of new possibilities, the explicit use of 
values, and the ways of informing and opening up the decision 
process. These are professional counterweights to the de-emphasis of 
those considerations by other actors.” (1994, 47)   
6.5.4 John Friedmann’s values as interests 
John Friedmann’s work on planning as social learning treats planning as “purposeful activity” and 
attempts to accommodate both science and politics. Planning is defined as “the linkage between 
knowledge and action in the public domain” (Friedmann, 1987). On this approach, planning takes 
place from the bottom up. An awareness of the role of values is implicit throughout Planning in the 
Public Domain but values are not proposed explicitly as a planning tool. Friedman does mention the 
historical divide between facts and values in his introduction and later, very briefly, links social 
values with interests. “[V]alues that inspire and direct the action” (Friedmann, 1987) are one of the 
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four elements of planning as a “simple” social practice, but not elaborated on and not central to his 
discussion of planning as a social movement.   
In an article written 16 years earlier, Friedmann also links values with interests in arguing for 
scepticism about the promises of comprehensive planning. Echoing Hayek, Friedmann argues that 
placing a single, overriding value at the top of the values hierarchy cannot accommodate the 
complexity of society. 
“…perceptions, interests, and values are to a large ext nt formed by 
location of the observer in a given social matrix. The resulting 
multiplicity of societal perspectives cannot by sheer force of logic be 
integrated into a single normative scheme or, as plnners like to put 
it, a hierarchy of values. Differing perspectives lad to clashes of 
social interests that are usually capable of being resolved only 
through processes of negotiation, bargaining, and political pressure. 
The comprehensive plan which expresses but a single perspective 
and a single hierarchy of values cannot, therefore obtain the 
commitment of all the parties whose interests may be affected, 
except where a clear cut overriding sense of crisis prevails.” (1971, 
317) 
The notion of values-as-interests lends itself easily to describing conflicts of values as social 
clashes and social fragmentation. Even as it creates a role for minority voices, interests, and values, it 
sets the stage for targeting pluralist relativism as h ving potential to destroy societies from the inside 
out. In the absence of interest, there should be no xpectation of a commitment to a common goal 
except if there appears to be no alternative. In contrast to a society characterized by a fragmentation 
of values, Friedmann describes the “classical order” with its “stable sense of purpose.”  
“We no longer have validated, traditional standards by which greater 
legitimacy can be attributed to the value perspectiv s of one group 
over those of others. The reconciliation of the ensuing conflicts is 
sometimes possible through political processes of bargaining and 
negotiation, but never through reason ostensibly unmoored from its 
social foundations.”  (Friedmann, 1971, 319) 
Though here Friedmann is addressing the substance of values, Nietzsche’s introduction of values as 
illusions, as discussed in Chapter 3, precipitated  similar phenomenon with respect to values usage. 
 
6.5.5 Values and advocacy  
In the 1960s, Davidoff proposes advocacy planning and rejects the idea that values constitute an 
unwarranted, subjective bias: “Appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a position of 
value neutrality, for prescriptions are based on desired objectives” (1965, 331). Davidoff does not 
distinguish between lay planners and professionals, s ying that all planners should be proponents in 
adversarial arenas. Dismissing claims that professional planners could be or should be neutral and 
objective, Davidoff expects that people who are not planners can do the work of planners, thus 
 
153 
blurring the boundary between planners and publics. This is a vision of “plural planning”, based on a 
plea for democracy in planning. Criticisms of the plans of government agencies should be “just as 
normal and appropriate as support. The agency, despite the fact that it is concerned with planning, 
may be serving undesired ends” (1965, 332). Interest groups would present alternative plans (1965, 
332).  
Beginning with the assumption that there are no value-neutral choices, Davidoff’s aim is to make 
planning more inclusive of the public and to help those who are disadvantaged. He invites 
examination and debate about values in the public arena. Davidoff calls for planning “which openly 
invites political and social values to be examined an debated” (1965, 331). Planners should act as 
lawyers do for their clients by being proponent-planners and arguing persuasively for one of two 
contending sides in adversarial processes. Planners should educate others about their value positions 
(1965, 333).  
The advocacy approach does not encourage planners to xamine which or whose values they 
advocate. On this model of planning, the professional sm of planners is derived from an obligation to 
serve the politics of justice in the same way that lawyers serve the laws of justice. What appears to 
suffice is if on some general level the values of the planner and values of the client could loosely b 
described as “the same”:  
“…the planner would have sought out an employer with hom he 
shared common views about desired social conditions and the means 
toward them. In fact one of the benefits of advocate planning is the 
possibility it creates for a planner to find employment with agencies 
holding values close to his own.” (1965, 333)  
Klosterman (1976) confirms that advocacy planners gnerally do take on clients with values similar 
to their own but goes further to argue that advocacy planners must take on such clients. 
“It is impossible in principle for the advocacy planning process (even 
in Friedmann’s utopian formulation) to represent all of the 
conflicting interests in the community because, ultima ely, each 
individual has conflicting interests…Thus Advocacy planning fails 
to solve the problem which generated its development in the first 
place—the fact that not all interests are adequately represented in the 
public policy-making process.” (1976, 103) 
In the 1970s, Creighton applies a “modified advocacy pproach”, modified because he sees all the 
public as clients, not only “special interests.”  
“The planner is trapped between his professional training—which 
typically equips him to deal with scientific fact, demonstrable 
propositions, and economic feasibilities, but not with feelings—and 
the democratic philosophy which stresses that all the people should 




Where Davidoff welcomes plural planning, Creighton laments what he understands as the loss of a 
single standard by which to judge value, a time when t re was “a framework created by a consensus 
of values within our society about the proper use of land”27 (1983, 148). Creighton defines values as 
“those internal standards by which we judge events or behaviour to be good/bad, right/wrong, 
fair/unfair, just/unjust”28 (1983, 144). 
Ensuring that spokespeople on behalf of groups involved in planning are in fact speaking for 
everyone is not straightforward. Claiming to speak on behalf of others creates an enormous burden on 
the speaker that requires a heightened sensitivity o the needs, interests, beliefs, and values of others 
and an ability to imagine what such values might be in the absence of more direct forms of 
knowledge. Howell S. Baum analyzes one such incident in which representatives of a community 
group were aware of their privileged position and made an effort to overcome this potential problem. 
Despite deliberate effort, the activists failed to incorporate needs of those who were not middle-class. 
Activists were uneasy about representing working-class ethnic communities within the larger 
community, in part because of “conservative political values and occasional racial prejudices” of 
those communities (Baum, 1998). 
The differences between activists and the communities n this case may not have been as great as 
assumed on a superficial level. Identifying people and communities in terms of their values may be an 
example of type of stereotyping, where the details of people’s values are not as important as the 
broad-brush labels by which they are categorized. In such cases, “values” may be an end point rather 
than a starting point. 
 
6.5.6 Values, judgements, and a questioning attitud e 
Treatment of values as either objective or subjectiv  can make it appear that judgements about values 
are redundant; objectivity because human judgement is i applicable and subjectivity if values are not 
considered to be rational. Reg Lang (1999) extricates values from rationality altogether and relegates 
them to the category of “arational”, meaning that vlues may be valid but unexplainable. 
“Planners have to be prepared to deal not only withassorted versions 
of rationality and irrationality, but also with the arational, in which 
reason and logic are seemingly absent but not necessarily violated (as 
when you know something without knowing how you came to know 
                                                  
27 The role that Creighton is assigning to a “consensus of values” is similar to Hudson’s lament for theloss of a 
single conception of happiness. My interest here is in usage and not in whether either author’s claim is valid.  
See Chapter 3. 
28 Creighton bases his own definition on that used by Fred M. Newmann and Donald W. Oliver in Clarifying 
Public Controversy (1970, 43). Newmann and Oliver also say that “Generally the values on which people base 
their positions are taken for granted rather than explicitly announced. We believe that impasses in cotroversial 




it). The arational encompasses subjectivity, moral and value 
judgments, feelings, instinct, intuition and non-traditional forms of 
meaning-making. Conclusions are reached by processes difficult to 
track or explain, and yet are valid and valuable.” (1999, 19) 
Utilitarians treat values as rational. P. J. Smith traces the roots of welfare economics and modern 
planning to Bentham’s utilitarian ethics, arguing that utilitarianism was “an early form of cost-benefit 
evaluation” that came to define rational choice (Smith, 1979, 200). For utilitarians, value is the 
product of evaluating according to a principle. 
“On the strength of their belief in Bentham’s principle of utility, ‘the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number,’ the philosophical radicals 
held the view that the value of prospective actions could be judged 
by a simple equation: i.e. any action which would lead to an increase 
in the sum of human ‘happiness (for which can be read ‘utility’ or 
‘welfare’) was ipso facto, a good action and thus a rational choice.” 
(1979, 200) 
Utilitarian values are thus a determination of fit w h the principle in which utilitarians “believe”, 
meaning that the principle by which values are determined is itself is not treated as a contestable 
value. It serves the same function as Hayek’s description of a single, overriding value that determines 
the value of all other values. Rawls’s theory of justice (1971), in the utilitarian tradition, uses the
principle of justice as the single-most important value. Also consistent with utilitarianism, Rawl’s 
theory is presented in terms of principles, not values29. Rawls does use the word “values” sparingly to 
refer to a “community’s values” (1971, 520). Here as well, principles are firm and certain starting 
points and values are products of determinations according to a principle.  Calling the principle of 
justice “a value” would put the overriding belief and the product of that belief both on the same 
footing. Calling justice a value30 would recast the theory as dependent not on something firm and 
certain but on judgement, detracting from the authority accorded to justice when it is described as a 
principle. In this respect, Rawl’s usage of a “different language” to speak about what is truly worthy 
is consistent with the necessity to avoid values langu ge when speaking about what is not relative, as 
argued by Objections One and Two31.  
Heather Campbell criticizes procedural justice “in a deliberative or Habermasian sense” for this 
very same reason—that a single value, justice, is treated as firm and certain and not contestable 
because when “reasonable” people disagree “Moral conventions cannot resolve such conflicts and 
recourse must be had to ethical convictions, to values” (2002, 279). 
                                                  
29 Boudon can call Rawls a “values theorist” because Boudon understands values to be beliefs, meaning that he 
identifies in Rawls’ work an implicit use of “values”.   
30 Rawls’ work illustrates how calling something a value can change how that something is understood. It is 
precisely for this reason that Andrew objects to the habit of recasting what has not been presented in terms of 
values into values language. See Chapter 4. 
31 See Chapter 4. 
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“Habermas attempted explicitly to rule out values from the just, 
suggesting that justice is solely dependent on legitimately executed 
dialogue…However, the justification for any procedure or standard 
must originate further back than the procedure itself…Consequently, 
to reject any consideration of values is crucially to leave them hidden 
from scrutiny…Much criticism has been targeted at the imposition of 
totalising conceptions of the ‘good life’. However, to abandon any 
recourse to questions of value is to remove the opportunity for re-
evaluation, not to remove the values themselves.” (2002, 279) 
Campbell’s own usage of values as “ethical convictions” is consistent with attaching a questioning 
attitude to all values and flows from her approach to planning. 
“My argument that planning needs to engage with questions of value 
is not to imply a universality of outcome, rather than in making 
decisions about the future of particular places recourse should be had 
to the nature of the underlying values…Planning should be a process 
of valuation and evaluation, not the imposition of fixed values and 
singular notions of the good life. That there can be many 
universals—not one good life—does not deny the importance of 
value…” (2002, 282) 
Here, Campbell is arguing that there is no “universality of outcome” not because something firm 
and certain is interpreted differently but because values are products of valuing. Values are more than
simple determinations of fit. By way of contrast, Mumford also suggests that there are multiple 
utopias but that all of these flow from different ierpretations of the same set of unquestioned values. 
If values are not firm and certain, if they are to be treated as penultimate (to use Simmel’s word), this 
suggests a perpetual state of uncertainty that cannot and should not be avoided. Instead of doubt and 
uncertainty leading to deep scepticism or pessimism, doubt and uncertainty can be recast as features 
of a learning process, as Campbell suggests.   
“The discomforting spectre of doubt and endless questioning is 
therefore central to situated judgement. Doubt can be personally and 
institutionally corrosive, and if it takes this form, can be 
paralysing…but if doubt and uncertainty are reframed into the notion 
of learning, then they are cast in a more positive light. I would argue 
that if as planners we have no capacity to learn, we have no capacity 
to plan effectively.” (2002, 284) 
 
6.6 Planning and Diverse Usage of Values 
Campbell’s usage of values as engaging doubt and uncertainty is compatible with the default concept 
of values suggested by the theory about diverse usage of values. This suggests, at a minimum, that the 
default concept of values as proposed here is not completely alien to planning. In the first instance, 
values are not about what we know but about what we do not know; in the second instance they are a 
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penultimate form of knowledge, knowledge to which learning can lead by not stopping to rest on 
what has been learned. 
Where the theory about diverse usage is considered only from the perspective of values, its attempt 
at explaining diverse usage of values is more descriptive than prescriptive. Once applied to planning, 
it becomes more prescriptive than descriptive. Applied to planning the theory becomes contestable 
both with respect to whether it provides an adequate explanation for diverse usage in planning and 
with respect to whether the consequences are desirable. Applied to values usage, the theory proposes 
that values should not be treated as firm and certain either as products of valuing or as the criteria by 
which valuing is conducted. Attaching a questioning attitude to values is not merely an 
epistemological stance; treating values as contestabl  makes them matters of politics. 
That there is diverse usage in planning supports the usefulness of attaching a questioning attitude to 
values. Awareness of diverse usage can be a check against treating particular a usage as if it were the 
whole of usage, something about general agreement may be simply assumed. Without such awareness 
of diverse usage, whether “intrinsic value”, for example, is used to describe an object’s qualities 
independently of human judgement, the human judgement itself, or rejected as oxymoronic may be 
decided by a planner’s own, prior, understanding of “intrinsic value”. 
Where values are not treated as judgements, they are presented as being incontestable. Applied as a 
determination of fit (fit with data and information r principles), values that determine the value of all 
other values are accorded a privileged status and protected from questioning. Values that are not 
sourced in humans are not treated as contestable becaus  their authority derives from a source 
external to humans—whether nature, God, metaphysics or something else that is regarded as having 
more authority than human judgement. 
That there is no single usage of values suggests tha  cross-usage communication, at least on the 
level of descriptive categories, may be taking place both with and without awareness of diverse usage. 
Values usages might be treated as merely different f om one another, as homonyms, in which case it 
is not possible to discuss values usage in general without detailing all of the characteristics of each of 
the values usages being discussed. In the preceding sections, examples of different values usage 
appear to have enough features in common that discussing them as a set is possible. These features 
are conceptual rather than purely descriptive. Thismeans that values usages in planning can be 
treated as diverse instances of a common concept of values in general, instead of distinctly and 
discretely different homonyms. 
 Awareness of diverse usage of “values implies use of some grasp of a concept of values that 
enables communication about values as a group, even wh  the word is used as one of the taken-for-
granted planning words that Campbell (2003, 389) suggests are problematic32.  
What values are called is a way of classifying, of gr uping of values into descriptive, substantive 
categories, also called “current labels” in grounded theory methodology. Descriptive categories create 
the impression that there are no further significant similarities and differences to be discovered within 
any given descriptive category. They imply homogeneity of substance but are silent with respect to 
usage. The category of “ethical values” in planning is an example of such a substantive category. 
                                                  
32 See Chapter 1. 
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Although both explicitly address “ethical values”, Gowdy’s and Hendler’s usage does not require a 
questioning attitude but Campbell’s does. 
Like “ethical values”, the category of “environmental values” is also a descriptive, substantive 
category. It includes all values that are about the environment but it too is silent on the question of 
diverse usage within that category. Members of the set of environmental values may be moral values 
as human judgements (or not), intrinsic values as human judgements (or not), ecological values as 
human judgements (or not), social values both as truly worthy and as barriers to planning, relative and
contestable or privileged and absolute, descriptive or prescriptive. Calling all of these “environmental 
values” masks such differences in usage and makes disagreement about environmental values 
potentially about values usage as well as the substance of values.  
When differences in usage are not recognized, descriptive, substantive categories have a 
conservative influence on how disputes about values ar  characterized because they imply that values 
usage is clearer and more straightforward than is the case. Accepting substantive categories at face 
value encourages treating values as affirmations of what is known and obscures the need for a 
questioning attitude. This makes it easier to ignore the conditional nature of categories of values as 
penultimate judgements and to make dogmatic claims bout values. 
By connecting values through conceptual categories, th  theory about diverse usage offers a 
remedy to the barriers created by descriptive categori s. The process of comparison and contrast by 
which conceptual categories are created requires a questioning attitude. 
 
6.6.1 Suggested needs of planning that an understan ding of values should address 
What follows are suggested needs of planning as an ex mple of how planning needs might be used to 
modify the default concept of values into a particular sage that is useful to planning. These 
suggested needs are accompanied by the caveat that how planning is understood shapes how values 
are understood in relation to planning. These suggested needs are, therefore, necessarily conditional, 
prescriptive, and contestable.  
Alexander’s proposed way of understanding planning in general is modified to apply to both values 
and planning and combined with modifications to Lynch’s value-based approach to the good. Added 
to these are items that emerge from a concern for process. 
To be a good fit with planning, a particular usage of values should: 
• be able to relate individuals and society 
o For example, the usage criticized by Objection Two (Chapter 4) casts all individual 
judgements as subjective narrow preferences that relativized what is truly worthy, 
thereby precluding collective discussion about commn good and harming 
democracy. Such a usage is not a good fit with planning 
• assist in planning over the long term without ignori g uncertainty and complexity 
o Treating values as firm and certain is a response to managing uncertainty that is 
not supported by the theory about diverse usage. As never more than penultimate 
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conclusions, values do not conflict with planning approaches that appreciate 
uncertainty. To the contrary, values may be particularly useful in situations where 
more facts will not assist in determining what is desirable.  
• not discourage challenging convention and the statu quo 
o Conceptual categories of values challenge the status quo but descriptive categories 
do not.  
• not be routinized but still be manageable  
o Explicit and deliberate attention to values need not exacerbate conflicts about 
values, particularly if planners manage to divert attention away from descriptive 
categories and towards conceptual categories. 
• be open to critical scrutiny and re-evaluation, rational and contribute to planning 
knowledge, even when uncertainty and complexity appe r to block the possibility of being 
fully or ideally rational 
o Lynch’s broad use of “rational” accommodates values. It corresponds with the 
approach to reasoning in the theory of diverse usage. Comparative logic 
encompasses both deduction and induction in establihing conceptual categories of 
values. Comparative logic is a basic form of reasoning that is prior to deductive 
reasoning. If the products of reasoning in general are knowledge, values are no less 
a form of knowledge than products of inductive or deductive reasoning.  
• assist in creating new possibilities 
o Conceptual categories of values create relations (values) where none were noticed 
previously. 
• encourage relating values about abstract ideas to real life situations 
o Conceptual categories of values cut across all other ways of grouping values, 
meaning that they apply equally to abstract values and values about details of 
everyday life. 
• address advocacy and the politics of planning, accomm date concern for absent clients, 
and improve rather than act negatively on communication and participatory planning  
o By taking a questioning attitude towards values, planners dismantle descriptive 
categories. For planners to have a deeper understanding of values presented by 
participants should improve the planning process. Consistently taking a 
questioning attitude towards values will likely provide a check on planners in their 
role as advocates, not to prevent advocacy but to ensur  that the planner has a 
reasoned stance about whatever stand is being advocted. This should have a 
moderating effect on potentially tense interactions between planners and 
participants who do not agree with the position being advocated. 
• be simple and not require expert skills 
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o Comparative reasoning, as the most basic form of reasoning, can be done 
consciously and deliberately or so automatically as to be imperceptible. It is done 
by children and not exclusive to educated adults in particular societies. 
From the perspective of a general concept of values, a particular usage of values for planning should: 
• Encourage awareness of a variety of diverse usages of values, 
• Encourage a questioning attitude, as required by the default concept of values, and  
• Not grant any values privileged status so that theyar  immune from challenge 
 
6.7 Summary  
As anticipated by the theory about diverse usage, there is diverse usage of values in planning theory 
and application. Just as planners have a choice in how planning is understood and in what substantive 
values planning is to reflect and promote, so too is there choice in how to understand and apply 
“values”. This means that there are at least two ways in which people can disagree about values, one 
on substantive ground and the other on the ground of usage. Exclusive focus on substantive 
disagreements masks differences about usage. Awareness of diversity may help to avoid treating 
particular examples of values usage the whole of values usage. 
How planning is understood may shape values usage. It is highly unlikely that a single usage of 
values will meet all of the needs of all ways in which “planning” is understood. This does not 
eliminate the possibility that some particular way of understanding planning may benefit from a 
particular usage of values selected for how adequatly it addresses the needs of that particular 
understanding or purpose of planning. 
In the next chapter, the suggested needs of planning, as proposed above, are combined with the 
default understanding of values from the theory about diverse usage in order to consider the 
usefulness to sustainability planning of a particular sage of values.  
 
6.7.1 The propositions 
Proposition One: Calling something “a value”, instead of a belief, principle, attitude and so on, 
can make a difference.  
Minimum threshold was met: Treating “values” as distinct from other words and ideas should 




When values are treated as the results of determinations of fit (as by utilitarians)33, restating the 
process of determining fit in terms of values langua e casts principles as values that are granted 
privileged status. Immune from questioning, they function as the single-overriding value that 
determines the value of all other values.  
Values are sometimes treated as equivalent to what is worthy (as by Bocking) but they are also 
treated as potentially a barrier to achieving something worthy (as in Rees’ identification of “social 
values”). A questioning attitude helps in judging how “values” is being used. The use of “values” as 
co-extensive with words such as principles and beliefs modifies the meaning of values by eliminating 
uncertainty and the need for a questioning attitude. On the theory of diverse usage, in instances such
as these the word “values” is misapplied. 
 
Proposition Two: Particular usages of “values”, no matter how diverse, are expressions of a 
concept of values in general. 
Minimum threshold was met: Even a few examples of diverse usage in planning ca establish 
diversity, meaning that no definitive or exhaustive l st of examples of usage is necessary—were such 
a list possible. No particular usage need match the default concept (Chapter 5) in every respect but 
both deviations and similarities must be explainable. If the concept of values has explanatory value in 
planning, then differences in usage cannot be so great that particular usages cannot be treated as 
comparable. 
 
Although discussion of examples of diverse usage in pla ning above was organized into sections, 
each discussion flowed into the next, with the intent of establishing that ways in which usages differ 
are not so great that they cannot be talked about as a whole. 
Where the default concept of values based on the theory about diverse usage treats all values as 
contestable, usages that treat values as firm and certain do so because values are applied in the service 
of other ideas, whether values as interests, values s virtues, values as intrinsic, and so on.  
 
Proposition Three: A questioning attitude should be attached to all values usage by default. 
Minimum threshold was met: Even when particular usage appears not to require a questioning 
attitude, treating such usages as contestable should create new opportunities for analysis and 
application. That a particular usage may discourage a questioning attitude should prompt 
investigation of what purpose or purposes are served by doing so. 
 
                                                  
33 See Chapter 3 for the first discussion in this theis of determination of fit as a common usage of values, where 
an overriding dominant value is granted immunity from challenge and allowed to determine the criteria by 
which other values are assessed as either fitting or ot with the dominant value. 
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Hayek more explicitly and Polanyi sparingly both used “values” in challenging convention. Hayek’s 
use of freedom as a value not requiring questioning attitude is all the more striking because of 
Hayek’s own argument against the use of single overriding values to define all other values. Treating 
freedom as a contestable value creates new opportunities for analysis. 
 Intrinsic values, though not generally presented as requiring judgement or as contestable, can be 
treated as penultimate and conditional judgements. Thi  changes the character of intrinsic values from 
firm and certain but legitimizes disagreement both about what counts as an intrinsic value and the 
substance of intrinsic values. 
 
6.8 Implications 
6.8.1 Implications for planning in general 
The word “values” is often used interchangeably with o her words such as interests, goals, principles, 
opinions. To be a useful planning tool, values need to be treated as distinct. Differentiating between 
values and other descriptors was one of the major problems with Albert’s and Vogt’s Values Study 
(Chapter 5). 
Faced with multiple concurrent usages of “values”, planners need a better grasp of diverse usage. 
Since there can be no finite list of features that can be identified as conceptual categories of values, 
the best guide for planners would be a body of examples, perhaps as a handbook. Ultimately though 
this is a skill best learned by doing rather than by prescription. This thesis takes a first step in that 
direction by its discussion of examples. 
Values usage may be shaped by planning approaches and purposes. Planning faces challenges 
similar to those encountered in Albert’s and Vogt’s Values Study (Chapter 5). Interdisciplinary 
efforts that include attention to values may have difficult producing coherent conclusions about 
values in more than superficial ways about descriptive categories. Methodology was identified in the 
Values Study as a means to integrate values. Planning applications should benefit from adopting the 
theory about diverse usage and the questioning attitude attached to the default concept of values. 
The theory about diverse usage of values suggests that a questioning attitude about values is 
necessary in order to uncover conceptual features according to which values usages can be 
understood and that this is necessary even when values re presented as incontestable. 
 
6.8.2 Implications for method 
Values language provides no single set of criteria ither for usages of values or for judgements about 
values.  
Judgements about values may require deciding what is better or worse as well as good and bad and 
right and wrong. This requires relating abstract and general values to specific and situational values 
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and treating values as being potentially either positive or negative. As supported by the history of 
diverse usage, treating values as positive only is regressive. 
Applied as a planning tool, values might be used as a separate step or integrated into other aspects 
of the process. 
 
6.8.3 Implications for planners 
Within any given planning process, participants may be using the word “values” in widely divergent 
ways. This is unavoidable, both because enforcement of a single usage is not feasible and because the 
evolution of values language in a wide range of applications is to be expected and may even be 
desirable. A questioning attitude is not the only feature by which usages are distinguished from one 
another. 
That the theory about diverse usage of values attaches a questioning attitude to all usages of values 
by default, justifies planners treating every usage of values as benefiting from a questioning attitude. 
It is the planner’s role to determine what conceptual categories are hidden by descriptive categories in 
order to grasp what is being valued in a deeper way even than what might have been intended by 
contributors. Even without adopting any particular usage as a planning usage, planners are in a better
position to be aware of diverse usage and the importance of a questioning attitude than any of the 
participants. 
In an effort to avoid controversy, some planners and other participants may be reluctant not only to 
make value judgements but even to describe problems in words. Awareness of this possibility may 
encourage planners to devise other means to address this potential barrier to collective consideration 
of values. 
Some planners and participants may prefer values that are presented as firm and certain over those 
that are presented as contestable. Similarly, greater weight may be placed on usages of values that can 
be easily managed and operationalized. Both of these impulses are counter to the default concept of 






A PARTICULAR USAGE OF “VALUES” FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
PLANNING 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the theory about diverse usage is applied to sustainability planning by proposing a 
particular usage of “values”. That there is an important connection between values and sustainability 
is not a new idea. In 1981, for example, Lester Brown titled his final chapter “Changing values and 
shifting priorities”. Is taking a questioning attitude towards values a good fit with sustainability 
planning?  If it is a good fit, is it also feasible? 
As is the case with values and with planning in general, there is no single, generally agreed upon 
definition of sustainability. Diverse usage is intimately related to the context in which usages emerge 
and the purpose to which a usage is applied. That how planning in general is understood can influence 
values usage, suggests that it is also likely that how sustainability is understood can influence values 
usage. This means that the values usage proposed here for sustainability is necessarily context-bound 
and contestable. 
7.1.1 The propositions 
In Chapter 6, three propositions were considered with respect to planning in general: (1) Calling 
something “a value” can make a difference, (2) Diverse usage can be related by a concept of values, 
and (3) A questioning attitude should be attached to values usage by default. All three propositions 
suggested new opportunities for analysis and understanding of values usage in planning.  
In its application to sustainability planning, the t ird proposition is now tested further in a different 
way. The “questioning attitude” that is attached to the default concept of values (Chapter 5) is treated 
as the basis for a particular usage of values in sustainability planning.  
All three themes of the theory about diverse usage of values support a questioning attitude:  
i. Diverse usage of values is ongoing and evolutionary.  
ii.  Values are relational; phrases such as “absolute valu ” nd “intrinsic value” 
are oxymoronic. 
iii.  Values are dependent on valuers even when values are described as 
objective. 
 
A case study of a local municipal sustainability initiative, Vision 2020 in Hamilton, ON is 




7.1.2 How a particular usage of “values” is develop ed for sustainability planning 
The proposed usage is developed both from the perspective of values and the perspective of 
sustainability planning by considering the theory about diverse usage and the suggested needs of 
planning in general together with the implications f values usage as these have been identified in 
preceding chapters and already applied to planning i  general. Potential obstacles to values usage in 
sustainability planning are identified first, consistent with the approach taken to values in previous 
chapters. 
Implications of the Polanyi-Hayek debate discussed in Chapter 6 are applied to sustainability 
planning to establish a broad social, political, and historical context from a planning perspective. That 
Hayek and Polanyi both challenged what each perceived as conventional values makes the debate 
particularly relevant to sustainability planning.  
How uncertainty, values, and sustainability interact may have implications for whether attaching a 
questioning attitude towards values is feasible.  
Additional needs of sustainability planning are noted, over and above the needs of planning in 
general. A particular usage of values for sustainability is proposed in light of the above and 
implications of values for sustainability noted. 
 
7.2 Potential Obstacles 
7.2.1 No single definition of sustainability 
Absent a single, generally agreed upon definition, “values”, “planning”, and “sustainability” are all 
contested concepts. Whatever else they may be, therfor , each has a political dimension.  
Much of the sustainability literature continues to regret and be critical of the fuzziness and diversity 
of definitions offered for sustainability (Baker et al., 1997). Mebratu (1998) describes sustainable 
development as “dangerously vague”, “elusive”, “an oxymoron”. Just as with “values”, the popularity 
of the word and concept of “sustainability” has notled to a clear consensus and, in the same way as 
the flexible and vague concept of values in general, m y also be constituted by diverse usage. 
When there is no single definition, understanding the reasons for diverse usage becomes even more 
important. James Meadowcroft notes the importance of other terms with which sustainability is 
combined in illustrating “the fluidity of conceptual categories and boundaries in the relatively open-
textured context of political and social debate” (1999, 13). The idea of sustainability shares with the 
idea of values fluidity and flexibility to be attached to other ideas. 
The need for sustainability to be treated as a formof “positive progress” (Meadowcroft, 1999, 15) 
has been constant.  In differentiating between an “old sustainability” that was “profoundly 
conservative” with respect to change and a newer version that is dynamic and accepts change as 
normal, Robert Gibson identifies the notion of progress as a constant (2005, 67). The constancy of 
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“positive progress” creates a context for values usage that lends itself easily to treating values as 
positive goals and sets up values as the ground for conflict between old (negative) values and new 
(positive) values. A usage of values that treats values as being only positive would either not 
recognize the “negative” values as values proper or would need to devise some other means to 
differentiate between the two different types of values. The study of values suggests that treating 
these two types of values usage as homonyms serves this purpose and is feasible so long as there is no
compelling reason to connect the two usages as both being expressions of some larger concept of 
values in general. 
 
7.2.2 Language 
As with “values”, the popularity of the word “sustain bility” suggests that this word too may be used 
as a jargon word. Holmberg (1994), for example, argues that “sustainable development as a concept 
has become devalued to the point where, to some, it is now just a cliché.”  
Just as in the eyes of some scholars the meaning of the new usage of “values” began to be 
subverted only decades after its introduction, so too the term “sustainable development” is not only 
used in diverse ways but may be claimed to be “misused”, relative to some particular understanding 
of sustainability. Only a decade after the introduction of the term, Hazell and Osberg are concerned 
about the possibility that misuse may damage the idea of sustainability.  
“The term ‘sustainable development’ first received wi e currency in 
the 1980 World Conservation Strategy and was popularized by Our 
common future, the 1987 report of the world commission on 
Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission). Yet 
the popularity of the phrase has not led to any clear consensus among 
scholars, let alone policy-makers, as to what the expression means or 
demands.... “Clearly, there is great danger that the erm may lose all 
content through overuse or misuse.” (Hazell and Osberg, 1990) 
Dean Lauter’s (2000) observations (Chapter 3) about the differences between values as names of 
things and the more powerful way of describing values as action words apply here as well. 
“Sustainability” is absent a corresponding verb, thus even less definite and more replete with 
possibility than values and planning. Like “values”, ustainability is a noun that is more likely to be 
treated as static; unlike “values” there is no single verb to explain how the history of the noun might 
have evolved. The concept therefore emphasizes the role of the word as a modifier, as in the phrase 
“sustainable development”. Different applications of the modifier expand the meaning of 
sustainability in different directions. In the phrase “sustainability planning”, it is planning that 




7.2.3 Values are relations 
Bowker and Star suggest there is a void in language, that we lack words by which to consider 
consciously the relations among ideas. This may indicate that there has not been enough interest in 
relations to require developing such a vocabulary. Bowker’s and Star’s discussion of the intricacies 
involved in communicating information across contexts applies to both sustainability and values.   
“We lack good relational language here. There is a permanent 
tension between the formal and the empirical, the local and the 
situated, and attempts to represent information across localities. It is 
this tension itself which is underexplored and undertheorized. It is 
not just a set of interesting metaphysical observations. It can also 
become a pragmatic unit of analysis. How can something be 
simultaneously concrete and abstract? The same and yet different? 
People are not (yet, we hope) used to thinking in this fashion in 
science or technology. As information systems grow in scale and 
scope, however, the need for such complex analyses grows as well.” 
(Bowker and Star, 1999)  
Valuing depends on identifying both similarities and differences. At a minimum it requires 
considering these similarities and differences about at least two ideas. Even if these two ideas were 
discrete from all other ideas, identifying their similarities and differences would necessarily engage 
other ideas. Valuing is necessarily complex. It is what we do when we create relations—how we 
describe the empty space between ideas or objects or people, real or imagined. The Estonian word for 
relation (as an example) is “vahekord”, with the first half of the word meaning either “space” or 
“difference” and the second meaning “order” or “terms”. Combining these two meanings in different 
ways leads to understanding relations, for example, as both “ordered space” and “terms of 
difference.” Both lead to thinking about relations as complex; each has different implications for what 
might constitute relations. Neither attempt at description is neutral about directing subsequent 
thinking in a particular direction. To describe values as relational is slightly different from describing 
values as relations and different again from considering the concept of values as constituted by the 
relations among particular usages and each other and the concept.  
Describing the concept of sustainability in the same way creates a sense of movement that may 
otherwise be missing. This is different from treating sustainability either as a goal or as a process 
defined in terms of (or relative to) the absence of a single end. Mackenzie described how  
ethical theory changes when it is reconfigured to fit with the idea of values; how the idea of values 
changes ideas about what is valuable from “The Good”, which suggests a “single end…once for all, 
at the end of the process” to an “organic system of ends, possessing various degrees of worth”. The 
effectiveness of values language in directing thougt away from a search for a single correct answer 
may also be usefully applied with respect to other concepts, such as the concept of sustainability. 
Casting consideration of sustainability in terms of values, following Mackenzie, will heighten the 
significance of “the worth of actions” even as it mni izes the importance of simply inculcating 




7.2.4 Descriptive categories 
As Alexander noted, substantive classification of planning (“Transportation planning”, “energy 
planning”, “land-use planning”) are affirmations of the status quo.  They are “the simplest and most 
intuitively obvious” and distinguish “according to the object of concern” (1986, 66). They reflect the 
existing ways in which areas of interest are identified and organized. 
Using “values” only to affirm existing beliefs, knowledge, and social organization makes the word 
redundant, easily interchangeable with words such as “attitudes”, “beliefs”, and so on. Here single 
words can act as descriptive, substantive categories that Alexander described as intuitive and 
immediately obvious. 
Similarly, sustainability planning is often organized on the basis of descriptive, substantive 
categories. Triandafyllidou, for example, examines “competing frames related by different social 
actors to the concept of environmental sustainability and to the equivalent to it in the transport 
sector—sustainable mobility” (1998, parag 3.1). Categories such as “environmental”, 
“transportation”, “cultural”, and so on, reflect and reaffirm existing ways of thinking not about just 
values but about social life in general. They cannot prescribe what kind of valuing process results in, 
for example, environmental values, because values encompassed by these categories are not all 
arrived at in the same way. 
In place of a single definition, features of sustainability have been used to focus consideration on 
aspects that need attention, along with disagreement about how many features need to be highlighted. 
For example, the Vision 2020 planning process in Hamilton, ON focussed on three pillars, describing 
these as three legs of a stool: Environment, Health, nd Economy. 
Robert Gibson notes that using the pillar approach to sustainability “is convenient because they are 
traditional fields of policy making, scholarly inquiry and specialized research” (2005, 88). This 
parallels the descriptive categories identified above with respect to how “values” are classified and 
the substantive categories of values that Alexander identifies with respect to planning. The latter two 
were both identified as having a conservative influence in how they directed further attention; they 
supported the status quo. Gibson makes the same observation with respect to the pillar approach 
because “this conventional convenience makes the pillars less well suited to encouraging substantial 
innovation,” (2005, 88). “Categorization and emphasis” are part of the problem; pillars are divisive 
rather than serving as bridges between “objectives usually assumed to be at odds (2005, 88). Relating 
this to values, descriptive categories of values constrain the potential of values as relations, as 
potential bridges. 
An alternative, sustainability theorists have proposed themes to be used as decision criteria. 
Gibson, for example, suggests the following eight themes: Socio-ecological system integrity, 
livelihood sufficiency and opportunity, intragenerational equity, intergenerational equity, efficiency, 
socio-ecological civility and democratic governance, precaution and adaptation, and immediate and 
long term integration (2005, 171-174). 
For sustainability planners to organize both values and sustainability according to descriptive, 
substantive categories counteracts the need for sustainability challenge convention. Sustainability 
affirms the status quo at the same time that it purports to challenge it. Treating values not as firm and
certain but as fluid and evolving makes it more difficult to treat the ways in which they are classified 
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as static. Applying a questioning attitude to values is a means to go deeper than the “intuitive” and 
“obvious”, both with respect to values and with resp ct to sustainability. 
Allocating environmental values to one realm of life and economic values to another (or cultural 
values to one and religious values to another, etc.) frustrates comparison and contrast, perhaps even 
more than if the word “values” was abandoned altogether. We are no further ahead in distinguishing 
significant values from trivial ones, identifying which values are superficial and which have solid 
cognitive support, deciding what to do about values that are deeply held but do not seem to fit with 
others of our values, or grasping why people say one thing and do another. Reliance on descriptive, 
substantive categories encourages usage of both values nd sustainability in predictable ways. 
 
7.2.5 The dilemma of sustainability planning and va lues 
Inevitably, the idea of sustainability challenges convention. This means that sustainability planners 
are likely to be faced with having to decide whether it is appropriate for them to advocate 
sustainability. Advocacy planning (Chapter 6) legitim zes planners acting on their own values and the 
values of their clients but does not encourage planners to question values. This creates a dilemma. 
On the model of advocacy planning, values usage treats values as unconditional and incontestable 
and narrows the range of who is rightfully considered “a client” to include only those who support 
whatever values are identified as appropriate to sustainability. Non-clients will have value positions 
that conflict with the appropriate values. Acting on behalf of their clients, sustainability planners, a  
advocates, are faced with the need to change the valu positions of non-clients, whose values pose a 
barrier to sustainability. Because the field of non-clients, for the moment at least, appears to be larger 
than the field of clients, sustainability planners act from a narrow social base to challenge 
conventional values in the larger society. This puts sustainability planners as advocates of 
sustainability in a position that contradicts the aim of sustainable development to “meet the needs of 
all” (WCED, 1987, 44). 
The question is whether framing sustainability planning in terms of values is neutral, beneficial, or 
harmful to sustainability planning. From the perspectiv  of a history of diverse usage of values, 
sustainability is a relatively new area of application. From the perspective of sustainability, a lack of 
awareness of diverse usage may make it appear that use of the word “values” is unproblematic. Our 
Common Future (WCED, 1987) does not mention values except in a narrow economic sense.   
 
7.3 The Polanyi-Hayek Dilemmas Applied to Sustainab ility Planning 
Not only do the dilemmad persist but issues are renw d in application to sustainability. Both Polanyi 
and Hayek believed they were challenging convention, Hayek using values language more explicitly.  
Polanyi extended his treatment of economics as part of the social whole to a larger relation between 
humans and nature by recognizing that interactions of humans and nature are complex (1944, 130). 
When man’s relationships to nature are disjointed, the natural habitat is at risk of annihilation. 
Trading classes in the 19th century, had no means  
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“…to sense the dangers involved in the exploitation of the physical 
strength of the worker, the destruction of family life, the devastation 
of neighborhoods, the denudation of forests, the polluti n of rivers, 
the deterioration of craft standards, the disruption of folkways, and 
the general degradation of existence including housing and arts, as 
well as the innumerable forms of private and public lie that do not 
affect profits.” (Polanyi, 1944, 133) 
Polanyi called for the market to be reintegrated into society as one of many aspects of society, 
thereby devaluing the market. Linda McQuaig describes Polanyi as anticipating sustainability: 
 “[Polanyi’s] system of economic accounting also hints at themes 
that have become central to the more recent concept of ‘sustainable 
development’ (that is, the notion that economic growth must take 
place in ways that are compatible with the protection of the natural 
environment and human communities). Like the movement for 
sustainable development, Polanyi accused the market system of 
failing to take ‘social costs’ into account in its unconditional 
dedication to economic growth. By measuring success purely in 
terms of the speed of growth of GDP, the market system failed to 
factor in the simultaneous destruction of the environment or the rise 
of inequality that might result.” (McQuaig, 2001, 150) 
Notwithstanding his own use of freedom as an overriding value or his insistence that the market be 
kept separate from politics, planning, and society, Hayek’s thesis suggests that sustainability should 
not be treated as a single, overriding value. Broadly, sustainability may be a single aim but it need not 
be understood as a source of value that is not itself alt red by values flowing from its component 
parts. Treating the concept of sustainability in the same way as a flexible and vague concept of values 
suggests that it may have no existence that is independent of diverse usage of “sustainability”, of 
different ways of understanding sustainability. Its value is constantly recreated by judgements made 
about other values. Again notwithstanding his own use of freedom as a single value, Hayek’s critique 
of single overriding values is consistent with treaing no value as exempt from questioning.  
Also following Hayek, judgements about value should be freely made. A single overriding value 
makes outcomes predictable because criteria established in accordance with any single value are 
necessarily static and constant. This is consistent with treating outcomes as unknown in sustainability 
planning. 
Hayek’s use of an impersonal agent as a device for all cating responsibility for the system in other 
than the hands of single individuals or small groups of individuals is also consistent with taking an 
approach to sustainability that does not depend solely n the leadership of governments and 
emphasizes the role of individual judgements, taken as an aggregate. Hayek’s impersonal agent, 
however, values the freedom in the economic sphere mor  highly than in other social spheres, 
because without economic freedom there are no otherfre doms. For sustainability to rely on some 
notion of an impersonal agent requires a different ationale.  
Hayek’s individuals make judgements freely in the context of complexity but have no need to 
attempt to understand the complexity because in making a judgement freely individuals are affirming 
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freedom as a single overriding value. They are living participants, actors, in bringing to life the model 
of determining whether something has value according to how well it fits with what is valued most 
highly. All other values are related to the dominant value, directly or indirectly, explicitly or 
implicitly. In a different context, where freedom is not the single most valued value, freely made 
judgements can not have the same value as they do under Hayek’s system of values. 
If Hayek’s individuals are free to be ignorant of cmplexity, this is at least in part because 
complexity in that system is confined to a narrow aspect of the social world. Once complexity is 
expanded to connect social complexity with complexity in an even broader system of ecological 
relations, as sustainability requires, it is more difficult to argue that complexity can be ignored. 
Hayek’s freely made judgements serve narrow human purposes even absent any intent to do so on the 
part of individuals. Absent intent and awareness of the broader context of complexity, freely made 
judgements continue to serve human purposes. This the point made by Objection One in Chapter 4, 
here substituting “complexity” for “Perfection”. 
Because sustainability is a human idea, the equation for complexity is complicated further by 
human understanding of the relations between the two spheres of complexity. In examining the 
“language of sustainability”, Jickling (2000), notes that in uniting economic and ecological 
communities, the word “sustainability” has become a hiding place for central issues. 
“Their differences are absorbed by use of this single term and the 
concept has become cliché. Now ecologists and mining promoters 
can, with public approval, both use the term sustainability to support 
radically different values.” (Jickling, 2000, 472) 
In the same way that similarities, in the first instance, are more important to classification than 
differences, values create a framework within which differences, in the first instance, are necessarily 
minimized. Appreciation of differences requires a second step once what is now to be considered 
comparable has been established. Treated as “a value”, sustainability is an example of this same 
phenomenon. It is not surprising that values-as-relations may create conditions which appear to hide 
differences, just as sustainability creates conditions to connect what to that point has been considered 
disparate and un-connectable. Jickling’s concern seem  to be that the differences are permanently 
gone from the idea of sustainability. 
“Unfortunately, the mantra of sustainability has conditioned many to 
believe that this term carries unconditional or positive values. Yet 
critical thought depends on transient elements in ordinary language, 
the words and ideas that reveal assumptions and worl views, and the 
tools to mediate differences between contesting value 
systems…sustainability tends, instead, to flatten out c ntradictions. 
And worse still, it is leading us in the direction f Orwell’s [1984] 
fabulously satirical notion ‘doublethink’ whereby ordinary citizens 
can increasingly accept contradictory meanings for the same term 
and accept them both. Seen this way sustainability tends to blur the 
very distinctions required to thoughtfully evaluate n issue.” 
(Jickling, 2000, 472-473) 
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The overview of diverse usages of values, as present d i  this thesis, suggests that the word 
“values” meets the above conditions above for “doublethink”: We have accepted and continue to use 
contradictory meanings of “values” as homonyms. Theconsequences may not be as bleak as Jickling 
suggests; used in parallel, the contradictions are not obliterated but remain accessible when the need
arises. The alternative, a single generally accepted usage, may have been more successful in 
successively and permanently obliterating differences in order to preserve its dominance.  
To describe the problem as Jickling does is to misalloc te ultimate responsibility for critical 
thought by ascribing it to ideas rather than human use of human ideas. Though Jickling is right to 
point out that unconditional or positive values associated with sustainability have played a role in 
shaping responses to it, ultimately the responsibility lies with humans for not taking the second step 
that the idea of sustainability makes possible. In the context of a complexity more expansive than 
Hayek’s slice of the social world, determination of fit with a single overriding value is not an 
appropriate values usage for sustainability planning. Whether the single overriding value is presented 
as the most fundamental value on which to base planning or as at the top of a hierarchy of values 
from which all other values flow, determination of fit with a dominant value precludes treating it in 
the same way as other values. It precludes attaching a questioning attitude to dominant values and 
requires that authority ascribed to such values be bas d on belief alone. Taking the second step to 
uncover differences is not an option without consequences. When overriding dominant values are de-
valued, the result is necessarily revolutionary.  No value is left standing and everything must be re-
evaluated. This was the consequence of Nietzsche’s all for a transvaluation of all values—for re-
evaluating all values according to a standard different from hitherto accepted dominant values1.  
Detaching the idea of values from the idea of absolutes resulted in the type of across-the board re-
evaluation that seems to be required by sustainabilty. In application to sustainability, the remedy to 
Jickling’s analysis is to recognize that values need not be treated as unconditional and positive. 
Attaching a questioning attitude to values is a vehicl  for reconfiguring the “flatness” that Jickling 
rejects. It treats as conditional those values present d as unconditional and questions whether a value 
is necessarily as positive as it is claimed to be. It is active involvement by valuers in the process of 
valuing that elevates ideas from the first stage, where our senses alone advise us that the surface 
appears to be “flat”, to the next stage where it is the mind that recognizes the possibility of a different 
topography. Such a usage of “values” is compatible with Polanyi’s approach. 
It is not necessary to blame either the idea of values or the idea of sustainability for the failure to 
think critically; humans seem more than capable of ch osing on our own not to take that second step 
of identifying difference in a sea of similarity. This does not mean that a different usage of values or 
sustainability might not be useful in prompting awareness of the need for a questioning attitude. 
 
                                                  
1 See Chapter 3. 
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7.4 Uncertainty, Values, and Sustainability 
For much of the recent past, the value of certainty has not been challenged. More recently, that 
uncertainty is the setting in which choices are made has attracted more attention (Luks, 1999) (Kay et 
al. 1999) (Allen, 2001) (Ravetz, 1999) (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). 
Uncertainty need not be a negative factor. The feeling of risk arising from uncertainty may be a 
motivator, encourage creativity and helps avoid passivity (Peter Bernstein, 1996). A better awareness 
of certainty and uncertainty as states of mind, as feelings of confidence, lack of confidence, and 
overconfidence, is helpful in appreciating the role th se play in evaluation. Terry Odean, (Barber and 
Odean, 2000); (Gervais and Odean, 1999) for example, has researched the impact of overconfidence 
on valuing markets.  
Uncertainty need not necessarily imply fear, though the two are often connected—particularly so in 
market analyses. Chancellor’s discussion of speculative bubbles interprets the making of bubbles as 
an act of throwing off constraints, of people removing the limits to freedom. “Although profoundly 
secular, speculation is not simply about greed. The ess nce of speculation remains a Utopian yearning 
for freedom and equality...” (Chancellor, 1999, 29). This interpretation of bubbles may have reverse 
application in sustainability planning where constraints and limits are part of the reason why 
sustainability is adopted. Following Chancellor, a speculative bubble might be about anything that 
appears to promise freedom, including freedom from environmental constraints. Always wanting 
more is not specific to consumer culture but also a psychological feature of humans. Uncertainty can 
also manifest as dizziness: “Losing the certainty of a particular world view leaves us sick, bewildered, 
dizzy...People will accept martyrdom in order to hold n to an idea” (Bateson, 1994). Learning to live
with psychological impacts of the idea of limits is something sustainability planning needs to address. 
Confidence is also related to a psychological sense of curity. How much and how information is 
passed on to the public is not simply a question of censorship but also of planners needing to make 
judgements about what is important. Swamping people with unnecessary information may be a poor 
strategy if value judgements and not more detailed assessments of detailed studies are what is 
required. Berlin cautioned about our inability to be aware of everything at the same time: “...if we 
were aware of all that we could in principle be aware of we should swiftly be out of our minds” 
(Berlin, 1953). This applies also to an overabundance of information, information that demands to be 
known.  
Postman addresses the fear of uncertainty and how we try to erase fear by being confident. Echoing 
George Grant’s admonition in Objection One, Postman (1999) writes: “The idea that we must make 
our own future is frightening”. Creating, as opposed to discovering a sense of purpose (a point that 
particularly concerned Grant) is also related to feeling certain, to hope, and to optimism—to a state of 
mind. Markets flutter when there is “too much” uncertainty, creating the impression that uncertainty 
is an enemy to be eliminated. But without uncertainty there would be no choice and no need for 
markets to try to anticipate value.  
The idea of “values” was used to satisfy the desire fo  certainty. “Values” began as a rejection of 
“absolutist ethical theory”. By 1917, values were being “pressed into service to bolster up the very 
thing to which it constituted a reaction” (Schneider, 154). Moore (1910) declared 1909 the year the 
“philosophy of values” was born, meaning that values were being systematically described, classified, 
and explained. Treating values as things allowed thm to be “routinized” (Alexander, 1986) and 
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manipulated. The need for a questioning attitude about values was no longer immediately obvious or 
evident to everyone. 
A low tolerance for uncertainty may go hand in hand with a reluctance to acknowledge that choices 
are made in the context of uncertainty. Treating values as firm ground helps to satisfy the desire for 
certainty, even if this satisfaction is premature. Values understood as incontestable and unconditional 
may be easier to systematize and operationalize than values to which a questioning attitude is attached 
and this too may act as a constraint on the willingness of planners to subject values to critical 
scrutiny. Planners’ own desires to base choices on firm and certain ground may influence which 
values are given more weight, those presented as firm and certain or those presented with questions 
attached. 
 On the other hand, a questioning attitude towards values allows for uncertainty and the possibility 
of fallibility to be part of study and learning. Treated as judgements that result from a questioning 
attitude, values cannot be used to predict whether the products of valuing will or not be compatible 
with sustainability. 
 
7.5 Additional Needs of Sustainability Planning 
Over and above the needs of planning in general, sustainability challenges convention in a more 
explicit context of uncertainty and does so without presuming that there is a single right answer. 
Descriptive categories (pillars) are unhelpful for integrating different fields, uncertainty must be an 
ally rather than an enemy, and predicting the outcome is not possible. 
What planning approaches are used by sustainability planners may also have an impact on how 
values are understood. Adaptive approaches (Holling, 1978) complement sustainability by not forcing 
an alien framework on the ecological dimension of sustainability. In the same way, adaptive planning 
should not force an alien framework on “values”. That this is a possibility arises when adaptive 
planning disdains deduction but not induction; deduction is a “barrier” but induction is a “bridge” 
(Gunderson et al., 1995, 526). As discussed in Chapter 5, neither induction nor deduction alone can 
approach values in the way they need to be treated, s relations. Induction alone creates the same 
barrier as do descriptive categories by focussing attention on what is immediately and easily 
apprehended2. Unlike inductive reasoning, comparative reasoning admits hypothetical cases and is 
therefore better suited to considering questions about the future and questions about values. 
The consequence of this is similar to another phenom on identified earlier with respect to values: 
Values were calibrated to fit existing knowledge rather than existing knowledge being recalibrated in 
light of a need for a questioning attitude. Utilitarians held that moral values could be calculated by 
using deductive reasoning. Means (1880) criticized this as evidence that utilitarians believe nothing 
can be known until everything is known. Means charged that this was an attempt to remove all 
uncertainty and “bound to lead to errors in estimating what is valuable” (Chapter 3). 
                                                  
2 See also Chapter 2. Grounded theory methodology was devised as a remedy for deficiencies in both deductive 
and inductive reasoning. 
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That sustainability is necessarily a collective endeavour (Jacobs, 1999, 81) means that values 
language should not be used by sustainability planners had there been no remedy for the concerns of 
Objections One and Two. Treating values as contestable may counteract the criticism that values are 
necessarily narrow individual preferences as values and may make collective discussion about the 
common good possible. 
Of the four objections, Objection Three was the only one to hold out the possibility that values 
language might be beneficial to planning. Objection Three must be allowed to stand so long as a 
questioning attitude is not attached to values. By inspiring a questioning attitude towards 
sustainability, sustainability itself may provide the motivation needed to attach a questioning attitude 
towards values. Such an approach to values will give sustainability planners a tool for challenging 
conventional values. 
To do so, however, sustainability planners will first have to challenge a dominant strain of 
conventional values usage—the usage that treats values s necessarily being unconditional and 
incontestable. They can do so by treating all values, irrespective of their source, their content, or h w 
they are presented, as worthy of critical scrutiny.  
Presenting sustainability as a question to which the answers are not known in advance may be a 
means to counteract the habit of dogmatically presenting values as unconditional. It allows the default 
approach to values as being conditional (Chapter 5) to be partnered with an epistemological stance 
that is appropriate to sustainability. Treating values as unconditional would make values 
counterproductive and an enemy of sustainability. Reconciliation is important because both 
uncertainty and values are elements of sustainability planning. Robert Gibson describes both “the 
inevitability of surprise” and “the role of values” as two of the ways in which ideas about 
environmental assessment have evolved (Gibson, 2005, 8). He concludes  
“…sustainability assessment accepts that life on Earth is and must be 
dynamic and diverse that it is lived in large and itersecting complex 
systems in which full description is impossible, prediction uncertain, 
and surprise likely. Accordingly, sustainability asse sment is mostly 
about how decisions are made, not about what conclusions are 
reached, and even the decision making is messy.” (Gibson, 2005, 
272) 
 
7.6 Suggested Features of a Values Usage for Planni ng 
The list below is a shorter version of the suggested needs in Chapter 6. To be useful to planning, a 
particular usage of values should: 
• be able to relate individuals and society 
• assist in planning over the long term without ignori g uncertainty and complexity 
• not discourage challenging convention and the statu quo 
• not be routinized but still be manageable  
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• be open to critical scrutiny and re-evaluation, rational and contribute to planning 
knowledge, even when uncertainty and complexity appe r to block the possibility of being 
fully or ideally rational 
• assist in creating new possibilities 
• encourage relating values about abstract ideas to real life situations 
• address advocacy and the politics of planning, accomm date concern for absent clients, 
and improve rather than act negatively on communication and participatory planning  
• be simple and not require expert skills 
• Encourage awareness of a variety of diverse usages of values, 
• Encourage a questioning attitude, as required by the default concept of values, and  
• Not grant any values privileged status so that theyar  immune from challenge 
 
7.7 A Particular Usage of Values for Sustainability  
Over and above the values usage suited for planning i  general, that a questioning attitude may be 
particularly useful to sustainability is suggested by four needs generally associated with sustainability 
planning: 
1. Challenging conventional values; 
2. Integrating policy formulation and implementation 
3. Recognizing and appreciating uncertainty; and 
4. That there is no single answer to questions about wha is sustainable and that there is no 
answer that can be knowable in advance. 
There is no conflict between these and the three thmes of the theory about diverse usage, all of 
which support a questioning attitude: 
1. That diverse usage is ongoing and evolutionary; 
2. Values are relational; and 
3. Values are dependent on valuers even when values are described as objective. 
Adopting a questioning attitude toward values, therefore, is a reasonable strategy for sustainability 
planners.  
 
7.7.1 Aspects of a values usage that engages a ques tioning attitude 
• No value should be treated as being immune to challenge, whether or not it is based on belief.  
• Values are relational and are also judgements about relations. 
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• Values as judgements are conditional, penultimate judgements. 
• There is no firm, certain, or static description of a single criterion or set of criteria by which 
to judge values. 
• Values and values usage both evolve in response to both ideas and events. 
• Comparison and contrast are more appropriate to complexity and uncertainty than either 
deduction or induction alone.   
 
7.7.2 Implications of “values” for a concept of sus tainability 
Just as “values” is a contestable concept, so too is the concept of sustainability. This has political 
implications for governments and other organizations in deciding which contributions framed in 
terms of sustainability qualify as competing interpr tations of sustainability and which can be 
ignored. 
Like the concept of values, the concept of sustainability too does not exist independently from 
particular ways of understanding sustainability. This has social and political implications because it 
increases the significance of contributions by individuals. It makes any attempt to understand, 
interpret, and act on sustainability part of the evolution of the concept, irrespective of whether the 
contribution is or can be somehow validated by logic or agreement as truly matching someone else’s 
idea of what sustainability “really” is.  
Values are a means to recalibrate existing knowledge as well as to affirm the status quo. Applied to 
sustainability, values can facilitate the dismantling of dominant descriptive, substantive categories as 
these now organize society and thought. If values ar  treated as conditional and contestable, then 
integrating values across sectors will result dismantling rather than reinforcing stereotypes. This ha
social and political implications with respect to the now common usage of values as a firm basis for 
social cohesion. 
Sustainability planning may be an optimal context in which to cultivate new habits of values usage. 
If sustainability is presented as a question that requires judgements about values, it has the potential to 
reconfigure how values are understood and counteract the tendency to present values dogmatically. 







VISION 2020 IN HAMILTON, ON 
8.1 The Beginnings of Vision 2020: Definition and P rinciples of Sustainability 
In June 1990 the then Regional Council of Hamilton-Wentworth in Ontario, Canada created the 
Chairman’s Task Force on Sustainable Development, initially comprised of three regional councillors 
and fifteen citizens. The Task Force was set up as a multi-stakeholder roundtable. From fifty 
applicants, the Chair of the Task Force and the Project Coordinator selected eighteen: Three members 
of Regional Council, two from academia, one from unions, one from resident associations, one from 
women’s organizations, one from health organizations, two from industry/commerce, two from 
environmental organizations, one from development industry, one from arts/culture, one from small 
business, one from agriculture, and one from real est t . Two regional councillors resigned midway 
through the process (following a municipal election) a d were not reappointed. The two small 
business and real estate representatives also resigned before the mandate was completed (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1997, 14). 
The Task Force was mandated to accomplish six tasks: 
• “to develop a precise definition of what sustainable 
development means to Hamilton-Wentworth, to be used in 
developing an overall vision for the Region; 
• to develop a community vision to guide future development 
in Hamilton-Wentworth based on the principles of 
sustainable development; 
• to establish a public outreach programme to increase 
awareness of the concept of sustainable development and to 
act as a vehicle for feedback on potential goals, objectives, 
and policies for the Region; 
• to provide input as to how the concept of sustainable 
development could be turned [sic] in practical applications 
through Regional initiatives; 
• to demonstrate and articulate in detail the usefulnss of the 
sustainable development concept in the review of the 
Region’s long term planning policies; and 
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• to provide direction to staff and the Economic Development 
and Planning Committee, who would be using the concept to 
guide their review of the Region’s Economic Strategy and 
Official Plan.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 12-13) 
In their first meetings, Task Force members began by discussing their own ideas about sustainable 
development as preliminary to developing a definitio  about which all agreed. Members of the Task 
Force chose to make all decisions by consensus. To assist them in doing so they attended a day-long 
workshop to learn about making decisions by consensus. (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 15-16) 
The definition of sustainability about which all mebers agreed was: 
“We the members of the Task Force define sustainable development 
as positive change which does not undermine the environment or 
social systems upon which we and future generations are dependent. 
Sustainable development requires the integration of ec nomic, 
environmental, and social factors in both private and public decision 
making to ensure a viable future for us all. The success of sustainable 
development depends upon widespread understanding of the critical 
relationship between people and their environment and the will to 
make necessary changes.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992b, 1) 
The version approved by Council six months later varied slightly, though perhaps significantly. The 
reference to future generations was removed and “integration” was replaced by “coordinated 
approach”, potentially somewhat weaker because coordination need not imply integration. The phrase 
“economic, environmental, and social factors” was replaced by “planning and policy making”, 
shifting the locus of action to one that applied more bviously to government.  The phrase “in both 
private and public decision making” was replaced by “that involves public participation”, 
substantially different in meaning because it more clearly applied to government rather than the 
private sector. The final version was: 
 “Sustainable development is positive change which does not 
undermine the environment or social systems on which we depend. It 
requires a coordinated approach to planning and policy making that 
involves public participation. Its success depends upon wide-spread 
understanding of the critical relationship between p ople and their 
environment and the will to make necessary changes.” (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1992, 4) 
Informing the community about the definition and principles was part of the Task Force’s mandate 
to “educate” the community (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 17). The four principles identified by the 
Task Force were as follows: 
• “[fulfillment] of human needs for peace, clean air nd water, 
food, shelter, education, and useful and satisfying 
employment;   
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• maintenance of ecological integrity through careful 
stewardship, rehabilitation, reduction in wastes and 
protection of diverse and important natural species and 
systems; 
• provision for self-determination through public invol ement 
in the definition and development of local solutions to 
environmental and development problems; and, 
• achievement of equity with the fairest possible sharing of 
limited resources among contemporaries and between our 
generation and that of our descendants.” (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1992a, 4) 
 
8.2 Soliciting Community Input on Values 
The definition and principles formed the basis for the Task Force’s outreach to the community. One 
of the goals of soliciting input from citizens was 
“To gather citizen perspectives on basic values and goals that can be 
used to develop a set of principles to guide the preparation of a 
Regional Vision Statement.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 7) 
At three Town Hall meetings held in the fall of 1990, the roughly 160 people attending were asked: 
• “what they liked about life in Hamilton-Wentworth 
• what detracts from life in Hamilton-Wentworth 
• what should be done to improve life in Hamilton-
Wentworth; and 
• what values did they feel should guide decision making in 
Hamilton-Wentworth.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 19) 
The 150 people who participated in 18 focus groups were asked the same questions. People who 
felt uncomfortable with traditional venues for participation had the option of submitting their 
comments by telephone. 
Input from the public was analyzed using content analysis. The Task Force then “reached 
consensus” on “seven major issues of concern” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 20) 
• “transportation system offers inadequate opportunities for 
cycling, pedestrians and public transit; 
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• recent urban development is unattractive, destructive of 
landscape character, wasteful of resources and lacks a sense 
of community; 
• pollution of air, water and soil; 
• loss of natural areas and encroachment on conservation l nds 
and scenic areas; 
• economic concerns regarding over dependence on 
manufacturing, a lack of dynamic initiative in the economy 
and shrinking employment opportunities; 
• local government is not responsive to citizens, shows a lack 
of leadership and exhibits little commitment to long term 
plans and policies; and 
• social problems such as poverty, security and an aging 
population.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 20) 
The Task Force also identified “nine specific values”, “best expressed as directives of the kind of 
regional community people would like to see” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 20). 
• “ensure community character and identity are preserv d and 
enhanced; 
• preserve and enhance natural areas and amenities; 
• preserve farmland and the rural landscape; 
• ensure the continuance of a friendly, safe, and diverse human 
community; 
• develop an integrated, balanced and efficient regional 
transportation system; 
• protect and rehabilitate the air, water, and soil; 
• develop a self-sufficient, diverse, sustainable local economy; 
• improve the appearance and fit of the built environme t with 
the natural and community context; and 
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• alleviate poverty.” Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 21) 
Over the six months, the Task Force and its eight volunteer working groups reviewed the 
community input in conjunction with eleven Discussion Papers that had been solicited to provide 
Task Force members with more information. These Discus ion Papers identified issues that might be 
cause for concern in the future but did not suggest po sible solutions (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 
22). The mandate for the Working Groups was “to research and develop a vision statement in their 
assigned topic area” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 23). The eight topics reflected the specific values 
expressed by community members, listed above, as these ad been identified by the Task Force.  
• “human health; 
• ecosystem integrity; 
• natural areas; 
• community design; 
• culture and learning; 
• community well being; 
• economy, livelihood and education; and 
• food and agriculture.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 23) 
The eight draft reports from the working groups were thus geared towards developing the eight 
specific values that were had been adopted as goals. The e reports were reviewed at an all-day 
Community Forum on June 15, 1991 by about 250 people. Approximately one month later the Task 
Force received the finalized reports from the Working Groups and reports summarizing the 
discussions at the Community Forum.  
Three factors played a significant role in determining the type of document that could be produced 
at this stage of the process.  
(1) The Task Force desired to produce a document that was easily understandable by all. 
“At this stage in the process that Task Force now had in front of it, a 
large amount of information and ideas. It now needed to take this 
information and distil into something which could be understood by 
all citizens of the community. The decision was made by the Task 
Force to develop a short four page vision statement which would 
reflect the major concerns and desires it had heard to date.” 
(Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 24-25) 
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(2) The Task Force had agreed only to produce material on which there was consensus among Task 
Force members. The six months that it took for the Task Force to develop that four-page document 
were described by the project coordinator as  
“…probably the most difficult and time consuming aspect of the 
initiative. The eighteen members had to go through all the 
information provided in the four summary reports and build a 
consensus between themselves of what were the most critical issues 
that needed to be presented in the vision statement.” (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1997, 25) 
(3) The Task Force decided the project required community support for the overall goals of the 
community sustainability initiative. 
“The Task force decided that it would only present a vision statement 
at this phase of the project because it wanted to ensur  that it was the 
goal that people wanted to achieve. Recommendations for how to 
achieve that vision would come from the next phase of its mandate. 
(Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 26) 
 
8.3 Basic Values in the Formal Document 
Although the Task Force had explicitly and deliberat ly sought input on “values”, the first draft 
version of Vision 2020 released in January 1992 did not present the overview as being comprised of 
“basic values” (Hamilton-Wentworth 1992b). The final version adopted by Council in June 1992, did. 
The overview now framed in terms of values language was explicitly described as underlying Vision 
2020 and as being the result of “ideas contributed by citizens” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992a, 4). In so 
doing it suggested that widespread and solid agreement within the community about these values 
justified using them as goals. 
The January and June versions differ otherwise only in that the final version below includes explicit 
reference to “carrying capacity” and farms are described as “family farms”(Hamilton-Wentworth, 
1992b, 2). 
“In the year 2020, Hamilton-Wentworth supports a population 
consistent with the carrying capacity of the region. People live in a 
region made up of compact urban core areas, surrounded by a rural 
landscape that includes productive family farms, hamlets and a 
continuous network of natural areas. 
We are an environmentally conscious community where the 
existence of all living things is cherished and where all can breathe 
fresh air, swim in clean streams and lakes and haveample 




We are an economically, socially and culturally diverse community 
that encourages opportunities for all individuals, reduces inequities 
and ensures full participation for all in community l fe. 
We are a caring community that gives opportunity and support to all 
its members, including children, the aged, people with disabilities, 
immigrants and refugees. People live longer in good health. 
Finally, we are a vibrant, vigorous community which builds on 
existing strengths and attracts wealth producing businesses that work 
in partnership with government and the community to create a 
diverse, sustainable economy. Economic growth incorporates non-
polluting, energy efficient and environmentally friendly businesses, 
including traditional manufacturing industries that ve been 
supported and helped to become environmentally sustainable. 
Business, government, labour and the community havegreat capacity 
for innovation in response to global change.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 
1992b) 
In both the draft issued in the winter and the final version released in July, values were otherwise 
explicitly mentioned only in the section on “Quality of Life”. 
“All citizens are knowledgeable about sustainable development and 
quality of life issues. Our cultural institutions and groups advocate 
values consistent with environmental sustainability. Educational 
institutions instil sustainable values and citizens pursue sustainable 
lifestyles. (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992b) (Hamilton-Wentworth, 
1992a) 
 
8.4 A Negative Reaction to the Draft Vision 2020 Do cument 
The four-page tabloid draft vision was distributed o the community for comment in January 1992. 
Although much discussion and information had passed through the hands of the Task Force in its 
preparation, the response to Vision 2020 was in large part negative primarily because it was perceived 
as not reflecting or speaking to anything substantial. Comments in an editorial in the local paper were 
typical of the responses. 
“Vision 2020 is full of platitudes about what the region should be in 
the new millennium. In fact, it’s a Utopian outlook in many ways. 
“It’s unfortunate that relatively few of the tangible ideas from the 
working groups are in the draft. Specific proposals are much more 
likely to get people thinking, and capture the public imagination, 
than bland generalities.” (Hamilton Spectator, 1992a) 
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The 1997 overview characterized the negative response by both media and the public as deeming 
the Vision 2020 document was “too short and vague to have any value for decision making” 
(Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 26). The Task Force recognized that their effort to engage the 
community to date had not been successful, that their “communication strategy had obviously failed 
to inform the community of the Task Force’s mandate and approach to achieving its mandate 
(Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 26). 
 
8.5 Developing an Implementation Strategy 
Their response was to begin work on the next stage of the project in the spring of 1992, prior to 
Council approving Vision 2020 in June. Eight implementation teams comprised of citizen volunteers 
were given a mandate to develop specific action-oriented content within the framework established by 
Vision 2020. They were to focus on the following are s: 
• “agriculture, rural settlement, and the rural economy; 
• economy, livelihood, and workforce education; 
• community well being, health and quality of life; 
• waste management, physical services and urban growth; 
• transportation; 
• land use planning and community design; 
• cultural, historical and recreational resources; and 
• natural areas and natural resources.” (Hamilton-Wentworth 
1997, 29) 
The Task Force again arranged for the members of the community at large to comment on the new 
reports it had received. On September 19, 1992 about 200 members of the public attended all-day 
workshops to develop implementation strategies. Reacting to feedback from the first Community 
Forum, the plenary session was omitted in favour of all wing more time for small work group 
discussions. 
“Essentially the forum was designed so that people could present 
their ideas but did not have to spend much time, other [than] in the 




Comment on values was specifically requested only in the workshop on “Community Well-Being.” 
Under “HOW TO DO IT”, comments were requested on four possible ways for “instilling the values 
of sustainable development and the delivery of healt  care services.” 
 
“INSTILLING THE VALUES—promote leaders and role models, 
train teachers in concept of sustainable development, provide 
teaching awards in sustainable development, promote sustainable 
development with other organizations, assist and educate 
organizations in adopting more sustainable practices, and lead by 
example.  
PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES—ensure level of 
services is equitable across the Region, provide services according to 
identified need, develop integrated health and social services 
planning… 
CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT—ensure a high level of citizen 
involvement in local government by using a jury selection procedure 
for public committees, hold town hall meetings, establish a regional 
office for citizen action and outreach, support community 
development activities, provide a human services plan as part of 
Official Plan, develop Region wide community consultation 
guidelines to be followed by all departments, and move toward one 
tier government.  
PUBLIC SAFETY—increase availability of emergency shelters, 
create rapid response teams for domestic violence situations, increase 
police presence in neighbourhoods, and incorporate design 
guidelines for safety into Official Plans.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 
1992c, 13) 
Following the workshops, Project Staff summarized the discussions in Summary Report No. 6: 
Community Workshop: Creating the Sustainable Region and also produced Summary Report No. 7: 
The Implementation Team Reports f om final reports submitted by the implementation teams. These 
two reports formed the basis for the final reports that the Task Force submitted to Regional Council to 
complete their mandate, Directions for Creating a Sustainable Region a d Detailed Strategies and 
Actions. In an overview of the process, the Project Coordinator again emphasized the significance of 
the Task Force having agreed to make all decisions by consensus. 
“The strength of these two final reports is that they are consensus 
documents. All four hundred goal statements and recommendations 
presented were agreed to by every member of the Task Force. 
Therefore they are recommendations where members of the Task 
Force made trade-offs in their own views and opinions.” (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1997, 31) 
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In the Detailed Strategies and Actions Report issued in January 1993, the new introduction 
included the word “values” in two sentences:  
“Action is required by every individual and until everyone grabs hold 
of the values of sustainable development the community e visioned 
in VISION 2020 will be unattainable.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1993, 
3) 
“WE CAN build a community on the principles and values of 
sustainable development.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1993, 3) 
The reference to values in the “Quality of Life” section was retained. One of three “New 
Directions” under “Personal Health and Well Being” was now worded as: 
“Educate everyone about the values of sustainable dev lopment.” 
(Hamilton-Wentworth, 1993, 23) 
Regional Council’s Economic Planning and Development Committee received and approved the 
final reports on January 25, 1993 at an event attended by about 300 people. The Project Coordinator 
noted the significance of the turnout, given that it was held “on a Monday afternoon during a 
snowstorm” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997, 32). Final approval was granted by Regional Council on 
February 2, 1993. There were no dissenting votes. 
Reaction was generally positive, though coupled with a “wait and see” caution. A column on the 
business page of the local paper was generally positive. 
“There’s little to argue with in the report. It is,as it says, a vision, 
although there’s more emphasis on the environment rathe  than the 
economic development that will be needed to fulfill its goals.” 
(Hamilton Spectator, 1993) 
The columnist also revisited the problem with producing a “feel-good” report, as had been noted in 
the paper’s editorial a year earlier in January 1992. 
“The crunch will come over some of the report’s more controversial 
recommendations, especially in the area of land use controls. The 
document calls on the region and the local municipalities to establish 
stringent urban boundaries beyond which development will be 
forbidden. One result: a more-intense use of existing urban and 
suburban areas that will increase population density, high-rise 
apartment buildings and the like.  
And the report also glosses over some immediate and co troversial 
issues. Despite a call to provide alternative modes of transportation 
to replace cars and trucks, there’s no mention of stopping the Red 
hill Creek Expressway or any of the other highway construction 
projects on the books. Regional chairman Reg Whynott i sists 
there’s no inconsistency. He rightly points out that t e expressway, 
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for example, is an environmentally-preferred alternative to sending 
trucks and industrial vehicles through city streets. But not everyone 
agrees.” (Hamilton Spectator, 1993)1  
 
8.6 Consensus, Vagueness, and an Emphasis on the Po sitive 
Throughout the process, the Task Force adopted a consensus-driven approach. As well as it may have 
served particular needs in Hamilton, the emphasis on a consensus was not without basis. The WCED 
also had emphasized that consensus was necessary to ustainable development. 
“Interpretations will vary, but must share certain general features and 
must flow from a consensus on the basic concept of sustainable 
development and on a broad strategic framework for achieving it.” 
(WCED, 1987, 43) 
The extent to which achieving consensus required not just minimizing differences but removing 
differences from the public face of the process, the speed with which consensus was declared, and 
scoping who was to be included in reaching consensus were all local choices. The same 1992 editorial 
that had objected to “bland generalities” also questioned whether consensus was appropriate. 
“Sustainable development, involving hard choices and new 
approaches, doesn’t readily lend itself to consensus. Some 
differences of opinion are inevitable, but the task force shouldn’t try 
to gloss over the differences with a final report that will offend no 
one.” (Hamilton Spectator, 1992a “Vision needs specifics.”) 
The challenge in Hamilton was not so much one of trying not to “offend” but of avoiding a 
controversy. Pro-expressway politicians had good reasons to fear that discussing the Red Hill Creek 
Expressway issue would disrupt the process. Accordingly, the final 1993 “Detailed Strategies and 
Actions” report describes “challenging issues” as hving been addressed. 
                                                  
1 The Red Hill Valley in Hamilton was a 700 hectare, mostly forested natural area. The City had purchased the 
land in 1929 and 1947 as parkland and subsequently designated it as an Environmentally Sensitive Area.  The 
north-south valley intersects the east-west Niagara Escarpment, designated a World Biosphere Reserve. Over 
one half of the valley is part of the Reserve. The proposal to build an expressway through the Red Hill Valley in 
Hamilton dates back to 1956 when Council first support a proposal that would have seen an expressway only in 
the valley portion below the Niagara Escarpment. The project was dropped a few years later but revived again 
in 1964. It was dropped again in 1974, and revived n 1977, after which the municipal government consistently 
supported the project in the face of increasing controversy, assessments, and appeals until construction finally 
began in 2003. Community groups formed both in support of the Expressway and in opposition to it.  
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“Over the last three years, a number of challenging issues were 
discussed and debated by the members of the Task Force and citizens 
in public forums and meetings. These included broad issues, such as, 
urban design, provision of housing choice, environme tal protection, 
transportation priorities, residential intensificaton, and more specific 
issues, like the north-south link of the Red Hill Creek Expressway, 
the Perimeter Road, and development in the Pleasant View area of 
Dundas.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1993) 
The workshops at the Community Forum in September 1992 had been organized around six topics:  
• Agriculture, Rural Settlement and the Rural Economy, 
• Community Well-Being, Health and Quality of Life, 
• Economy, Livelihood, and Workforce Education,  
• Natural Areas and Natural Resources,  
• Waste Management and Physical Services, and  
• Land Use Planning, Transportation and Community Design. (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992c) 
Interestingly, no reference to the Red Hill Expressway was cited in the summaries of any of the 
eight working groups that had focussed on “Land UsePlanning, Transportation, and Community 
Design” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992c). Other working group summaries did record objections to the 
Expressway, as recognized by Project Staff in Summary Report No. 6 (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992c). 
“Community Well-Being, Health and Quality of Life” comments from workshops: 
o “Red Hill Creek Valley and the Beverly Swamp need to be addressed.” 
“Natural Areas and Natural Resources” comments from workshops: 
o “it may be less expensive to rehabilitate areas the government owns, such as the Red Hill 
Creek valley than to purchase new pristine private areas.” (24) 
o “the Niagara Escarpment is a critical local feature; to ensure continuity of natural area 
roadway alternatives must be found, including tunnels” (24) 
o “the Task Force should recommend that the N-S expressway should not be built through 
the Red Hill Creek Valley” (24) 
o “the greenway system idea must be tied to transportati n questions, how can we have the 
network of green areas be connected and still route transport…use tunnels and waterways 
for transport…the Task Force should make a specific recommendation about the destiny of 
the Red Hill Creek Valley…the greenway idea and the expressway are contradictory.” (26) 
“Waste Management and Physical Services” comments from workshops: 
o “There seems to be no comment in the report on the Redhill Creek Expressway. How could 
your group not comment on such a major piece of infrastructure that seems to fly in the 
face of your basic recommendations?” (34) 
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o “Specifics such as the Red Hill Creek have to be examined; the report is irrelevant if 
specifics aren’t examined.” (34) 
“Economy, Livelihood, and Workforce Education” comments from workshops: 
o “The Red Hill Valley has to be included in any environmental report.” (42) 
o “Concern that Red Hill not referred to in the report. It was mentioned in last year’s 
deliberation. The Red Hill should be included as an environmental issue.” (48) 
But such was not the experience of participants. At least one participant complained to the Project 
Coordinator in writing that his contribution about the Expressway had been omitted from the verbal 
presentation summarizing discussions of the workshop he attended on Natural Areas. He objected that 
he and several others had made the point  
“…that an expressway down Red Hill Creek Valley is totally 
incompatible with transportation policy under sustainable 
development principles…Needless to say, the omission fuelled 
plenty of disappointment and cynicism…We must make n honest 
change of direction, not just choose to display a new flag.” (Kurelek, 
1992) 
In March 1993, working with the local Social Plannig and Research Council and members of the 
Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistic  at McMaster University, Brenda Poland 
approached participants in the two Community Forums (held June 1991 and September 1992). She 
requested participation in a survey because “[f]or this type of project, it is important to identify the 
reactions of community participants to the process of participation which occurred” (Poland, 1993a). 
Perhaps significantly, the outcomes do not appear to reflect differences in how the two Community 
Forums were structured, or that changes were made to the second Forum as an attempt to address 
problems identified with the first. 
The survey had a response rate of 60%, with 110 completed surveys returned to the researcher 
(Poland, 1993b). The survey compared the difference between what respondents expected and what 
they experienced. The expectations were: 
• learn what was going on 
• hear concrete suggestions 
• have a say in the matter 
• discuss my particular area(s) of concern 
• offer new ideas 
• experience a more open form of government 
• meet interesting people 
Although “learned what was going on” remained on top of the list as an outcome, “having a say in 
the matter” dropped to number 5 and “hearing concrete suggestions” dropped to number 6. 
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Respondents expressed concern about whether their involvement had mattered. The most often 
cited concern (52%) was about whether “everyone’s input was considered seriously.” Average scores 
were on the low side in response to being asked to rate “the degrees to which they felt that they had 
been heard.” 
“With 1 being low and 7 being high, the average scores were: the 
degree to which participants felt that they had been h ard: 3.9; their 
involvement was valued: 4.1; and their involvement influenced the 
Task Force: 3.1. When asked what would best make them feel that 
their involvement had been appreciated, over half (56%) chose (out 
of a short list) ‘reading comments similar to theirs in follow-up 
reports from the workshops’, and 17 percent chose ‘receiving a 
follow-up letter noting the importance of their invol ement’. Of the 
ones who noted that reading similar comments to theirs in follow-up 
reports would best make them feel that their involvement had been 
appreciated, only half of them (55) actually read comments similar to 
theirs in follow-up reports.” (Poland, 1993b) 
That respondents wished for a follow-up letter is interesting, given that such letters had already 
been sent to participants. An official “thank you” letter signed by the Regional Chairman and Task 
Force Chairman was sent to all participants shortly af er final the January 1993 event. The letter 
expressed appreciation, noted the number of participants, and how successful the event had been 
(Whynott, 1993). 
“Thank you” letters had also been sent out by the Task Force Project Coordinator following earlier 
public events. One month after the Community Forum in September 1992, for example, participants 
received a letter advising them of the total number of participants, thanking them, and providing a 
copy of the proceedings (Bekkering, 1992). Further comments were welcomed and the usefulness of 
participation was noted: 
“…The Task Force is now using the ideas generated at the workshop 
as they prepare their final implementation strategy, scheduled for 
completion in December, 1992. You will be informed of when the 
final strategy is completed and when it will be presented to Regional 
Council. 
If you have any further comments or ideas, please mail them care of 
the address below or call me...” (Bekkering, 1992a) 
For this not to have “counted” in participants’ minds as the type of thank you letter they were 
expecting suggests that participants were not so much interested in being thanked as they were in 
being effective or productive—knowing that their participation made a difference in some way. 
Poland’s survey may shed more light on this, because re pondents were asked “what could have been 
done differently”:  
“Most (over 60%) agreed with the suggestion to hold more 
workshops like the one(s) they attended so that people get used to 
going to these things, and to continue to involve the public by setting 
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up a group who are interested in carrying on the work. Almost half 
(45%) would like to see comments included (in reports) which had 
not been accepted by the Task Force, as well as the ones that had.” 
(Poland, 1993b) 
The last comment is particularly interesting, given the high importance placed by the Task Force on 
consensus, vagueness, and positive thinking. That almost half of the participants wanted not only to 
see the results but also to see what had been rejected may indicate, from the perspective of 
participants at least, that ongoing discussion and debate and possibly even controversy would have 
been welcomed.   
 
8.7 Implementing Vision 2020: “It’s like the Bible”  
Consensus, vagueness, and an emphasis on the positive continue to have an impact on the ability of 
the community to move towards Vision 2020. At the March 16, 2004 meeting of the Planning and 
Economic Development Committee, Councillors received the Annual Sustainability Indicators report 
from Vision 2020 Coordinator Linda Harvey. They passed a motion to make mandatory that each 
municipal report must describe how it connects with Vision 2020. Harvey noted that a template and 
prompt for doing just this was already attached to reports, “"But a lot of people apparently turn that 
off or aren't even aware it's there" (CATCH, 2004). Before voting, councillors discussed the problem 
of having a document that could be used to justify multiple purposes, potentially conflicting. 
Councillors generally concurred with Councillor Mitchell’s comments, below. 
The Committee Chair, Councillor Kelley, went so far as to say "Your point's well taken councillor. 
It's like the Bible. You can take any phrase out of the Bible to suit just about anything you want too” 
(Planning, 2004). 
Mitchell:  "The Vision 2020 information, that's fabulous information, 
but we used to have it for Regional Council. On every r port, it was 
always there, the feelings of what Vision 2020 meant. My problem 
with that was depending on who wrote the report, Vision 2020 has 
your three parts - your social, economic and enviroment - and 
depending on the person that wrote the report, which slant it went to 
was what you got in your five or six statements in the report. Yes, 
this supports the Vision 2020 under this section of the book, da da 
da. But if you took a person that was more concerned about the 
economic structure of the city, or the social component of the city, or 
another avenue; they could go to another section of Vision 2020 and 
slant that document that we're getting to say that Vision 2020 
supports what you're doing. And I looked at Vision 2020—great—
because it supports absolutely whatever we're doing, r whatever 
you're not doing, depending on which segment and which slant of the 
three sections you go to to pull out of it. So it's a great piece of 
information, but unless you're going to measure somehow, what's fair 
and what's not fair, it's very subjective to who actu lly pulled the 
information out of it and wrote the report, because of those three 
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major components. So I'm not going to vote against thi  
recommendation. I don't mind having it there, but we as councillors 
have to keep that in mind. Because whatever the mindset of the 
person that wrote that—was more social, that's where their 
comment's going; if it's more economic, that's where there comment's 
going; if it's more environmental, that's where their comment's going. 
And they're all there and can be made believable in that document—
fabulous document. It's all there. There's my concern. So there's no 
right and wrong to that." (Planning, 2004) 
More than only a question of using Vision 2020 to distinguish between right and wrong, competing 
interpretations of vague documents should have beenanticipated. The following record of a 
participant’s statement, included in the record of the September 1992 workshops, is an example of 
how even at the stage where implementation guidelines were being created, the Task Force would 
have had evidence for how vagueness can prompt multiple reactions.  
“…a statement about hunting should be included…opposed to 
hunting in Valens/Beverly Swamp…the Vision talks about 
cherishing all life.” (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1992c, 26) 
There are multiple ways to understand what it means to cherish life. Because the Task Force 
operated on the basis of consensus, all it would have t ken to dismiss this contribution as not relevant 
to the implementation guidelines would have been for one member of the Task Force to say no, that is 
not what the vision was intended to say. They issued no minority reports. 
Establishing a pattern of behaviour for how to handle competing interpretations might well be the 
Task Force’s most influential legacy. The result is that a Red Hill Valley Expressway opponent could 
claim that building the expressway is anti-life, just as a Red Hill Expressway supporter might claim 
that protestors are anti-human life. But there is no mechanism by which the two claims and their 
underlying reasons could be explored further. The community forums were designed primarily to 
provide an opportunity for people to express their views and for these views to be recorded, not for 
them to be debated. This analysis is consistent with less than half of the participants in the Poland 
survey (1993b) believing they had influenced the Task Force. 
The Red Hill Expressway continued to divide Council and the community even after construction 
had begun on the project. Its relation to the Vision 2020 document continued to be something that 
simply was not discussed unless the point was being used as a claim by one side against the other. Its 
exclusion from normal discourse is illustrated by the following exchange by an anti-Expressway 
Councillor and the Vision 2020 Coordinator in March 2004 during the same meeting of the Planning 
and Economic Development Committee cited above. Even as committee members are about to 
reaffirm the need for staff to connect their reports to Vision 2020, it is quite clear that the anti-
Expressway Councillor believes that it is inappropriate for him to ask the Vision 2020 Coordinator to 
comment on whether the Expressway is consistent with Vision 2020.  
Councillor Braden:…And I'm not going to ask you if the 
expressway is sustainable, because I'm not going to put you in that 
position. But what I'd really like to know is if you have any sense 
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that middle and senior staff pay attention to this document at all? We 
really need to know that." (Planning, 2004) 
The Coordinator responded by reiterating that Vision 2020 is not being used to its potential. 
Vision 2020 Coordinator Harvey: "My commentary in the past, 
and I maintain, is that this is the most under-utilized document in the 
city. And we're working to improve that, but we certainly need 
council support to indicate to everyone how important it is, and you 
must take it seriously. And then it follows that staff will follow your 
lead as always which is how it should be." (Planning, 2004) 
The effect of the Task Force’s approach was to scope the process without making explicit what was 
being omitted and why. Another example is the development of the action plan to implement Vision 
2020’s economic goals. Apparently everyone was eligible to comment on environmental, social, and 
health issues but the economic dimension of Vision 2020 needed to be structured by business people. 
This is particularly interesting given that the need for a new guiding vision for economic development 
was one of the reasons for having undertaken the Community Initiative process (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1997, 13).  
 The final document on the economic implications of Vision 2020 came not from the Vision 2020 
process but from what began as an advisory board to the Regional Chairman (Boatman Associates, 
1994). The business vision of Vision 2020 that was developed by this group did not explicitly refer to 
sustainability. 
“Working together, we will implement a set of actions which will 
revitalize Hamilton-Wentworth, and make it the most desirable 
community in Canada in which to live, work, play and i vest.” 
(Boatman Associates, 1994) 
Local columnist Doug Farraway referred to the authors of the report as “movers and shakers” in 
questioning why a voluntary organization that is not under regional control should be granted 
responsibility for creating an economic vision on behalf of the public (Farraway, 1994). 
In not showing by example that there was a way to connect business and environment through 
specific issues, such as the Red Hill controversy, Vision 2020 left each to go its own separate way. It 
should therefore not have surprised anyone that there was likely to be conflict when business and 
environment did intersect on this and other issues. 
 
8.8  The image problem and the credibility gap 
A few days after the community workshop was held in September 1992, an editorial in The Hamilton 
Spectator considered Vision 2020 as a remedy for Hamilton’s “image” problem. 
“It may not be fair, but the perception of Hamilton as a heavily-
industrialized, polluted city has long hurt the community in attracting 
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new business…If the task force agenda is implemented, Hamilton-
Wentworth would be known as a region which recognized its image 
problem and acted to correct the mistakes of the past…. 
Set to present its final recommendations to regional council in 
December, the Vision 2020 task force is showing what Hamilton-
Wentworth has to do if it hopes to improve its quality of life and 
long-term economic future. If the region resists necessary changes, it 
won’t do itself any favor in the long run. With a wholehearted 
commitment to sustainable development, the region will be posed to 
move forward among the ranks of the municipalities known as the 
best places to live.” (Hamilton Spectator, 1992b) 
In the fall of 1993, only nine months after Regional Council had officially accepted the Vision 
2020 reports, great fanfare accompanied the announcement by that Hamilton had been chosen as a 
model community for the Local Agenda 21 program. The newspaper’s report of festivities began by 
describing just such a change in image. 
“It’s a makeover from a dull, ashen, industrial gray to a vibrant 
natural green. From the historic image of a city of smokestacks, 
smog, and a toxic harbor, Hamilton-Wentworth has succeeded in 
being named one of the United Nations’ 21 model municipalities for 
environmentally sustainable development.” (Hughes, 1993) 
Events at which the Region was honoured by an award became an opportune time for Red Hill 
Valley Expressway opponents to remind people that Vision 2020 had not addressed the Expressway 
issue and that this reflected negatively on whether t  Region was genuinely committed to 
sustainability. In the same article that described a change in image, the reporter quoted critics who 
“said the expressway issue will be the measure of the region’s credibility” (Hughes, 1993). Don 
McLean, Chair of the Friends of the Red Hill Valley, noted that “They have to recognize there’s a 
contradiction between doing this and (running) an expr ssway through the biggest park in the city” 
(Hughes, 1993). Pro-valley Regional Councillor Dave Wilson noted that the expressway vs. valley 
issue was “the one anomaly in all the things the region is doing right now” (Hughes, 1993). The pro-
Expressway Regional Chair, Reg Whynott, claimed there was no contradiction.  
“This has no direct impact on that. We’ve given a lot of 
consideration to the environment, to the recreationl potential of the 
valley. We believe it will be better rather than worse.” (Hughes, 
1993) 
The next day, the newspaper ran an editorial in which it objected to the tactic of using the Red Hill 
Valley vs. Expressway issue to discredit the Region. 
“The region’s implementation of Vision 2020 shouldn’t be defined 
solely in terms of one project. Whatever the perceived drawbacks of 
the valley route, the region has made a sincere effort to keep the 
damage to a minimum…Regardless of what happens with the 
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expressway, Hamilton-Wentworth has accepted the challenge of 
sustainable development as the philosophy by which its future will 
be determined. And its designation as a model community will help 
to make Vision 2020 a reality.” (Spectator 1993b)  
The Red Hill Valley Expressway issue continued to dog Vision 2020. When Hamilton-Wentworth 
received the Environment Canada award in 1994, Anne Redish, then president of the Bay Area 
Restoration Council and former member of the Niagar Escarpment Commission, was quoted as 
being critical of  “local politicians for their support of the proposed Red Hill Creek Expressway” 
(Nolan, 1994). 
The (now former) City of Stoney Creek gave the Expressway unconditional support. Despite 
having been supportive of Vision 2020 in September 1992 (Stoney Creek News, 1992), by 1994 the 
weekly Stoney Creek News ran an editorial in which it drew attention to theinconsistency between 
saying and doing—the credibility gap. 
“Unfortunately, like the oxymoron-like term ‘sustain ble 
development’ itself, many of the region’s deeds continue to be at 
odds with its pronouncements. In the past year, for instance, we’ve 
seen our enviro-politicians continue to lobby for a full expressway 
through the Red Hill Valley, as well as for the transfer of 
development control over the Niagara Escarpment to local
municipalities. We’ve seen our politicians urge us to embrace the 
three Rs…to lengthen the life of the [municipal] Glanbrook dump, 
only to turn around and entertain a proposal to use the extra capacity 
for private haulers.” (Stoney Creek News, 1994) 
In 1994 as well, a local writer glowingly described “the region’s remarkable transformation” in the 
National Round Table Review, claiming that Vision 2020 had (already) become “an entrenched part 
of the political process” (Kendrick, 1994). 
“In theory, it articulates a set of values based on a parallel concern 
and respect for people and the environment—not one or the other, 
not one more than the other, but both together. In practice, it weaves 
the concept of sustainable development into the govrnment’s 
decision-making process.” (Kendrick, 1994) 
The article quoted the former Task Force Chair as saying that it remained unclear whether a 
smaller, more environmentally friendly arterial road would “meet the transportation needs of this 
community today or 20 years from now”. The article w nt on to cite as evidence that the expressway 
should not be used to detract from Vision 2020 the support in March 1994 of the Provincial 
Government. The government that had previously opposed the expressway now offered financial 
assistance. Therefore the Region’s credibility and integrity could no longer be impugned and the 




8.9 Summary of the Process 
Sustainability is still one of the City of Hamilton’s ten “core values”, endorsed by the new City 
following amalgamation. The word “values” was used explicitly and deliberately by members of the 
Task Force and regional planners who developed Vision 2020 as synonymous with broad-brush 
visions of a desirable community thirty years hence, as goals of the planning process, and as a basis 
for the plan. Members of the Task Force selected th “basic values” of Vision 2020 from 
contributions made by community members.  
Task Force members favoured vagueness as a means to vert disagreements and controversy. This 
was their strategy for creating the wide-spread support believed to be necessary for ensuring long-
term support for Vision 2020. The extensive and deliberate effort to avoid controversy during the 
planning process continued to shape how disagreements were treated after Vision 2020 was adopted 
by Council by establishing a pattern of behaviour for how to handle the competing interpretations that
were the inevitable result of vagueness in the document. Although it included a definition of 
sustainability and principles of sustainability, more than ten years later the Vision 2020 document 
continued to be criticized for being abstract and vague. The “basic values” of Vision 2020 could be 
interpreted in a variety of ways. One councillor commented that the document could be used to 
support “absolutely whatever we’re doing, or whatever you’re not doing…they’re all there and can be 
made believable in that document…” 
The Task Force also buried disagreements by issuing no minority reports, though post-process 
surveys indicated most participants were interested in knowing not only what had been approved but 
also what had been rejected. An entire subject area was made inaccessible to members of the public. 
That the economic component of the document was prepared by experts and not discussed in the 
same way as environmental and health issues meant that the “three legs” of Hamilton’s sustainability 
policy were never integrated in the minds of participants in the process. Vagueness, heavy-handed 
control of negative information and an overriding emphasis on the need for consensus during the 
planning process established no patterns of behaviour or other mechanisms by which to handle 
disputes or competing interpretations once implementation began. 
The phrase “people’s value set” was not used to identify values-as-attitudes until af er the planning 
process was complete. These values were identified as requiring fundamental change. These values 
had not been addressed by the original process and once implementation began they posed an 
unexpected problem. The planning process had not set an xample for how to handle disagreements 
or for how to accommodate change. 
If Vision 2020 was based on “the public’s values”, how was “the people’s value set” different and 
why was it not part of the process? 
 
8.10 Values Usage and Vision 2020  
With information about anything that might threaten consensus having been so tightly controlled by 
the Task Force, it was inevitable that whatever support was generated for Vision 2020 was expected 
to be based on belief rather than the product of reasoned debate. It is also possible that the firmness 
and certainty of “the public’s values” may have been nhanced by the context in which they were 
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used.  The steps taken to control for disagreement and controversy were not only complementary to 
treating values as firm and certain beliefs but may h ve precluded competing values usages, at least 
until after planning process was complete. A values sage that was not compatible with consensus, 
vagueness, and an emphasis on the positive would not have fit with the process as it was conducted in 
Hamilton. 
Values about which there is existing social agreement may conflict with values embodied by 
government positions and policies, as in the Vision 2020 case. In pluralist democratic societies, it is
not immediately apparent which is the more firm andcertain foundation, and on what grounds—
whether existing values as changeable attitudes or values treated as ideals. The existing “people’s 
value set” may be the weaker position when they conflict with official policy but on political ground 
these values-as-attitudes may be stronger and more difficult to dislodge than “the public’s values”. 
Neither can be ignored, particularly when values are understood both as a solid foundation and as 
tools for social change. 
 
• VALUES AS VISIONS AND GOALS:  
o The use of the word “values” during the period of sliciting public input and 
compiling the Vision 2020 document was virtually synonymous with positive and 
uncritical “visions”.   
o The product was later described as an “ethic of sustainability”. 
o The “basic values” of Vision 2020 were also referred to as “goals” (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1997; 1992a and b).  
• VALUES AS ATTITUDES:  
o The 1997 overview cited the “peoples’ value set” as not having been addressed 
during the original process (Hamilton-Wentworth, 1997), despite the community 
initiative having been presented as based on the “public’s values”.  
The different usage of “values” suggests various questions and concerns: 
• If the “public’s values” formed the basis for Vision 2020, how does the “people’s value 
set” differ from the “public’s values” and why was the former not addressed earlier by the 
Vision 2020 planning team?  
o The “public’s values” on which Vision 2020 is based are vague and abstract. The 
“people’s value set”, in contrast, requires particular changes, such as values about 
bike routes and higher density.  
o Attention to both usages of “values” would have required connecting values about 
abstracts to values about particulars, perhaps a separat  challenge over and above 
any potential disagreements about substantive issues. 
• Focussing only on the positive was a deliberate, strategic choice made by the Task Force.  
o If core and basic values are only positive, this suggests values may be disconnected 
from any critical input, thus allowing positive values to be treated as incontestable 
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because there is nothing negative with which to compare them. Focusing on the 
positive, as the direction to be taken, combined with d sconnecting them from a 
potentially negative context, externalizes existing values.  
o Describing the “people’s value set” as a b rrier to sustainability suggests that 
relative to Vision 2020 the “people’s values” are negative, “wrong”, or “incorrect”, 
particularly with respect to issues such as bike routes and urban growth 
boundaries2.  
• Describing sustainability as an “ethic” creates an association between moral values and the 
“public’s values” on which Vision 2020 is based. 
o The “people’s value set” may be considered as immoral, relative to the “public’s 
values” which are moral. Portraying the “people’s value set” as potentially 
immoral is different from characterizing it as a competing moral stand, incorrect in 
some value-neutral way, or simply unhelpful.  
o Characterizing the “people’s value set” as “attitude” suggests a lack of deep 
commitment of the kind that can be associated with a firm moral position.  
o Describing the difference between the two usages on a moral dimension may 
contribute towards insulating Vision 2020 from competing interpretations or 
criticism.  
• What happens to vague, positive values once competing interpretations emerge?  
o Who decides whether the “people’s value set”, in the case of Vision 2020, is a 
competing interpretation of sustainability, external to the question of sustainability, 
or a correctable confusion?  
o If goals must be vague in order to achieve consensus, and if indeed consensus is 
necessary in order to move forward (as was believed in Hamilton), protecting the 
consensus from potential threats becomes a reasonable course of action. Failure to 
recognize the potential significance of ongoing competing interpretations, 
however, may inhibit understanding sustainability as a contested concept. 
• Implementing sustainability policies allegedly requires a “fundamental change” (Hamilton-
Wentworth, 1997, 49) in the values of the electorate. 
o  If the “people’s value set” is seen as a barrier to sustainability, as sustainability is 
set out in Vision 2020, then whose role is it to correct what are seen as unhelpful, 
improper, confused, or just plain “wrong” values?  
                                                  
2 Such differences may also be inconsistencies but until values usage is established, there is no way to 
distinguish between one set of coherent values that is being fractured by inconsistent application andtwo sets of 
distinct usages. In this case, the details of “the people’s value set” are not the only basis for contrasting two 
usages. The focus is not on the details but on how t is category of usage, labelled “the people’s value set” is 
being used, relative to the other usage, “the public’s values”. 
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o Does or should Vision 2020 being a municipal policy mean that the municipality is 
and should be in charge of determining the received m aning of Vision 2020 and 
sustainability?   
If the “people’s value set” is seen as a barrier in light of the interpretation of sustainability set out in 
Vision 2020, then whose role is it to correct what are seen as unhelpful, improper, or just plain 
“wrong” values? If value change is the responsibility of the municipality, then “educating the people” 
about the received doctrine of sustainability challenges the original intent of Vision 2020 to have 
sustainability driven by the local population. Without leadership from government, however, the 
Vision 2020 process would not have been undertaken. This leaves the municipal government in a 
difficult position, over and above the financial constraints noted in the 1997 overview. 
 
8.10.1 Agreement and disagreement 
Values could have been used as a tool for addressing co troversy instead for evasion of controversy. 
Although the Vision 2020 planning process could have made a significant contribution to learning 
how to make decisions that contribute to sustainability, politicians shied away. The ideas (values) that 
were most likely to be agreed upon were also the most vague, allowing misunderstandings to be 
buried in vagueness.  
Even assuming the best of intentions and no hidden ag das, controversy should have been 
expected. In Hamilton, however, key actors frequently referred to the avoidance of controversy as a 
priority. That there was no controversy about Vision 2020, despite the highly controversial Red Hill 
Expressway issue, during the stage that Vision 2020 was developed, suggests attempts to control the 
situation were successful. 
 
8.10.2 Contestability and general concepts of value s and sustainability 
For the local government to be the dispenser of knowledge about what is sustainable puts it in a 
precarious position. Had the local government not taken the initiative, there would have been no 
process. Once adopted by council, Vision 2020 becam the government’s official version of 
sustainability because of its authority was in a position to determine the value of competing versions 
of sustainability. The dissolution of the municipal rtnership with Action 20203 followed withdrawal 
of funding to the organization by the municipality. Funding was withdrawn after Action 2020 
appealed an urban boundary expansion because it wasnot compatible with Vision 2020 (CATCH, 
2005). 
What happens once competing interpretations emerge? Who decides whether the “people’s value 
set”, for example, is a competing interpretation of sustainability or not an interpretation of 
sustainability at all? If indeed goals must be vague and positive in order to achieve consensus, and if 
indeed consensus is necessary in order to move forward (as was believed in Hamilton), in the absence 
                                                  
3 This was a citizens’ group, now disbanded, that formed to promote implementation of Vision 2020.  
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of some counter-force such as reflective, reasoned discussion or debate there is an opportunity for 
arbitrary power to be the deciding factor in creating a single dominant interpretation of what the goals 
should mean. It is against this received meaning that contesting interpretations of sustainability are 
judged by the municipality. This is different from understanding sustainability as necessarily a 
contested concept, context-dependent, and continually in the making. 
The lack of a more intensive, rigorous, and critical deliberation about what sustainability meant in 
Hamilton’s context masked real agreement and disagreement. In approaching sustainability this way, 
Council did not set an example of how to live with controversy, of what to do with different 
interpretations of sustainability. The long-term impact has been an ever-more strident conflict in the 
community between the pro- and anti-expressway groups, each now in a position to claim to be “more 
sustainable” than the other by referring to Vision 2020. Aside from this specific conflict, there may 
broader underlying conflict between those speaking out on behalf of the environment in the planning 
process and elsewhere and those speaking on behalf of business. Because it has never been addressed 
openly, there is no way of knowing how profound the differences are. 
 
8.10.3 “Values” and the social process 
In treating values as equivalent to abstract goals (as in “This is what we hope we will be like in the 
future”) the Vision 2020 process buried the question of whether values that we have today will need 
to change. These values were formulated without any critical input. What happened to values 
thereafter in the process was an articulation of what such vague values might imply, a unidirectional 
influence from the top down. Values as goals were not informed by values about particulars. Had 
values been incorporated throughout so that particulars informed the goals, as well as the reverse, this 
would have enabled connecting abstract values to the particular context of Hamilton. The values that 
were identified subsequently as “the people’s value set” were never considered because these values 
were not implied by the goals. 
Although the process made clear that Vision 2020 would set a new direction, and therefore implied 
that “do-nothing” was not a value-free alternative, there was no discussion of which values were to be 
rejected. What does it mean to “adopt new values”, a  Mark Bekkering’s piece suggested would be 
necessary? Where would these values come from? A questioning attitude could have helped uncover 
hidden values and perhaps led to examining values that were associated with what people chose not to 
want in the future. 
Values as used in Vision 2020 were implicitly taken to mean that they could only be about 
something good. They were not treated as potentially f l ible, potentially either positive or negative 
and requiring a critical examination. Without such a treatment, there is no rationale for treating some 
values as more significant than others. 
 
8.11 Applying a Particular Usage of Values for Sust ainability 
This examination of values usage associated with Vision 2020 shows: 
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• There was no awareness of diverse usage or attempt o relate the usage of values to describe 
firm ground to the usage of values to describe what as incorrect and undesirable. 
• Avoidance of negative positions and conflict meant tha values could be left vague and that 
no solid grasp of current conditions was necessary. 
• Aspects of Vision 2020 were not treated as being connected during the planning process. 
Topics were addressed one by one by separate groups of people, with specific workshops 
more likely to attract participants were already enthusiastic about environment or health, and 
so on, and thus even more likely to contribute to emphasizing the positive. Economics was 
isolated from the rest of the process by the hiring of a consultant. Vision 2020 was 
undertaken at least in part as an answer to economic problems but participants were not asked 
to consider cost in considering what they desired. 
• Values as desires were translated directly into values as goals with no need to consider 
desires critically 
• Uncertainty played no role in the process except as allowing people to consider what they 
would like in the future. 
• Values usage served the status quo. As non-controversial goals, values led to the drafting of 
Vision 2020 in terms of descriptive, substantive categories instead of issues or problems. As 
attitudes that needed to be changed, values were ultimately described as being in the service 
of these same descriptive, substantive categories.  
• There was no opportunity to develop habits that could s stain diversity of opinion during an 
ongoing process of becoming sustainable, reflecting an overall emphasis on the goals and not 
on the process. 
 
A different understanding both of values and of sustainability could have resulted in a very 
different process. The answer to the question “what will our sustainable community look like in thirty 
years” was in the goals, in the same way that premis s are part of conclusions by deduction. Values-
as-goals were treated in the same way as unquestiond first premises.  
Treating sustainability as a question to which there is no single right answer and to which the 
answer is not known in advance could have instigated  questioning attitude towards values at the 
same time that it prevented the local concept of sustainability, vague as it was, from hardening into an 
interpretation that required enforcement by the municipality in the face of challenges by members of 
the public. 
The Vision 2020 process treated “values” as being isolated from events and ideas, from a broader 
context. The overview of the history of diverse usage (Chapter 3) showed how the features that 
connect different usages of “values” were intimately connected with the larger social context and also
the basis for connecting various usages with each other and with the concept of values in general. 
Values, in general and specifically, have a history.  
From the very beginning of the process, the values-as-goals needed to be scrutinized critically. 
Because they were treated as visions, the emphasis on the positive, and the need for consensus, this 
never happened. As a result, the set of values that dominated Vision 2020 was formulated uncritically 
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and allowed to determine what else would count as a “real” value throughout the process. This is an 
application of the “determination of fit” usage of values first described in this thesis in the historcal 
overview of diverse usage as a utilitarian application and later revisited in the form of Hayek’s values 
usage (Chapters 6 and 7). This may be the most insidiou  form of values usage. A single overriding 
value or set of dominant values determines, from the top down, what should count as a value in its 
domain; this overriding value is often so pervasive that it may only be detectable through the 
footprints it leaves on other values; and even when all other values are treated as contestable, this 
value is immune from challenge. Its authority comes from unquestioning faith and belief, not from 
being able to address challenges. This usage of values is deductive reasoning brought to life, an 
example of how deductive reasoning can be a “barrier” to sustainability (Gunderson et al., 1995, 526). 
In some respects this problem could have been addressed procedurally. It should have been much 
harder for any given value to be crowned as a goal at the outset without having been critically 
examined, allowing criticisms to become public knowledge and matters for debate. Approached 
adaptively, it should have been expected that any vlue-as-goal would change when it was allowed to 
be informed by details in an ongoing way, throughout the process.  
To ensure that procedural changes brought about all of the necessary changes, however, would also 
have required explicit attention to three aspects of values that have emerged during this study: Values 
are relations; as relations, values are penultimate products of comparison and contrast; and that 
comparison and contrast done well engages a questioning attitude. It is comparative logic (Chapter 5) 
that acts as a bridge between inductive and deductive reasoning and on which both depend because 
neither is sufficient alone. As relations, values are bridges between the known and the unknown, the 














There were two stages to this exploratory research into the word and idea of “values”. The first stage 
was conducted only from the perspective of values. In the second stage, conclusions from the study of 
values were applied to planning as an exercise in rflective planning. To better reflect the research, 
there are several sections to this concluding chapter. First, the research is summarized by chapters. 
Second, conclusions are summarized by relating values and planning. Third, the conclusions are 
stated formally and followed by a discussion of implications. This is followed by discussion of 
limitations and constraints and suggestions for further research. 
 
9.2 Summary by Chapters 
The flexibility of the word “values” has allowed it to be adapted to a variety of purposes and 
applications in a range of disciplines since it was introduced in the late 1800s.  Respecting the 
multiple disciplines from which planning draws its knowledge and methods, this research did not 
begin with assumptions about what values are and how t ey should be used in planning. It began 
instead with a study of actual usage of the word “values”. Using grounded theory methodology 
(Chapter 2), examples of values usage were compared and contrasted in an iterative process to 
develop a theory about diverse usage of the word “values”. This theory was then applied in to 
planning in general, to sustainability planning, and lastly to a case study of sustainability planning. 
In Chapter 3, a brief history of diverse usage illustrated connections among particular usages, the 
social context, and other ideas to which “values” were attached. That values language is so pervasive 
makes it hard to imagine that “values” came into use relatively recently. The early history of “values” 
evolved not only in the context of ideas but also of social forces related to the insecurity and 
uncertainty created by conditions leading up to the two world wars, the wars themselves, the rise of 
democracy and the industrial state, the changing relationships among states, societies, and 
individuals, and impossibly high expectations placed on the newly emerging social sciences.  
A flexible and vague concept of values arose out of necessity after Nietzsche’s new use of the word 
“values” raised the possibility that values were fallible; values could no longer simply be assumed to 
be valuable. As a result, the idea of values became detached from the idea of absolutes. The new 
usage challenged conventional ideas about epistemology and philosophy. Equally significant was the 
social challenge it presented to prevailing dominant beliefs. Nietzsche’s usage emerged in concert 
with and as a reflection of widespread scepticism in the decades preceding and following 1900. His 
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call for a transvaluation of values involved not only re-evaluation but more incisively a re-evaluation 
of conventional values according to new criteria.  
This understanding of values was soon competing with other usages, some of which attempted to 
reinstate the belief that values could only be positive by definition and that values could be used as 
firm and certain principles. Such usages emerged in applications in which values were systematized 
and operationalized for application in large-scale projects by behavioural sciences to serve the 
purposes of states, such as moulding good democratic itizens. The strongest strain of this usage, 
however, emerged almost immediately after the new usage was introduced. Early in the history of 
“values”, the study of ethics reclaimed the idea of values as absolutes, leading other scholars in the 
early 1900s to protest that ethics was attempting to subvert idea of values. This strain of values usage 
continues to the present, notably, for the present purposes, in the field of planning when values are 
treated as firm and certain beliefs. 
 During some periods in the history of values, thatere was such a thing as a general concept of 
values appeared obvious. As usages continued to diverge, that various usages could be considered 
together as a group, as expressions of a single general concept of values, seemed less likely. Various 
usages became entrenched in different fields, making it possible to work within a single usage 
without ever needing to be aware of competing usages. There is no single history of “values” that 
cannot be countered by another history of values conducted from the perspective another usage of the 
word. In the historical overview of diverse usage, a flexible and vague concept of values was used as 
a conceptual device to explore whether a concept could allow all values usages to be considered as a 
group, even when differences among usages were so great as to suggest that various usages were so 
different, disconnected, and discrete that they might be described more appropriately as homonyms. 
Four objections to the use of values language were considered in Chapter 4. All four objections 
acknowledge the importance of language in shaping what e think about and how we think. 
Objection Four demonstrates this by its treatment of “relativity” but does not treat the word “values” 
as being meaningful enough to shape thinking; its use as a jargon word means it obstructs clarity. 
Other than that, for Objection Four, whether or not something is called “a value” makes no difference.  
The other three objections disagree. Objection One holds that using values language destroys our 
ability to appreciate what is truly valuable. Objection Two holds further that dogmatic, subjective 
declarations of values are a necessary consequence of using values language and therefore prevent 
collective consideration of common good and are destructive to democracy. Values language is, 
however, particularly well suited to the market place. Using values language in social applications is a 
vehicle by which the consumer mentality is imposed on other spheres of life. The remedy is to keep 
the market separate from what is really valuable.  
Objection Three agrees and laments that values are pres nted dogmatically but does not agree that 
this is an essential or necessary feature of values. The problem is not that values allow the 
marketplace to dominate social life but that the relational aspect of values is not appreciated for its 
potential for making cross-sectoral applications. Were a questioning attitude attached to values, this 
could address the problem of dogmatic claims about val es and also assist in applications of values 
that bridged one or more usages. That values are treated as unconditional and incontestable is a 
barrier to realizing the potential of values. Only Objection Three holds out the possibility that, 
understood differently, values might useful to planning. 
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A theory about diverse usage of values was presented i  Chapter 5. The theory is in response to the 
two research questions: (1) Given the frequency with hich the word “values” is used as 
interchangeable with other descriptors, can calling something “a value” make a difference? and (2) 
Are various usages of “values” merely discretely and distinctly different homonyms or can they be 
treated as diverse instances of some concept of values in general? This theory was developed by 
comparing and contrasting thousands of actual usages of the word “values”, the key unit of analysis 
and core category during research using grounded theory methodology (Chapter 2).  
A flexible and vague concept of values in general ws proposed as being able to provide support 
for assumptions about a shared understanding of values. The concept of values does not have an 
existence independent of the particular usages of which it is comprised. Diverse usage of values is not 
random but part of an ongoing and evolutionary process of recognizing and determining value. This 
gives a concept of value explanatory power but not predictive power. Even if there might be values 
that could be assumed with complete certainty to be absolutely true in all contexts over time, these 
values would need to be distinguished from those that are not. This means that a questioning attitude 
is an important feature of a concept of values that con inues to evolve. It means that all values are 
judgements, irrespective of what they purport to be a out, where they are claimed to be sourced, or 
what type of authority they are presented as having. 
If all values are judgements about relations, then values should not be treated as absolutes that are 
firm and certain. No value should be treated as incontestable and all values benefit from critical 
scrutiny. All values are “penultimate” judgements about relations, irrespective of whether values are 
about abstract ideas of perfection, truth and goodness or they are about narrow individual preferences 
about particular goods or ideas. When comparison and co trast is familiar and simple, such 
judgements may happen so quickly that the process may be imperceptible. Comparison and contrast is 
a way of classifying, an ongoing process of attempts to apprehend, organize, and understand. Values 
present themselves as moments of this process and not final or complete.  
Values are dependent on valuers, irrespective of whether individuals are valuing narrow individual 
preferences or the common good. It is valuers who ident fy qualities in objects as being inherently or 
intrinsically valuable and valuers who make judgements about whether these qualities are essential or 
imposed on objects by humans. The subjectivity of values is not something that can be avoided but 
that values are subjective does not justify the making of dogmatic claims. Dogmatic claims can be 
deflated by attaching a questioning attitude to values.  
That a questioning attitude is suggested by all three themes of the theory about diverse usage 
suggests that values may be an appropriate tool for challenging conventional ideas and the status quo. 
Although the use of values to challenge conventional ideas is historically related to a concept of 
values, such usage is currently not common.  
In Chapter 6, the grounded theory developed and tested from the perspective of values usage was 
applied to planning in the form of three propositions. None of these propositions failed. As 
anticipated by the theory, there is also diverse values usage in planning. This means that there are at 
least two ways in which people can disagree about val es, one on substantive grounds (different 
positions about values) and the other on the ground f values usage.  
A discussion of Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation and Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to 
Serfdom was used to frame the debate about dilemmas associted with planning. In their usages of 
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“values”, Polanyi and Hayek (more so) provide an opportunity to examine the relationship between 
how the word “values” is used and how planning is understood. 
It is highly unlikely that a single usage of values will meet all of the needs of all ways in which 
“planning” is understood. This does not eliminate th possibility that some particular way of 
understanding planning may benefit from a particular sage of values selected for how adequately it 
addresses the needs of that particular understanding or purpose of planning. A suggested list of needs 
for planning in general was proposed to guide development of a particular values usage for 
sustainability planning. 
In Chapter 7, a particular usage of values for sustainability planning was developed based on the 
history of diverse usage, objections to values langu ge, and the theory about diverse usage. These 
were combined with the suggested needs of planning and the default concept of values. Sustainability 
is essentially a collective undertaking. The feasibility of using values language as part of 
sustainability planning rested on whether values necessarily preclude collective consideration of the 
common good. 
Sustainability-oriented planning has a particularly desperate need for a usage of “values” that 
enables cross-sectoral applications and appreciates r ther than minimizes uncertainty and complexity. 
Some usages constrain such applications; others are neutral about the potential of values. The history 
of diverse usage demonstrated how a particular usage of “values”, the usage called “determination of 
fit”, allows all values to be treated as contestable except for an overriding dominant value by which 
other values are determined. Treating sustainability as an unconditional, incontestable dominant value 
may not serve it as well in the long run as would treating it as conditional and contestable, like any
other value. A particular usage of values might be sel cted for how easily it can be operationalized 
and assist in manipulating outcomes in favour of judgements that conform to particular ways of 
understanding sustainability. There are, however, strategic, political, social, and epistemological 
reasons for promoting a values usage that engages a questioning attitude, whether or not such a values 
usage is easy to manage. Planners may prefer a particular usage of “values” for their own use but 
must still be able respond to other usages as thesear  presented to them by non-planners in the course 
of planning. The ways in which non-planners use the word “values” cannot be forced or enforced. 
Planners are able to mitigate this problem by attaching a questioning attitude to all values. 
Chapter 8 reviewed the planning process for a local government’s sustainability initiative: the case 
of Vision 2020 in Hamilton, Ontario. The phrase “the public’s values” was used explicitly and 
deliberately as coextensive with vague goals and visions for the future. “The people’s value set”, in 
contrast, was used as coextensive with a weaker, changeable form of values. In this case the latter 
usage was applied to more specific matters.  
At the end of Chapter 8, the particular usage of values suggested for sustainability planning was 
applied to the usage of values in Vision 2020. That t e “the public’s values” addressed vague matters 
and “the people’s value set” addressed details turned out to be a red herring because these differences 
flowed from distinguishing values on the level of descriptive categories of values and not conceptual 
categories. Descriptive categories of values reinforce the status quo. What is more significant was the 
lack of awareness that these two usages are related, both competing expressions of a concept of 
values in general. In the Vision 2020 process, the goal of avoiding controversy reinforced the 
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apparent need to treat values as firm and certain. Attaching a questioning attitude to values could have 
improved the planning process. 
 
9.3 Summary: Planning and Values 
 “When new information threatens emerging agreement, it tends to 
be dismissed as ‘dangerous knowledge.’ Thus mediators may pursue 
agreement at the expense of understanding.” Schön (1983) 
This application of the word and idea “values” was an exercise in reflective planning, in the tradition 
articulated by Donald Schön (1983). Changes to values can be threatening in the same way that new 
knowledge may be dismissed as “dangerous”. When values are used to affirm existing beliefs they 
affirm the status quo on several dimensions—politically, socially, economically, culturally, 
epistemologically, and so on. Such usage of “values” may serve the purposes of planning approaches 
that do not reach beyond the world as we know it, such as the rational comprehensive approach to 
planning, but it constrains and even counteracts the purposes of planning approaches, such as 
sustainability planning, that challenge the status q o by embracing uncertainty.  
As Schön suggests in the above quote, the desire for certainty and agreement may overwhelm and 
overshadow other important considerations. Values ar  increasingly touted as the firm and certain 
ground on which agreement takes place; they are treated as a means to achieve agreement. Such usage 
of values, however, comes at the “expense of understanding”. This study concludes that agreement 
and understanding need not be mutually exclusive goals of values usage, provided that the 
stereotypical understanding of values is supplanted by a better grasp of what values are and how they 
can be used. 
Key aspects of a better grasp of “values” include the three propositions that were tested in 
application to planning and are summarized below (Section 9.3). 
 
9.3.1 The trouble with “values” for planners 
Originally, the word challenged dominant beliefs of the day simply by calling these beliefs “values”. 
It challenged the use of a single, objective standard for determining what is valuable and in this way, 
for the first time, created the possibility that something that was called “a value” was not necessarily 
valuable. For the most part the word “values” has for aken its revolutionary origins and is now used 
to reaffirm and support dominant social beliefs rather than to question them.  
New usages of “values” continue to emerge as the word is used in different disciplines and new 
applications. Today, multiple and even contradictory usages coexist. Planners, therefore, cannot select 
their audience to include only those who have the same understanding of “values” and use the word in 
the same way. The planner’s problem of communicating across multiple and diverse usages of 
“values” is the same problem faced in any discussion of values. This problem is similar to speaking at 
the UN without benefit of translators—hearers understand “values” depending on their own 
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understanding and experience with the word. The diff rence is that the language problem is 
recognized at UN but there is little recognition in the planning community that miscommunicating 
across values usages may play an underlying role in shaping how people describe positions they take 
about values and in constraining resolution of different positions about values. Planners may not be 
able to enforce how the word is used but they should be able to recognize different usages and 
understand how and why those usages are in play. 
Use of the word “values” in planning ranges from trea ing the word loosely as interchangeable with 
descriptors such as “principles”, “beliefs”, “opinio s”, “attitudes”, “interests”, “opinions”, “goals”, 
and so on, to precisely defined definitions that apply only to a given work of a particular author. 
Where there is an assumption of shared meaning, differences in how values are understood may be 
obscured. In such situations, there appears to be n compelling motivation or reason to question how 
the word is being used because differences in meaning are not noticed or acknowledged. Even when 
there is an awareness of different meanings, however, there appears to be no remedy for confusion. 
Even if each speaker defines precisely how the word is used, the result is a multiplicity of definitions 
that at first glance do not appear to be comparable nd may even be contradictory. This precludes 
integrated conclusions across values usages—even if each usage of “values” is precisely defined. 
In light of this, can “values” be a useful tool for planning?  
 
9.3.2 The trouble with values usage in planning 
Calling something “a value” appears to grant an idea, belief, opinion, and so on, a special authority—
greater than what it might have had without that label. This authority creates an aura of immunity 
from challenge, perpetuating assumptions that it is either disrespectful or unnecessary to challenge 
what someone claims to be a value. With no reason to expect a challenge, claims about values can be 
made without needing to expect consequences. There is no apparent need to take responsibility for 
how we use the word “values” or for the positions we take about values. The result, ultimately, is that
values usages may contribute to prolonging disputes about values. 
For example, natural features such as the Niagara Esc rpment are often described as “having 
values”, where “values” refer to intrinsic qualities in nature, not created by humans and not requiring 
judgement or critical evaluation by humans. Because anything can be claimed as an intrinsic value, 
without critical examination there is no opportunity to distinguish what may be intrinsic from what 
may not be intrinsic—even though it is claimed to be intrinsic. Intrinsic values are treated as 
unconditional. There is no uncertainty about them and thus no apparent need for further investigation.  
Calling some values “intrinsic” is a way to distinguish this group of values from human values. 
This means that whenever intrinsic values are discussed, there are two parallel sets of values usage in 
play, even if the second usage remains implicit. Intrinsic values necessarily divide values into human 
values and values sourced in objects, independent of human judgement. Talk about “intrinsic values”, 
therefore, implicitly or explicitly serves to reinforce the separation of humans from nature.  
Unlike intrinsic values, human values may or not be presented as absolute and unconditional. 
Human values may be more likely to be recognized as fallible and require evaluation but human 
values too are often presented dogmatically as unconditi nal and absolute. In this example there are 
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now potentially three different usages of “values” in play, simply by virtue of having called 
something an “intrinsic value”: Non-human values as unconditional, human values as conditional, 
and human values as unconditional. 
 Because there is little awareness of the multiplicity of values usage, the distinction between 
intrinsic values and human values may not be recognized. This means that the common usage of 
intrinsic values as not requiring judgement may serve as a model for other uses of the word “values” 
by reinforcing a common assumption that no values ar  conditional. Usage of the phrase “intrinsic 
values”, therefore, may influence other values usage but not necessarily in predictable ways. Whether 
a value is presented as unconditional or conditional has quite different implications for the resolution 
of disputes but there seem to be no solid criteria fo  establishing which of these (unconditional or 
conditional) should apply in what circumstances. 
This example of “intrinsic values” is only one of a multitude of ways in which values usages 
interact with each other.  
 
9.3.3  The problem with descriptive groups of value s: Values as “silos” 
Grouping values according to what the values are about is common practice. Values are described as 
“environmental values” because they are about the environment. “Transportation values” are about 
transportation. “Economic values” are about economics, and so on. Such usage reflects similar 
divisions in how social life and government are organized. Without a mechanism to compare and 
contrast groups of descriptive values, limiting examination of values to their “face value” treats each 
group of descriptive values as a silo unto itself. Grouping values according to descriptive content 
compartmentalizes values. 
When examined more closely, each silo of descriptive values contains a myriad of miniature 
descriptive silos. To categorize quarrying operations as governed primarily by “economic values”, for 
example, is to isolate economic values from the moral and environmental values that are also in play. 
We have moral values about economics and about environment. Environmental values include values 
about morality and values about economics, and so on. When they are examined more closely, 
descriptive categories seem to crumble in ways that are not manageable because the groups of values 
are not the same on the inside as their outsides sugge t. Even though there is potentially a wide range 
of overlap internally, descriptive groups of values do not appear to have enough in common to be 
comparable, primarily because all attention is focussed on their face value. 
For example, moral values may appear not to be comparable to other groups—economic values, for 
example—because moral values may be understood (by some) as being based on absolutes. If moral 
values are understood as absolute (unconditional), this means they can and should be treated as 
distinct from economic values, for example, because economic values depend on comparison and are 
conditional (for some). 
Moral values, however, are not always treated absolutes. Moral values too may be the result of 
comparative reasoning, just like economic values. In this case, both economic values and moral 
values require human judgement. Similarly, environme tal values may sometimes be presented as 
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absolute intrinsic values but other values about the environment are calculated, result from 
comparison, or may simply be individual preferences.  
None of these groups of descriptive values corresponds uniquely to a particular way of developing 
or determining what is a value. Comparison is not uniq ely a basis for distinguishing economic 
values. As with moral and environmental values, within the group of economic values some may be 
calculated and others derived deductively and present d as dogmatically as any intrinsic value or 
individual preference.  
None of these silos of descriptive values is homogeneous internally, either on the level of what they 
are about or with respect to how the values are known and used. The variables that make them non-
homogenous may be the very features that enable making connections across descriptive groups of 
values and create opportunities to integrate values that appear to be incomparable. 
The most common way to characterize the different positions people have about values is also 
according to what the different value positions are about. If descriptive values can be misleading, then 
this way of grouping value positions may also be misleading and potentially a factor in protracted 
disagreement. 
By masking underlying similarities and differences—the nuts and bolts of values usage—
descriptive groups of values deflect from other opportunities to resolve disputes about values. Both 
agreements and disagreements will be disrupted easily if people were talking about different things 
but believed they were talking about the same thing.  
Simply identifying silos of values provides neither means nor motivation to connect different value 
positions that are identified according to what they are about. As a result, resolving differences in 
positions about value appears to be strictly a normative problem. Barring an intervention by power, so 
long as the person with the “poorer” values chooses to adopt the “better” values, differences are 
resolved. A change in beliefs appears to be the only way to resolve differences about values. This 
leaves the door wide open for manipulation of values and for power to be the arbiter of values. There 
may be another way to address the problem. 
 
9.3.4 Grouping values according to conceptual featu res: Beyond the “face value” of 
values 
Going beneath the silos and beyond the descriptions of what values are about may provide 
opportunities to connect and compare values. Identifyi g the features of any given usage of “values” 
requires some thought. They are not immediately obvious in the same way as descriptions of values 
according to what they are about. Some examples of conceptual features by which to group values 
are: 
• recognizing when a value is being presented dogmatically and when it is not (irrespective of 
whether these values are individual preferences or presented as being good for society as a 
whole), 
• identifying the purpose of a values usage and understanding its political agenda (presenting 
values as not being contestable serves human purposes), 
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• distinguishing between values presented as being sourced in humans and values sourced at 
arm’s length from humans (whether from Spirit or God, Nature, or organized religion),  
• distinguishing between values that are treated as static and valuing as a process or activity,  
• identifying the one value that may be hidden and protected from questioning even though 
other values are all presented as being contestable 
• determining what conditions a value must meet in order to qualify as “a value” according to 
some particular usage 
Values are essentially relative and inevitably penultimate judgements. At any given moment in the 
process, values are themselves the results of earlier comparison and contrast processes that are now 
hidden by more recent valuations. The phrase “absolute values”, therefore, is an oxymoron. 
Nonetheless, the phrase is used and values are presented as absolutely certain even without calling 
them such. In the same way, religions describe themselves in terms of values, seemingly unaware that 
describing religious tenets in terms of values weakens the tenets. Such usages are examples of actual 
values usage that must be part of the planner’s vocabulary of values, a vocabulary that cannot be 
limited only to those usages that the planner deems to be correct. 
 
9.3.5 Barrier to conceptual groups of values  
The range of values usage, including phrases such as “absolute values”, is extensive and continues to 
expand. If the word “values” is used in wildly different ways, is it even possible that all instances of 
values usage share something in common, something more than the word itself?   
If they do not, then values are merely homonyms, completely distinct and incomparable. If so, this 
means not only that descriptive values have nothing in common beyond the word “values” but also 
that connecting these discrete applications of “values” through their conceptual features is not 
justifiable. The silos must be allowed to stand andintegrating judgements about different groups of 
descriptive values must be accepted as impossible. 
Because treating values at face value has negative consequences for planners, we have reason to 
dig a bit deeper and to ask whether all values usages, despite their differences, might not be 
considered as components of some more general concept of values? Can a single concept unite such a 
wide range of usage? 
 
9.3.6 A concept of values in general  
Integrating values usages requires a concept of values. For a single concept to relate values usages 
that are so different as to be contradictory, it would need to: 
• embrace diverse usages and uncertainty 
• treat values as relational and comparative judgements 
• connect abstract values to values about particulars 
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• evolve as new usages emerge 
• require questioning all values 
Such a concept of values is possible. It works in the same way as, for example, the concept of 
dogness. The concept of dogness, like the concept of values, does not emerge full blown or exist only 
abstractly but is learned through experience. Children or isolated villagers may know of only one dog 
who constitutes the whole of their concept of dogness. Their concept of dogness evolves and adapts 
with learning about other animals who are also called “dogs”.  There can be no concept of dogness 
without instances of dogs. In the same way, the concept of values has no existence independent of the 
values usages of which it is comprised. 
For example, if we only know that values are absolutely certain, then why would we also call 
something we cannot know for certain “a value”? If Great Danes are the only known instances of 
dogness, how do we know that a terrier is also a dog? The same process applies to a concept of values 
and learning about other usages of “values”. The concept of values today is necessarily different from 
what it was when word values first emerged because the range and application of “values” is broader. 
Even though the default concept of values treats values penultimate judgements, the concept includes 
values that are presented as certain and values that are not. The concept of values is flexible and 
vague and tolerant of diversity but can also explain when and why the word “values” is used 
inappropriately, as in the phrase “absolute values”. 
Calling something “a value” makes it different from principles, beliefs, attitudes, interests, 
opinions, and so on. Values and other descriptors are not interchangeable even though they are used 
as such.  Calling a principle or a belief “a value” changes it from something firm and certain into 
something that is relative and uncertain. 
 
9.3.7 Barrier to a concept of values 
Convention is the single most powerful barrier to recognizing a multiplicity of values usage as 
instances of a concept of values in general. On normative grounds, a concept of values may be 
undesirable (for some) because it poses a threat to prevailing beliefs. 
The segregation of areas of social life is also a matter of convention and also threatened by a 
concept of values. Acceptance of such a concept of values makes it more difficult to treat any single 
usage as the whole of values usage. Whichever usage of values supports convention is forced to 
compete with other usages. 
 
9.3.8 Values as a planning tool   
If this barrier to a concept of values can be overcome, then values can be a useful planning tool 




Values are relative judgements. If no value is immune to questioning, then no value can be 
considered as so solid that it can be used as firm and foundational. “Core” values are no more solid or 
significant than any other value. This means core values should not be used to justify core zones of 
planning unless their conditionality is acknowledge. Acknowledging conditionality detracts from the 
purpose of using core values to justify core zones. 
Values should and can be integrated throughout planning processes, not left stranded as abstract 
goals. Values as goals acquire their meaning from the details of planning processes, in the same way 
that the concept of values is constituted by a variety of values usages. 
Values can be used in planning ethics but not as solid and certain principles or beliefs. Values and 
ethics are compatible when the approach to ethics allows for comparison and judgement. Statements 
of Values are better called something else unless the values are intended to invite questioning. 
Questioning how someone’s values are presented is not disrespectful but necessary, particularly in 
the context of planning in pluralist democracies. Planners need to have a good understanding of 
values usage in weighing contributions to planning processes that are phrased in terms of values. It 
matters how someone understands “values” when they make a claim about values. 
 
9.3.9 Opportunities for sustainability planning: 
Just as planners have a choice in how planning is understood and in what substantive values planning 
is to reflect and promote, so too is there choice in how to understand and apply the word “values”. 
Values can do more than affirm what already is. Sustainability planners have opportunities both to 
choose to treat values as conditional and contestabl  and to encourage taking a questioning attitude 
towards values. 
Values originated as a tool to challenge prevailing beliefs and such a usage remains available to 
sustainability planners. The first step is not allowing any value, however it is presented and however 
it is claimed to be justified, to be immune to criti al examination. Prevailing beliefs are a barrier to 
changing unsustainable behaviour. To call something “a value” means that it must be questioned. If 
the prevailing beliefs are treated as values and if they cannot withstand scrutiny then they must be 
rejected. 
Cross-sectoral integration and comparison of values is possible and necessary. Sustainability 
planners need to look beyond the limitations of superficial, descriptive groups of values for other 
ways of recognizing diverse usages of “values”. Awareness that a concept of values can connect 
usages of values that are so different as to be contradictory makes this possible.   
Recognizing that all values are judgements and therefore necessarily uncertain increases the 
likelihood of success for sustainability planning exercises. Without taking a questioning attitude 
towards all values, dogmatic claims about values will continue on familiar paths. Disagreements 
about values cannot be settled by gathering more information or data but neither do they need to be 
circular and dogmatic. Reasoning about values is pos ible.  
Allowing values to stand without critical examination creates a climate in which dogmatic positions 
about values persist without expectation of resoluti n. Understood as proposed above, values can be a 
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useful tool for planning in general and sustainability planning in particular. Moreover, such a values 
usage may actually assist in resolving protracted disputes about values.   
 
9.4 Conclusions  
This thesis has demonstrated that there is diversity in how “values” are understood and used.  Diverse 
usage emerges from the confluence of events and ideas. Each application of values is potentially 
unique at the same time that it interacts with and is an expression of a flexible and vague concept of 
values in general. Diverse usage is established here not on the ground of positions that people take 
about values or the content of values but on the basis of conceptual categories that identify features of 
usage and establish criteria by which to determine wh ther and how calling something “a value” is 
justified relative to a particular usage. This aspect of values is a factor in determining the content of 
values and in how people express positions about val es but remains a subject for further research. 
Detaching the idea of values from the idea of absolutes takes values back to the original meaning. 
This thesis has attempted to address “values” from a variety of positions about what values are or 
should be. Each reader will have brought to this the is his or her own understanding of what values 
“really” are. For some readers, the conclusions reach d here will challenge what they understand to 
be the conventional usage of “values”, seeming for them to be perhaps as revolutionary as when the 
new usage of values first emerged in the late 1800s. For others, the idea that a questioning attitude 
should be attached to all values may seem elementary, self-evident, and modest. Neither the study of 
values nor the way in which the results have been pr sented has been aimed at satisfying only a single 
audience. Because for many readers the conclusions may challenge convention, it is particularly 
important that the conclusions result from a formal ethodology that is transparent and establishes 
terms for validity and that the history of diverse usage has been documented in detail. Equally 
important is that the study was explorative rather an normative. That values should be approached 
with a questioning attitude was not a normative hypothesis around which the research was structured 
but a proposition that emerged from an exploration of the word “values” using grounded theory 
methodology.  
The general question that this study attempted to adress is whether an explicit and deliberate use 
of “values” has neutral, beneficial, or detrimental implications for planning. The general answer is 
that the value of explicit and deliberate use can vry according to understanding and usage of 
“values” but that values do have potential to be an important and powerful planning tool. Attaching a 
questioning attitude to all values changes them fro pillars of the status quo to challengers of 
convention. This suggests that it would be prudent for planners to appreciate how potent values may 
be, particularly because attaching a questioning attitude to all values does not guarantee that the 
products of valuing will necessarily be what planners xpect. When a questioning attitude is attached 
to values, explicit and deliberate use of “values” may be a volatile social force. 
Whether the theory about diverse usage is or not desirable is a separate question in the same way 
that critics and supporters of values both agree that values are necessarily relative (Chapter 4) and 
proceed to disagree from that point forward. There is disagreement among the objections about 
whether the relativity of values is harmful or beneficial and this disagreement reflects positions taken 
by the objections about the desirability of values language. The objections were used as an external 
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control on conclusions reached using grounded theory methodology, confirming that values are 
necessarily relative. This thesis does make a normative judgement about the desirability of values 
language. Had the objections been allowed to stand, his thesis would have had no choice but to find 
that explicit and deliberate use of “values” necessarily has a negative effect on planning. The 
desirability of the theory about diverse usage of “values” remains to be considered by others. 
The general question studied here was made more specific by asking three research questions. The 
first two questions are addressed by the first three conclusions. The last question is addressed by the 
fourth conclusion. 
 
9.4.1 Conclusions One, Two, and Three 
Using grounded theory methodology, the first two questions were researched from the perspective of 
values in general. This was the subject of the first half of the thesis. The conclusions from grounded 
theory were then re-stated as propositions and applied to planning in general. The third proposition 
emerged from the theory about diverse usage and is the basis for proposing a particular usage of 
values for sustainability planning. This particular usage of values was then applied to a case study of 
sustainability planning to establish whether understanding values differently might have made a 
difference in the planning process and implementation.  
 
Conclusion One: Calling something “a value” can make a difference.  
The word “values” is used interchangeably with a long list of other words. Some values may be 
beliefs but not all beliefs are values. The same applies to words such as attitudes, opinions, principles, 
goals, and so on. Not distinguishing values as distinct from such other terms makes the word “values” 
redundant and defeats its potential. Use of the word “values” can change something firm and certain 
into something conditional, no more than a penultima e judgement about value. 
Though some usages treat values as coextensive with “what is valuable”, in the sense of what is 
worthy, not all usages do so. Values are used variously to refer to scales such as good and bad, right 
and wrong, and only good and right. The default concept of values calls for investigation of which 
usage applies. 
 
Conclusion Two: Diverse values usage can be related by a concept of values.  
Pessimism about the possibility of articulating a concept of values in general stemmed from concern 
about the lack of a single definition, the wide range of application, and the variety of methodological 
approaches to values. A concept of values based on conceptual categories of values was able to 
circumvent the disparities on the substantive level (d scriptive categories). This concept is a 
component of the theory about diverse usage presentd i  Chapter 5. 
The theory about diverse usage is a middle-range theory rather than a grand theory about values. It 
treats all values as essentially relative and as judgements that require a questioning attitude. Beyond 
that, it does not stipulate a methodology. It establishes a basis to which normative applications of 
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values respond in diverse ways but does not require that all aspects of the concept be adopted by all 
particular usages of values. 
A concept of values that is flexible and vague allows values to be considered as a group and allows 
comparison and contrast of diverse usages as related to one another. At least in part, such a concept 
may explain assumptions about shared meaning even wh differences among particular usages 
appear too significant to permit treating them as comparable. The usages are connected by a flexible 
and vague concept of values that does not prescribe orr ct usage but is pluralist and tolerant of 
diversity. In this application, “pluralist”, “tolerance”, and “diversity” are rooted in epistemological 
ground. This is not to suggest that epistemology cannot also be contested on political-moral ground. 
That a flexible concept enables general communication about values does not also mean that 
particular usages must be flexible about which criteria are to be satisfied in order to justify calling “a 
value”. 
 
Conclusion Three: A questioning attitude should be attached to values usage by default. 
There is no single standard for determining value. The standards by which values are determined are 
themselves to be treated as values and therefore as b ing contestable. Three themes of a flexible and 
vague concept of values all suggest that a questioning attitude should be attached to values, making 
all values contestable irrespective of whether particular usages are presented as incontestable. The 
three themes are: 
• Diverse usage of values is ongoing and evolutionary;  
• Values are relational; phrases such as “absolute valu ” nd “intrinsic 
value” are oxymoronic; and 
• Values are dependent on valuers even when values are described as 
objective. 
Together, the three propositions applied to planning met the minimum threshold set as a target in 
this study by establishing that  
1. Use of “values” as distinct from similar ideas creates new opportunities for analysis and 
application.  
2. There is diverse usage and positing a concept of values in general allows values to be 
considered as a group despite their differences.  
3. Even when particular usage appears not to invite or r quire a questioning attitude, treating 
such usages as contestable yields greater understanding of the implications of that usage for 
the substantive dimension of values. 
 
9.4.2 Conclusion Four 
The last conclusion is in answer to the third research question: What are the implications and 
opportunities for planning? Even though a questioning attitude towards values can be useful, 
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adopting such an attitude may require overcoming the desire for certainty and stability. Developing a 
particular usage of values to meet the needs of sustainability planning creates an opportunity for 
planning to assist in promoting the need to take a questioning attitude in considering values.  
 
Conclusion 4: A questioning attitude toward values can be encouraged by the planning purpose. 
Treating sustainability as a question to which there is no single right answer and where the answer is 
not known in advance makes taking a questioning attitude a practical necessity. In promoting a 
particular usage of values, planners take on the role of advocates. The values usage as “determination 
of fit” depends on faith and belief to protect the most dominant value from being contested. Advocacy 
planning is at high risk for applying the “determination of fit” usage if it is selective about which 
values are treated as conditional and contestable and the selection is not transparent. A questioning 
attitude can help identify those situations in which valuing is more a case of “determination of fit” 
with an uncontested belief than it is a penultimate judgement based on comparison and contrast of all 
values. 
 
9.4.3 Implications for planners 
Treating each value as a penultimate judgement about val e suggests that the making of value 
judgements by planners should be less a heroic act and more a matter of necessity. When values are 
understood as being both the products of valuing and the starting points for re-valuing, they cannot 
become single, overriding values that allow unquestioned beliefs to determine the value of other 
values.  
That the general concept of values is widely tolerant of diverse usage increases rather than detracts 
from its value to planners. Because diverse usage is widespread, it is unlikely that planners will not be 
presented with diverse usage. Where values are not treated as discrete, static, and absolute, their value 
cannot simply be assumed from context to context or person to person. The “same” values may be 
described differently in different contexts, making t difficult to determine just when something is the 
same and when it is different.  
Conclusions reached in this thesis suggest that addressing values in planning processes cannot be a 
simple, mechanical operation but should be accepting of uncertainty and ongoing processes of 
learning.  To do otherwise is to treat values like any of the words with which it is sometimes used as 
interchangeable and to deny the potential of values. This does not mean that planners should not make 
lists of features that characterize attitudes, opini ns or beliefs, and so on—only that items on such 
lists are not usefully described as “values” unless they are treated as starting points and penultimate 
judgements, as part of an ongoing process.   
Because there is diverse usage of “values”, both in general and within planning, there are two ways 
to disagree about values—about the substantive dimension and about how the word and idea of 
“values” are understood and applied. Awareness by planners of both of these ways of disagreeing 
should assist in participatory planning processes. Disagreements about values may appear to revolve 
around descriptive, substantive categories. Applying comparative approaches to values in planning 
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processes creates opportunities for planners to develop innovative ways of using discussions about 
similarities and differences to break free of descriptive, substantive categories. 
Whether one or another particular usage is more appropriate in given circumstances is a matter of 
judgement that calls on other ideas and purposes to which “values” are attached. Proponents of any 
particular usage, including the particular usage suggested here for sustainability planning, may 
become advocates for that usage, making values usage contestable and a matter of politics at the same 
time that it is a matter for planning.  
 
9.4.4 Implications for planning theory 
On occasion, planning theorists are explicit about how they use “values”, defining values for their 
own applications. For the most part, however, the word “values” is used without being defined and is 
simply assumed to be understood on the basis of a shared understanding. Without first being aware of 
the diversity of values usage and then responding to the problem, such an assumption is not 
warranted. Particular usages can differ wildly and raising awareness about diverse usage may assist in 
averting confusion and resolving ambiguities that have yet to be acknowledged. 
Increased awareness may assist in recognizing instances where most values are presented as 
contestable but a single value is granted immunity from questioning. In the history of diverse usage 
this type of usage is described as a “determination of fit” (Chapter 3). In such applications of 
“values”, other values are ranked according to their ab lity to promote an overriding value. The 
overriding value derives its authority from belief rather than because it has been able to withstand 
critical examination. In planning theory, examples of determinations of fit are found in the utilitarin 
tradition and in deliberative democracy. In the history of diverse usage (Chapter 3), J. S. Mackenzie’s 
critique of democracy demonstrated that what is treated as a single overriding value can benefit by 
being subjected to scrutiny. Treating the highest ranking value-as-purpose as a contestable value can 
improve its longevity and deepen support for it without needing to appeal to people’s beliefs or 
attempting to manipulate opinions and attitudes. This may have particular significance for 
sustainability planning. Planners can contest a value that appears to be untouchable and is perhaps so 
pervasive that its power is not recognized. 
This approach to values usage suggests that even wh values are used as firm and certain goals at 
the start of planning processes, these values permeate the process and make all other values 
derivative. This may be appealing if it establishes coherence and consistency but deceptive because if 
values are not treated as conditional and contestabl  throughout the process, from top to bottom, 
opportunities are missed to examine how abstract values may change in specific application.  
 
9.4.5 Implications for participants in planning pro cesses 
Values contributed to planning processes by members of the public may be wide-ranging in both 
substance and modes of usage. Objection Two (Chapter 4) characterizes all declarations of value as 
reflecting narrow individual preferences. The theory about diverse usage, while also treating 
individuals as valuers, holds that all values should be treated in the first instance as judgements for 
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which individuals can be held accountable. Participants in planning processes who choose to present 
their contributions in terms of values should therefor  be prepared to offer reasons for values that 
otherwise be treated as privileged and incontestable. Such values are often associated with claims 
about intrinsic values in the natural world or a single moral order. The theory about diverse usage 
treats intrinsic values as judgements by valuers about qualities that reside in objects. In any given 
application, what intrinsic values are is determined by values usage. 
Following Objections One and Two (Chapter 4), if participants seek to contribute their beliefs 
about what is truly valuable or worthy, values langua e may not be appropriate terminology because 
claims about intrinsic qualities and universality are necessarily made relative when cast in terms of 
values.  
In “Post-Issue Activism” (2004) Patrick Reinborough argues for citizen activists taking a new 
direction. His discussion is replete with references to values. For Reinborough, “common-sense 
values” that are life-affirming should replace “corp ate values” in “values-based” critiques (2004, 
190) that separate issues of dissent from “the self-righteous tone that many people associate with 
protest (2004, 180)”. Reinborough pays particular attention to the way in which the word “reality” is 
contested and an instance of “an overarching politics of reality (2004, 200)”. Unlike his treatment of 
“reality”, Reinborough does not consider that how values are understood may be a factor constraining 
activists’ battles against convention. This allows Reinborough to suggest that citizen activists should 
be addressing problems by means of “values-based critiques” that are governed by a single, 
overriding value, that all values should affirm life. This thesis concludes that the use of single, 
overriding values is not advisable because such values usage draws firm boundaries around which 
values can be questioned and which should not. In particular circumstances, drawing such boundaries 
may serve immediate strategic interests but the boundaries cannot be sustained in the long run. 
  
9.5 Limitations and Constraints to Applying the The ory of Diverse Usage 
9.5.1 Limitations 
Broadly, this study concludes that diverse usage of “values” should be treated as a variable with the 
potential to shape what people value. Because this study has been conducted from the perspective of 
the word “values” and not from the perspective of hw people value or from the perspective of how 
to describe, identify, assess, or change what people value, identifying other possible variables and 
considering what weight should be assigned to diverse usage relative to other possible variables were 
not considered. 
Where particular usages do not co-exist with competing usages, for example in communities where 
values usage is locally homogeneous, it is easier to treat a single usage as representative of the whole 
of values usage and the advisability or usefulness of being aware of diverse usage may be harder to 
appreciate. As a result it may be more difficult to encourage taking a questioning attitude towards 
values and to consider values as relative and contestabl . 
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Asking what various usages of “values” have in common and how they are different leads to an 
answer different from asking only what values have in common. As applied in this study, the former 
was encouraged by the comparative logic on which grounded theory methodology is based. 
Following a belief that even in the face of diverse u age there should be a single, firm and certain 
meaning of values leads down a path different from the one taken in this research.  
 
9.5.2 Current usage as a constraint 
The ways in which people now use the word “values” must be considered a constraint, as argued by 
Objection Three (Chapter 4). This objection can be addressed by attaching a questioning attitude to 
values but the ease with which this might be accomplished will vary according to convention and 
circumstance. A questioning attitude might be encouraged by planners presenting the concept of 
sustainability as requiring a re-evaluation of values. In this case planners must also refrain from 
taking a position on what specific values must be the products of such re-evaluations. If this can be 
done, then it may be possible to treat current usage as both a constraint and an opportunity. 
Even if planners themselves treat values as relativ nd contestable, however, when participants in 
planning processes make contributions in terms of the word “values”, they may be invoking “values” 
according to a completely different usage from thatof the planner. This will be more of a problem in 
communities in which “values” are understood as being positive only, absolute, and incontestable. 
Awareness of diverse usage might prepare planners to anticipate and recognize such usage. 
Awareness, however, will not be enough on its own to direct planners how to respond when values 
are presented as incontestable and unconditional. The effectiveness of planners’ responses may 
depend as much or more on social skills than planners’ knowledge about values usage. 
 
9.5.3 Institutional and organizational constraints 
This constraint is a variation of the current usage constraint discussed above. As demonstrated in the 
history of diverse usage, social organizations and institutions are in a position to direct values usage 
and understanding in ways that serve the status quo and away from understanding values as a tool to 
challenge convention. That it is much easier not to act against convention is also a constraint on how 
widely a questioning attitude towards values might be adopted. 
Statements of values by institutions and organizations also discourage taking a questioning attitude 
towards values. This fairly common application treas “values” as guiding principles. Such statements 
are declarations about standards to be used as criteria, n which “values” describe an organization’s 
firm beliefs and as such can be treated as being a solid basis for determining appropriate conduct. 
Unless values are expected to be subjected to periodic questioning and scrutiny, casting such 





9.6 Further Research  
9.6.1 Applying the theory about diverse usage to un derstanding people’s positions 
about values 
Values that are formulated according to one particular sage of values may differ in kind from values 
that are based on a different usage of “values”. Comparative studies of values of different groups or 
societies should take into account the possibility that values usage may differ widely among 
communities and between communities and researchers. For example, researchers might cast the 
“same” value in terms of more than one values usage to t a better grasp of what aspects of that 
value are peculiar to one usage and not others.  
The theory about diverse usage may assist in studying implicit and hidden values. Researchers will 
need to test for how various usages might yield different implicit and hidden values. A comparative 
study might incorporate several usages into the resarch methodology.  
Cognitive studies of values often rely on a values sage that looks for consistency between stated 
values and behaviour. Researchers’ awareness of diverse usage may be valuable in such studies 
because it will encourage researchers to watch for whether the values usage that governs the research 
is at odds with how participants understand values. B cause people may have difficulty providing a 
statement about their particular usage of the word “values”, researchers will have to devise ways to 
elicit evidence of values usages in ways that may differ from eliciting statements about people’s 
positions on values or the content of values. That there is diverse values usage may have a significant 
impact on whether stated values and behaviour are determined to be consistent with one another or 
not. 
The theory of diverse usage may have useful application in the study of conflicts about values and 
be complementary to the approach taken by Vanessa Watson (2006) in her study of deep differences. 
How these differences are described may be a function of values usage, with certain differences 
highlighted by labels of descriptive categories that m sk other similarities and differences internal to 
the descriptive categories. Researchers will requir an awareness of diverse usage and an appreciation 
of the distinction between descriptive and conceptual categories of values (Chapter 6). 
 
9.6.2 Self-Awareness of diverse usage as a variable  
To be aware of diverse usage of values by others may be one thing and have self-awareness of diverse 
usage may be another. Situations may develop, for example, where people become conditioned to 
believing that a particular usage of values is the most appropriate and must attempt to determine or 
develop values in accordance with that usage. Self-consciousness and a desire to present themselves 
in a good light may lead people to say they have conformed to some usage when they have not—for 
example in claiming to have questioned or scrutinized a value when they have not. Studying 
consistency between any one individual’s behaviour and stated values usage could be complicated in 
unexpected ways by self-consciousness of our own values usage and by knowing what values usage is 
deemed as desirable by the larger community. 
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Logical consistency among a single person’s values might also be affected by diverse usage if some 
values have been formed according to one usage and others according to other usages. This might be 
very difficult to study. 
Self-awareness of diverse usage may also be a variable with respect to the “framing effect”: 
 “Human choices are remarkably susceptible to the manner in which 
options are presented. This so-called ‘framing effect’ r presents a 
striking violation of standard economic accounts of human 
rationality…This finding highlights the importance of incorporating 
emotional processes within models of human choice and suggests 
how the brain may modulate the effect of these biasing influences to 
approximate rationality.” (Martino et al. 2006, 684) 
Competing presentations of values may elicit different responses to what might otherwise be 
considered the “same” value. They may elicit the type of emotional response that plays a role in 
responding to how choices are framed. 
 
9.6.3 Diverse usage and values clarification 
Taking value usage into account may have consequences for values clarification, particularly in group 
efforts. There is a difference between clarifying whether a value is to be desired and whether 
something deserves to be called “a value”. Values clarifi ation (Chapter 3) stipulates criteria for both. 
Internally to values clarification, all values have a positive-only meaning, to be desired or not by a 
given individual. Values clarification deems something “a value” first by virtue of a method that is 
common to all users but ultimately by whether the value is deemed desirable by an individual. What 
counts as a value is ultimately a determination by individuals. What will be a value for one person 
will not count as a value for another. This approach, therefore, limits the usefulness of values 
clarification for collective discussion of common good (Chapter 3) because there will be no common 
starting point about what values can be discussed a values. 
The theory about diverse usage and the default concept of values (Chapter 5) enable collective 
discussion of common good in values language becaus values are not restricted to being positive. 
Values can be considered as a set without having first to declare that all values have been desired by 
every individual. Ultimately some values may turn out to be illusions (negative) but this will not 
mean that they no longer count as “values” or that t ey never did. 
The role of facilitators in group exercises may be similar to that of planners (Chapter 6) in 
encouraging a questioning attitude towards the object of consideration.  
This approach might also be useful in reconfiguring the relationship between values and the 




9.6.4 Metaphors and values 
Treating comparison and contrast as basic to valuing suggests a need for better understanding of ways 
of identifying, describing, and applying ideas about sameness and difference. Metaphors are both 
conservative and revolutionary; conservative because they require a common initial starting point of 
shared understanding, and revolutionary because they s r tch the meaning of the starting point in 
novel directions.  
Metaphors may be a useful tool for using values to relate what is known to what is unknown by 
suggesting different ways to describe and understand existing knowledge. Descriptive categories of 
values are a type of existing knowledge; conceptual categories of values are new knowledge because 
they dismantle and reclassify features internal to descriptive categories of values. Metaphors may be 
helpful in revealing similarities and differences masked by descriptive categories and replacing these 
with conceptual categories. Andrew Ortony, for example, argues that metaphors can produce new 
knowledge by just such a mechanism. 
“The new information in a simile is the statement of a similarity 
between the referent and the relatum. A more precise terminology, 
therefore, might distinguish between old, current, a d new 
information: the relatum is old information, the referent is the current 
topic, and the relation of similarity between them is new 
information.” (Ortony, 1979, 218) 
That metaphors help to relate old and new knowledge is Donald Michael’s point as well. New 
knowledge and unlearning are important because “Ourconventional ways of thinking and speaking 
about language and social reality are inadequate for coping with our current circumstances” (1995, 
462). Metaphors may be useful in shaping how deeply the new knowledge is apprehended. Michael 
observes that metaphors “can enter the psyche more deeply” because metaphors “imply no limit 
(1995, 475). He also notes, however, that because they imply no limit metaphors may go deeply into 
the psyche “unquestioningly” (1995, 475). Metaphors “reinforce entrenched views of what is real, 
true, important, or trivial” (1995, 476) but they can also “ease reframing of issues and actions” (1995, 
476). This is important because the type of knowledge that is most powerful is “new knowledge or 
newly organized knowledge” (1995, 478). The “setting” for metaphors is one of uncertainty and 
interconnectivity. 
If values are treated not as static and discrete but as ongoing conceptual activity, then values too are 
perpetually creating new knowledge and dismantling old knowledge in a context of uncertainty and 
interconnectivity. An approach that focuses using new knowledge to dismantle old knowledge makes 
values more threatening. They become more fully the epitome of Schön’s, “dangerous knowledge” 
(1983). 
 
9.6.5 Integrating values or using values as a separ ate planning tool 
Kenneth Kernaghan argues for integrating values into “the structures, processes, and systems of 
public organizations” (2003, 711). Integration would emphasise the importance of  
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“…the values statement as the central component of a values 
regime—that is, of the collectivity of measures for making shared 
values an integral part of the public-service culture.” (2003, 711) 
Understood as firm and certain, values may be more anageable and integration throughout 
planning processes more orderly than if values are understood as contestable and conditional. 
Although sustainability planning may be better served if contestable and conditional values are 
integrated throughout the process, the mechanisms by which this might be accomplished need further 
study.  
Areas that require attention might include such as the following.  
• the degree to which and stages at which integration must be coherent, 
• clarifying just what aspect of values it is that needs to be integrated, whether methodology, 
usages, substantive positions taken by values, the connection between planning goals and 
implementation and everything in between, values integrated with other values to form a 
coherent set or system of values, and so forth, 
• Kernaghan suggests above that making shared values part of the pubic service culture is an 
important feature of integration. Can a shared culture be based on values if values are 
inevitably conditional and contestable? 
Whether values should be integrated or treated as a sep rate operation parallels asking whether 
there should be separate departments of “environment” or environmental issues should be a 
dimension of every government department. If everything is related, in what circumstances and to 
serve what purposes does something deserve special and separate attention? When does something 
need to be treated distinctly and when as interconnected?  
 
9.6.6 How to inspire a questioning attitude 
This thesis suggests that presenting sustainability as having no right answer may inspire a questioning 
attitude and affect how values are understood and use . J. S. Mackenzie’s prediction (Chapter 3) that 
a questioning attitude will become increasingly desired on a broad scale may be correct in the long 
run but for the moment the desire for a questioning attitude appears to have stalled. Research into 
how a questioning attitude correlates to times of relative calm and to times of crisis would be useful.  
The task here is distinct from one of surveying the content of values in times of relative calm and in 
crisis situations. If how we value has the potential to shape what value, then such surveys ignore a 
potentially important variable. Without first learning more about the implications of a questioning 
attitude for values usage, it cannot be incorporated s a variable in studying the content of values. 
 
9.6.7 Values, civic education and democracy 
This thesis has presented an application of Nietzsche’  usage of values to the questions of moral and 
civic education (Chapter 3). J. S. Mackenzie’s willingness to attach a questioning attitude towards 
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values despite being known as an Idealist makes him a useful example. Values are commonly treated 
as incontestable and unconditional building blocks of moral character (Chapter 3). This contrasts 
sharply with Mackenzie’s rigorous scrutiny of values. His willingness to re-evaluate democracy is a 
useful example, particularly because Mackenzie is aware that others in his day believed in democracy 
with a religious fervour and treated it as incontestable and unconditional. He concluded that closer 
critical scrutiny of democracy was a means to ensure its long-term survival. 
Considering lists of values associated with democracy, s is now common, contrasts sharply with 
taking a questioning attitude toward democracy. Mackenzie treats valuing as an ongoing process that 
can alter the way that individuals value democracy. Transvaluation (re-evaluating according to new 
standards, Chapter 3) might also provide new opportunities to strengthen or weaken the value placed 
on democracy. Whatever the conclusion, it will not be final. Values are penultimate judgements. 
 
9.6.8 Cross-cultural travels of values language 
That the word “values” continues to migrate from its origins in German and English suggests an 
opportunity to investigate which usages other languges adopt as the word is translated. This may 
have implications for global-scale understanding and confusion about values. 
The focus on global-level shared values may encourage treating values as firm and certain. 
Applying a questioning attitude on a global scale may be difficult if this creates more opportunities 
for disagreement. This may be a context in which the feasibility of taking a questioning attitude about 
values requires special attention. 
 
9.6.9 Values and relational language 
This thesis has noted the importance of relations and considers values as relational but has not 
pursued the idea in depth, in part because the lack of vocabulary with which to consider values as 
relations makes any comment or question about relations difficult to phrase. That values are relations 
created by comparison and contrast makes having a better grasp of the mechanism even more 
important. 
 
9.6.10 Comparing relative values on the level of de scriptive categories 
Taking a questioning attitude towards all values allows comparison and contrast of market values and 
moral values and enables cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary exchange. 
“Relationship Marketing” is a business tool that focuses on interconnectedness among actors in the 
marketplace (Mattson, 1997, 39), but some of the literature and methods might have useful 
application in increasing awareness about other types of relationship. Merged with a values usage that 
engages a questioning attitude, the products of such a process will not be predictable in the same way 
that marketing techniques are traditionally results-oriented. It would have to be approached as a 
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learning experience for all actors rather than a simpler process of merely identifying obvious 
relationships. For example, Blois identifies problems with “the generality of the terms used to discus 
‘relationships’…” (1997, 60) and needing have a “thorough understanding of…both the dark and the 
light side of relationships; the customers’ viewpoints and…the costs of building and maintaining 
different types of relationships” (1997, 63). 
Behavioural economics may have lessons of interest to sustainability planners. Terry Odean 
(Barber and Odean 2000) has extensively researched the impact of overconfidence on valuing 
markets. This is different from more common attempts to address people’s desire for certainty. As 
well, in Devil Take The Hindmost (1999), Edward Chancellor analyzes speculation as symptomatic of 
psychological disorder. Fluctuating between hope and despair, the speculator and the stock market are 
on a manic depressive cycle; speculation expresses a y arning for freedom from constraints of all 
kinds. Speculation understood in this way may be usefully applied to sustainability planning as one 
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